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Abstract	
	
This	 ethnographic	 field	 study	 examines	 East	 Germans’	 experiences	 and	
perceptions	 of	 state	 surveillance	 in	 the	 former	 German	 Democratic	 Republic.	
Through	ethnographic	accounts	and	in-depth	life	histories,	this	study	illustrates	
the	 long-term	effects	state	control	has	had	on	the	wellbeing	of	 individuals	and	
society	 as	 a	 whole.	 Here,	 several	 key	 themes	 emerged	 which	 are	 explored	 in	
detail:	 ideology	 and	 state	 control;	 betrayal	 and	 distrust;	 and	 trauma	 and	
resilience.		
Life	in	a	dictatorship	and	exposure	to	repressive	techniques	of	the	state	created	
complex	 socio-cultural	 dynamics	 that	 are	 still	 palpable	 for	 victims	 today.	 Over	
40	 years	 of	 Stasi	 surveillance	 and	 the	 extensive	 use	 of	 unofficial	 informants	
within	 the	 population	 created	 a	 self-perpetuating	 surveillance	 culture.	 Along	
with	 the	 unique	 conditions	 that	 followed	 Germany’s	 reunification,	 this	 has	
impacted	East	Germans’	interpretation	of	their	own	wellbeing	negatively	(albeit	
to	 varying	 extents),	 accumulating	 traumatic	 experiences	 and	 compounding	
human	suffering.	The	social	dynamics	created	continue	to	impact	East	German’s	
lives,	 their	 sense	 of	 self,	 and	 their	 regional	 identities.	 This	 thesis	 explores	
through	various	accounts	how	traumatic	experiences	are	understood	and	coped	
with.	It	concludes	that	state	surveillance	leads	to	collective	trauma	that	at	times	
causes	continued	suffering,	but	in	certain	cases	is	interpreted	positively	eliciting	
a	narrative	of	resilience.	
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Chapter	One:	Mo_va_on	and	
Methodology	
	
I	was	born	in	1987	in	a	small	town	in	
the	Northeast	of	Germany,	 located	in	
a	 picturesque	 rural	 area	 called	
Uckermark.	 In	 1989	 my	 family	 and	 I	
moved	 to	 East	 Berlin.	 Shortly	 a`er	
our	move	 to	 the	 city,	 the	Wall	 came	
down	 and	 the	 lives	 of	 many	 East	
Germans	 changed	 drama_cally	
overnight.	
One	 of	my	 earliest	memories	 is	 about	me	 siang	 in	 the	 backseat	 of	my	mother's	
Czech-built	 white	 Lada	 and	 crossing	 the	 border	 to	 West	 Berlin	 at	 "Bornholmer	
Brücke".	 Men	 in	 uniforms	 stopped	 our	 car	 and	 opened	 our	 trunk	 to	 search	 it.	
Although	I	was	very	small	at	the	_me,	I	recall	that	this	intrusion	made	me	feel	very	
uncomfortable.	
Of	course,	 I	did	not	understand	what	was	happening	at	the	_me.	 I	s_ll	have	some	
vague	 recollec_ons	of	 this	 exci_ng	_me	period,	 known	 to	Germans	as	 the	Wende	
(Engl.:	 Turning	point).	We	 lived	 in	a	 typical	 turn-of-the-century	building	 in	Berlin	 -	
Prenzlauer	 Berg,	 part	 of	 the	 city	 which	 is	 nowadays	 considered	 very	 hip,	 full	 of	
quirky	shops	and	restaurants,	par_cularly	popular	amongst	tourists	from	abroad.		
Only	 a	 short	 walk	 across	 Prenzlauer	 Allee,	 was	 my	 Kindergarten.	 Surprisingly,	 I	
remember	my	"Eastern"	Kindergarten	quite	dis_nctly.	In	the	GDR,	Kindergarten	and	
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Krippe	 (Engl.	Daycare	and	nursery),	were	a	person's	ﬁrst	 contact	with	 the	 socialist	
state	 and	 its	 ideology.	 In	 the	GDR,	 almost	 90%	of	women	were	working	 full-_me.	
Hence,	 a	 highly	 developed	 network	 of	 childcare	 was	 available,	 even	 catering	 to	
those	 parents	working	 night	 shi`s.	 State-run	 childcare	was	 available	 to	 everyone.	
Children	were	uniformly	taught	cleanliness,	order,	and	independence.	At	they	same	
_me,	they	were	supposedly	moulded	into	becoming	"good	socialists"	(Plänkers	et	al.	
2005;	 Schroeter	 1974).	 Indeed,	 I	 remember	 the	 strict	 rules	 and	 highly	 structured	
daily	 rou_ne,	 the	 songs	we	 sung	and	 the	 stories	we	were	 told.	 This	was	 the	_me	
when	they	would	do	what	some	people	these	days	ironically	call	"Pojy-terrorism"-	
"Toepfchen-Terror",	 aligning	 poaes	 in	 the	 nursery	 bathroom	 and	 expec_ng	 all	
toddlers	to	use	them	at	the	same	_me	to	achieve	a	controlled,	reliable	daily	rou_ne.	
Indeed,	it	was	one	of	those	things	I	would	later	hear	my	informants	describe	as	"just	
normal".	 I	 suppose	 I	 felt	 the	 same	way	 then.	 But	 as	 I	 discovered	 throughout	my	
ﬁeldwork,	this	"normality"	had	a	much	deeper	meaning.		
Finally,	in	1990	Germany	was	oﬃcially	reunited	and	soon	a`er	my	family	relocated	
to	 the	 West	 Berlin	 Bezirk	 of	 Reinickendorf,	 where	 I	 then	 spent	 the	 rest	 of	 my	
childhood.	We	moved	into	a	house	that	a	distant	West	German	rela_ve	rented	out	
to	 us	 in	 a	 quiet	 residen_al	 area.	 I	 s_ll	 recall	 the	 ﬁrst	 day	 at	 my	 new	 "Western"	
Kindergarten	and	how	 foreign	 it	 seemed	 to	me.	 If	 one	was	 to	believe	my	 family's	
stories,	I	was	a	prejy	ar_culate	toddler	and	apparently	repeatedly	pointed	out	the	
stark	diﬀerences	between	the	two	Kindergartens	expressing	my	devasta_on	at	the	
disorderliness	of	the	new	place.	
Later	on,	as	 I	started	school,	my	East	German	background	did	not	 impact	my	daily	
life	 much.	 	 Only	 occasionally	 would	 it	 come	 up	 in	 conversa_on	 amongst	 the	
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teachers.	Looking	at	 it	now,	 I	suppose	 it	was	the	type	of	conversa_on	adults	have,	
without	realising	that	children	can	not	only	hear	them	but	also	understand	that	they	
are	being	talked	about.	I	have	several	memories	of	this	from	Kindergarten	and	then	
later,	primary	school.	Being	the	only	Easterner	it	made	me	feel	like	I	was	diﬀerent	in	
some	way,	without	really	understanding	how	or	why	it	majered.	
I	 do	 not	 remember	when	 exactly	 it	 started,	 but	 at	 some	point	 in	my	 childhood,	 I	
began	to	get	embarrassed	about	my	background.	I	suspect	it	was	my	older	brother	
who	 introduced	me	 to	 that	 feeling.	He	was	a	 teenager	 in	 the	1990's	and	had	 just	
been	 transferred	 to	 a	 school	 in	 West	 Berlin,	 where	 he	 persistently	 denied	 being	
from	the	East.	 It	simply	wasn't	"cool".	He	wanted	to	ﬁt	 in	with	the	other	kids,	and	
having	the	s_gma	of	being	an	"Ossi"	(i.e.,	a	cliché	for	being	lazy,	always	complaining,	
etc.)	 ajached	 to	 him	 was	 not	 desirable.	 Indeed,	 many	 East	 Germans	 of	 his	
genera_on,	especially	 those	who	were	between	8	and	16	years	old	when	the	wall	
fell,	felt	this	way.	They	were	ashamed,	as	people	from	the	GDR	were	o`en	portrayed	
as	 being	 less	worthy	 by	 the	media,	 and	West	German	 clichés	 further	 emphasised	
this	 (Rennefanz	 2014).	 So,	 my	 brother	 would	 always	 tell	 me	 that	 I	 should	 never	
men_on	where	we	were	from.	From	that	point	onwards,	I	believed	being	from	the	
GDR	was	something	to	be	ashamed	of	and	avoided	men_oning	it.			
As	an	easily	impressionable	child,	his	words	stuck	with	me,	even	to	this	day.	Without	
knowing	why	exactly,	my	East	German	 iden_ty	had	an	ambivalent	connota_on	 for	
me.	Later,	when	I	spent	_me	abroad,	where	most	of	my	friends	and	acquaintances	
were	not	German,	my	"Eastern"	background	rarely	majered	to	anyone	besides	me.	
	 10	
Looking	at	it	now,	it	seems	somewhat	puzzling,	as	all	my	extended	family	con_nued	
to	 live	 in	 the	 East	 a`er	 Germany's	 reuniﬁca_on	 and	 I	 s_ll	 denied	 this	 part	 of	my	
iden_ty.	As	a	child,	 I	 spent	many	summers	 there,	with	my	grandmother	 in	a	small	
town	in	Brandenburg	and	my	great-grandmother	in	a	lijle	village	in	Saxony.	To	this	
day,	 these	places	have	a	comfor_ng	 familiarity	 for	me	and	even	make	me	 feel	"at	
home".	 Looking	 back	 at	 those	 summers	 in	 the	 countryside,	 the	 GDR	 was	 o`en	
casually	 men_oned	 in	 everyday	 conversa_ons,	 mostly	 star_ng	 with	 the	 words	
"During	the	_me	of	the	GDR,	we	used	to..."	("Zu	DDR	Zeiten,	haben	wir...").	To	me,	
these	memories	always	resembled	some	mys_cal,	faraway	place	or	even	a	previous	
life	that	everyone	besides	me	had	experienced.	
In	recent	years	I	have	begun	reﬂec_ng	more	cri_cally	on	where	I	am	from	and	what	
it	means	to	me.	To	what	extent	is	East	Germany	s_ll	part	of	my	own	iden_ty?	I	ﬁnd	
myself	wondering	whether,	a`er	so	many	years,	it	s_ll	majers	where	you	are	from	
in	Germany.		As	a	Masters	student	in	Medical	Anthropology,	I	decided	to	inves_gate	
and	 compare	 contracep_ve	 choices	 of	 women	 in	 East	 and	 West	 Germany.	 The	
con_nuing	 diﬀerences	 in	 percep_ons	 and	 gender	 images	 were	 remarkable	
(Neuendorf	 unpublished,	 2011).	 Conduc_ng	 this	 research,	 I	 became	 extremely	
interested	in	the	topic	of	the	GDR.	I	was	curious	how	my	parents,	family	and	friends	
had	 experienced	 life	 in	 this	 small	 isolated	 state.	 How	 had	 the	 legacy	 of	 the	 GDR	
shaped	their	lives	as	well	as	my	own	life	and	worldview?	
Following	my	Masters,	 I	spent	half	a	year	 living	 in	the	East	German	city	of	Leipzig.	
This	remarkable	place	is	rich	in	history	and	a	signiﬁcant	site,	due	to	its	major	role	in	
community	ac_vism,	the	forma_on	of	the	Neues	Forum	and	eventually	the	uprising	
against	the	socialist	regime.		
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At	the	ﬁrst	viewing	of	my	new	apartment,	I	was	quite	astonished	however.	The	place	
I	had	decided	to	rent	was	 inside	of	a	 lovely	early	1900's	building,	not	far	from	the	
city	centre.	What	unsejled	me	though,	was	the	street	I	was	going	to	live	in.	Apart	
from	the	newly	renovated	building	directly	opposite	mine,	all	other	buildings	in	the	
lijle	street,	were	derelict	with	broken	or	bolted	up	windows.	As	it	turned	out,	much	
of	my	new	neighbourhood	was	like	this.	There	were	empty	apartment	blocks,	ﬂats,	
factories	and	even	a	large	school	in	the	area,	giving	the	place	a	ghost-town-like	feel.	
Some_mes	 you	 would	 ﬁnd	 a	 dark,	 derelict	 building,	 right	 next	 to	 beau_fully	
restored	houses.		
I	 was	 told	 that	 many	 of	 these	 apartments	 had	 belonged	 to	 the	 state	 before	 the	
reuniﬁca_on,	and	ownership	was	now	uncertain	or	s_ll	unsejled.	Neighbours	also	
described	to	me	how	many	people	had	moved	to	the	West	a`er	1989	and	had	le`	
their	life	in	Leipzig	behind.	Indeed,	it	was	es_mated	that	Leipzig	lost	up	to	50%	of	its	
popula_on	during	the	Wende.	
Although	 I	 found	 these	 old,	 empty	 buildings	 with	 their	 dusty	 GDR	 style	 shop	
windows	a	lijle	creepy	at	_mes,	they	somehow	fascinated	me.	Walking	along	those	
shady	 streets	on	my	way	home,	 I	o`en	wondered	what	had	been	going	on	 inside	
them.	Where	were	 the	people	who	had	once	 lived	 there?	 I	 started	 reading	about	
the	GDR	and	visited	the	local	memorial	site	at	the	Stasi	headquarters.	I	became	very	
intrigued	 by	 the	 dark	 sides	 of	 life	 in	 the	 GDR.	What	 role	 did	 the	 socialist	 state’s	
secret	police,	the	Stasi,	play	in	people's	everyday	lives?	
It	was	also	at	this	_me	that	my	family,	following	a	complicated	applica_on	process	at	
the	BStU,	 gained	permission	 to	 view	 their	 parents'	Stasi	 ﬁles.	 There	were	piles	 of	
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ﬁles	 with	 reports	 of	 in-depth	 surveillance	 of	 the	 family.	 These	 ﬁndings	 not	 only	
conﬁrmed	exis_ng	 suspicions,	 but	 revealed	 that	 the	en_re	 family	 home	had	been	
bugged	and	oﬃcials	were	eavesdropping	on	every	conversa_on.	There	was	even	a	
report	conﬁrming	that	the	dog	had	been	poisoned	by	Stasi	men,	who	had	tried	to	
gain	access	to	the	house.		
Due	to	the	sheer	amount	of	material,	my	rela_ves	only	made	photocopies	of	a	very	
small	 por_on	of	 the	ﬁles.	Reading	 them	 revealed	 the	 intensity	of	 the	around-the-
clock	 surveillance,	 but	 also	 highlighted	 its	 absurdity	 and	 pointlessness.	 There	was	
for	instance	a	highly	detailed	account	of	my	great-grandmother's	daily	shopping	trip	
to	the	small	town	centre,	describing	her	every	step	in	minute	detail	and	men_oning	
each	_me	she	stopped	(every	ﬁve	minutes)	to	chat	to	acquaintances	she	met	on	the	
way.	The	reports	also	give	detailed	descrip_ons	of	the	family	members'	personali_es	
and	appearances,	providing	them	with	cover	names	by	which	they	were	referred	to	
in	the	following	reports.	Ironically	(for	a	socialist	country)	my	grandparents	received	
the	 cover	names	"Adam	and	Eve",	while	my	great-grandmother	was	 simply	 called	
"Oma"	 (German	 for	 granny/grandma).	 Despite	 the	 irony	 of	 it	 all,	 reading	 these	
reports	 of	 observa_ons	 and	 interroga_ons,	 I	 slowly	 began	 to	 understand	 the	
constant	fear	and	pressure	people	had	to	endure	in	those	years	of	the	dictatorship	
and	the	power	this	frightening	state	apparatus	must	have	had	over	people.		
In	my	 ethnographic	 explora_on,	 I	 aim	 to	 uncover	 how	 East	Germans	 experienced	
the	presence	of	the	Stasi	in	their	lives.	What	did	mass-surveillance	of	this	calibre	do	
to	people	and	how	do	they	feel	about	it	today?		Does	the	legacy	of	the	SED	regime	
s_ll	 impact	 their	 lives	 in	 any	 way?	 And,	 most	 importantly	 how	 are	 personal	
rela_onships	mediated	in	this	context?	I	undertook	12	months	of	ﬁeldwork	to	unveil	
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these	 ques_ons	 and	 view	 the	 issues	 at	 hand	 through	 an	 anthropological	 lens,	
discerning	 key	 concepts	 such	 as	 state	 control,	 trauma	 and	 wellbeing.	 I	 will	 be	
looking	at	the	way	surveillance	was	and	s_ll	is	u_lised	as	a	tool	of	state	control	and	
the	consequences	that	result	for	the	people	aﬀected.			
Methodology		
Anthropology	at	home	and	being	a	"parLal	insider"	
	
Anthropology	 at	 home	 has	 many	 advantages	 including	 the	 ease	 with	 which	 a	
researcher	can	enter	the	ﬁeld	without	having	to	learn	a	new	language	and	adjust	to	
a	new	culture	and	environment	(Strathern	1987).	 It	also	has	the	added	bonus	of	a	
"discovery	 of	 large	 areas	 of	 ignorance	 about	 one's	 own	 circumstances"	 (Jackson	
1987).	But,	it	can	mean	that	one	is	prone	to	overlook	details,	which	may	not	stand	
out	as	extraordinary.		
I	decided	to	conduct	research	"at	home",	as	I	believe	that	I	am	in	a	unique	posi_on.	
On	the	one	hand	I	am	a	na_ve	East	German,	but	on	the	other	hand,	I	have	spent	the	
majority	of	my	 life	 in	 the	West	and	abroad.	During	 the	ﬁeldwork	my	own	 iden_ty	
was	always	 shi`ing	between	being	an	 insider	and	an	outsider;	being	a	 researcher	
from	a	foreign	university,	but	also	sharing	the	same	roots	with	my	 informants	and	
coming	to	terms	with	my	own	"East	German-ness".		
In	her	essay,	"How	Na_ve	is	a	"Na_ve"	Anthropologist?',	Kirin	Narayan	addresses	the	
"shi`ing	 iden__es"	 of	 anthropologists.	 Indeed,	 she	 urges	 us	 to	 acknowledge	 the	
subjec_vity	of	ﬁeld	research,	since	an	anthropologist's	work	is	inevitably	inﬂuenced	
by	 their	 unique	personal	 and	professional	 experiences,	 giving	 them	a	 "hybrid	 and	
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posi_oned	nature"	(1993,	p.682).	Although	someone	may	have	been	born	in	or	lived	
in	 a	 par_cular	 place,	 this	 does	 not	 automa_cally	 mean	 that	 they	 are	 a	 "na_ve	
returning	home	to	blend	smoothly	with	other	na_ves"	(1993,	p.	675).		Just	as	Jahan	
(2014)	ques_oned	her	posi_on	in	her	ﬁeld	site	where,	despite	having	been	a	na_ve	
to	 the	village	where	 she	conducted	 research,	 she	 s_ll	 recognised	 the	 limits	of	her	
posi_on	as	an	apparent	“‘na_ve’,	having	power	and	pres_ge	as	an	‘insider’”	(2014,	
p.1).	 I	 too,	am	aware	of	my	shi`ing	 iden_ﬁes	 in	 the	ﬁeld,	 I	o`en	ques_oned	how	
na_ve	I	am	in	my	own	culture.	I	have	come	to	the	conclusion	that,	like	Jahan,	I	see	
myself	as	a	"par_al	insider"	(Jahan	2014).		
When	I	was	twelve	years	old	I	spent	a	year	at	a	Bri_sh	boarding	school,	later	I	went	
to	an	 interna_onal	 school	 in	Berlin	and	eventually	 spent	most	of	my	_me	abroad,	
primarily	in	the	UK.	I	always	had	a	close	rela_onship	with	my	"home",	yet	due	to	my	
experience	of	 living	 abroad,	 I	 o`en	 see	 things	 in	 a	 slightly	 diﬀerent	 light	 than	my	
family.	 At	 _mes,	 this	 has	 made	me	 feel	 like	 an	 outsider	 in	 my	 culture.	 However,	
while	 conduc_ng	 research,	 I	 experienced	 this	 as	 an	 advantage,	 allowing	 me	 to	
uncover	unknown	aspects	I	otherwise	may	not	have	no_ced.	
Kra`	Alsop	 explores	 the	German	 concepts	 of	 Fernweh	 and	Heimweh1	 In	 an	 auto-
ethnographic	account	of	her	 life	as	a	German	 immigrant	 in	 the	United	States,	 she	
demonstrates	 the	 value	 of	 self-reﬂexive	 auto-ethnography	 and	 describes	 how	her	
iden_ty	 and	 feelings	 change	 while	 home	 and	 away.	 She	 captures	 the	 process	 by	
which	an	emigrant	 turns	 into	a	 stranger	 in	 their	home,	once	 they	 leave	 it	behind.	
"However,	 leaving	 not	 only	 turns	 me	 into	 an	 outsider	 in	 the	 new	 culture,	 I	 also	
																																								 																				
1	Fernweh	is	a	longing	to	go	to	a	distant	place,	and	Heimweh	is	yearning	for	home	and	the	
familiar.	
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become	an	outsider	at	home.	My	leaving	disturbs	the	order	of	the	divide	into	a	here	
and	a	there.	Those	who	stay	at	home	iden_fy	me	as	belonging	to	their	we,	whereas	
I	oﬀend	them	by	preferring	the	company	of	a	they."	(2006)	I	can	certainly	relate	to	
this	constantly	shi`ing	role	of	insider-outsider.		
This	 ambivalent	 posi_on	 can	 be	 tricky	 as	 Kra`	 Alsop	 eloquently	 puts	 it	 "Auto-
ethnographers	 who	 set	 themselves	 the	 task	 of	 rela_ng	 cultures	 are	 boundary	
walkers:	they	crisscross	between	the	boundaries	of	being	home	and	away,	of	being	
insider	 and	outsider,	 of	 being	personal	 and	 cultural	 selves.	 There	 is	 nothing	more	
diﬃcult	 than	 this	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 ways	 of	 living,	 speaking,	 thinking	 and	
feeling."	(2006,	p.13)	
Despite	 this	 diﬃcult	 balancing	 act,	 I	made	 it	my	 goal	 to	 gain	 the	most	 from	both	
worlds.	Throughout	my	ﬁeldwork,	 I	 found	myself	being	 iden_ﬁed	as	East	German.	
My	age	also	played	a	signiﬁcant	role.	Yes,	I	was	born	in	the	GDR;	but	I	was	too	young	
to	 experience	 the	 regime.	 Therefore,	 my	 informants	 accepted	 that	 I	 had	 some	
knowledge	about	the	GDR	due	to	my	background,	but	my	age	s_ll	provided	me	with	
enough	 distance	 not	 to	 have	 "too	 many	 preconcepSons	 and	 poliScal	 opinions".	
There	was	o`en	 the	 sense	 that	 they	wanted	 to	 teach	me	 "what	 it	was	 really	 like	
back	 then".	 At	 the	 same	 _me,	 being	 a	 part-outsider,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 analyse	 and	
understand	my	informants’	stories	more	objec_vely.	
Nonetheless,	 gaining	 their	 trust	was	 a	 very	 signiﬁcant	 aspect	 and	 challenge	 in	my	
ﬁeldwork.	 Jahan	 (2014)	 describes	 her	 experience	 of	 doing	 ﬁeldwork	 in	 her	 na_ve	
village	 in	 Bangladesh	 and	 her	 struggles	 as	 a	 "par_al	 insider".	 She	 found	 her	
ﬁeldwork	to	be	a	"transforming	experience"	which	changed	her	"understanding	of	
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the	 social	 world"	 (2014,	 p.2).	 Just	 as	 I	 had	 experienced	 in	my	 own	 ﬁeldwork	 "at	
home",	 Jahan	 also	 developed	 ways	 to	 gain	 informants'	 respect	 and	 trust	 in	 a	
sensi_ve	manner,	as	well	 as	 forming	 friendships.	 She	writes:	 "In	many	 instances,	 I	
shared	 my	 own	 life	 story	 and	 personal	 feelings,	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 rela_ons	 of	
mutual	 friendship."	 (2014,	 p.2).	 This	was	 certainly	 the	 case	 in	my	 own	 interviews	
too.	 	 Every	 mee_ng	 began	 with	 a	 ten	 to	 ﬁ`een-minute	 conversa_on	 about	 my	
background,	my	family	story,	and	my	mo_va_on	in	conduc_ng	this	ﬁeldwork.	In	fact,	
all	 of	 my	 informants	 asked	 me	 numerous	 ques_ons	 before	 beginning	 the	
"Zeitzeugengespräch".	 Since	 "The	 Stasi"	 as	 an	 area	 of	 enquiry	 is	 s_ll	 a	 sensi_ve	
issue,	I	was	generally	approached	with	cau_on.	But,	as	the	conversa_on	ﬂowed,	my	
interlocutors	became	more	relaxed	and	at	ease.		
Finding	Informants		
In	the	months	leading	up	to	my	ﬁeldwork,	I	always	considered	my	background	to	be	
an	 advantage,	 as	 I	 assumed	 it	 provided	 me	 with	 me	 with	 plenty	 of	 informants	
amongst	my	own	family	and	their	friends.	I	openly	discussed	my	research	ideas	with	
them	before	star_ng	the	ﬁeldwork.	They	were	quite	interested,	par_cularly	because	
of	the	family's	own	history	of	being	observed.	When	I	asked	who	would	be	willing	to	
speak	to	me	about	their	experience	with	the	Stasi,	I	received	posi_ve	feedback.	We	
exchanged	 phone	 numbers	 and	 email	 addresses	 of	 acquaintances	 who	 had	
"interes_ng	stories".			
Once	the	_me	of	my	ﬁeldwork	came	around,	 I	was	mo_vated	and	conﬁdent	that	 I	
had	already	 lined	up	my	group	of	 informants.	However,	 I	quickly	 realised	 that	 this	
would	 be	 much	 more	 complicated	 than	 I	 had	 ini_ally	 an_cipated.	 They	 would	
hesitate	and	ask	"what	exactly	is	your	research	about	again?"	And	when	I	told	them,	
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they	began	making	up	excuses.	"	 I'm	not	sure	my	story	will	be	 interesSng	to	you",	
"This	was	so	 long	ago,	 I	don't	 remember	exactly...",	 "I'm	very	busy	 in	 the	next	 few	
weeks",	and	so	on.	All	of	a	sudden	no	one	seemed	to	want	 to	speak	to	me.	 I	was	
astonished—especially	 when	 I	 talked	 to	 people	 in	 my	 social	 network.	 Asking	 to	
conduct	 interviews	for	the	ﬁrst	_me,	I	was	confronted	with	the	massive	emo_onal	
impact	 that	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 Stasi	 has	 on	 people.	 There	 were	 several	 diﬃcult	
conversa_ons	in	which	I	felt	out	of	my	depth.	Was	I	allowed	to	ask	these	ques_ons?	
Was	 this	 too	 personal?	 Could	 this	 have	 wider	 implica_ons	 for	 our	 family	
rela_onships	or	friendships?			
Research	Challenges		
A`er	several	weeks	of	unsuccessful	ajempts	at	conduc_ng	my	prepared	interviews,	
I	decided	 to	approach	my	ﬁeldwork	 from	a	diﬀerent	angle.	Even	 though	 it	 ini_ally	
felt	 like	this	resulted	from	personal	shortcomings,	 I	soon	learnt	this	behaviour	was	
not	at	all	unusual.	In	fact,	it	showed	what	it	was	that	I	was	dealing	with.	The	extent	
of	 emo_onal	 pain	 and	 the	 a`ermath	 s_ll	 aﬀec_ng	 personal	 rela_onships	 was	
immense.	The	reluctance	to	recall	the	condi_ons	of	governance	and	the	avoidance	
of	engaging	with	the	personal	repercussions	resul_ng	from	them,	are	quite	common	
in	post-communist	 socie_es.	 This	 silence	may	 in	 fact	be	 regarded	as	 a	 sign	of	 the	
repression	of	trauma_c	experiences	(Sztompka	2004;	Smelser	2004),	as	I	will	outline	
later	in	this	thesis.	So,	 it	can	be	said	that	the	object	my	research	indeed	became	a	
major	obstacle,	par_cularly	 in	 the	early	 stages	of	my	ﬁeldwork.	As	Gallinat	 (2013)	
has	 asserted,	 the	 landscape	 of	memory	 in	 East	Germany	 is	 complex	 and	 at	 _mes	
ambiguous	 and	 this	 certainly	 poses	 some	 challenges	 in	 the	 research	 process	 and	
analysis.	
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I	soon	realised	that	the	rejec_ons	of	my	requests	to	conduct	interviews	were	merely	
scratching	 the	surface	of	an	underlying	problem	 I	did	not	an_cipate	encountering,	
let	 alone	 amongst	my	 extended	 family	 and	 friends.	 The	 Stasi	may	 not	 exist	 as	 an	
ins_tu_on	any	longer,	but	 in	these	ﬁrst	weeks	of	my	ﬁeldwork	it	became	apparent	
that	it	s_ll	haunts	people's	rela_onships,	keeping	alive	secrecy,	rumours,	suspicion,	
and	shame.		
When	I	no_ced	that	my	original	plan	would	be	very	challenging	to	realise,	 I	hence	
began	 to	 search	 for	other	ways	 to	get	 in	 touch	with	East	Germans	who	would	be	
able	 to	 contribute	 to	my	 study.	My	 search	 led	me	 to	 various	websites,	memorial	
sites	and	organisa_ons.		
A	note	on	the	Oral	History	Approach	and	the	Zeitzeugenbörse	e.V.	
I	 became	 interested	 in	 the	 oral	 history	 approach	 or	Zeitzeugeninterview.	 As	 I	 had	
planned	 originally,	 in	 my	 inves_ga_on	 I	 primarily	 used	 the	 ethnographic	 and	 life	
history	 methodologies.	 But,	 since	 my	 work	 to	 an	 extent	 is	 also	 an	 oral	 historical	
record,	it	made	sense	to	search	for	organisa_ons,	which	support	this	approach.		
The	Oral	History	Associa_on	(OHA)	deﬁned	“Oral	History”	as	“a	ﬁeld	of	study	and	a	
method	 of	 gathering,	 preserving	 and	 interpre_ng	 the	 voices	 and	 memories	 of	
people,	communi_es,	and	par_cipants	in	past	events.	Oral	history	is	both	the	oldest	
type	of	historical	inquiry,	preda_ng	the	wrijen	word,	and	one	of	the	most	modern,	
ini_ated	 with	 tape	 recorders	 in	 the	 1940s	 and	 now	 using	 21st-century	 digital	
technologies.”	(OHA	2017).		
The	 recording	 of	 oral	 history	 therefore	 gives	 those	who	 experienced	 history	 ﬁrst-
hand	 a	 voice.	 This	 is	 par_cularly	 useful	 in	 contexts	 where	 historical	 research	 is	
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hindered	by	poli_cal	circumstances,	lack	of	-	or	destruc_on	of	archival	records	and	
war.	 Vilanova’s	 (1997)	 work	 for	 instance,	 has	 focussed	 on	 oral	 history	 records	 in	
Spain.	 She	 inves_gated	 the	 Franco	 dictatorship	 (1939-	 1975)	 and	 notes	 that,	 for	
many	years,	historical	accounts	were	repressed	and	only	in	the	1980’s	some	Spanish	
Universi_es,	 in	 par_cular	 the	 University	 of	 Barcelona,	 began	 engaging	 in	 the	
collec_on	 and	 analysis	 of	 historical	 accounts.	 Here	 the	 use	 of	 the	 oral	 history	
approach	became	invaluable.	
In	 Germany,	 Lutz	 Niethammer	 has	 wrijen	 extensively	 about	 the	 Oral	 History	
Approach	 and	 has	 published	 many	 oral	 history	 accounts	 of	 post-war	 Germany.	
Remarkably,	he	was	also	one	of	the	few	researchers	that	was	able	to	independently	
interview	GDR	 ci_zens	before	 the	 fall	 of	 the	wall,	 in	 the	 late	 1980’s.	 For	 his	 book	
“Die	volkseigene	Erfahrung”,	the	West	German	historian	managed	to	get	permission	
from	the	GDR	authori_es	to	conduct	numerous	life	history	 interviews	with	ci_zens	
from	all	over	East	Germany,	regarding	their	personal	biographies	and	views.	These	
accounts	 are	 extremely	 valuable,	 as	 they	 allow	 for	 a	 unique	 glimpse	 into	 GDR	
society,	which	reﬂects	the	authen_c	living	condi_ons	within	the	GDR	at	the	_me.	So	
the	accounts	are	not	only	memories	but	they	illustrate	the	contemporary	reali_es	of	
life	in	the	regime.		
In	recent	years,	there	has	been	an	emergence	of	many	non-proﬁt	organisa_ons	that	
support	 and	 allow	 for	 a	 recording	 and	 distribu_on	 of	 oral	 history	 and	 personal	
accounts	 outside	 of	 the	mainstream	 public	 domain.	 These	 organisa_ons	 act	 as	 a	
point	 of	 contact	 for	 researchers,	 “Zeitzeugen”,	 and	 the	 interested	 public.	 Such	
organisa_ons	have	been	par_cularly	useful	in	post-totalitarian	contexts,	especially	in	
Eastern	Europe.	In	countries	where	the	public	recogni_on	of	the	historical	record	of	
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former	regimes	is	highly	poli_cally	contested	and	researchers,	as	well	as	ins_tu_ons	
are	 in	 some	way	 limited	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 conduct	and	publish	 impar_al	 accounts	
(e.g.	 Belarus,	 Poland,	 Czech	 Republic),	 the	 use	 of	 the	 oral	 history	 approach	 and	
these	organisa_ons	provide	a	good	alterna_ve.		
For	 instance,	 in	 Belarus	 the	 Belarussian	 Online	Museum,	 collects	 and	makes	 oral	
history	 accounts	 available	 to	 the	 public.	On	 their	website	 they	write:	 “Since	 2007	
we’ve	 been	 collecSng	 materials:	 recording	 audio	 and	 video	 interviews	 with	 the	
vicSms	of	the	Soviet	system,	copying	documents	and	photos.	Now	we	want	to	share	
it	all	with	you!”	
The	Post	Bellum	and	Memory	of	NaSons	organisa_ons	in	the	Czech	Republic	are	also	
good	examples	of	 this.	Over	 the	 last	years,	 they	have	created	a	 large	collec_on	of	
oral	history	records.	On	their	website	it	says	that,		
“They	were	led	by	their	convicSon	that	witnesses	of	historic	events	need	to	have	an	
opportunity	to	tell	their	stories	 in	detail	and	in	their	enSrety.	These	memories	bear	
precious	 tesSmony	not	only	 about	modern	history,	 but	 about	 the	 character	 of	 the	
Czech	people	as	well”.		
Inspired	 by	 this,	 I	 began	my	 own	 search.	 One	 a`ernoon	 in	 late	 February	 2014,	 I	
visited	the	Berlin	Wall	Memorial	Informa_on	Centre	in	the	hope	of	ﬁnding	resources	
to	 get	 in	 touch	 with	 possible	 informants.	 I	 spoke	 to	 a	 middle-aged	 lady	 at	 the	
informa_on	desk.	She	was	surprised	when	I	explained	my	research	and	what	I	was	
looking	 for.	 It	 seemed	 like	 she	 had	 never	 heard	 of	 such	 a	 request.	 This	 in	 turn	
surprised	me,	considering	that	it	is	an	important	aspect	of	recent	history	and	surely	
the	 appearance	 of	 researchers	 here	 should	 be	 a	 common	 occurrence.	 I	 had	
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previously	read	about	research	projects	that	were	ongoing	at	the	BStU	and	so-called	
Zeitzeugen	 (Engl.:	 contemporary	 witnesses),	 that	 conducted	 public	 lectures	 and	
spoke	at	schools.	Yet,	I	had	ini_ally	been	scep_cal	of	approaching	such	"professional	
speakers"	for	fear	that	they	had	already	formed	too	much	of	a	rehearsed	narra_ve.	I	
was	not	looking	for	people	who	had	some	heroic	story	to	oﬀer	or	who	would	jump	
at	 any	 opportunity	 to	 tell	 their	 story	 for	 a	 TV	 interview.	 I	 wanted	 to	 speak	 to	
individuals	 who	 were	 not	 necessarily	 well-known	 poli_cal	 ac_vists,	 but	 rather	
represented	a	cross-sec_on	of	general	GDR	society.	But,	in	my	research,	I	found	that	
throughout	 Germany,	 many	 memorial	 and	 oral	 history	 organisa_ons	 had	 been	
extremely	useful	in	recording	the	history	of	the	20th	century.	With	regards	to	recent	
history	 of	 the	 divided	 Germany,	 the	 German	 Federal	 Founda_on	 for	 the	
reconcilia_on	of	the	SED	regime,	had	funded	and	organised	numerous	oral	history	
projects.	 They,	 too,	 provide	 a	 collec_on	 of	 Oral	 History	 records	 and	 a	 contact	
database	of	interviewees	(see	Zeitzeugenbüro.de).		
	So,	 I	 decided	 to	 give	 this	 approach	 a	 try	 a`er	 all.	 During	my	 search	 I	 had	 come	
across	the	non-governmental,	non-proﬁt	Zeitzeugenbörse	(ZZB).	Their	mojo	is	“ZZB:	
Preserving	 Priceless	 Memories	 for	 the	 Future”,	 alluding	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
preserva_on	of	oral	historical	accounts.		
		I	 preferred	 the	 idea	 of	 working	 with	 this	 smaller	 organisa_on,	 as	 it	 is	 not	 only	
independent	of	the	State	Department,	but	the	Zeitzeugen	who	are	registered	here	
are	 also	 extremely	 mul_faceted	 in	 their	 personal	 backgrounds.	 Members	 give	
accounts	of	the	NS	and	SED	regime,	as	well	as	the	Second	World	War.	Amongst	the	
possible	 informants	are	supporters	and	opposers	of	the	past	dictatorship.	Notably,	
the	organisa_on	is	keen	to	encourage	dialogue	between	the	organisa_on	members	
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themselves	as	well	as	researchers.	I	found	that	they	organise	informal	a`ernoons	of	
lectures	with	coﬀee,	cake	and	discussions.		
Addi_onally,	the	organisa_on	oﬀered	a	"service"	of	referring	researchers	(primarily	
journalists	and	historians)	to	possible	Zeitzeugen	-	 informants.	They	also	organised	
talks	 at	 schools,	 where	 children	 could	 hear	 real-life	 accounts	 about	 things	 they	
would	normally	only	read	in	history	books.		
On	their	website	they	describe	the	organisa_on’s	work	as	such:	
“Witnesses	 to	 Berlin	 history	 want	 to	 share	 their	 memories	 and	 experiences.	
EducaSon	and	media	professionals	are	looking	for	vivid	and	exciSng	narraSves.		
The	ZZB	brings	both	sides	together.		
The	 ZZB	 organizes	 the	 dialogue	 between	 the	 older	 and	 the	 younger	 generaSon	 in	
Berlin	 in	order	to	share	their	experiences	regarding:	the	Sme	of	NaSonal	Socialism	
and	the	post-War	period,	 life	 in	the	divided	and	reunited	city,	poliScal	and	cultural	
events	in	East	and	West	Berlin”	(Zeitzeugen	Börse	e.V.).		
I	 decided	 to	get	 in	 touch	with	 them	and	 see	 if	 they	 could	be	of	help.	A`er	a	 few	
weeks,	I	had	a	response	and	arranged	a	mee_ng	to	explain	my	research	further.	
On	a	sunny	day	in	March,	I	arrived	at	their	oﬃce	in	Ackerstrasse,	Berlin	Mide.	I	was	
greeted	 by	 two	 middle-aged	 women	 in	 a	 small	 ground	 ﬂoor	 oﬃce,	 which	 only	
consisted	 of	 two	 small	 rooms	 and	 a	 kitchen.	 They	 were	 both	 very	 friendly	 and	
welcoming	and	immediately	began	making	coﬀee	and	unwrapping	a	cake	that	one	
of	 them	had	baked.	We	sat	at	a	 table	and	started	talking.	 I	explained	my	research	
interests	and	what	 I	was	 looking	for.	They	 listened	and	began	asking	me	ques_ons	
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about	 the	aims	of	my	 research:	what	 I	was	 interested	 in;	my	university	aﬃlia_on;	
how	I	would	ensure	my	informants'	opinions	were	represented	accurately;	and	what	
type	 of	 people	 I	was	 looking	 for.	 It	was	 an	 intense	 in-depth	 interview,	 somewhat	
resembling	 the	 departmental	 "upgrade	 exam"	 I	 had	 taken	 at	 UCL	 prior	 to	 my	
departure,	 but	 more	 daun_ng.	 They	 were	 very	 interested	 in	 the	 ﬁeld	 of	
Anthropology	and	told	me	that	most	researchers	who	asked	them	for	contacts	were	
journalists.	They	explained	that	their	small	"contac_ng	service"	had	been	successful	
in	 matching	 up	 researchers	 and	 Zeitzeugen,	 but	 that	 there	 had	 been	 occasions	
where	the	informants	were	unhappy	with	the	way	journalists	wrote	about	them	or	
the	 way	 their	 opinions	 and	memories	 were	 represented	 in	 the	media.	 They	 also	
warned	me	about	 the	handling	of	 sensi_ve	 issues	and	 trauma_c	memories.	 I	 told	
them	about	my	diﬃcul_es	in	ﬁnding	informants,	and	they	were	not	at	all	surprised.	
Apparently,	 this	 was	 a	 well-known	 challenge	 to	 researchers.	 A`er	 all,	 this	 was	 a	
controversial	topic	surrounded	with	much	secrecy.	
When	the	two	women	were	ﬁnally	happy	with	my	introduc_on,	they	took	out	lists	
with	 the	 organisa_on	 members’	 names	 and	 phone	 numbers.	 They	 both	 went	
through	the	list	and	discussed	who	could	be	a	suitable	contact.	I	encouraged	them	
to	 suggest	people	with	as	wide	a	 range	of	backgrounds	as	possible.	 They	 told	me	
that	they	would	email	me	a	list	of	informants	I	could	call	and	see	if	they	would	agree	
to	be	interviewed.		
A	 week	 later	 I	 received	 a	 list	 of	 numbers	 and	 began	 making	 calls.	 I	 was	 not	
disappointed,	the	range	of	peoples'	backgrounds	was	indeed	extraordinary.	I	spoke	
to	a	variety	of	people:	from	a	94-year-old	lady	who	was	s_ll	a	convinced	socialist	(as	
I	 learned	 over	 the	 phone),	 to	 a	 middle-aged	 "poli_cal	 dissident"	 who	 had	 been	
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imprisoned.	These	contacts	came	to	be	crucial	in	my	ﬁeldwork,	as	I	also	managed	to	
make	new	connec_ons	through	some	of	them.	I	conducted	further	interviews	with	
acquaintances	 and	 friends-of-friends	 and	 eventually	 ended	 up	 recording	 ten	 in-
depth	life-histories	in	addi_on	to	several	in-depth	and	casual	interviews.	
Research	QuesLons	
In	the	SED	regime	of	the	GDR,	German	peoples’	lives	were	heavily	impacted	by	the	
presence	 of	 the	 Stasi.	 Always	 living	 under	 the	 watchful	 eye	 of	 state	 oﬃcials	 and	
unoﬃcial	 informants	 inﬂuenced	 their	 personal	 freedom	 and	 life	 quality.	 When	
would	one	ever	have	known	whether	it	was	safe	to	speak	one's	mind	openly?	At	the	
_me,	 any	 step	 oﬀ	 the	 desired	 ideological	 path	 could	 have	 poten_ally	 led	 to	
personally	 catastrophic	 consequences.	 These	 condi_ons	 created	 strong	 feelings	 of	
uncertainty,	suspicion	and	also	anxiety.	
In	 turn,	 this	 fear	 brings	 up	 numerous	 ques_ons.	 How	 did	 life	 under	 these	
circumstances	 inﬂuence	 interpersonal	 rela_onships?	 How	 was	 social	 mistrust	
generated,	and	what	were	the	nature	of	the	bonds	that	people	created,	despite	the	
heavy	 impact	 of	 the	 SED	 state	 on	 work,	 school	 and	 family	 life?	 	 Enduring	 the	
constant	uncertainty	of	not	knowing	to	whom	one	could	truly	invest	one's	trust	was	
a	heavy	burden.	How	did	East	Germans	perceive	and	deal	with	this	uncertainty?	
Aim		
The	 aim	 of	 this	 ethnographic	 ﬁeld	 study,	 then,	 is	 to	 understand	 East	 Germans'	
experiences	 of	 state	 control	 and	 mass	 surveillance	 in	 the	 former	 German	
Democra_c	Republic	and	to	do	so	from	two	standpoints.	
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First,	from	a	collec_ve	perspec_ve,	it	has	been	my	aim	to	gain	insight	into	how	the	
general	 popula_on	 perceived	 life	 in	 a	 dictatorship.	 I	 explore	 how	 control	 and	
conformity	were	achieved	among	East	Germans.	I	look	at	Hannah	Arendt	and	other	
scholars	 to	 understand	 how	 totalitarian	 regimes	 establish	 themselves	 and	 how	
ci_zens	become	ac_vely	 involved	 in	 those	systems.	 I	 inves_gate	how	the	 legacy	of	
Stasi	 spying	 is	 interpreted	 today	 and	 how	 those	 aﬀected	 have	 dealt	 with	 the	
a`ermath.	How,	if	at	all,	have	East	Germans	come	to	terms	with	the	past,	and	what	
role	does	the	availability	of	Stasi	records	play	in	their	eﬀorts	to	reconcile,	if	not	heal	
their	emo_onal	turmoil?	And	I	explore	the	way	Germany's	divided	past	con_nues	to	
impact	the	wellbeing	of	those	who	lived	former	their	lives	in	the	GDR.	
The	 second	 approach	 examines	 the	 impact	 of	 surveillance	 at	 an	 individual	 level.	
How	did	my	interviewees	experience	state	control,	and	how	did	such	control	shape	
their	 ongoing	 lives,	 iden__es,	 and	 sense	 of	 wellbeing?	 Through	 ethnographic	
ﬁeldwork,	in-depth	life	histories,	and	less	structured	interviews,	I	have	ajempted	to	
unpack	 what	 state	 control	 meant	 in	 everyday	 contexts	 and	 what	 led	 individuals	
either	to	conform	to	or	to	resist	state	doctrines.	How	have	people	coped	with	the	
trauma	they	experienced	through	repression	and	state	violence	since	1989?	Can	the	
painful	 wounds	 of	 the	 past	 ever	 be	 healed?	 Here	 I	 inves_gated	 not	 only	 their	
memories	 but	 how	my	 informants	 see	 their	 development	 in	 the	 two	 states	 (GDR	
and	FRG).	
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Fieldwork	and	Informants	
	
Life	History	Approach	
The	main	methodological	tool	used	in	this	research	project	are	life	history	(or	oral	
history)	interviews.	I	chose	this	method,	as	it	allowes	for	the	most	comprehensive	
and	in-depth	data-collection.	Recording	a	person’s	unique	life	experiences,	helps	us	
locate	them	within	the	historical	context	and	gives	a	multifaceted	impression	of	life	
at	the	time	of	socialism	as	well	as	their	personal	transition	and	development	in	the	
reunited	Germany.	It	relies	on	a	person’s	past	memories	as	well	as	contemporary	
impressions.	This	approach	is	a	“powerful	tool	for	discovering,	exploring	and	
evaluating	the	nature	of	the	historical	memory	–	how	people	make	sense	of	their	
past,	how	they	connect	individual	experience	and	its	social	context,	how	the	past	
becomes	part	of	the	present,	and	how	people	use	it	to	interpret	their	lives	and	the	
world	around	them”	(Frisch,	1990,p.188).	
The	use	of	this	qualitative	ethnographic	method	has	been	popular	with	historians	
and	social	scientists	alike,	as	the	collected	narrative	accounts	can	make	“links	across	
life	phases	and	cohort	generations	revealing	historical	shifts	in	a	culture.	They	help	
establish	collective	memories	and	imagined	communities;	and	they	tell	of	the	
concerns	of	their	time	and	space.”	(Plummer	2001,	p.395).		
An	important	aspect	in	my	investigation	is	understanding	motivations	and	moral	
dimensions	of	people’s	actions	and	experiences.	In	this	context,	understanding	a	
person’s	upbringing,	whether	they	experienced	the	2nd	World	War,	where	they	
lived	at	the	time,	worked	and	studied,	as	well	as	gaining	an	insight	into	their	family	
and	personal	relationships	has	been	crucial.	These	chronologically	recounted	
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memories	allow	a	researcher	“to	see	lives	as	moral	struggles,	embedded	in	specific	
contexts,	shaped	by	particular	conventions	of	time	and	place.”		(Plummer	2001	
p.404)	In	other	words,	through	learning	about	my	informants’	life	stories,	I	have	
been	able	to	place	their	unique	experiences	and	motivations	within	a	local,	
historical	and	personal	context	and	therefore	gained	a	sympathetic	impression	of	
their	moral	struggles.	Further,	it	has	helped	me	to	gain	insight	into	challenges	to	
their	wellbeing,	which	are	not	exclusively	related	to	the	SED-regime,	such	as	illness	
and	family	tragedies.		
The	way	life	stories	are	constructed	and	how	narratives	are	placed	within	a	
chronological	framework,	provides	further	insight	into	informants’	meaning-making	
processes.	Gallinat	(2015)	for	example,	explored	the	narratives	of	two	East	Germans	
who	experienced	the	reunification	process	and	found	significant	incoherence	in	the	
way	the	narratives	were	constructed,	indicating	a	“lack	of	wider	shared	frameworks	
for	the	understandings	of	national	events	and	historical	problems”.	
Moreover,	I	felt	that	the	approach	of	asking	my	informants	to	describe	their	
personal	journey	was	of	practical	value	in	overcoming	my	informants’	and	my	own	
reservations.	It	relieved	initial	tensions	while	discussing	the	sensitive	topic	of	Stasi	
surveillance.	It	meant	that	I	did	not	have	to	“jump	right	into”	the	topic,	but	instead	
it	gave	my	informants	the	chance	to	take	the	lead.	Once	they	were	recalling	their	
story,	it	was	then	easier	to	follow	up	on	certain	aspects	and	ask	questions.	I	found	
this	to	be	less	intrusive	and	it	gave	my	informants	more	control	of	the	situation,	
avoiding	“putting	them	on	the	spot”	or	making	them	uncomfortable.		
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While	this	research	method	has	been	extremely	fruitful	in	my	investigation,	there	
are	inevitably	risks	involved	in	using	it.	First	and	foremost,	is	the	ambiguous	nature	
of	memory	itself.	Various	scholars	have	addressed	this	issue	(Plummer	2001;	
Halbwachs,	1992;	Niethammer,	1985).	Naturally	memories	shift	and	change	over	
time.	Certain	details	may	be	forgotten,	dates,	places	and	people	might	get	mixed	
up.	Memories	are	also	selective,	and	therefore	so	are	the	narratives	that	are	chosen	
to	be	recalled.	The	role	of	collective	memory	is	also	significant	in	this	context	as	“no	
memory	is	possible	outside	frameworks	used	by	people	living	in	society	to	
determine	and	retrieve	their	recollections”	(Halbwachs	1992,	p.	43).	
Therefore,	the	social	frameworks	for	recalling	certain	occurrences	have	to	exist	and	
the	recalling	of	oral	history	give	the	claims	legitimacy.	Another	possible	risk,	which	
is	unavoidable	in	any	work	with	human	subjects,	is	the	possibility	that	they	might	
lie.		
The	problem	of	fictional	life	accounts	has	been	written	about	extensively,	as	well	as	
various	methods	of	checking	the	validity	of	informants’	claims	(see	for	example	
Denzin	1989).	While	this	has	not	been	possible	with	all	my	informants,	I	have	had	
the	chance	to	see	copies	of	some	Stasi	files,	as	well	as	photos,	letters	and	
newspaper	snippets	provided	by	my	interlocuters.	In	terms	of	my	informants’	
accounts	of	events,	they	have	proven	to	be	historically	accurate.	But,	as	it	is	the	
case	with	any	recalling	of	personal	history,	there	is	always	a	possibility	for	small	
inaccuracies.		
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Informants		
As	 men_oned	 above,	 I	 made	 contact	 with	 interviewees	 who	 contributed	 to	 my	
ethnographic	 ﬁeld	 study	 with	 the	 help	 of	 the	 Zeitzeugen	 Börse	 e.V.,	 my	 own	
acquaintances,	 my	 informants’	 recommended	 contacts,	 as	 well	 as	 my	 extended	
family.	
Ten	 informants	 provided	 in-depth	 life	 histories,	 which	 I	 audio	 recorded	 and	
transcribed.	 A	 further	 seven	 informants	 took	 part	 in	 interviews	 which	 I	 mostly	
recorded	in	note-form.	Addi_onally,	I	conducted	numerous	casual	interviews	during	
my	ﬁeldwork.	The	research	was	conducted	in	Berlin	(where	I	had	my	base),	in	small	
towns	throughout	Eastern	Germany	(to	which	I	travelled	by	car	or	train),	as	well	as	
in	one	West	German	city.	There	I	had	the	chance	to	speak	to	several	East	Germans	
who	had	moved	to	the	West,	either	immediately	a`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall	or	in	the	
years	before	1989	through	an	Ausreiseantrag	or	escape.	These	informants	allowed	
me	 to	 gain	 a	 clearer	 idea	 of	 life	 transi_ons	 from	 East	 to	 West,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
mo_va_ons	behind	escaping	or	applying	to	leave	the	GDR.		
Interviews	primarily	took	place	in	my	informant's	homes,	as	this	provided	a	private,	
comfortable,	and	relaxed	atmosphere.	Interviewing	in	homes	also	oﬀered	a	glimpse	
into	 an	 individual's	 personal	world,	 and	 helped	me	 gain	 a	 clearer	 picture	 of	who	
they	were.	 However,	 one	 of	my	 informants	 chose	 to	 visit	me	 in	my	 home,	 while	
several	others	met	me	in	the	home	of	the	acquaintance	responsible	who	had	put	us	
in	 touch.	 Further	 casual	 conversa_ons	 took	 place	 in	 numerous	 loca_ons,	 such	 as	
dinner	 par_es	 and	 guided	 tours,	 including	 the	 Stasi	 archive	 (BStU),	
Hohenschönhausen	Memorial,	Bautzen	Memorial,	Gedenkbibliothek	Berlin,	Runde	
Ecke	Leipzig	and	the	Wall	Memorial	Berlin.		
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The	age	of	my	informants	ranged	between	35	and	94	years.	They	had	a	wide	variety	
of	 backgrounds,	 both	 regarding	 their	 careers	 and	 social	 standing,	 as	well	 as	 their	
personal	 convic_ons.	 In	 spite	 of	 this	 diversity,	 all	 interviewees	 came	 into	 close	
contact	with	 the	 Stasi	 and	were	 aware	 that	 they	were	under	 surveillance	 (usually	
beyond	the	general	base	level	of	state	control)	during	the	_me	of	the	surveillance.	
Their	 experiences	 at	 _mes	 involved	 extreme	 repression,	 interroga_ons	 and	
imprisonment.	Some	informants	were	repor_ng	to	the	Stasi	themselves	and	in	turn	
were	also	spied	upon.		
All	 interlocutors	who	par_cipated	 in	 this	 study	were	 very	 keen	 to	 contribute	 to	 it	
and	felt	that	it	was	important	for	a	discussion	about	the	GDR	to	occur.	Despite	their	
at	 _mes	 radically	 diﬀerent	 conivc_ons,	 they	 all	 felt	 that	 my	 endeavor	 was	 very	
important	in	crea_ng	a	nuanced	image	of	life	in	the	former	GDR.	
Interviews	
For	some,	only	men_oning	 the	word	Stasi	already	had	a	visible	emo_onal	 impact.	
Therefore,	 I	 became	 very	 careful	 in	 the	 way	 I	 described	 my	 research	 topic,	
some_mes	needing	to	be	quite	circumspect	about	asking	sensi_ve	ques_ons.	
Thus,	during	my	interviews	I	kept	my	ini_al	ques_ons	as	general	as	possible.	I	began	
every	mee_ng	 following	 a	Zeitzeugengespräch	 narra_ve	 style	 (see	 Zeitzeugenbüro	
Advice	Brochure).	This	 is	o`en	used	 in	historical	 interviews,	and	 I	 found	 it	 to	be	a	
good	 star_ng	point	 for	genera_ng	conversa_on.	 Speciﬁcally,	 I	 began	by	asking	 the	
informant	 to	 describe	 their	 personal	 journey.	 "Könnten	 Sie	 bide	 Ihren	Werdegang	
beschreiben..”2	 This	way,	 the	 informants	 usually	 started	 oﬀ	 explaining	where	 they	
																																								 																				
2	"Could	you	please	describe	your	personal	journey."	
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were	born,	their	childhood,	their	educa_on	and	career.	It	helped	to	put	the	events	
in	 a	 chronological	 order	 and	 provided	 me	 with	 fascina_ng	 life	 histories.	 In	 the	
process,	 I	made	 sure	 to	 let	 the	 informant	 take	 the	 lead	 in	 the	 conversa_on	 at	 all	
_mes,	yet	enquiring	for	more	details	when	something	stood	out	to	me.	With	many	
of	my	 interviewees,	 I	 conducted	 two	 in-depth	 interviews.	 Generally,	 the	 ﬁrst	 one	
being	a	detailed	 life	history,	and	 in	 the	 second	one	asking	ques_ons	about	details	
that	intrigued	me	in	our	previous	encounter.	
All	my	 in-depth	 interviews	were	 rather	 lengthy,	 las_ng	one	hour	at	 the	very	 least.	
However,	 the	 majority	 of	 conversa_ons	 took	 approximately	 two	 to	 four	 hours.	
Some_mes	 I	 would	 spend	 an	 en_re	 day	 with	 an	 interviewee,	 some_mes	 several	
days.	This	depended	on	their	 loca_on,	age,	and	also	their	rela_onship	to	me	(e.g.,	
acquaintances	and/or	extended	family).	While,	spending	_me	in	Berlin	and	smaller	
towns	 in	 Brandenburg,	 Saxony,	 and	 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,	 I	 also	 conducted	
numerous	informal	interviews	and	recorded	my	general	observa_ons.		
"Ossi	or	Wessi?"	-	Why	does	it	maYer?	
As	 I	men_oned	 in	 the	 beginning,	 the	 role	 of	my	 own	 background	was	 extremely	
important	when	I	conducted	my	interviews.	The	ques_on	of	whether	I	was	from	the	
East	 or	 the	 West	 came	 to	 be	 an	 issue	 I	 encountered	 in	 every	 single	 one	 of	 my	
interviews.	But	why	did	this	s_ll	majer	so	much?	I	am	constantly	in	the	process	of	
unravelling	 this	 ques_on.	 Ul_mately,	 it	 was	 important	 for	 my	 informants	 to	 see	
whether	 I	was	 trustworthy	 and	 if	 I	 had	 some	poli_cal	 (or	 other)	 agenda.	 Perhaps	
they	even	thought	I	would	misunderstand	or	judge	them	as	an	"ignorant	Wessi".	To	
me,	 these	 ques_ons	 showed	 that	 many	 East	 Germans	 are	 s_ll	 conscious	 of	 the	
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dangers	 and	 moral	 dilemmas	 associated	 with	 Stasi	 surveillance,	 as	 well	 as	 an	
indica_on	of	con_nued	divisions	between	the	East	and	the	West.		
Language		
The	spoken	 language	 in	all	 interviews,	 save	one,	was	German,	my	mother-tongue.	
For	this	reason,	I	decided	to	oﬀer	the	original	language	in	all	my	quotes.	Keeping	the	
original	language	secures	the	authen_city	of	the	statement	made.	To	those	readers	
who	are	German	speakers,	this	will	provide	an	interes_ng	addi_on	to	the	text.	For	
others,	I	have	done	my	best	to	either	give	an	English	transla_on	and/or	explain	the	
German	expressions	I	use	in	the	text.	Furthermore,	I	feature	some	frequently	used	
terms	in	the	language	glossary	below.	
Language	Glossary		
	
German	 English	
Ministerium	für	Staatssicherheit/	Stasi	 Ministry	of	State	Security	
Kindergarten	 Kindergarten/	Day	care	
(Kinder)	Krippe	 Nursery/	Creche	
Bezirk	 Regional	city	district	e.g.	Berlin	Mije	
Zeitzeugen	/	Zeitzeugengespräch	
Contemporary	witness	of	the	_me	
/Contemporary	witness	interview	
Fluchthelfer	
A	person	who	assisted	others	to	escape	(the	
GDR)	
Au}ruchss_mmung	
Op_mis_c	spirit	of	embarking	on	a	
trip/entering	a	new	era	
Zuversicht	 Conﬁdence/assurance	
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Nega_ve	Elemente	 Stasi	speak	for	poli_cal	dissidents	
Inoﬃzieller	Mitarbeiter	(IM)	
Unoﬃcial	informants	–	regular	GDR	ci_zens	
who	secretly	spied	and	reported	on	people	
around	them.	They	would	usually	meet	Stasi	
oﬃcials	to	oﬀer	their	reports	in	secret	
loca_ons	such	as	“fake	ﬂats	or	houses”	–	
KonspiraSve	Wohnungen	
Zersetzung	
Described	as	"the	dissolu_on	of	the	social"	–	
extreme	opera_ve	repressive	technique	
employed	by	the	Stasi	to	ins_l	fear	and	
destabilise	a	person's	sense	of	self.	
Republikﬂucht	
Legal	term	to	describe	the	oﬀence	of	
escaping	from	the	GDR	
Systemtreu	
Being	in-line	with	the	poli_cal	ideology	of	
the	state	
Opera_ver	Vorgang	
Stasi	speak	for	opera_ve	process	of	targeted	
repression	on	an	individual	or	group	
Oberschule	 Secondary	school	
Volkshochschule	 Community	College/	Adult	Educa_on	School	
Gemeinscha`sgefühl	 Sense	of	community	
Klassenfeind	 Marxist	term	for	imperialist	class	enemy	
Gesinnungsschnüﬀelei		
Espionage	into	a	person’s	poli_cal	
convic_ons	
Gesellscha`liche	Mitarbeiter	(GM)	 Stasi	speak	for	a	Community	employee		
Anpassungsdruck	 Pressure	to	conform	
"Lasst	uns	einig	sein	um	uneinig	zu	sein."	 "Let's	agree	to	disagree."	
Neubau	Wohnung	
A	new	building.	In	the	GDR	these	ﬂats	were	
much	sought	a`er	because	they	oﬀered	
new	ameni_es	such	as	a	central	hea_ng	
system,	which	were	unavailable	to	those	
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living	in	old	(mostly	unrenovated)	buildings	
Aufarbeitung	 Reconcillia_on	of	the	past	(dictatorship)	
Jdm.	rauskaufen	
“Buying	someone	out”	–	especially	in	the	
1980’s	the	West	(FRG)	(and	some	
organisa_ons)	paid	the	GDR	to	release	
poli_cal	prisoners	and	leave	the	country	
Autobahn	 Motorway	
Neue	Bundesländer	
New	Regional	Districts	of	East	Germany,	
formerly	the	GDR	
Menschenkenntnis	
Knowledge	of	human	nature,	understanding	
others	mo_va_ons	and	inten_ons	
Bauchgefühl	 Gut	feeling	
Deutsche	Demokra_sche	Republik	(DDR)	 German	Democra_c	Republic	(GDR)	
Wende	
Turning	Point	describes	the	_me	period	of	
the	fall	of	the	Wall	and	Germany's	
Reuniﬁca_on.	
SED	/	Sozialis_sche	Einheitspartei	
Deutschlands	
Socialist	Party	of	the	German	Democra_c	
Republic	
Ossis	/	Wessi	
Colloquial	term	describing	East	and	West	
Germans	
Werdegang	
personal	journey	
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Thesis	Overview	
	
This	 ethnographically	 based	 thesis	 consists	 of	 nine	 chapters.	 Chapter	 1	 is	 a	 brief	
introduc_on	 to	 my	 personal	 background	 and	 mo_va_on	 for	 conduc_ng	 this	
ethnographic	research,	including	methodological	details	of	my	ﬁeldwork.		
Chapter	2	provides	an	overview	of	the	exis_ng	literature	on	the	topic,	as	well	as	a	
theore_cal	framework.		
Chapter	3	oﬀers	a	selec_on	of	three	extraordinary	life	stories	that	exemplify	some	of	
the	 key	 themes	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 my	 ethnographic	 inquiry:	 Ideology	 and	
state	 control;	 betrayal	 and	 distrust;	 trauma	 and	 resilience.	 These	 topics	 are	 a	 red	
thread	running	throughout	the	thesis	and	will	be	examined	in	greater	detail	in	later	
chapters.	
Chapter	4	 is	divided	 into	 three	 sec_ons.	 The	ﬁrst	 gives	a	brief	 introduc_on	 to	 the	
work	of	the	Ministry	of	State	Security	in	the	GDR.	The	second	and	primary	focus	of	
the	 chapter	 is	 my	 informants'	 percep_ons	 of	 the	 Stasi,	 which	 I	 illustrate	 through	
various	ethnographic	examples.	The	third	part	looks	at	the	physical	remnants	of	the	
ministry's	 work:	 the	 ﬁles.	 Here,	 I	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 decision-making	
process	involved	in	viewing	one's	records,	and	also	a	descrip_on	of	the	eﬀects	of	the	
revela_ons	discovered	in	ﬁles	on	those	who	explore	them.	
Chapter	5	focuses	on	the	way	state	control	intruded	on,	impacted,	and	shaped	East	
Germans’	 lives.	 How	 were	 state	 control	 and	 conformity	 achieved?	 The	 chapter	
explores	how	concepts	of	privacy	shi`ed	over	_me,	and	how	certain	social	dynamics	
promoted	and	reinforced	systems	of	control.		
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Chapter	 6	 examines	 the	 trauma	 experienced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 state	 control	 and	
violence.	Using	ethnographic	evidence,	 I	 illustrate	 the	various	ways	violent	control	
was	experienced,	how	individuals	have	coped	with	the	a`ermath	of	state	terror,	and	
how	such	experiences	shaped	their	wellbeing	in	the	long	term.		
Chapter	 7	 explores	 how	having	 a	 past	 characterised	by	mass	 surveillance	 impacts	
former	 East	 Germans	 today,	 and	 how	 mul_ple	 incidences	 of	 trauma	 among	 this	
popula_on	have	led	to	a	form	of	social	suﬀering	that	manifests	itself	in	high	levels	of	
distrust.	
Following	on	 from	this,	 in	Chapter	8	 I	brieﬂy	examine	what	mass	 surveillance	and	
repression	 can	 do	 to	 society	 as	 a	 whole.	 For	 this,	 I	 examine	 my	 interviewees'	
narra_ves,	illustra_ng	the	broad	range	of	answers	to	this	ques_on.	
Finally,	 in	 Chapter	 9,	 I	 provide	 a	 synthesis	 of	 the	 arguments	made	 and	 ajempt	 a	
conclusion	of	my	ﬁndings.		
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Chapter	Two:	An	Overview	of	the	Literature	
	
“He	who	controls	the	past	controls	the	future,		
He	who	controls	the	present	controls	the	past.”-	
George	Orwell,	1984	
	
In	this	chapter	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	existing	anthropological	and	other	
related	literature	relevant	to	the	research	themes	of	this	thesis.	First,	I	will	give	a	
brief	introduction	to	some	of	the	literature	on	the	former	German	Democratic	
Republic	(GDR)	and	its	secret	police	force.	Secondly,	I	will	look	at	more	theoretical	
perspectives	surrounding	the	study	of	the	state,	its	governance	and	different	modes	
of	surveillance	(or	“social	optics”).	Thirdly,	I	explore	state	terror	and	the	way	in	
which	Stasi	surveillance	qualifies	as	such.	Moving	on	from	this,	I	will	examine	
medical	anthropology	literature,	which	is	concerned	with	the	consequences	of	state	
terror,	namely	individual,	cultural	and	collective	trauma.	With	this	chapter,	I	hope	
to	offer	a	basic	theoretical	framework	for	the	arguments	made	in	this	thesis.	
Literature	on	East	Germany		
The	former	GDR	is	a	subject	of	interest,	which	has	gained	growing	attention	over	
the	last	few	years,	both	in	media	(documentaries,	TV	series,	Films)	and	publishing	
(books,	newspapers,	magazines).	Especially	journalists	and	other	academic	non-
academic	authors	have	been	intrigued	by	the	exciting	and	sometimes	dark	stories	of	
the	small	socialist	country	that	existed	more	than	27	years	ago.	Many	interesting	
explorations	have	been	embarked	on;	in	popular	German	bookshops	it	is	possible	to	
find	various	biographies	(see	for	example	Schädlich	2017),	family	histories	(e.g.	Leo	
2011;	Hoffmann	2013)	accounts	of	imprisonment	(e.g.	Knabe	ed.	2007),	spectacular	
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escapes	(e.g.	Wensierski	2014)	and	reflections	on	Germany’s	reunification	(e.g.	
Goerz	2015).	There	are	also	numerous	more	nostalgic	publications	on	GDR	popular	
culture,	cuisine,	design	and	many	more.	Increasingly,	non-German	literature	on	the	
GDR	is	also	emerging,	so	far	the	most	famous	of	which	is	probably	the	Australian	
author	Anna	Funder’s	excellent	book	Stasiland	(2011),	which	portrays	the	
experience	of	Stasi	surveillance	through	several	stories	of	East	Germans,	who	she	
interviewed	shortly	after	the	fall	of	the	Wall.		
Academically,	the	GDR	has	been	of	great	interest	nationally	and	internationally	to	
many	disciplines,	but	first	and	foremost	to	historians.	There	are	too	many	historical	
studies	of	the	GDR	and	its	infamous	secret	police	to	list	here,	but	scholars	such	as	
Weber	(1991;	2012)	have	written	extensively	about	the	SED-dictatorship,	Fulbrook	
(2008;	2014)	and	Betts	(2010)	have	looked	more	specifically	at	the	social	history	
and	private	life	within	the	state.		
Betts’	compelling	book	“Within	Walls”	(2010)	sheds	light	on	the	many	complex	and	
at	times	contradictory	aspects	of	private	life	in	the	GDR.	For	instance,	he	illustrates	
East	Germans’	defence	mechanisms	against	state	infiltration	of	their	personal	lives,	
while	at	the	same	time	maintaining	the	outward	image	of	upstanding	socialists.	I	
have	found	his	work	extremely	useful,	not	only	in	terms	of	gaining	a	historical	
understanding	of	the	GDR,	but	most	importantly	a	societal	insight.		
Comprehensive	studies	on	the	country’s	Ministry	of	State	Security	have	been	
composed,	for	example	by	Macrakis	(2009),	Bruce	(2010)	and	Gieseke	(2011).	While	
these	studies	are	highly	detailed	and	extremely	well	researched,	they	tend	to	focus	
primarily	on	institutional	organisation,	as	well	as	technological	and	practical	
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surveillance	methods	used	by	the	Stasi.	Further,	it	is	important	to	mention	that	The	
Federal	Commissioner	for	the	Records	of	the	State	Security	Service	of	the	former	
GDR	(BStU)	commissions	various	studies;	produces	and	publishes	general	
information	on	the	topic.	Numerous	public	and	private	research	institutes	
continually	conduct	surveys	and	quantitative	research	in	and	about	the	former	GDR	
(e.g.	Bertelsmann	Stiftung,	bpb.de).	
East	Germany	has	also	received	much	attention	from	cultural,	media	and	memory	
studies.	Pinfold	and	Saunders’	(2012)	edited	volume	“Remembering	and	Rethinking	
the	GDR”,	for	instance,	looks	at	memory	cultures	and	the	different	ways	in	which	
the	GDR	is	reconstructed	and	reflected	on	in	the	media.	Social	scientific	work	on	the	
GDR	is	slowly	emerging.	Still,	qualitative	research	and	a	social	analysis	of	the	wider	
societal	effects	of	the	dictatorship	are	still	relatively	few	and	far	apart.	Significantly,	
the	number	of	anthropologists	studying	the	former	GDR	remains	relatively	small.	
Anselma	Gallinat	has	probably	written	most	extensively	about	the	former	GDR	and	
East	Germany	focussing	on	a	very	wide	range	of	topics	such	as	regime-change	
(2009a),	the	role	of	personal	and	social	memory	(2009b),	identity	and	narratives	
(2015).	She	has	also	explored	notions	of	morality	and	secrecy	in	her	work	with	
former	political	prisoners	(2006)	and	her	reflections	on	the	Stasi	(2009c;	2015).		
Another	well-known	anthropological	account	is	“Where	the	World	Ended”	by	
Daphne	Berdahl.	She	conducted	fieldwork	in	a	village	located	right	at	the	border	
between	East	and	West	Germany	in	the	early	1990’s.		She	paints	a	vivid	picture	of	
villagers’	lives,	including	their	exceptional	religiosity.	She	describes	their	struggles	
during	communist	rule,	such	as	clashes	with	authorities,	the	arbitrariness	of	the	
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state,	as	well	as,	the	deportation	of	some	of	the	village	inhabitants.	Further,	she	
sheds	light	on	everyday	concerns	like	chronic	shortages	of	consumer	goods	and	
how	people	managed	to	overcome	them,	how	they	used	relationships	to	their	
advantage	and	secretly	bartered	for	products.	She	explores	what	life	so	close	to	the	
border	entailed,		how	its	fall	affected	the	village	and	the	following	consequences	
such	as	unemployment.		
Despite	being	less	of	a	classic	ethnography	Hans	Baer’s	Crumbling	Walls	and	
tarnished	Ideals	(1998)	is	another	anthropological	study	on	the	GDR,	which	looks	at	
post-revolutionary	society	and	the	contradictions	between	ideology	and	real	life	
socialism.	Like	many	authors,	he	searches	for	the	reasons	behind	the	collapse	of	
state.	He	has	written	a	number	of	articles	on	life	in	the	GDR,	before	and	after	1989.	
Glaeser	(2011)	has	probably	written	the	most	comprehensive	social	scientific	study	
on	the	Stasi,	I	have	come	across	so	far.		His	sociological	research	focusses	on	the	
role	of	“political	understanding”	within	the	institutional	and	societal	processes	of	
the	GDR.	His	detailed	account	of	Stasi	officials	and	civil	activists	of	the	peace	
movement	of	the	1980’s,	offers	insight	into	the	two	groups’	contrasting	world-
views	and	motivations.	Glaeser	argues	that	the	Stasi’s	accumulation	of	knowledge	
and	the	state’s	claims	to	superior	insight	into	the	human	condition,	were	
unsuccessful	in	solving	the	problems	of	real	existing	socialism.	He	links	the	regime’s	
collapse	to	some	extent	to	the	over-use	of	ideology	and	propaganda.	The	Marxist-
Leninist	ideology	propagated	by	the	regime,	and	in	particular	by	the	Stasi,	
contradicted	the	real	life	situation	that	East	Germans	experienced	on	an	everyday	
basis.	The	secret	police	as	well	as	the	political	elite	of	the	GDR	were	unable	to	
abandon	their	old	ideology,	clinging	onto	their	own	notions	of	reality	within	the	
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country.	Anyone	who	questioned	these	was	deemed	an	“anti-socialist”	and	
therefore	an	enemy	of	the	state.	Economic,	social	and	environmental	problems	
were	also	largely	ignored	by	the	leadership,	as	they	refused	to	reform	the	GDR’s	
political	institutions,	only	in	order	to	maintain	the	illusion	of	the	perfectly	
functioning	state.	So,	by	the	late	1980’s	state	institutions,	did	not	solve	problems	or	
improve	living	conditions,	but	rather	became	fetishized	versions	of	themselves,	
merely	propagating	ideology	(Glaeser,	2011).		
Looking	at	the	topic	of	secret	police	surveillance	in	the	former	Soviet	Bloc	more	
broadly,	the	anthropological	work	of	Katherine	Verdery	(1996;	2014)	stands	out.	
She	has	studied	(post-)	socialism	and	transformations	in	Romania	and	Transylvania.	
In	Secrets	and	Truths	(2014)	she	explored	the	Romanian	secret	police	force,	also	
known	as	Securitate.	Here,	she	considered	how	the	institution	compares	to	classical	
anthropological	concepts	about	secret	societies.	She	researched	the	archives	and	
even	investigated	her	own	file.	In	fact,	she	is	one	of	a	few	authors	who	had	the	
chance	to	conduct	research	in	Eastern	Europe	pre-1989	and	was	viewed	with	
suspicion	by	the	authorities	and	therefore	put	under	surveillance.	Similarly,	
Vatulescu	(2012)	examined	her	own	records	and	the	“aesthetics	of	secret	police	
files”	in	general.	The	journalist	Timothy	Garton	Ash,	also	reflects	on	his	own	Stasi	
records	in	“The	File”	(1998).	
So	we	can	see	that,	while	there	is	surely	a	fascination	with	Cold	War	spy	stories	and	
life	in	seemingly	“exotic”	socialism,	there	remains	so	much	to	be	explored.	
Understanding	people’s	memories,	feelings	and	opinions	on	the	past	dictatorship	
are	essential	in	the	reconciliation	process.	One	of	the	main	reasons	why	the	study	
of	East	Germany	is	so	fascinating,	is	probably	also	intimidating:	it	is	highly	complex	
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and	contradictory.	Especially	with	regards	to	studying	the	Stasi	-	reservations,	
suspicion	and	distancing	continue	to	persist,	making	qualitative	research	difficult	at	
times.	The	remembrance	culture	is	accordingly	ambivalent,	ranging	from	“ostalgic”	
feelings	to	extreme	antipathy	towards	the	former	GDR,	and	everything	in-between.		
	Undoubtedly,	a	deeper	social	analysis	of	life	under	socialism	and	the	subsequent	
transformations	is	needed.	In	this	thesis,	I	would	like	to	embark	on	new	territory	
and	attempt	to	understand	East	Germans’	experiences	of	Stasi	surveillance	from	
two	anthropological	standpoints,	namely	from	a	political	and	a	medical	perspective,	
as	well	as	their	intersection.	In	the	following	section,	I	will	start	by	looking	at	
anthropological	concepts	of	the	state	and	governance.	Accordingly,	I	will	attempt	to	
place	GDR	surveillance	within	this	framework.		
	
The	State	and	its	governance		
	
For	a	long	time,	social	and	political	scientists	have	regarded	the	state	as	a	clearly	
bounded	entity,	which	exists	separately	from	society.	Indeed,	not	only	was	the	state	
seen	as	the	ultimate	expression	of	the	“nation”,	but	it	was	believed	to	hold	all	
power	as	the	single	most	significant	actor,	which	possessed	the	monopoly	over	
violence	and	territory.	However,	this	clearly	bounded	concept	of	the	state	has	been	
increasingly	challenged	due	its	restrictive	nature	(Abrams	1988;	Mitchell	1991,	
1999;	Foucault	1991).		
Abrams	(2006	(1988))	questions	“the	state”	as	an	ideological	construct,	since	it	is	
not	an	“object”	that	physically	exists.	He	argues	that	the	state	should	not	be	studied	
like	a	material,	bounded	entity,	but	rather	the	“idea	of	the	state”	should	be	
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considered.	He	encourages	us	to	pay	especially	close	attention	to	the	particular	
legitimating	processes,	which	often	take	place	coercively	in	exercising	power	over	a	
population.	He	writes	that	it	is	the	“institutions	of	the	state	system”,	which	initiate	
the	subjection	of	certain	groups,	creating	hierarchies	of	power.	Abrams	elaborates,	
“the	crux	of	the	task	is	to	over-accredit	them	as	an	integrated	expression	of	
common	interest	cleanly	dissociated	from	all	sectional	interests	and	the	structures	
–	class,	church,	race	and	so	forth	–	associated	with	them.”	(Abrams	2006	(1988)	p.	
122)	It	is	institutions	like	the	judicial,	educational	systems,	as	well	as	prisons	and	
armies	which	actively	legitimise	illegitimate	actions,	that	are	in	reality	aimed	at	
subjecting	people	to	their	power.	
Concealment	plays	a	very	important	role	in	the	ideological	notion	of	the	state,	as	it	
facilitates	the	control	and	governance	of	people	by	particular	actors,	all	in	order	to	
achieve	certain	means.	In	more	drastic	terms	Abrams	writes,	“the	state	is	not	the	
reality	which	stands	behind	the	mask	of	political	practice.	It	is	itself	the	mask	which	
prevents	our	seeing	political	practice	as	it	is.	It	is,	one	could	almost	say,	the	mind	of	
a	mindless	world,	the	purpose	of	purposeless	conditions,	the	opium	of	the	citizen”	
(Abrams	2006	(1988),	p.	125).	
Timothy	Mitchell	(1991;	1999),	too,	believes	that	the	separation	of	state	and	society	
is	achieved	through	particular	social	practices,	which	exert	power	and	social	control.		
He	says	that	“the	phenomenon	we	name	‘the	state’	arises	from	techniques	that	
enable	mundane	material	practices	to	take	on	the	appearance	of	an	abstract,	
nonmaterial	form”	(Mitchell	2006	(1999)	p.	170).	So,	through	the	numerous	
everyday	social	norms	and	practices,	conducted	by	a	variety	of	actors,	enact	power	
and	control.	He	writes,	“construed	as	a	machinery	of	intentions	–	usually	termed	
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rule-making,	decision	making,	or	policymaking	–	state	becomes	essentially	a	
subjective	realm	of	plans,	programs,	or	ideas.”	It	is	the	resulting	procedures;	
intertwining	state,	society	and	economy,	which	exert	power	over	people.	
Mitchell	argues	that	the	“state	should	be	addressed	as	an	effect	of	the	detailed	
operations	of	power,	of	its	spatial	and	temporal	organisation,	and	its	techniques,	
functions	and	symbols.”		In	other	words,	the	power	of	the	state	does	not	work	from	
the	outside	but	from	within	society,	through	social	life	and	“it	does	this	not	by	
constructing	individual	actions,	but	by	producing	them.”	This	is	very	much	in	line	
with	Foucault’s	(1977;	1991)	standpoint,	which	I	will	examine	in	more	detail	later.	
He,	too,	asserted	that	the	state	itself	is	not	“the	ultimate	seat	of	power”,	but	it	is	
instead	social	and	institutional	actors,	which	direct	people’s	behaviour	in	seemingly	
mundane	everyday	practices.		
Understanding	the	state	through	social	processes	
Using	the	United	Kingdom	as	a	case	study,	Joyce	(2013)	highlights	how	“liberalism”	
goes	hand	in	hand	with	“order”	and	draws	attention	to	the	role	of	social	
relationships.	The	UK	is	an	interesting	example	of	how	hierarchy	is	created	by	the	
cultivation	of	particular	social	relationships,	in	which	certain	groups	are	governing,	
while	others	are	being	governed.		
The	British	example	shows	how	tightly	intertwined	the	state	and	society	actually	
are.	Joyce	explains	that	“(…)	the	supposed	bastions	of	hierarchy	and	“tradition”	–	
the	monarchy,	the	established	Church,	the	Armed	Forces,	the	Conservative	Party,	
the	House	of	Lords,	the	public	schools	(the	list	in	Britain	is	very	long)	-	are	inimical	
to	the	liberal	state	for	the	simple	fact	that	they	are	an	integral	part	of	it.	They	are	
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the	other	side	of	the	same	liberal	coin,	that	of	authority,	order	and	control.”	(Joyce	
2013,	p.7).	In	the	context	of	my	research	it	is	therefore	essential	to	recognise	the	
power	that	lies	within	the	“social”,	not	necessarily	“society”.		
Power	is	expressed	by	the	social	in	various	forms,	these	can	be	physical	(e.g.	one’s	
house),	in	writing,	in	gender	relations,	education	or	even	legalised	coercions	(Joyce	
2013).	So	it	can	be	said	that	social	power	may	be	found	in	“localised	versions	of	the	
state”	as	well	as	particular	social	relationships	and	processes.		
Social	processes,	which	are	inherently	political,	are	what	Bourdieu	(1984)	called	
“habitus”.	He	suggests	that	state	actors	produce	and	impose	particular	“categories	
of	thought”,	which	shape	and	determine	what	people	believe	about	them.	These	
particular	categories	are	applied	in	everyday	life	and	constitute	“habitus”.		
The	term	describes	“the	set	of	socially	acquired	dispositions,	skills	and	schemes	of	
behaviour	which	are	acquired	by	people	in	the	activities	of	everyday	life.	It	
highlights	the	non-discursive,	taken-for-granted	aspects	of	social	life	that	often	
operate	outside	conscious	awareness.”	(Joyce	2013,	p.7)	I	would	therefore	propose	
that	in	the	Soviet	Bloc,	for	example,	habitus	came	to	determine	much	of	everyday	
life.	Due	to	the	heavy	influence	of	state	actors	on	the	private	sphere,	even	the	most	
intimate	moments	gained	substantial	political	significance.	With	the	concept	of	
habitus,	Bourdieu	(1984)	also	encapsulates	what	many	other	authors	have	
described	(see	Abrams	1988;	Mitchell	1999;	Joyce	2013)	namely,	that	the	state	is	
constituted	through	socio-political	processes	within	society	and	that	this	creates	
conditions	in	which	even	the	abnormal	is	normalised,	allowing	for	extreme	
exercises	of	power.	Joyce	summarises,	that	“this	‘normalisation’	enables	the	
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ordering	and	the	sanctioning	of	what	would	otherwise	be	regarded	as	abnormal.	
This	eventually	extends	to	the	abnormal	in	extreme	forms,	so	that	the	state	has	
been	enabled	through	the	routines	it	has	established	in	its	mundane	operation	to	
order	and	incorporate	not	only	injustice	and	inequality	as	‘normal’	but	famine,	
social	conflict,	and	eventually	if	with	some	difficulty,	mass	war	and	the	mass	
extermination	of	human	beings”	(Joyce	2013,	p.7).		
So	to	summarise,	understandings	of	the	nation	state	as	a	distinct,	solitary	actor	of	
power	over	society	must	be	challenged.	Instead,	different	power	processes	are	
deeply	embedded	within	society,	(as	indeed	the	East	German	police	was).	It	is	these	
processes	and	relationships,	which	I	will	focus	my	thesis	on.		
My	ethnographic	fieldwork	shows	that	the	state	and	society	are	not	clearly	
separable,	but	inherently	intertwined	even	in	the	most	mundane	everyday	actions	–	
take	for	example	small	children	singing	socialist	propaganda	songs	in	GDR	
Kindergartens.	These	children	may	have	greatly	enjoyed	the	act	of	singing	and	may	
even	have	liked	the	lyrics	of	the	songs,	without	initially	understanding	their	
propagandistic	function.	Yet,	one	could	say	that	such	songs	were	a	successful	tool	
to	instil	the	ideology	of	socialism	from	an	early	age,	leading	them	internalise	
particular	ideas	about	correct	behaviour.	So,	although	a	state	department	initially	
ordered	the	integration	of	propaganda	in	the	education	system,	it	is	in	the	everyday	
life	of	society	where	political	power	is	translated	into	actions	and	vice	versa.	
	Although	my	informants	in	their	narratives	repeatedly	refer	to	the	“state”,	as	an	
actor	of	almost	almighty	power,	by	closer	examination	it	becomes	clear	that	the	
state’s	power	is	deeply	embedded	in	social	processes,	through	the	use	of	many	
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anonymous	actors	in	almost	all	interactions.	Notably,	through	an	Anthropological	
inquiry,	we	can	understand	how	the	concept	of	the	state	is	culturally	constructed,	
and	the	role	that	culture	plays	in	the	building	and	maintenance	of	it	(see	Steinmetz	
1999).	An	anthropological	lens	helps	us	discern	the	various	actors	involved	in	
processes	of	governance	(Sharma	&	Gupta	2006).	
Power	and	Foucault’s	theory	of	governmentality		
	
In	the	following	section,	I	would	like	to	pay	closer	attention	to	ideas	about	power.		
As	mentioned	previously,	Foucault,	too,	was	critical	of	accrediting	the	state	too	
much	power.	He	writes,	that	in	reality,	the	state	does	not	possess	the	attributes	or	
importance	that	it	is	often	ascribed.	He	claims	that	the	state	by	itself	is	simply	a	
myth.	Rather,	it	is	the	people	in	the	apparatuses	within	society,	which	govern	the	
state.	He	proposed	instead	to	consider	the	concept	of	governmentality:	a	process	
by	which	social	conduct,	places	and	things	become	a	tool	in	political	control.	He	
elaborates,	
“This	governmentalization	of	the	state	is	a	singularly	paradoxical	phenomenon,	
since	if	in	fact	the	problems	of	governmentality	and	techniques	of	government	
have	become	the	only	political	issue,	the	only	real	space	for	political	struggle	and	
contestation,	this	is	because	the	governmentalization	of	the	state	is	at	the	same	
time	what	has	permitted	the	state	to	survive,	and	it	is	possible	to	suppose	that	if	
the	state	is	what	it	is	today,	this	is	so	precisely	thanks	to	this	governmentality,	
which	is	at	once	internal	and	external	to	the	state,	since	it	is	the	tactics	of	
government	which	make	possible	the	continual	definition	and	redefinition	of	
what	is	within	the	competence	of	the	state	and	what	is	not,	the	public	versus	the	
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private,	and	so	on;	thus	the	state	can	only	be	understood	in	its	survival	and	its	
limits	on	the	basis	of	the	general	tactics	of	governmentality”	(Foucault	(2006)	
1991	p.143).		
Mitchell	clarifies	that	for	Foucault	“government”	is	less	about	the	formal	
institutions	and	apparatuses	themselves	but	about	the	methods	and	techniques	
that	are	utilized	to	achieve	certain	means	(Mitchell	1999	(2006)).	Therefore,	
governmentality	can	be	understood	as	“the	ensemble	formed	by	the	institutions,	
procedures,	analyses	and	reflections,	the	calculations	and	tactics	that	allow	the	
exercise	of	this	very	specific	albeit	complex	form	of	power,	which	has	as	its	target	
population,	as	its	principal	form	of	knowledge	political	economy,	and	as	its	essential	
technical	means	apparatuses	of	security.”	(Foucault	(1991)1977)	
Yet,	Foucault’s	idea	has	been	criticised	for	going	too	far	in	downplaying	the	role	of	
the	state.	Joyce	(2013,	p.29)	writes	that	“the	governmentality	literature,	in	
emphasising	power	beyond	the	state,	tended	to	throw	out	the	baby	of	the	state	
with	the	governmental	bathwater.”	Accordingly,	Foucauldian	approaches	tend	to	
emphasise	the	diffusion	of	different	types	of	power	(e.g.	disciplinary	power,	bio-
power),	without	paying	much	attention	to	the	state.		
So,	I	must	differentiate	in	my	analysis:	it	is	clear	that	the	state	does	possess	power.	
Although	it	may	not	be	a	singular,	bounded	entity,	the	state	does	have	the	power	to	
normalise	abnormal	and	even	dangerous	processes	such	as	violence,	war	and	
famine.		While	Foucault	may	go	too	far	in	undermining	the	overall	significance	of	
the	state,	his	ideas	are	nonetheless	incredibly	useful	in	understanding	how	power	is	
exercised.	In	the	context	of	this	thesis,	Foucault’s	assumptions	about	
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governmentality	lay	the	groundwork	for	analysing	the	methods	and	purpose	of	
surveillance	in	the	context	of	the	GDR.	His	theories	on	different	types	of	power	and	
modes	of	governance	can	help	us	place	Stasi	surveillance	within	a	theoretical	
framework.	
In	Foucault’s	writings	we	can	see	that	his	perspectives	and	focus	changed	over	time.	
He	began	by	attempting	to	understand	the	goals	of	early	government	–	I.e.	in	a	
sovereign	society,	the	main	aim	was	for	a	leader	to	gain	control	over	territory	and	
his	subjects,	through	exercising	strict	prohibitions.	Foucault	then	went	on	to	study	
disciplinary	societies,	in	which	not	only	the	mode	but	also	the	object	of	governance	
changed	(from	entire	populations	to	individuals)	(Galic	et	al.	2017,	p.	16).	He	found	
that	power	is	diffuse	and	“hidden	in	the	processes	of	conformity	present	in	
different	places	of	society.”	This	is	where	Foucault	asserted	his	standpoint	that	
disciplinary	power	is	not	only	exercised	by	the	state,	but	indeed,	through	different	
institutions	which	merge,	shift	and	change	in	order	to	produce	the	desired	
outcomes	(Galic	et	al.	2017).	In	this	context	he	further	consolidated	his	ideas	about	
surveillance	as	a	method	of	control,	which	I	will	examine	in	more	detail	later.	It	is	
important	to	note	that	“although	this	power	operates	somewhat	independently	
from	the	judicial	and	government	apparatus,	it	nevertheless	requires	institutions	
and	the	state,	since	it	works	through	them—‘the	state,	correctional	institutions,	and	
medical	institutions	[need	to]	be	regarded	as	coagulations	of	practices’”(Valverde	
2008,	p.18	cited	in	Galic	et	al.	2017).	
So,	which	aspects	are	involved	in	generating	and	maintaining	disciplinary	power?	
On	the	one	hand	it	takes	place	through	the	utilisation	of	ideology,	on	the	other	by	
something	Foucault	called	“normation”.	He	writes,	“The	perpetual	penalty	that	
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traverses	all	points	and	supervises	every	instant	in	the	disciplinary	institutions,	
compares,	differentiates,	hierarchizes,	homogenizes,	excludes.	In	short,	it	
normalizes”	(Foucault	1977,	p.	183).	Governing	people,	therefore	means	leading	
them	to	comply	with	particular	ideas	–	i.e.	the	norm.	Dalibert	(2013)	explains	that	
the	norm	“constitutes	what	one	has	to	conform	to	and	strive	for;	it	is	both	standard	
and	ideal.	Being	regarded	as	normal	is	to	conform	to	the	norm,	hence	to	occupy	the	
position	of	the	invisible,	i.e.	unmarked	by	difference	construed	as	abnormality,	and	
putative	universal	subject.	The	abnormal	is	the	one	deemed	deficient	and	inferior	in	
relation	to	the	norm(al)”	(Dalibert	2013).	In	the	same	vein,	Canguilhem	(1989)	has	
asserted	that	what	is	deemed	“normal”	and	even	what	is	regarded	as	
“pathological”,	is	certainly	not	based	on	objective	facts,	but	always	culturally	and	
politically	relative.	As	I	will	elaborate	later,	ideas	about	“normalisation”	will	become	
very	important	in	this	thesis.	
In	conclusion	it	can	be	said	that,	we	should	not	simply	examine	the	state	and	
society	as	separate,	independent	actors	but	rather	try	to	understand	the	processes	
involved	in	governance	(i.e.	surveillance)	because,	as	Mitchell	asserts,	“the	essence	
of	modern	politics	is	not	policies	formed	on	one	side	of	this	division	being	applied	to	
or	shaped	by	the	other,	but	the	producing	and	reproducing	of	these	lines	of	
difference.”	(Mitchell	2006	(1999)	p.	185).	In	the	following	section,	I	will	look	at	the	
interaction	of	ideology	and	power.	How	societies	may	abide	by	and	promote	
particular	norms	and	rules,	even	if	individuals	do	not	believe	in	their	value.	
Power	and	Ideology		
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Before	examining	the	method	of	surveillance	in	detail,	I	would	like	to	shed	more	
light	on	the	interplay	between	ideology	and	power	in	a	real-life	context.	Hannah	
Arendt	wrote:	“To	establish	a	totalitarian	regime,	terror	must	be	presented	as	an	
instrument	for	carrying	out	a	specific	ideology;	and	that	ideology	must	have	won	
the	adherence	of	many,	and	even	a	majority,	before	terror	can	be	stabilized.”		
It	is	important	to	understand	that	ideology	serves	a	specific	purpose,	it	is	a	means	
to	an	end	so	to	speak;	as	ideology	monopolizes	the	truth.	It	gives	sense	to	the	
senseless	and	mundane	actions	of	life	under	real	socialism.	It	excuses	acts	of	
violence	and	intimidation,	for	the	purpose	of	the	greater	good.	It	discourages	the	
population	from	questioning	the	regime.	Indeed,	it	stops	people	from	being	
engaged	–	it	stops	them	from	thinking.		
Vaclav	Havel’s	essay	“The	Power	of	the	Powerless”	is	excellent,	not	only	to	
understand	the	multitude	of	forces	interacting	in	governance,	but	his	work	(written	
in	1985)	provides	a	unique	insight	into	life	in	the	former	Soviet	Bloc.	Although	Havel	
analyses	the	Soviet	Bloc	as	a	whole	and	the	“system”	within	it,	I	have	found	his	
observations	to	be	spot-on	and	very	relatable	to	the	East	German	context.		
Havel	writes	that	the	Soviet	Bloc	was	not	a	dictatorship	in	the	classic	sense,	as	it	
was	not	limited	geographically	within	a	single	country,	but	it	was	a	“huge	power	
bloc	controlled	by	one	of	the	two	super	powers.”	This	meant	that	any	sign	of	
resistance	or	uprising	of	a	population	could	be	controlled	by	not	only	a	single	
national	army	but	by	the	armed	forces	of	several	states,	if	necessary.	This	created	a	
power	structure	so	immense,	it	is	hard	for	us	to	imagine	today.	(And,	as	I	would	
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argue,	also	creating	a	massive	feeling	of	powerlessness	on	behalf	of	those	who	
were	against	it).	
The	Soviet	Bloc	also	differed	substantially	from	other	dictatorships,	due	its	unique	
psycho-social	conditions,	in	particular	the	response	to	the	ideology	that	was	
embedded	in	everyday	activities	of	“real	existing	socialism”.	In	the	following	
chapters,	I	outline	some	of	the	ways	in	which	this	took	place	(e.g.	in	schools,	the	
workplace	and	even	on	vacation).	Havel	writes	that	“(…)	it	commands	an	
incomparably	more	precise,	logically	structured,	generally	comprehensible	and,	in	
essence,	extremely	flexible	ontology	that,	in	its	elaborateness	and	completeness,	is	
almost	a	secularized	religion.”	(Havel	1985,	p.	25)	Socialism	was	certainly	a	
tempting	system	to	follow,	as	its	ideology	was	relatable	and	seemed	to	solve	
humankind’s	most	pressing	problems	(as	confirmed	by	my	informants,	see	Chapter	
3),	while	apparently	providing	a	home	for	all.	But,	Havel	warned,	“Of	course,	one	
pays	dearly	for	this	low-rent	home:	the	price	is	its	abdication	of	one’s	own	reason,	
conscience,	and	responsibility,	for	an	essential	aspect	of	this	ideology	is	the	
consignment	of	reason	and	conscience	to	a	higher	authority”	(Havel	1985,	p.25).	
As	this	thesis	demonstrates,	we	may	observe	a	unique	form	of	governmentality	in	
which	the	state	certainly	had	the	power	to	enforce	punishment,	yet	disciplinary	
power	and	control	was	largely	enacted	in,	and	deeply	embedded	within	society.	
Havel	even	claims	that	the	Soviet	Bloc	was	a	novel	totalitarian	regime,	with	a	new	
form	of	power	over	its	subjects:	an	intricate	system	of	direct	and	indirect	
manipulation.	Havel	calls	it	a	“post-totalitarian”	regime.	(However,	as	this	could	be	
a	misleading	term	I	prefer	to	use	the	word	“neo-totalitarian”,	from	here	on.)		
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Besides	the	Soviet	Union’s	vastness,	Havel	points	out	the	importance	of	“state	
ownership	and	central	direction	of	all	the	means	of	production”,	as	this	gave	the	
system	even	more	power.	It	gave	the	“power	structure	an	unprecedented	and	
uncontrollable	capacity	to	invest	in	itself	(in	the	areas	of	bureaucracy	and	the	
police,	for	example)	and	makes	it	easier	for	that	structure,	as	the	sole	employer,	to	
manipulate	the	day-to-day	existence	of	all	citizens”	(1985	p.26).	In	other	words,	the	
regime	had	complete	influence	on	all	areas	of	life,	controlling	everything	from	
employment	to	accommodation.		
Understanding	Ideology	in	the	Lme	of	Socialism:	The	Greengrocer	
Havel	provides	an	excellent	example	to	illustrate	how	the	system	of	“real	existing	
socialism”	maintained	itself	at	the	time	and	the	role	that	ideology	and	propaganda	
played	in	this.	Havel	writes,	“The	manager	of	a	fruit	and	vegetable	shop	places	in	his	
window,	among	the	onions	and	carrots,	the	socialist	slogan:	‘Workers	of	the	World,	
Unite!’”.	Then	he	asks,	“Why	does	he	do	it?	What	is	he	trying	to	communicate	to	
the	world?”.	He	finds	that	there	are	a	multitude	of	answers	to	these	questions,	least	
of	them	are	expected,	such	as	the	greengrocer’s	strong	conviction	of	the	socialist	
cause.	Indeed,	Havel	claims	that	“it	can	be	safely	assumed	that	the	overwhelming	
majority	of	shopkeepers	never	think	about	the	slogans	they	put	in	their	windows,	
nor	do	they	use	them	to	express	their	real	opinions”	(1985,	p.27).	Rather,	the	
shopkeeper	put	the	sign	in	the	window	because	this	was	what	everyone	did,	what	
had	been	done	for	years	and	because	it	was	what	was	expected	of	him.	
Furthermore,	he	had	to	uphold	the	image	of	the	obedient	citizen	in	order	to	live	
peacefully	without	the	harassment	of	state	officials	or	his	fellow	citizens.	The	
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salesman	thus	followed	the	unwritten	rules,	because	“these	things	must	be	done	if	
one	is	to	get	along	in	life”	(1985,	p.28).		
So,	Havel	explains	that	by	putting	the	sign	in	his	window,	the	action	is	deeply	
connected	to	the	greengrocer’s	personal,	“vital”	interests.	His	interests	have	
nothing	to	do	with	the	socialist	slogan,	but	the	slogan	provides	a	good	cover-up	for	
the	real	purpose	of	this	procedure.	Since	he	does	not	want	to	risk	being	publicly	
humiliated,	“his	expression	of	loyalty	must	take	the	form	of	a	sign	which,	at	least	on	
its	textual	surface,	indicates	a	level	of	disinterested	conviction”	(Havel	1985,	p.28).		
It	is	this	seemingly	mundane	“obedient”	action	which	illustrates	the	role	of	ideology	
and	propaganda	in	socialist	everyday	life.	It	covers	up	the	realities	of	state-control	
and	obedience.	Havel	explains	that	the	sign	“must	allow	the	greengrocer	to	say,	
‘What’s	wrong	with	the	workers	of	the	world	uniting?’	Thus	the	sign	helps	the	
greengrocer	to	conceal	from	himself	the	low	foundations	of	his	obedience,	at	the	
same	time	concealing	the	low	foundations	of	power.	It	hides	them	behind	the	
façade	of	something	high.	And	that	something	is	ideology”	(Havel	1985,	p.28).	
Therefore,	ideology	helps	to	justify	actions	(and	inaction),	it	aides	in	deceiving	one’s	
conscience	(in	the	name	of	creating	something	better,	serving	the	common	good	
etc.)	and	it	hides	true	opinions	from	oneself	and	those	surrounding	him.		
Maintaining	the	order	
	
One	of	the	main	purposes	of	ideology	is	therefore	to	conceal	realities	and	excuse	
certain	actions,	to	maintain	the	order	of	the	socialist	system.	This	was	true	for	
everyone	within	that	system,	regular	citizens	and	state	officials	alike.	Havel	
explains,	“The	primary	excusatory	function	of	ideology,	therefore,	is	to	provide	
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people,	both	as	victims	and	pillars	of	the	post-totalitarian	system,	with	the	illusion	
that	the	system	is	in	harmony	with	the	human	order	and	the	order	of	the	universe.”	
(Havel	1985,	p.	29).		
Similarly,	in	my	interviews,	I	encountered	many	situations	where	my	informants	did	
not	question	certain	aspects	of	the	dictatorship,	simply	claiming	that	“that	was	just	
how	things	were	done	back	then”.	This	could	be	seen	in	seemingly	mundane	
activities,	as	illustrated	in	Havel’s	example.	But,	when	blatant	injustice	is	not	
challenged	but	excused	as	serving	the	socialist	cause,	it	becomes	clear	that	ideology	
serves	a	very	particular	purpose.	On	the	one	hand,	it	maintains	the	order	by	
providing	convenient	excuses.	On	the	other,	ideology	is	the	link	between	the	regime	
and	the	people,	it	keeps	the	system	running	smoothly.	So,	the	constant	demand	for	
conformity,	uniformity,	and	discipline,	was	a	means	for	ensuring	the	system	would	
be	maintained,	while	inciting	a	social	phenomenon	where	“self-preservation	is	sub-
ordinated	to	something	higher,	to	a	kind	of	blind	automatism	which	drives	the	
system”.	(Havel	1985,	p.30)	Therefore,	much	of	what	keeps	this	system	running	is	
based	on	hypocrisy	and	lies	according	to	Havel,	indeed	he	claims	“the	regime	is	
captive	to	its	own	lies”,	caught	up	in	a	game	of	pretences	(Havel	1985,	p.31).	Havel	
phrases	this	phenomenon	as	“living	within	a	lie”:	in	order	to	keep	the	said	system	
going	and	to	avoid	any	disorder,	citizens	had	to	tolerate	falsehoods	and	even	live	by	
them.	They	had	to	“accept	appearances	as	reality”,	participate	in	and	“accept	the	
prescribed	ritual”,	just	as	the	greengrocer	did	when	he	put	the	sign	into	his	shop	
window.	As	I	will	show	in	this	thesis,	this	is	exactly	how	the	all-encompassing	
surveillance	system	functioned.		
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Understanding	power	in	the	neo-totalitarian	system	
Havel	focuses	less	on	the	state,	but	rather	on	“the	system”.	By	this	he	means	the	
Soviet	regime	which	not	only	controlled	one	state	but	the	entire	Eastern	Bloc.	
Although	there	were	local	differences,	the	unique	neo-totalitarian	structures	had	
very	similar	attributes	throughout	the	Bloc.	Havel	describes	how	power	was	
generated	within	the	system	creating	a	“power	structure”,	which	was	constituted,	
maintained	and	bound	through	a	variety	of	mechanisms,	only	one	of	which	was	
ideology.	Only	if	all	parts	of	the	power	structure	worked	together,	could	the	system	
continue	to	exist.	It	was	therefore	essential	that	this	“metaphysical	order”	of	things	
would	be	upheld	in	order	to	protect	the	power	structure.		
In	line	with	the	literature	I	reviewed	above	(Mitchell	1999;	Abrams	1988;	Joyce	
2013	Foucault	1977),	we	learn	that	governance	is	deeply	embedded	within	society,	
and	the	system	that	Havel	speaks	of.	This	is	not	“a	social	order	imposed	by	one	
group	upon	another”,	but	as	we	have	seen	it	is	“something	which	permeates	the	
entire	society	and	is	a	factor	in	shaping	it,	something	which	may	seem	impossible	to	
grasp	or	define	(for	it	is	in	the	nature	of	a	mere	principle),	but	which	is	expressed	by	
the	entire	society	as	an	important	feature	of	its	life.”	(Havel,	1985,	p.37).	
The	common	ritual	and	anonymous	power	
	
Resonating	with	what	I	said	earlier	about	the	role	of	the	state,	it	did	not	matter	so	
much	who	held	which	position	in	the	system,	as	power	became	anonymous	(see	
also	Foucault	1977).	Even	when	internal	power	struggles	took	place	amongst	
individuals,	the	order	was	mostly	restored	swiftly	as	the	other	aspects	of	the	system	
remained	intact.	People	still	continued	to	accept	and	abide	by	the	common	rules	
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and	enacted	their	rituals	of	everyday	life,	enforced	by	the	“faceless	people”,	the	
“puppets”	of	state	institutions.		
Havel	makes	a	very	important	point	here,	which	helps	us	to	understand	how	the	
Stasi’s	power	gained	such	a	grip	on	the	population.	It	was	not	about	individual	
officers	doing	their	“duty”,	but	instead	the	significance	lay	within	the	system	that	
they	actively	maintained	and	enforced.	It	was	the	system	of	control,	which	became	
self-perpetuating.	No	one	knew	exactly	who	was	watching	them	at	any	given	time,	
but	it	did	not	matter	because	the	system	gave	the	illusion	that	the	almighty	control	
apparatus	was	present	and	ready	to	strike	at	any	moment.		
This	in	turn,	brings	us	to	Hannah	Arendt’s	work	on	the	“Banality	of	Evil”.	She	too	
speaks	of	a	totalitarian	system,	albeit	a	more	traditional	one,	in	which	everyone	
participates	knowingly	and	unknowingly	to	maintain	and	drive	the	system.	Like	
Havel,	she	explores	the	potential	of	individual	responsibility	for	crimes	committed	
in	the	regime.	Havel	asserts	that	Western	scholars	have	the	tendency	to	
overemphasize	the	power	of	individuals	in	the	Soviet	Bloc,	while	they	are	more	
often	than	not,	opportunistic	unreflecting	executers	that	keep	the	system	running.	
Significantly,	“this	automatism	is	far	more	powerful	than	the	will	of	any	individual;	
and	should	someone	possess	a	more	independent	will,	he	or	she	must	conceal	it	
behind	a	ritually	anonymous	mask	in	order	in	order	to	have	an	opportunity	to	enter	
the	power	hierarchy	at	all”	(Havel,	1985,	p.34).	Despite	the	seemingly	very	powerful	
nature	of	the	system,	it	was	still	fragile	because	it	was	built	on	lies.	It	was	only	
sustainable	as	long	as	the	people	would	participate	in	the	game	of	pretences	(1985,	
p.35).	History	taught	us	that	this	was	indeed	one	of	the	main	contributing	factors	
that	led	to	the	eventual	collapse	of	the	system	(see	for	example	Glaeser	2011).	
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To	conclude,	life	under	Socialism	was	a	life	in	an	all-encompassing	neo-totalitarian	
regime,	which	operated	its	power	from	“within”.	In	the	final	part	of	this	chapter,	I	
will	examine	one	of	the	particular	modes	of	governance	that	allowed	the	regime	to	
function	in	this	way:	surveillance.	While	I	will	go	into	the	specificities	of	what	Stasi	
spying	entailed	in	the	later	chapters	of	this	thesis,	I	would	like	to	provide	an	
overview	of	the	various	theories	that	have	emerged	to	make	sense	of	the	act	of	
surveillance	and	I	will	explore	how	the	surveillance	apparatus	of	the	GDR	may	
constitute	as	a	form	of	state	terror.	
Surveillance	Theories	
	
Like	the	study	of	the	state,	inquiries	on	surveillance	have	also	transformed	over	
time	and	can	be	divided	roughly	into	three	phases.	In	the	first	phase,	Bentham	and	
Foucault’s	theories	stand	out.	They	consider	the	Panopticon	and	panopticism,	
which	offer	architectural	theories	of	observation,	where	surveillance	is	largely	
physical	and	spatial	in	character	(Galic	et	al.2017).	
The	PanopLcon		
When	Jeremy	Bentham	visited	his	brother	in	Russia	in	the	late	1780's,	he	no_ced	a	
technique	that	he	used	to	watch	and	control	his	factory	workers.	Bentham	took	this	
idea	and	created	a	physical	design	of	how	the	same	method	could	be	applied	in	
diﬀerent	ins_tu_ons,	which	required	some	level	of	supervision;	schools,	factories,	
hospitals	and	most	famously	prisons	(Bentham	1843).	He	designed	a	circular	
building	with	an	observa_on	tower,	which	is	surrounded	by	individual	cells.	Inside	
the	tower	sits	the	watchman,	the	person	who	surveilles	those	who	are	meant	to	be	
supervised	and	controlled.	Those	who	are	being	watched	would	sit	in	the	cells	
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surrounding	the	watchtower.	The	watchman	can	at	any	_me	shine	a	light	on	one	of	
the	cells	and	see	the	person	inside,	while	at	the	same	_me	being	invisible	to	them.	
The	assump_on	is	that	those	who	are	surveilled	can	never	be	sure	whether	the	
watchman	is	looking	at	them	at	a	given	_me.	Therefore,	they	are	constantly	weary	
of	his	scru_ny.	This	uncertainty	creates	a	condi_on	of	self-policing,	where	those	who	
are	under	surveillance	alter	and	control	their	behaviour	to	avoid	punishment	
(Foucault	1977;	Lyon	2006,	2007).	
Michel	Foucault	analysed	this	model	in	Discipline	and	Punish	and	highlights	the	way	
in	which	this	idea	can	also	be	applied	to	condi_ons	of	disciplinary	socie_es.	Indeed,	
the	most	interes_ng	aspect	of	his	idea	is	the	asymmetrical	nature	of	surveillance.	
"He	who	is	subjected	to	a	ﬁeld	of	visibility,	and	who	knows	it,	assumes	responsibility	
for	the	constraints	of	power;	he	makes	them	play	spontaneously	upon	himself;	he	
inscribes	in	himself	the	power	rela_on	in	which	he	simultaneously	plays	both	roles;	
he	becomes	the	principle	of	his	own	subjec_on"	(Foucault	1977	(1975),	p.	202-203).	
Foucault	elaborates	on	the	anonymous	power	that	is	located	within	the	central	
tower	of	the	Panop_con,	proposing	that	"we	have	seen	that	anyone	may	come	and	
exercise	in	the	central	tower	the	func_ons	of	surveillance,	and	that	this	being	the	
case,	he	can	gain	a	clear	idea	of	the	way	the	surveillance	is	prac_ced"	(cited	in	Hier	
&	Greenberg	2007,	p.73).	In	individualising	the	"inmates"	and	exposing	them	to	
constant	observa_on,	the	eﬃcacy	of	the	model	as	a	tool	for	total	control	is	
increased.	Most	importantly	perhaps,	control	is	ensured	without	necessarily	
physically	exer_ng	power	(Hier	&	Greenberg	2007).		
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As	the	subsequent	chapters	of	this	thesis	show,	this	same	process	was	evident	in	the	
GDR,	where	the	state	transformed	the	public	servant	into	this	powerful	being	who	
controlled	every	aspect	of	the	ci_zens’	lives.	Signiﬁcantly,	I	argue	that	even	ci_zens	
themselves	were	easily	converted	into	watchmen,	informers	who	would	shine	a	
constant	light	on	the	people	who	"needed	to	be	watched".	Not	knowing	who	
actually	was	looking	at	you,	or	even	if	you	were	being	watched	improved	the	
eﬃcacy	of	this	model	of	surveillance.	As	my	ethnographic	accounts	suggest,	mutual	
surveillance	became	common-place.	
Post-PanopLc	Theories	
The	second	phase	of	surveillance	studies,	moves	away	from	classic	panoptic	
metaphors	and	shifts	the	focus	from	institutions	to	networks,	from	ostensible	forms	
of	discipline	to	relatively	opaque	forms	of	control.	But,	they	focus	largely	on	new	
forms	of	surveillance	that	involve	technology	and	do	not	place	much	emphasis	on	
physical	human	beings	but	largely	on	data	(Galic	et	al.	2017).	Scholars	such	as	
Latour	(2005),	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1987),	Deleuze	(1992),	Haggerty	and	Ericson	
(2000)	and	Murakami	Wood	(2013)	have	developed	post-panoptic	theories.			
Bruno	Latour’s	concept	of	the	oligopticon	for	example	urges	us	to	look	beyond	
Foucault’s	panopticon	as	it	is	too	large	and	utopian	in	his	opinion.	He	does	not	
agree	with	the	idea	of	a	“society	of	total	surveillance”:	
	“We,	however,	are	not	looking	for	utopia	but	for	places	on	earth	that	are	fully	
assignable.	Oligoptica	are	just	those	sites	since	they	do	exactly	the	opposite	of	
panoptica:	they	see	much	too	little	to	feed	the	megalomania	of	the	inspector	or	the	
paranoia	of	the	inspected,	but	what	they	see,	they	see	well…”	(Latour,	2005).		
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He	proposes	the	idea	of	an	oligopticon	instead:	conditions	where	there	are	a	
multitude	of	surveillance	devices.	They	record	everything	but	rarely	communicate	
with	one	another	and	therefore	cannot	create	conditions	of	absolute	surveillance.		
Further	surveillance	theories	have	emerged	in	which	the	observing	gaze	is	thought	
to	be	dispersed,	not	only	originating	from	a	single	site	(Wood	2003;	Deleuze	and	
Guattari	2003;	Haggerty	&	Ericson	2000).	Rhizomatic	surveillance	encapsulates	the	
idea	that	surveillance	is	a	series	of	"interconnected	roots	which	throw	up	shoots	in	
different	locations"	(Haggerty	&	Ericson	2000,	p.	614).		
Significantly,	this	theory	broadens	the	scope	of	who	the	surveillers	can	be:	
“While	Orwell	and	Foucault	talk	about	either	a	state	or	a	person	(or	at	least	
understood	as	a	limited	number	of	people	in	control)	of	surveillance	from	the	top	
down,	the	idea	of	rhizomatic	surveillance	connotes	that	the	hierarchies	of	
observation	are	disrupted	and	now	both	institutions	and	the	general	population	can	
become	surveillers”	(Haggerty	&	Ericson	2000,	p.	616).	Furthermore,	studying	
contemporary	surveillance	we	see	an	increasingly	quantitative	approach,	focussed	
primarly	on	the	categorisation	and	profiling	of	data.	This	trend	in	surveillance	
practices	noticeably	came	into	motion	in	the	aftermath	of	9/11	and	has	become	
relatively	accepted	and,	importantly,	has	been	normalised	since	then	(Haggerty	&	
Gazso	2005).	
Thirdly,	in	the	most	recent	approaches	to	surveillance	studies,	the	theories	of	the	
first	two	phases	have	been	expanded,	combined	and	reconceptualised.	These	new	
theories	examine	the	predominantly	technological	trends	of	“dataveillance,	access	
control,	social	sorting,	peer-to-peer	surveillance	and	resistance”	(Galic	et	al.	2017).	
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For	instance,	Albrechtslund	(2008)	has	examined	surveillance	practices	that	people	
are	engaged	in	on	social	media	sites.	He	contemplates	the	positive	sides	to	
surveillance,	such	as	the	entertainment	value	of	watching	others,	as	well	as	being	
watched	(Albrechtslund	and	Dubbeld	2005).	Galic	et	al.	(2000)	explain,	
“Albrechtslund	coins	the	term	‘participatory	surveillance’;	citizens/users	are	actively	
engaged	in	surveillance	themselves	as	watchers,	but	they	also	participate	
voluntarily	and	consciously	in	the	role	of	watched.”		
Post-PanopLc	Surveillance	in	the	GDR	
Overall,	we	can	see	that	there	are	a	multitude	of	surveillance	theories,	each	
adapting	to	particular	local	conditions	and	media	(i.e.	physical/digital/statistical).	
Ascribing	one	particular	theory	of	surveillance	to	the	context	of	the	former	GDR	is	
not	simple.		
Over	the	last	few	pages	of	this	chapter,	I	demonstrated	that	disciplinary	power	is	
generated	and	maintained	within	society,	with	the	state	(at	least	in	a	physical	
sense)	mainly	occupying	the	role	of	policymaker	and	ultimate	enforcer	of	
punishment	(e.g.	violence	and	imprisonment).	As	we	saw,	in	neo-totalitarianism	the	
main	aim	was	to	preserve	and	protect	the	socialist	system,	eliminating	any	threat.	
Surveillance	therefore	played	an	important	role	in	achieving	this.	Controlling	all	
areas	of	citizens’	lives,	Stasi	spies	were	able	to	observe,	listen	to	and	influence	GDR	
citizens’	interactions.	Especially	due	to	the	high	number	of	undercover	informants,	
a	feeling	of	omnipresence	was	created,	leading	to	conformity,	fear	and	suspicion.	
Significantly,	people	not	only	complied	for	fear	of	repercussions,	they	also	came	to	
pressure	those	around	them	to	conform	-	knowingly	and	unknowingly.	Havel	called	
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this	form	of	forced	conformity	“social	auto-totality”.	He	wrote,	“They	do	what	is	
done,	what	is	to	be	done,	what	must	be	done,	but	at	the	same	time	–	by	that	very	
token	–	they	confirm	that	it	must	be	done	in	fact.	They	conform	to	a	particular	
requirement	and	in	doing	so	they	themselves	perpetuate	that	requirement.”	(Havel	
1985,	p.36)	In	other	words,	social	auto-totality	works	by	involving	each	and	every	
citizen,	leading	them	to	reinforce	the	system	amongst	themselves,	even	exerting	
pressure	on	one	another	to	conform	and	maintain	the	order.	
With	respect	to	surveillance	this	meant	that	everyone	watched	one	another.	As	I	
will	demonstrate	through	my	informants’	narratives	in	the	following	chapters,	the	
destructive	forces	of	the	East	German	surveillance	apparatus	were	two-fold.	Firstly,	
people	suffered	from	the	direct	results	of	Stasi	operative	techniques	such	as	
repression,	intimidation	and	imprisonment	by	state	officials.	And	secondly,	
especially	notable	in	this	context,	they	endured	societal	dynamics	that	led	those	
who	did	not	conform	to	be	ostracised	and	even	abnormalised.	Havel	explains	how	
this	interplay	of	complacency	and	intimidation	created	adverse	societal	conditions,	
in	which	people	“may	learn	to	be	comfortable	with	their	involvement,	to	identify	
with	it	as	though	it	were	something	natural	and	inevitable	and	ultimately,	so	they	
may	–	with	no	external	urging	–	come	to	treat	any	non-involvement	as	an	
abnormality,	as	arrogance,	as	an	attack	on	themselves,	as	a	form	of	dropping	out	of	
society”	(Havel	1985).	
Hence,	everyone	became	an	instrument	of	power,	individuals	were	merely	
responsible	to	different	degrees.	Technically	everyone	could	be	a	victim	and	
supporter	of	the	system	–	sometimes	both	at	the	same	time.	Certainly	this	is	an	
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argument	not	everyone	would	agree	with.	Those	who	suffered	greatly	under	the	
regime	tend	to	set	themselves	apart	from	the	“perpetrators”-“the	state”.	Yet,	the	
truth	is	that	even	those	who	committed	state	terror,	were	at	the	end	of	the	day,	
also	victims	of	the	system.	Those	who	exerted	pressure,	meddled	with	others’	
career	and	education,	observed	private	lives,	arrested	and	imprisoned	were	
compliant	to	the	system.	Havel	(1985)	writes	that	many	of	these	people	did	not	
necessarily	conform	because	of	“any	authentic	inner	conviction	but	simply	under	
pressure	from	conditions,	the	same	conditions	that	once	pressured	the	greengrocer	
to	display	official	slogans.”	They,	too,	are	instruments	in	the	system.	Havel	explains	
that	they	persecuted	people	“because	it	was	expected	of	them”,	“to	demonstrate	
their	loyalty”,	or	“simply	as	part	of	the	general	panorama,	to	which	belongs	an	
awareness	that	this	is	how	situations	(…)	are	dealt	with,	that	this	is,	in	fact,	how	
things	are	always	done,	particularly	if	one	is	not	to	become	a	suspect	oneself”	
(Havel	1985,	p.	39).	At	this	point,	I	would	like	to	reiterate	that	this	does	not	mean	
that	these	people	are	not	responsible	for	their	own	actions,	or	to	excuse	the,	at	
times,	irreparable	damage	they	did.	It	merely	explains	how	they	came	to	be	
executers	of	unpleasant	or	even	evil	deeds	within	the	neo-totalitarian	power	
structure.	
A	system	of	Auto-Governmentality?	
In	order	to	place	the	spying	efforts	of	the	Stasi	into	a	particular	framework	of	
surveillance	theory,	we	must	consider	that	it	does	not	fully	fit	into	either	the	classic	
theory	of	the	Panopticon,	or	the	more	technological	data	and	information	centred	
theories.	However,	my	argument	builds	on	all	of	them.	GDR	surveillance	did	not	just	
take	place	metaphorically,	but	physically,	since	there	was	a	strong	focus	on	
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watching	“real”	people	and	not	merely	the	collecting	raw	data.	Of	course	the	
collection	of	information	and	data	mattered	too,	but	it	was	only	one	aspect	of	the	
Stasi’s	control	apparatus.	It	is	not	the	only	focus	of	my	study,	as	I	have	been	
particularly	interested	in	the	socio-psychological	dynamics	created	by	the	control	
system	of	the	GDR.		
Considering	the	work	of	Foucault	we	may	then	say	that	Stasi	surveillance	is	a	
combination	of	disciplinary	and	post-panoptic	society	as	it	shows	features	of	both.	
It	undoubtedly	shows	features	of	governmentality,	in	that	it	created	power	
structures	from	within,	that	lead	and	managed	the	population,	sometimes	openly,	
sometimes	coercively.	Yet,	this	took	its	shape	in	a	disciplinary	fashion,	as	it	used	
repressive	techniques	and	punishment	to	control	the	population.	Furthermore,	the	
use	of	ideology	played	a	major	role	in	maintaining	the	system,	as	did	the	normation	
or	normalisation	of	control	and	violence.			
Moreover,	surveillance	was	de-territorialised	in	the	sense	that	it	took	place	on	a	
large	scale	within	the	confines	of	the	GDR/Eastern	Bloc,	but	also	on	a	smaller	scale	
within	local	institutions	and	apparatuses	like	the	workplace,	schools,	youth	
organisations	etc.	following	Latour’s	idea	of	the	oligopticon	(2005).	There	was	
certainly	a	“levelling”	out	of	surveillance,	meaning	that	it	became	increasingly	de-
centralised.	Not	only	conducted	by	one	individual,	but	by	many	–	often	indiscernible	
and	anonymous	(Havel	called	them	“faceless	puppets”),	this	would	be	in	line	with	
Haggerty	and	Ericson’s	(2000)	assumptions	about	rhizomatic	surveillance.	
In	this	sense,	we	may	also	see	similarities	to	the	most	recently	emerged	type	of	
surveillance.	As	proposed	by	Albrechtslund	(2008)	who	investigated	social	media	
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and	found	that	“many	look	at	many”.	Although,	his	approach	focusses	on	the	
entertainment	values	of	social	media	surveillance,	here	too	we	can	discern	
similarities	in	the	sense	that	in	the	GDR	everyone	was	also	constantly	monitoring	
one	another	and	oneself.		
So,	we	can	assume	that	Stasi	surveillance	was	a	form	of	“auto-governmentality”.	By	
this	I	mean	that	the	socialist	state’s	institutions	governed	the	population	via	various	
processes	and	at	the	same	time,	individuals	within	the	population	governed	
themselves	and	one	another.	This	was	done	by	creating	conditions	of	“normality”	
(Foucault	2006)	and	the	cultivation	of	“habitus”	(Bourdieu	1984)	–	all	in	order	to	
maintain	the	“system”.	My	theory	therefore	resonates	with	what	Havel	called	
“social	auto-totality”	an	aspect,	unique	to	neo-totalitarian	regimes	such	as	the	
former	Soviet	Bloc	and	East	Germany.		
State	Terror	and	Its	Consequences		
In	the	final	section	of	this	chapter,	I	will	consider	the	effects	and	long-term	
consequences	of	the	forms	governance	I	introduced	above.	I	will	briefly	examine	
the	Stasi’s	mode	of	operation	and	how	it	can	be	considered	as	a	form	of	state	
terror.	Finally,	I	will	review	some	of	the	Anthropology	literature	on	state	terror,	as	
well	as	literature	on	the	resulting	trauma.		
In	“The	origins	of	totalitarianism”	Hannah	Arendt	(1951)	wrote:	“A	fundamental	
difference	between	modern	dictatorships	and	all	other	tyrannies	of	the	past,	is	that	
terror	is	no	longer	used	as	a	means	to	exterminate	and	frighten	opponents,	but	as	
an	instrument	to	rule	the	masses	of	people	who	are	perfectly	obedient.”	
	 68	
	This	rings	true	in	the	case	of	the	GDR	and	the	heavy	impact	of	its	security	
apparatus.	The	methods	used	by	East	Germany’s	Ministry	of	State	Security	were	
originally	based	on	the	Russian	Cheka.	The	Cheka	was	the	first	in	a	long	succession	
of	Soviet	Secret	Police	agencies,	first	founded	by	Felix	Dzerzhinsky,	in	order	to	
defeat	counter-revolutionaries	during	the	Bolshevik	rule.	The	Stasi	utilized	some	of	
its	methods	and	officials	were	often	referred	to	as	“Checkists”	(Willis	2013,	p.88,	
see	also	Betts	2010).	Essentially	this	meant	that	terror	–	in	the	form	of	persecution,	
repression	and	imprisonment	of	dissidents	–	became	a	form	of	governance.		
The	Anthropologist	Jeffrey	A.	Sluka	defines	state	terror	as	follows:	“the	use	or	
threat	of	violence	by	the	state	or	its	agents	or	supporters,	particularly	against	
civilian	individuals	and	populations,	as	a	means	of	political	intimidation	and	control	
(i.e.	a	means	of	repression)”	(Sluka	2000,	p.	2).	As	it	will	be	demonstrated	
throughout	this	thesis	and	supported	by	ethnographic	evidence,	all	of	the	above	
criteria	apply	to	the	methods	of	the	East	German	secret	police.	The	Stasi’s	mode	of	
operation	was	very	much	embedded	in	socialist	ideology.	The	social	historian	Paul	
Betts	(2010)	explains	how	the	Stasi’s	place	within	GDR	society	differed	from	other	
secret	police	forces	in	the	West:	“Whereas	liberal	law	was	built	on	protecting	
individuals	from	the	state,	socialist	jurisprudence	presumed	that	the	state	was	the	
people”	(Betts	2010).	Therefore,	it	was	crucial	to	organise,	control	and	even	mould	
each	and	every	citizen	to	fit	the	pre-prescribed	ideals.	Further,	Betts’	statement	
alludes	to	the	fact	that	any	resistance,	even	if	it	was	only	committed	by	a	single	
person,	could	be	seen	as	a	threat	to	the	entire	state.	Betts	explains	that	“the	state	
thus	felt	compelled	to	organize	networks	of	intelligence,	snooping,	and	supervision	
in	order	to	scout	out	potential	wellsprings	of	dissatisfaction.”	Significantly,	“the	
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home	was	routinely	singled	out	as	the	most	worrisome	cell	of	secrecy	and	dissent”	
(Betts	2010),	threatening	East	Germans	freedom	and	privacy.		
The	Stasi’s	policing	methods	shifted	over	the	40	years	of	its	existence,	while	in	the	
early	years	there	was	a	clear	tendency	to	use	physical	violence	on	a	large	scale,	
later,	more	subtle	methods	were	employed,	resorting	to	systematic	psychological	
control	(BStU	2016).		Especially	after	the	June	1953	Uprising,	did	the	Stasi	truly	
begin	targeting	its	own	citizens,	aiming	to	eliminate	any	form	of	dissent.	They	began	
to	infiltrate	the	private	sphere	more	than	ever,	all	in	an	attempt	to	single	out	and	
remove	so-called	“asocials”.	Interestingly,	these	methods	not	only	focused	on	
regular	citizens,	but	indeed	everyone,	including	state	officials.	Party	members,	as	
well	as	Stasi	officers	or	anyone	in	an	official	position	had	to	prove	their	suitability	
and	“socialist	morality”.	This	meant	that	their	private	lives	were	scrutinized	to	the	
same	extent	(or	at	times	even	more	intensely)	as	any	regular	citizen.	Betts	writes	
that	amongst	officials,	adultery	and	unstable	family	relationships	were	frowned	
upon.	“If	married	functionaries	were	caught	in	adulterous	relationships,	for	
example,	they	were	often	forced	to	confess	all	before	the	commission,	express	
contrition,	and	recommit	to	their	spouses	at	the	next	Party	forum”	(Betts	2010).	
Yet,	it	must	be	said	that	the	Stasi’s	methods	were	more	noticeable	to	some	than	to	
others.	Betts	outlined	his	research	findings	as	such:	“In	the	twenty-five	interviews	
and	thirty	questionnaires	on	private	life	that	were	conducted	for	this	book	over	the	
period	2004–7,	I	was	surprised	how	few	people	communicated	any	real	conflict	with	
either	the	Stasi	or	the	Hausvertrauensmann.	Invariably	they	all	knew	who	these	
people	were	in	the	neighbourhood	and	residential	building,	and	that	they	had	to	be	
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very	careful	and	discreet	in	their	dealing	with	them.	Many	recounted	an	atmosphere	
of	fear	and	mutual	surveillance.	Yet	those	who	kept	their	heads	down	and	never	fell	
foul	of	the	state's	purview—probably	the	vast	majority	of	people—rarely	
encountered	any	real	problems,	and	even	dismissed	the	state's	security	presence	as	
more	akin	to	an	accepted	annoyance”	(Betts	2010,	p.34).	
While	the	majority	of	the	population	came	to	accept,	and	more	or	less	got	used	to	
the	base-level	of	surveillance,	some	others	suffered	greatly	especially	if	they	
became	explicit	targets	of	Stasi	investigation	and	repression.	When	a	person	was	
deemed	an	“enemy	of	the	state”,	the	secret	police’s	actions	were	to	re-establish	
“order”.	As	I	will	review	in	detail	in	the	following	chapters,	in	these	cases	operative	
repressive	methods	such	as	Zersetzung	were	employed.	The	main	goal	of	
Zersetzung	was	to	actively	destabilize	a	person.	Its	use	indicates	a	clear	shift	away	
from	merely	cultivating	a	“socialist	personality”,	but	instead	its	aim	lay	explicitly	in	
“breaking”	the	person.	This	had	profound	psychological	consequences	such	as	
anxiety	and	paranoia.	Betts	describes	instances	where	“people	dreamt	of	being	
followed	and	observed,	they	internalized	fear	to	such	an	extent	that	the	Stasi	were	
believed	to	be	able	to	spy	on	their	dreams.”(Betts	2010)	These	methods	explicitly	
set	the	Stasi	apart	from	other	secret	police	agencies,	both	historically	and	
compared	to	other	states	of	the	Soviet	Bloc	(Rosenberg	1995;	Gallately	1997).	The	
Stasi’s	use	of	systematic	psycho-social	repressive	techniques	led	to	its	far-reaching	
traumatic	societal	impact.	So	to	conclude,	this	brief	outline	indicates	that	the	mode	
of	operation	of	the	GDR’s	security	apparatus	certainly	qualifies	as	a	form	of	terror	
as	the	Ministry	of	State	Security	was	a	highly	regulated,	hierarchical	organisation	
and	its	sophisticated	socio-psychological	approach	caused	widespread	fear,	distrust	
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and	self-policing.	Over	the	next	few	pages	I	would	like	to	review	some	of	the	
existing	literature	on	state	terror	and	its	consequences.		
Anthropology	of	state	terror		
	
In	the	Anthropological	literature,	there	are	many	recorded	cases	of	state	terror	
around	the	world.	Jeffery	Sluka	(2000)	has	written	extensively	on	the	topic.	In	his	
book	“Death	Squad:	The	Anthropology	of	State	Terror”	he	reviews	numerous	
ethnographic	examples	of	instances	where	fear	and	terror	became	the	prime	mode	
of	governance.	Robert	Carmack’s	edited	volume	“Harvest	of	Violence”	(1988)	for	
example	examines	the	“culture	of	fear”	amongst	the	indigenous	populations	of	
Guatemala,	as	a	reaction	to	the	government’s	destructive	policies.	Similarly,	Suarez-
Orozco	(see	1991)	and	Green	(1994;	1995),	examined	the	long	lasting	psychological	
aspects	of	collective	anxieties	and	the	state	of	“living	in	fear”	in	Guatamala	and	
Argentina.	Another	example	is	E.V.	Walter’s	(“Terror	and	Resistance,”	1969)	
research	on	despotic	rule	in	African	Kingdoms,	which	investigated	governance	by	
“fear	and	violence”.	The	aim	of	this	mode	of	governance	was	to	stop	potential	
disobedience	pre-emptively	and	“break	the	power	to	resist”	(1969,	p.10).			
So	one	may	wonder,	how	do	such	regimes	of	fear	occur	in	the	first	place	and	how	
do	they	gain	enough	support	from	within	a	given	society?	Sluka	writes	that,	often	
cultures	of	fear	arise	out	of	state	terror	in	colonial,	post-colonial	or	3rd	world	
contexts,	this	is	for	example	evidenced	by	the	extensive	literature	from	Latin	
America.	Moreover,	there	is	often	an	extensive	ideological	machinery	in	place,	
which	provides	justification	for	the	state’s	abuses.	Further	roots	of	collective	
anxieties	lie	in	war	and	violence,	such	as	those	caused	by	US	intervention	missions,	
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for	example	(Sluka	2000).	Very	important	in	the	context	of	this	research	is	Sluka’s	
assumption	about	the	maintenance	of	order,	which	is	compatible	with	what	I	
described	above:	“The	basic	characteristic	of	cultures	of	terror	is	that	these	are	
societies	where	“order”	(more	precisely,	the	order	of	stratification	or	social	
inequality)	and	the	politico-economic	status	quo	can	only	be	maintained	by	the	
permanent,	massive,	and	systematic	use	or	threat	of	violence	and	intimidation	by	
the	state	as	a	means	of	political	control.”	(Sluka	2000	p.	22).		
Another	important	point	to	consider	in	this	regard,	is	the	issue	of	conformity	and	its	
consequences.	Walter	found	that,	“The	terror	regime	creates	a	context,	in	which	a	
person	must	choose	between	the	lesser	of	two	evils	–	the	obvious	dangers	of	
resistance,	or	relative	safety	and	the	potential	advantage	of	cooperating	with	the	
regime;	“the	subjective	alliance	he	makes	with	the	officials	shatters	the	solidarity	of	
his	own	social	group	and	reinforces	his	active	cooperation	with	despotic	power”	
(Walter	1969,	p.	286-287;	Sluka	2000	p.16).	In	other	words,	people	have	the	
tendency	to	cooperate	with	regimes.	This	becomes	particularly	clear	when	there	is	
something	to	be	gained	from	cooperation,	but	it	inevitably	has	an	adverse	effect	on	
social	relationships	and	the	society’s	wellbeing.	Accordingly,	I	would	now	like	to	
take	a	look	at	some	of	the	long-term	effects	of	state	terror;	how	it	is	remembered	
and	made	sense	of.		
Memory	and	Trauma	
	
The	literature	on	trauma	is	very	broad	and	encompasses	trauma	experienced	in	a	
wide	range	of	regional,	temporal	and	cultural	contexts.	For	the	purpose	of	this	
thesis,	I	am	briefly	examining	trauma	which	is	primarily	caused	by	the	state	and	its	
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supporters.	Here,	I	would	like	to	explore	the	intersection	between	medical	and	
political	anthropology,	so	to	speak.	Understanding	trauma,	begins	with	an	
investigation	into	memory,	how	and	if	it	is	recalled.		
Kirmayer	(1996)	investigated	the	distinctive	features	of	childhood	trauma	compared	
to	the	trauma	experienced	by	Holocaust	survivors.	Childhood	trauma	in	general	is	
associated	with	forgetting,	memory	lapses	and	mental	escape,	whereas	symptoms	
of	Holocaust	trauma	tend	to	be	overwhelming	and	ever-present	in	sufferer’s	
everyday	lives.	The	most	intriguing	argument	Kirmayer	makes,	is	the	way	in	which	
memories	are	recalled	and	made	sense	of.	While	childhood	trauma	survivors	often	
struggle	with	shame,	stigma	and	wider	social	repercussions	of	their	experiences,	the	
trauma	narratives	of	Holocaust	survivors	have	received	more	extensive	acceptance	
and	are	seen	as	an	active	dealing	with	collective	trauma.	Therefore,	it	can	be	
expected	that	the	open	recognition	of	the	trauma	suffered	during	the	artrocities	of	
the	NS	regime	have	gained	a	high	level	of	social	acceptance.	Kirmayer	argues	that	
the	symptoms	of	childhood	and	Holocaust	trauma	differ	significantly,	which	is	partly	
due	to	the	“landscape	of	memory”	that	they	are	embedded	in.	These	landscapes	of	
memory	are	culturally	constructed.	The	psycholopathology	does	not	differ	
significantly,	but	it	is	dependent	on	the	socio-political	context,	in	which	memories	
are	recollected	and	retold.	He	explains	that,	“Landscapes	of	memory	are	given	
shape	by	the	personal	and	social	significance	of	specific	memories	but	also	draw	
from	meta-memory	–	implicit	models	of	memory	which	influence	what	can	be	
recalled	and	cited	as	veridical.	Narratives	of	trauma	may	be	understood	then	as	
cultural	constructions	of	personal	and	historical	memory”	(Kirmayer	1996,	p.5).	
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	In	his	investigation,	he	looks	at	cases	in	which	childhood	and	Holocaust	trauma	
coincided,	and	makes	an	interesting	discovery.	In	one	case	where	a	person	recalled	
the	suffering	experienced	as	a	child	during	the	Holocaust,	yet	emitted	particular	
aspects	of	the	trauma	narrative,	the	recalling	of	trauma	was	selective,	leaving	out	
the	experience	of	rape.	Therefore	it	can	be	seen	that	the	retelling	of	an	experience	
is	highly	dependent	on	notions	of	shame	and	humiliation,	and	what	is	deemed	
“socially	acceptable”.	“When	the	costs	of	recollection	seem	catastrophic	for	self	or	
others,	memory	may	be	sequestered	in	a	virtual	(mental)	space	that	is	asocial,	a	
space	that	closes	in	on	itself	through	the	conviction	that	a	telling	will	ever	be	
possible.	Dissociation	is	the	sequestration	of	memory	in	a	virtual	space	shaped	by	
the	social	demand	–	and	personal	decision	–	to	remain	silent,	or	to	speak	the	
unspeakable	only	with	a	voice	one	can	disown.”	(Kirmayer	1996,	p.24).	
So,	here	we	can	see	that	there	are	two	distinct	spheres	in	which	the	recalling	and,	
most	importantly,	the	retelling	of	trauma	occur.	There	is	a	“public	space	of	
solidarity”	versus	the	“private	space	of	shame”.	Each	of	these	spheres	is	highly	
culturally	constructed.	To	gain	any	understanding	of	trauma,	it	is	therefore	
important	to	note,	“if	a	community	agrees	traumatic	events	occurred	and	
interweaves	this	fact	into	its	identity,	then	collective	memory	survives	and	
individual	memory	can	find	a	place	(albeit	transformed)	within	that	landscape.	If	a	
family	or	a	community	agrees	that	a	trauma	did	not	happen,	then	it	vanishes	from	
collective	memory	and	the	possibility	for	individual	memory	is	severely	strained”	
(Kirmayer	1996,	p.25).	Under	such	conditions,	it	extremely	problematic	to	deal	with	
private	trauma.	
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In	the	context	of	trauma	that	occurred	during	GDR	times	or	shortly	after,	this	
realisation	is	extremely	significant.	Firstly,	due	to	the	deep	infiltration	and	influence	
of	the	Stasi	in	the	private	sphere	and	people’s	most	intimate	personal	lives,	an	
element	of	shame	is	almost	inevitable	in	the	recalling	of	experiences.	Secondly,	we	
must	note	the	deep	ambiguities	encountered	in	the	East	German	context	(Gallinat	
2013).	Memory	of	the	GDR	and	the	engagement	with	the	legacy	of	the	SED-regime,	
are	therefore	problematic.	The	deep	contradictions	of	life	under	socialist	rule,	
created	a	complex	landscape	of	memory,	in	which	the	retelling	of	trauma	is	a	highly	
political	and	personal	act	(Gallinat	2013).	Indeed,	Gallinat	and	Kittel	(2009)	say	that	
“Memories	will	often	reflect	tensions	that	individuals	experienced	during	the	
socialist	past	as	well	as	since.”	The	question	of	legitimacy	plays	a	major	role	in	this	
context	–	was	one	an	opponent	or	a	supporter	of	the	regime?	Is	one’s	suffering	
legitimate?		
Gallinat	is	critical	of	oversimplifying	GDR	memory.	She	asserts	that	there	is	no	
simple	categorisation	of	supporter	or	opponent	of	the	system.	Contemporary	
debates	about	the	GDR	lack	depth,	especially	when	it	comes	to	understanding	the	
more	complex	social	repercussions.	GDR	life	was	multifaceted	and	we	must	be	
careful	not	to	overemphasise	the	Stasi	in	the	memory	of	the	GDR.	Certainly,	they	
played	an	extremely	significant	and	impactful	role,	but	for	many,	memories	of	life	in	
the	socialist	regime	encompassed	much	more:	personal	relationships,	growing	up,	
feeling	at	home	and	a	sense	of	belonging,	personal	milestones	such	as	marriage,	
having	children,	as	well	as	divorces	and	deaths.	Gallinat	accurately	points	out	the	
two	main	public	discourses	in	East	Germany,	which	can	be	categorised	into	the	two	
distinct	binaries	of	Aufarbeitung	and	Ostalgie.	One	is	the	political	effort	of	
	 76	
reworking	and	coming	to	terms	with	the	past,	while	the	other	one	is	a	feeling	of	
nostalgia	for	socialist	everyday	life.	In	reality	however,	East	Germans	memories	and	
associations	do	not	fit	these	oversimplified	official	discourses.	Gallinat	highlights	
how	people	may	feel	pressured	to	take	on	one	or	the	other	memory	of	the	GDR.	
She	warns	that	a	sole	emphasis	on	the	memory	of	suffering	and	subjection	can	be	
problematic:	“Due	to	the	emotional	power	of	its	messages	about	suffering	this	
discourse	has,	however,	become	part	of	the	narrative	framework	and	for	individuals	
to	be	recognised	as	morally	acceptable	beings	they	have	to	acknowledge	the	
‘dictatorship’	when	talking	about	the	GDR.”	(Gallinat	2013,	p.160).	As	I	mentioned	
earlier	in	this	chapter,	it	is	this	ambiguity,	which	makes	East	Germany	an	interesting	
but	also	very	complex	region	to	investigate.	With	this	thesis,	I	hope	to	add	new	
insights	to	the	study	of	the	former	GDR,	how	it	is	remembered	and	made	sense	of.		
As	my	ethnographic	case	studies	demonstrate,	many	of	those	who	were	exposed	to	
intense	pressure	during	the	SED-regime	saw	the	fall	of	the	Wall	as	a	chance	for	a	
new	beginning.	So,	there	was	a	tendency	to	concentrate	on	making	a	life	in	the	
new,	reunited	Germany.	Thus,	distancing	themselves	from	negative	memories	of	
the	past.		
Neil	Smelser	(2004)	has	extensively	engaged	with	the	issue	of	the	mass	denial	of	
trauma.	Repression	of	trauma	is	displayed	in	various	ways	and	much	has	been	
written	on	the	symptoms	and	behavioural	patterns	associated	with	it.	For	instance,	
those	affected	often	show	a	tendency	of	attraction	to	-	or	avoidance	of		-	situations	
that	resemble	the	traumatic	event.	“One	of	the	peculiarities	that	has	been	noticed	
in	connection	with	acute	psychological	traumas	is	a	very	strong	dual	tendency:	to	
avoid	and	to	relive.	There	is	an	avoidance	of	situations	or	places	which	remind	the	
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victim	of	-	or	resemble	-	the	traumatic	experience.	At	the	same	time,	some	people	
experience	a	strong	compulsion	to	repeat	the	trauma	or	some	aspect	of	the	
experience	(Smelser	2004,	p.53).	Interestingly,	this	has	been	seen	in	trauma	
patients	on	a	personal	level,	but	also	on	a	broader	societal	level.	Further	distress	is	
caused	by	the	constant	pressure	to	avoid	and	deny	the	experience	of	a	frightening	
or	violent	event.	Based	on	this	assumption,	“traumatic	feelings	and	perceptions,	
then,	come	not	only	from	the	originating	event	but	from	the	anxiety	of	keeping	it	
repressed”	(Neal	1998,	p.5).	Caruth	(1995)	has	found	that	“trauma	is	not	locatable	
in	the	simple	violent	or	original	event	in	an	individual’s	past,	but	rather	in	the	way	
its	very	unassimilated	nature	–	the	way	it	was	precisely	not	known	in	the	first	
instance	-		returns	to	haunt	the	survivor	later	on”	(Neal	1998,	p.7).		
Smelser	reflects	for	instance	on	the	memory	culture	of	West	Germany,	and	asserts	
that	there	was	a	systematic	denial	of	trauma	after	the	Second	World	War	(Smelser	
2004).	He	explains	that	in	the	post-war	years,	there	was	an	initial	focus	on	moving	
forward,	and	rebuilding	of	the	country.	Especially	with	regard	to	the	Holocaust,	the	
tendency	was	to	“forget”,	“deny”	or	simply	“an	unwillingness	to	remember”.	Both	
in	East	and	West	Germany,	during	first	years	after	the	War	hardly	any	dealing	with	
the	personal	traumas	of	destruction,	violence	and	displacement	took	place.	Here,	
we	may	note	that	this	lack	of	engagement	is	beginning	to	be	recognised	increasingly	
through	the	display	of	intergenerational	trauma.	The	recent	emergence	of	German	
Kriegsenkel	literature	(literally	meaning	grandchildren	of	the	war),	explicitly	deals	
with	the	silence	surrounding	traumatic	experiences	and	the	profound	effects	on	the	
psyche	and	intergenerational	family	relations.	For	instance,	Welzer	et	al.	(2002),	
Bode	(2017)	and	Baer	et	al.	(2017)	have	explored	these	issues	in	great	detail.		
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Although	this	thesis	does	not	explicitly	focus	on	this	topic,	intergenerational	trauma	
of	the	war	is	undoubtedly	a	concern	in	the	multi-layered	landscape	of	trauma	of	
East	Germany	and	should	be	explored	in	detail	in	future	research.		
So,	we	can	see	that	there	is	an	inherent	diﬃculty	in	recognising	an	event	or	a	series	
of	events	of	state	terror	as	trauma_c.	This	may	be	due	to	a	poli_cal	eﬀort	to	repress	
a	reconciliatory	process,	or	a	personal	and	societal	denial	of	its	occurrence,	or	
indeed	the	nature	of	trauma	as	a	diagnos_c	category	may	be	limi_ng,	in	presen_ng	
the	complexity	of	the	problem.	As	I	will	discuss	further	in	the	later	chapters	of	this	
thesis,	trauma	in	itself	is	a	controversial	topic.	Fassin	and	Rechtman	(2009),	for	
example,	have	discussed	the	diﬃcul_es	of	“trauma”	as	a	psychological	and	social	
concept	in	great	detail.	Smelser,	too,	has	reviewed	the	history	of	trauma	research	
(Smelser	2004,	p.56)	and	alluded	to	some	of	the	issues	of	trauma	as	a	diagnos_c	
category.	He	writes,	“If	we	regard	the	history	of	the	concept	of	trauma	in	this	
constructed	journey,	we	note	a	progression	from	the	simple	(and	as	it	turns	out	
erroneous)	causal	connec_on	contained	in	Freud’s	theory	of	conversion	hysteria	to	
a	vast	number	of	possible	(not	necessary)	trauma_c	events	and	situa_ons	all	
funnelling	into	a	single	clinical	en_ty	(PTSD),	which	is	manifested	in	an	equally	vast	
number	of	possible	(not	necessary)	symptoms.”	(2004,	p.58)	Therefore,	one	of	the	
main	cri_cisms	of	“trauma”,	is	its	unspeciﬁcity.	As	I	will	elaborate	later,	many	
scholars	have	argued	for	an	expansion	of	sub-categories	of	trauma.	For	the	purpose	
of	this	chapter,	I	would	like	to	look	at	some	of	the	literature	on	collec_ve	trauma	
caused	by	state	terror.		
Jeffrey	C.	Alexander	has	written	extensively	about	trauma	as	a	social	theory.	In	his	
edited	volume	(2012)	he	introduces	various	cases	of	social	suffering	from	around	
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the	world,	including	accounts	of	trauma	from	the	Holocaust,	Maoist	China,	and	the	
India	–	Pakistan	conflict.	Alexander	notes	that	collective	trauma	does	not	always	
originate	from	a	single	event,	but	instead	it	can,	for	example	occur	in	multiple	
instances	while	a	particular	event	unfolds.	Or,	interestingly,	even	before	anything	
happens.	Indeed,	some	traumatic	events	may	just	be	“imagined”.	On	these	
occasions	it	is	often	the	fear	that	something	could	happen,	which	has	a	traumatizing	
effect.	Alexander	links	this	to	Anderson’s	concept	of	imagined	communities,	
commonly	found	in	nationalist	history	which	often	asserts	“the	existence	of	some	
national	trauma”.	He	writes,	“in	the	course	of	defining	national	identity,	national	
histories	are	constructed	around	injuries	that	cry	for	revenge.”	The	accusations	
usually	target	some	“putatively	antagonistic	ethnic	or	political	group”	(Alexander	
2012,	p.8).	What	Anderson	describes	is	wholly	imagined,	yet	it	serves	to	feed	into	
nationalistic	ideology.	In	terms	of	collective	trauma,	“imagination	informs	trauma	
construction	just	as	much	when	the	reference	is	to	something	that	has	actually	
occurred	as	to	something	that	has	not.	It	is	only	through	the	imaginative	process	of	
representation	that	actions	have	a	sense	of	experience.”	(Alexander	2012,	p.9)	
It	can	be	said	that	something	is	regarded	to	be	traumatic	(real	or	imagined),	
because	“these	phenomena	are	believed	to	have	abruptly,	and	harmfully,	affected	
collective	identity”	(Alexander	2012,	p.10).	Cultural	trauma	is	therefore	a	social	
process,	in	which	one	or	several	events	significantly	harm	a	group,	leading	to	a	
social	crisis,	which	turns	into	a	cultural	crisis	in	other	words,	“trauma	is	not	the	
result	of	a	group	experiencing	pain.	It	is	the	result	of	this	acute	discomfort	entering	
into	the	core	of	the	collective’s	sense	of	its	own	identity”	(Alexander	2012,	p.10).	As	
I	will	argue	in	this	thesis,	this	has	been	the	case	in	East	Germany.	
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Alexander	lays	out,	what	he	calls	the	“trauma	process”.	This	process	illustrates	how	
trauma	is	recognized	and	constructed.	At	the	beginning	is	the	harmful	event,	which	
is	then	called	out	in	the	“claim”.	While	making	the	“claim”,	particular	individuals	
report	on	the	nature	of	the	traumatic	event.	“It	is	a	claim	to	some	fundamental	
injury,	an	exclamation	of	the	terrifying	profanation	of	some	sacred	value,	a	
narrative	about	a	horribly	destructive	social	process,	and	a	demand	for	emotional,	
institutional,	and	symbolic	reparation	and	reconstruction.”	Such	claims	are	made	
sense	of,	by	so-called	“carrier	groups”	(Alexander	uses	Max	Weber’s	terminology).	
These	carrier	groups	facilitate	the	meaning-making	process	that	occurs,	before	any	
public	representation	of	the	cultural	trauma	can	take	place.	Part	of	this	“trauma	
process”	is	the	determining	of	the	nature	of	pain,	who	the	victims	are	and	the	
attribution	of	responsibility.	Once	some	public	recognition	of	the	suffering	has	been	
achieved,	representation	becomes	possible	in	the	various	institutional	arenas,	such	
as	religious,	legal	and	scientific	arenas,	as	well	as	through	mass	media	and	state	
bureaucracy.	Still,	stratificational	hierarchies	continue	to	exist.	This	is	exemplified	
by	the	uneven	distribution	of	material	resources	and	within	social	networks.		
The	process	of	trauma	recognition	and	representation	is	not	straightforward	and	
there	are	many	obstacles	to	overcome	before	an	“identity	revision”	takes	place.	A	
failure	to	accept	collective	trauma	and	the	inability	to	incorporate	its	repercussions	
into	the	collective	identity,	are	not	dependent	on	the	actual	nature	of	the	original	
suffering,	but	rather	a	failure	in	completing	the	“trauma	process”	that	Alexander	
describes.	Such	a	disruption	in	the	“trauma	process”	is	very	common,	as	it	can	be	
seen	in	the	cases	of	Japan,	China,	Rwanda	and	many	other	countries,	where	victims	
make	claims	to	be	recognised,	yet	the	so-called	“carrier	groups”	fail	to	acknowledge	
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their	suffering.	This	is	seen	when	the	perpetrators	of	the	traumatic	events,	fail	to	
take	responsibility	for	their	actions,	or	straight	out	deny	that	the	event	took	place	at	
all.	For	many	East	Germans	the	trauma	process	also	has	not	been	completed	yet.		
	
As	mentioned	before,	there	is	a	wealth	of	literature	from	Latin	America	concerning	
state	terror	and	accordingly	its	long-term	consequences.	In	“Layers	of	Memories:	
Twenty	years	after	Argentina”	Jelin	and	Kaufman,	shed	light	on	collective	trauma	
originating	in	the	brutality	and	terror	of	the	past	dictatorship.	They	question	how	
memory	is	produced	and	constructed	in	a	highly	ambiguous	and	complex	social	
environment,	as	they	are	found	in	Argentina.	Their	analysis	attempts	to	make	sense	
of	the	process	of	“societal	remembering	(and	forgetting),	looking	at	the	various	
levels	and	layers	in	which	this	takes	place”	(Jelin	&	Kaufman	2009,	p.	89).	
Here	trauma	sufferers	face	some	similar	paradoxes	to	those	Germans	are	
confronted	with.	In	Argentina,	while	victims	strive	to	be	recognised,	perpetrators	of	
the	regime	continue	to	deny	the	existence	of	traumatic	events	and	their	emphasis	
to	forget	the	past,	dominates	the	public	discourse.	In	addition,	there	is	the	
persistent	denial	of	ever	having	known	about	what	was	happening	at	the	time.	
Thus,	shedding	any	responsibility	for	ever	having	been	part	of	the	system:	“The	
confrontation	is	between	the	voices	of	those	who	call	for	commemoration,	for	
remembrance	of	the	disappearances	and	the	torment,	for	denunciation	of	the	
repressors,	and	those	who	make	it	their	business	to	act	as	if	nothing	has	happened	
here”	(Alexander	2012,	p.12).		
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One	of	the	long-term	consequences	of	collective	trauma	is	the	further	
manifestation	in	the	form	of	cultural	trauma.	Piotr	Sztompka	has	conducted	
research	in	Poland,	studying	trauma	as	the	result	of	social	change	after	the	collapse	
of	communism.	He	describes	how	even	revolutionary	change	initiated	by	the	people	
can	have	traumatic	effects.	Sztomka	writes,	“But	even	when	change	of	regime	is	
originating	from	below,	realizing	aspirations	of	the	people,	it	inevitably	engenders	
some	forms	of	cultural	trauma,	as	it	clashes	with	deeply	embedded,	thoroughly	
internalized,	earlier	“habits	of	the	heart”	(Tocqueville	1945	(1835);	Bellah	et	al.	
1985),	which	create,	at	least	temporarily,	the	“learned	incapacity”	to	follow	cultural	
imperatives	of	the	new	system.”	(Sztompka	2004,	p.163)	Postcommunist	societies	
exemplify	this	condition.	Although	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Bloc	was	celebrated	as	
a	success,	leading	to	benefits	and	progress	for	all,	it	inevitably	led	to	a	traumatic	
change	for	(at	least	some	segments	of)	post-communist	societies.		What	Bourdieu	
(1984)	called	“habitus”	continues	to	be	deeply	ingrained	in	people’s	lives,	as	well	as	
ideologies	and	ideas	about	the	right	conduct	in	everyday	life.	Closely	related	to	the	
“trauma	process”,	Sztompka	introduces	the	idea	of	the	“traumatic	sequence”,	the	
trauma	experienced	by	a	society	as	a	result	of	a	sudden,	abruptly	experienced	
change.	He	writes,	“Trauma	thus	is	neither	a	cause	nor	a	result,	but	a	process,	a	
dynamic	sequence	of	typical	stages,	having	its	beginning,	but	also	–	at	least	
potentially	–	its	resolution.”	(Sztompka	p.	168)	
Sztompka	lists	some	of	the	after-effects	of	cultural	trauma:	In	the	first	instance,	
people	feel	“anxious,	insecure	and	uncertain”,	this	may	display	itself	in	the	
“phenomenon	of	moral	panics”.	Secondly,	high	levels	of	distrust	towards	people	
and	institutions	are	common.	And	finally,	“the	collective	identity	is	challenged	and	
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re-shaped”.	Feelings	of	“apathy,	passivism	and	helplessness”	become	prevalent	
leading	to,	general	atmosphere	of	hopelessness	and	pessimism	about	the	future.	At	
the	same	time,	nostalgic	voices	become	louder,	praising	the	good	things	of	the	past	
(Sztompka	2004,	p.	166).		
The	“generational	turnover”	is	another	significant	aspect	in	the	trauma	process.	It	
can	be	described	as	the	process	in	which	the	radically	contradicting,	differing	new	
ideas,	as	well	as	the	new	political	and	social	order	challenge	old	beliefs	and	
convictions.	“This	means	that	the	powerful	impact	of	culture	derived	from	earlier	
history,	and	internalized	by	the	generations	whose	lives	were	spent	during	its	
prevailing	grip,	may	become	much	weaker	as	the	new	generations	emerge,	raised	
under	different	conditions,	the	changed,	reformed	society.	This	process	running	
parallel	to	the	traumatic	sequence	becomes	very	helpful	at	the	stage	of	overcoming	
trauma	and	achieving	final	reconsolidation	of	a	culture.”	(Sztompka	2004,	p.169)	
Coping	with	Post-communist	trauma	
Sztompka	asserts	that	there	is	a	“trauma	of	collective	memory,	with	strong	
sentiments	of	guilt	or	shame,	self-righteousness	or	forgiveness,	concerning	the	
communist	past.”	(Sztompka	2004,	p.	183)	He	believes	that	post-communist	trauma	
is	in	its	healing	phase.	Yet,	claims	that	as	long	as	the	cultural	gap	between	socialism	
and	capitalism	still	exists	in	post-communist	countries,	a	complete	healing	is	not	
possible.	More	importantly,	a	generational	turnover	needs	to	take	place.		“Cultural	
ambivalence	or	split	between	the	heritage	of	the	‘bloc	culture’	and	the	democratic	
and	market	culture	fades	away	or	disappears	may	we	expect	lasting	healing	of	the	
post-communist	trauma”	(Sztompka	2004,	p.193).		
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Although	I	agree	that	collective	communist	and	post-communist	trauma	is	
beginning	to	be	worked	through	in	Germany,	I	feel	that	there	is	still	much	to	be	
done,	both	in	terms	of	healing	and	addressing	personal	and	cultural	trauma.	While	
silence	persists	the	trauma	process	cannot	move	forward.	Smelser	points	to	Freud’s	
works	on	repression,	who	argued	that	repression	leads	to	neurosis,	preventing	a	
successful	healing	process.	(Smelser	2004,	p.50	-51).	In	contemporary	diagnosis,	
too,	the	repression	of	trauma	is	associated	with	PTSD.	
One	may	wonder,	whether	East	Germans	are	in	fact	trapped	in	a	state	of	liminality.	
Thomassen	encourages	us	to	consider	that	the	transition	from	one	type	of	political	
system	to	another	can	create	a	state	of	liminality	(Thomassen	2009).	The	healing	of	
trauma	must	occur	by	solving	problems	in	the	“outside”	world,	but	significantly,	
also	on	the	“inside”	(Neal	1998),	allowing	people	to	move	forward.	Despite	
trauma’s	initially	negative	impact,	it	does	hold	the	potential	for	social	change	in	the	
long-run	and	as	I	will	show	in	this	thesis	it	may	also	create	resilience	and	strength.	
Conclusion	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	outlined	some	of	the	theoretical	debates	that	this	thesis	
addresses.	Taking	into	consideration	Hannah	Arendt’s	study	of	the	“Origins	of	
totalitarianism”,	I	would	argue	that	the	neo-totalitarian	state	certainly	also	used	
terror	as	a	form	of	governance.		
As	the	ethnographic	evidence	in	this	thesis	will	demonstrate,	on	the	one	hand	there	
is	a	self-perpetuating	system	at	play	(“auto-governmentality”)	that	led	the	
population	to	conform	and	discipline	itself,	in	order	to	keep	the	system	intact	and	
the	façade	of	socialism	upheld.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	clear	evidence	of	state	
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terror	in	the	form	of	interrogations,	extensive	repressive	and	intimidating	
techniques	used	by	the	Stasi,	torture	and	imprisonment.	Here,	the	state	(as	well	as	
the	Soviet	Union	as	a	superpower	controlling	the	GDR)	clearly	committed	crimes	
against	its	own	population.	So,	despite	the	fact	that	“the	state”	is	an	illusive	
concept,	it	still	holds	significance	here,	especially	when	we	consider	individual	cases	
of	extreme	repression	and	abuse.	I	argue	that	East	Germans	suffered	from	state	
terror,	leading	to	individual	and	collective	trauma.		
On	an	individual	level,	we	see	post-traumatic	symptoms	caused	by	direct	
observation,	repression	and	abuse	by	the	Stasi,	as	well	as	suspected	surveillance	
(see	trauma	of	the	imagined	in	Alexander	2012).	Some	of	the	evidence	in	this	thesis	
further	points	towards	the	occurrence	of	personal	trauma	as	a	direct	result	of	the	
regime’s	mode	of	governance,	even	provoking	traumatic	experiences	years	after	
the	collapse	of	the	state	(as	I	will	discuss	later	in	regards	to	revelations	made	by	
viewing	Stasi	files).		
On	a	collective	level,	again,	traumatic	experiences	are	manifold	and	indeed,	I	would	
argue	that	East	Germans	suffered	collective	trauma	from	the	intimidating	and	
destructive	large-scale	measures	of	the	Stasi	and	the	regime	as	a	whole.	Further	
trauma	ensued	after	the	fall	of	the	Wall	due	to	fundamental	social	change	in	the	
wake	of	the	collapse	of	socialism,	creating	uncertainty	and		further	cultural	trauma.		
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Chapter	Three:		
Life	in	the	former	German	Democra_c	Republic:	Emerging	themes	
	
From	 my	 ten	 main	 informants’	 life	 histories,	 I	 have	 chosen	 the	 following	 three	
ethnographic	 vignejes	 to	 illustrate	 some	 of	 the	main	 themes	 that	 have	 emerged	
throughout	my	ﬁeldwork.	These	 life	histories,	despite	being	quite	unusual,	display	
the	essence	of	what	many	East	Germans	were	confronted	with	before	and	a`er	the	
fall	of	the	Wall.		
It	 is	 important	to	note	that	their	stories	are	by	no	means	representa_ve	of	all	East	
Germans.	Instead,	I	have	decided	to	present	these	three	cases	to	demonstrate	some	
of	 the	 meaning-making	 processes	 and	 spacial	 –	 temporal	 factors	 involved,	 in	
shaping	social,	psychological	and	poli_cal	trends	in	East	Germany.			
Ideology	and	State	Control		
In	 the	 ﬁrst	 life	 story,	 Frau	 M.	 formerly	 a	 devoted	 socialist	 who	 migrated	 from	
Australia	to	the	GDR,	readily	accepted	betrayal	and	denunciatory	prac_ces	to	serve	
the	socialist	cause.	Her	fears	and	childhood	trauma	(speciﬁcally,	having	been	forced	
to	 ﬂee	 Nazi	 Germany),	 led	 her	 to	 cling	 onto	 a	 set	 of	 beliefs	 she	 thought	 would	
provide	the	solu_on	for	all	human	suﬀering.	For	her,	socialist	ideology	seemed	to	be	
a	remedy	for	the	pain	and	suﬀering	of	displacement	and	war	years	she	had	endured.	
But	being	a	part-outsider	in	the	GDR,	she	not	only	came	to	realise	over	the	years	her	
own	role	in	the	system	of	control	and	repression,	but	also	the	destruc_ve	forces	that	
were	 poisoning	 personal	 rela_onships	 throughout	 society	 as	 a	 whole.	 Frau	 M.'s	
accounts	were	ripe	with	examples	of	the	self-perpetua_ng	and	reinforcing	control	of	
the	 Stasi	 among	 the	 popula_on,	 leading	 to	 self-policing	 and	 an	 acquiescence	 to	
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control	 in	everyday	 life.	Her	break	with	the	East	German	secret	services	became	a	
further	turning	point	 in	her	 life.	Her	troubled	past	con_nues	to	 impact	her	mental	
wellbeing	severely.	
This	example	shows	on	a	smaller	scale,	how	personal	circumstances	during	the	Nazi	
regime	 and	 in	 post-war	 years	 also	 shaped	 many	 East	 German's	 beliefs	 and	
mo_va_ons.	 For	 some,	 socialism	 was	 a	 beacon	 of	 hope.	 The	 building	 of	 a	 new,	
bejer	 state	 was	 a	 substan_al	 incen_ve	 to	 create	 a	 system	 of	 control	 in	 the	 ﬁrst	
place	for	showing	 loyalty	to	the	state	and	complying	with	the	system.	But,	as	Frau	
M.’s	 story	 demonstrates,	 the	 ideal	 and	 reality	 did	 not	 coincide.	 The	 nega_ve	
consequences	of	real	life	socialism	coupled	with	the	psychological	burden	of	living	in	
a	 dictatorship	 caused	 disillusionment,	 blind	 conformity,	 and	 apathy.	 Only	 a	 few	
people	came	to	 realise	 these	dangerous	 tendencies	within	 the	state	and	stood	up	
against	them,	eventually	leading	to	the	breakdown	of	the	regime.		
Betrayal	and	Distrust		
The	 second	 account	 concerns	 the	 remarkable	 story	 of	 Herr	 K.,	 a	 so-called	
Fluchthelfer,	who	helped	over	50	East	Germans	leave	the	repressive	regime	with	the	
aid	of	elaborate	escape	plans,	engaging	in	James	Bond-like	missions.	His	astounding	
story	 demonstrates,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 ingenuity	 and	 determina_on	 of	 a	man	
who	put	his	 life	at	risk	to	help	others.	On	the	other,	 it	highlights	the	condi_ons	of	
sheer	despera_on	and	anguish	that	these	ideas	sprang	from.		He	helped	his	parents	
and	 other	 GDR	 ci_zens	 ﬂee	 the	 injus_ce	 that	 he	 had	 experienced,	 without	 ever	
expec_ng	anything	in	return.	
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While	 he	was	 selﬂess	 in	 his	 pursuit,	 others	 around	 him	 acted	 in	 self-interest	 and	
placed	state	ideology	above	the	value	of	trust	or	personal	rela_onships.	The	trauma	
he	 experienced	 was,	 therefore,	 two-fold.	 First,	 he	 suﬀered	 immensely	 under	 the	
dictatorship	 in	 the	 GDR	 and	 later	 on	 from	 the	 Stasi's	 persecu_on	 and	 repressive	
techniques,	 leading	 to	 an	 unstable	 sense	 of	 self,	 anxiety	 and	 severe	 distrust	 of	
others.	A`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall,	the	second	trauma_c	breakdown	ensued.	Viewing	
his	 Stasi	 ﬁles	 provided	 some	 shocking	 revela_ons.	 Since	 his	 re_rement,	 like	many	
others,	 he	 has	 begun	 to	 delve	 deeper	 into	 his	 past	 by	 researching	 his	 archival	
records.	 Over	 the	 years,	 and	 through	 several	 applica_ons	 at	 the	 BStU3,	 he	
uncovered	some	ugly	truths	about	people	whom	he	had	previously	trusted.		
Like	many	others,	he	had	to	come	to	terms	with	extreme	betrayal.	At	the	same	_me,	
his	 con_nua_on	 of	 rela_onships	 with	 those	 who	 betrayed	 him	 demonstrates	 the	
human	capacity	to	suppress	feelings	and	consciously	ignore	certain	reali_es	in	order	
to	move	forward	and	(in	his	speciﬁc	case)	to	save	a	familial	_e.	
Trauma	and	Resilience		
	
In	the	third	vigneje,	I	explore	the	trauma_c	story	of	a	woman	who	was	subjected	to	
the	arbitrariness	of	 the	 regime	at	a	very	young	age.	Frau	L.	was	 forced	 to	witness	
her	parents'	unjust	treatment	and	was	exposed	to	intense	social	pressure	by	those	
who	 supported	 the	 dictatorship.	 	 Even	 as	 a	 child,	 she	 had	 to	 experience	 isola_on	
and	rejec_on	from	those	who	became	so	deeply	 ingrained	 in	 the	GDR's	system	of	
indoctrina_on	 and	 control	 that	 they	 lost	 sight	 of	 their	 essen_al	 humanness.	 Soon	
																																								 																				
3	Abbreviation	BStU	 stands	 for	 Federal	Commissioner	of	 the	 State	 Security	 Service	of	 the	
former	German	Democratic	Republic,	also	known	as	the	Stasi	file	archive	
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she	 saw	 the	 state	 as	 an	 enemy	 that	 separated	 her	 from	 her	 parents,	 and	 that	
restricted	her	life	signiﬁcantly.	Even	years	later,	the	a`ermath	of	the	regime's	impact	
on	 her	 profoundly	 aﬀects	 her	 personal	 wellbeing.	 Her	 East	 German	 iden_ty	
con_nues	to	be	an	ambivalent	issue	in	spite	of	the	intervening	years.	
Though	she	was	s_ll	bajling	her	ongoing	emo_onal	trials,	what	stood	out	to	me	in	
our	conversa_on	was	 the	way	she	 laid	emphasis	on	 the	posi_ve	personal	gains	of	
her	experience,	especially	with	regard	to	her	rela_onships	with	others.	Despite	her	
experience	 of	 disloyalty,	 her	 childhood	 taught	 her	 a	 great	 lesson	 about	 human	
character.	 She	 found	 that	 even	 though	 many	 people	 were	 conforming	 to	 the	
dictatorship	at	any	price,	 there	were	also	a	 few	who	were	very	consistent	 in	 their	
behaviour.	 	 They	 disregarded	 the	 possibility	 of	 being	 persecuted,	 ac_ng	 on	 their	
moral	 standards	 as	 opposed	 to	 state-ordered	 behaviour.	 Like	 some	 of	 my	 other	
interviewees	who	endured	adverse	circumstances	in	the	GDR,	her	narra_ve	was	one	
of	hope	and	resilience.	
Ethnographic	vignettes	
	
The	 following	 sec_on	 consists	 of	 these	 three	 biographical	 accounts.	 All	 stemmed	
from	interviews	conducted	in	2014.		
Case	1:		Ideology	and	State	Control		
"I	reported	on	my	husband,	the	man	who	was	the	father	of	my	children…	"	
Frau	M.		
I	was	slightly	afraid	of	my	ﬁrst	encounter	with	Frau	M.	 I	had	spoken	to	her	on	the	
phone	 a	 few	 _mes,	 and	 she	 was	 always	 a	 lijle	 abrupt.	 Un_l	 then,	 my	 other	
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informants	 had	 been	 very	 kind	 and	 welcoming.	 She	 was	 a	 lijle	more	 brash.	 She	
demanded	 to	 know	why	 I	 had	 not	 called	 back	 sooner,	 and	 anyway	 she	was	 busy	
right	now.	I	could	call	back	later.	
When	we	ﬁnally	agreed	on	an	appointment,	I	made	sure	to	arrive	very	punctually.	I	
was	a	 lijle	 surprised	when	 I	 saw	 the	area	 she	 lived	 in.	 It's	 a	popular	 tourist	area,	
which	has	been	taken	over	by	many	hip,	crea_ve	young	professionals	most	of	whom	
are	not	originally	from	the	city.	The	area	where	she	lives,	has	undergone	a	drama_c	
transforma_on	 in	 recent	 years	 and	 some_mes	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 forget	 that	 there	 are	
people	who	have	been	living	here	for	decades.		
I	arrived	at	the	turn	of	the	century	block	of	ﬂats	at	3	o'clock	on	the	dot	and	climbed	
the	 old	 creaky	 staircase.	 Frau	 M.	 already	 stood	 in	 the	 door-frame	 awai_ng	 my	
arrival—a	 small,	 sturdy	woman	with	 short	 greyish-dark	 hair.	 She	 greeted	me	 and	
told	me	to	come	in,	put	down	my	things,	and	please	take	oﬀ	my	shoes.	The	ﬂat	had	
an	 unusual	 beau_ful	 Altbau-style	 layout	 with	 high	 ceilings.	 The	 interior	 was	 old-
fashioned	 and	 sparsely	 decorated.	 Her	 living	 room	 had	 a	 large	 old	 bookshelf	 and	
many	books,	newspapers,	and	old	casseje	tapes	ﬂoa_ng	around	the	room.		
In	 her	 very	majer-of-fact	manner,	 she	 told	me	 to	 sit.	 I	 gave	 her	my	 informa_on	
sheet	to	read	and	told	her	that	my	work	would	be	wrijen	in	English.	I	then	went	on	
to	 explain	 what	 I	 was	 interested	 in	 ﬁnding	 out.	 She	 silently	 watched	 me	 and	
listened.	All	of	a	sudden	she	said	(in	English)	"So,	we	can	speak	English".	At	ﬁrst,	 I	
thought	 she	might	have	 learnt	English	 somewhere,	but	as	 she	con_nued	 to	 talk,	 I	
could	make	out	from	her	accent	and	vocabulary	that	she	must	be	a	na_ve	speaker.	I	
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asked	 her	 why	 she	 spoke	 such	 good	 English.	 Surprisingly	 she	 answered	 that	 she	
grew	up	in	Australia.	
A`er	this	short	introduc_on,	she	began	recalling	her	life	story	in	a	very	factual	and	
structured	manner.	 She	 told	me	 that	 she	was	 Jewish,	 born	 in	 Germany,	 and	 as	 a	
child	forced	to	ﬂee	from	Hitler	with	her	family.	She	also	stated	that	the	ﬂight	from	
Germany	was	a	severely	trauma_sing	experience.	A`er	a	long,	tedious	journey,	they	
arrived	in	Australia,	where	she	spent	most	of	her	youth	and	young	adult	life.	From	
an	 early	 age,	 she	 was	 fascinated	 by	 socialism	 and	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 the	 only	
ideology	 that	 could	 lead	 the	 way	 to	 achieve	 equality,	 peace,	 and	 freedom	 for	
humankind.	She	had	close	rela_onships	with	a	group	of	communist	men	known	as	
the	Dunera	Boys,	who	had	ini_ally	arrived	in	Australia	onboard	the	HMT	Dunera.	
The	 story	of	 the	Dunera	Boys	 is	quite	 fascina_ng	 in	 itself.	At	 the	beginning	of	 the	
second	World	War,	as	fears	over	a	German	invasion	grew,	and	Britain	was	afraid	of	
housing	enemy	spies,	it	ordered	a	ship	to	take	German	na_onals	away	from	Europe.	
However,	 the	 opera_on	 was	 hasty	 and	 chao_c.	 In	 July	 1940,	 the	 HMT	 Dunera	
(originally	 with	 a	 capacity	 for	 1600	 passengers	 including	 crew),	 took	 away	 2000	
mostly	Jewish	refugees.	On	board	the	highly	overcrowded	ship	were	also	prisoners	
of	 war,	 around	 200	 Italian	 fascists,	 and	 251	 German	 Nazis.	 Without	 originally	
knowing	 where	 they	 were	 being	 sent,	 these	 people	 eventually	 ended	 up	 as	
internees	in	Australia	(BBC	2010).	
"A`er	a	57-day	journey	in	appalling	condi_ons,	during	which	the	ship	was	hit	by	a	
torpedo,	the	internees'	eventual	arrival	is	regarded	as	one	of	the	greatest	inﬂuxes	of	
academic	and	ar_s_c	talent	to	have	entered	Australia	on	a	single	vessel."	(BBC	2010)	
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Onboard	 were	 many	 extraordinary	 personali_es	 who	 later	 became	 renowned	
scien_sts,	authors,	and	sportsmen.	Among	the	passengers	was,	for	example,	Anton	
Walter	 Freud,	 grandson	 of	 psychoanalyst	 Sigmund	 Freud,	 who	 wrote	 about	 the	
Dunera's	 journey	 in	his	unpublished	memoirs	 (BBC	2010).	The	story	of	the	Dunera	
boys	became	a	scandal	in	Bri_sh	poli_cs	and	the	government	eventually	apologised,	
oﬀering	them	to	stay	in	Australian	camps	and	wait	un_l	the	end	of	the	war	or	join	
the	military.	
Out	of	these	passengers	emerged	a	group	of	young,	idealis_c	communists.	Frau	M.	
was	a	young	woman	and	became	 infatuated	with	 their	 ideas.	She	began	to	 follow	
them	and	when	the	group	decided	to	move	to	the	GDR,	she	decided	to	join	them.	
By	 1945/1946,	 they	 were	 sent	 back	 to	 Europe,	 ﬁnding	 themselves	 in	 an	
AuqruchssSmmung	 -	an	atmosphere	of	star_ng	afresh.	Frau	M.	was	quickly	 taken	
by	this	euphoric	mood.	
"The	atmosphere	at	the	end	of	the	war...arer	the	main	1945	wars...	we	had	
fought	this	war	so	that	never	again,	shall	there	be	fascism,	shall	there	be	
wars,	shall	we	have	depressions...we	the	people	are	now	going	to	let	us	take	
it	in	our	own	hands	and	not	let	all	the	capitalists	keep	it	all	for	themselves.	
The	post-war	years	were...	there	was	an	atmosphere	of	great	hope...	
Zuversicht..."	
Though	it	was	the	beginning	of	the	Cold	War,	Frau	M.	applied	for	immigra_on	to	the	
GDR	 several	 _mes.	 To	 her,	 the	 GDR	 represented	 the	 hopeful	 new	 beginning	 of	 a	
bejer	 social	 order.	 She	was	 denied	 entry	 for	 the	 ﬁrst	 few	 years.	 Then	 eventually,	
when	she	was	in	her	early	thir_es,	she	was	permijed	to	move	to	the	small	socialist	
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country.	In	her	Stasi	ﬁles,	she	later	found	that	the	state	was	highly	suspicious	of	her,	
yet	she	had	already	begun	repor_ng	to	the	Stasi.	
"Anyway...	they	couldn't	really	believe	that	anybody	would	want	to	live	in	
their	country...which	is	what	I	read	in	my	Stasi	ﬁle...	and	I	arrived	and	they	
then	let	me	in	in	1963	arer	I	had	already	worked	for	the	Stasi	since	1961	and	
...	so	that	they	should	believe	I	was	a	real	communist	but	whether	they	
believed	me	or	not,	was	not	a	quesSon....	And	I	arrived	there	naïve,	
blauäugig	...believing	all	the	propaganda	because	my	comrade...	was	telling	
lies.	I	needed	20	years	to	realise	that	...	I	was	living	in	a	police	state."	
Nonetheless,	she	quickly	moved	on	to	work	in	a	pres_gious	posi_on	in	the	na_onal	
trade	 department	 as	 a	 translator.	 She	 believed	 that	 she	 was	 helping	 the	 GDR	
accomplish	 the	 "building	 of	 the	 socialist	 state"	 by	 working	 as	 an	 unoﬃcial	
collaborator	(IM)	for	the	Stasi.	At	the	_me	she	was	en_rely	convinced	by	the	cause.	
She	spied	and	reported	on	everyone	around	her—family	and	friends	and	even	her	
husband.	
I	 asked	 her	 what	 mo_vated	 her	 to	 do	 this	 and	 she	 said	 that	 it	 was	 out	 of	 the	
convic_on	that	this	was	the	only	true	and	right	thing	to	do.	It	was	her	ﬁrm	belief	in	
socialism,	 she	 claimed,	 that	 drove	 her	 to	 do	 it.	 However,	 by	 the	 late	 1970's	 she	
realised	that	the	GDR	was	not	the	state	she	had	thought	it	would	become.	She	saw	
all	the	contradic_ons	of	everyday	life	and	the	injus_ces	imposed	upon	people.	She	
encountered	 suﬀering	 and	 repression,	 just	 as	 there	 had	 been	 in	 the	 former	
dictatorship.	 Having	 had	 the	 experience	 of	 growing	 up	 in	 a	 democracy,	 the	 state	
control	of	the	GDR	became	ever	more	apparent	to	her.	
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"You	have	to	understand	that	my	experiences	are	very	diﬀerent	to	the	ones	of	
the	normal	GDR	ciSzens.	Or	more	to	the	point,	not	only	were	my	experiences	
diﬀerent,	but	my	reacSons	towards	those	experiences	were	diﬀerent."	
She	had	wanted	to	adapt	to	East	German	culture,	but	she	came	to	realise	that	she	
was	diﬀerent,	having	been	socialised	 in	Australia,	where	one	was	not	used	to	self-
censorship	 and	 state	 inﬂuence	 to	 the	 extent	 she	 now	 rather	 unexpectedly	
experienced.		
"A	normal	GDR	ciSzen	was	used	to	keeping	his	mouth	shut.	He	was...he	grew	
up	with	the	fact	that	he	was	under	surveillance	and	that	the	school	and	the	
state	 decided	 for	 him	what	 his	 future	was	 going	 to	 be	 like.	 These	were	 all	
things	 that	 had	nothing	 to	 do	with	me.	 I	was	 over	 30	when	 I	 came	 to	 the	
GDR,	but	I	was	already	socialised	out	in	Australia.	And	not	told	what	not	to	
do....	I	thought	for	a	long	Sme	that	I	could	change	my	idenSty...	but	that	was	
not	possible.”		
In	addi_on	to	this	realisa_on,	she	became	aware	of	the	toxic	rela_onships	she	had	
had	with	 the	men	who	 ini_ally	 drew	her	 to	 the	 country.	 She	 said	 that	only	much	
later	when	 she	 received	psychological	 counselling,	 did	 she	 realise	 that	 these	men	
had	been	"father	ﬁgures"	 to	her	and	 that	 she	had	suﬀered	 from	her	own	 form	of	
"Stockholm	syndrome"	in	which	the	vic_m	sympathises	with	the	oppressor.	
The	1980s	became	a	turning	point	in	her	life.	It	became	increasingly	diﬃcult	for	her	
to	jus_fy	the	means	to	an	end	that	did	not	match	reality.	Her	troubling	rela_onships	
and	growing	disillusionment	with	the	regime	ﬁnally	led	her	to	the	decision	that	she	
could	no	longer	con_nue	to	inform	on	others.	Upon	breaking	with	the	Stasi,	Frau	M.	
	 95	
found	herself	in	the	midst	of	a	crisis.	She	became	suicidal	and	depressed.	Eventually,	
she	was	forced	to	seek	out	the	help	of	a	professional.	The	therapy	sessions	provided	
her	with	many	 insights	 and	 realisa_ons	 about	herself	 and	her	 life.	 She	now	knew	
that	 she	 had	 never	 really	 been	 able	 to	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 her	 trauma_sing	
childhood.	Her	early	experience	of	"being	uprooted	and	living	in	fear",	con_nued	to	
dominate	her	feelings	and	thoughts.	She	told	me	that	the	old	fears	are	s_ll	inside	of	
her,	 the	 same	 ones	 she	 felt	 when	 she	 ﬂed	 with	 her	 family	 many	 years	 ago.	
Psychotherapy	 and	 reﬂec_ons	 about	 her	 childhood	 helped	 her	 come	 to	 this	
conclusion	and	eventually	 led	her	 to	 confess	 to	 friends	and	 rela_ves	 that	 she	had	
been	informing	on	them	to	the	Stasi.	
"We	talked	about	my	childhood...	and	I	came	to	understand	how	much	I	had	
been	driven	by	fear	in	my	life.	And	by	1987	I	was	feeling	very	guilty	indeed.	I	
had	helped	to	make	this	country	a	police	state.		
I	went	from	one	friend	to	the	other	and	told	them...		
'Look,	 I	 want	 to	 tell	 you	 that	 I	 was	 working	 for	 the	 Stasi	 for	 20	 years...	 I	
reported	on	you	as	well."		
Everything	changed	a`er	she	publicly	revealed	that	she	had	reported	on	her	friends	
and	 family	 to	 the	Stasi.	Some	of	her	personal	 rela_onships	were	challenged.	Soon	
a`er	she	ﬁnally	overcame	this	_me	of	crisis,	the	Wall	fell.		
Her	case	was	par_cularly	unusual	in	my	work	because	not	only	did	she	openly	admit	
that	 she	 worked	 for	 the	 Stasi,	 but	 she	 also	 gained	 a	 unique	 insight	 into	 GDR	
society—one	which	other	people	barely	had,	and	certainly	one	not	provided	by	my	
other	 informants.	She	saw	the	state	with	diﬀerent	eyes	because	she	was	not	born	
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into	 the	 system.	 Unlike	 the	 majority	 of	 East	 Germans,	 she	 had	 grown	 up	 in	 a	
democra_c	country	where	 it	was	possible	 to	prac_ce	 free	speech.	Life	 in	Australia	
also	did	not	 involve	 the	kinds	of	heavy	 restric_ons	as	did	 life	 in	 the	GDR.	 Indeed,	
many	things	that	most	East	Germans	consider	ordinary	made	a	strong	impression	on	
her.	She	did	not	see	things	as	"just	normal".	
	As	an	example,	 she	 recalled	one	_me	when	 she	was	 standing	at	 the	 local	 airport	
and	heard	 the	 announcements	 coming	 from	 the	 speakers.	 They	 told	people	 (they	
didn't	 ask	 them)	 to	 take	 sharp	 objects	 out	 of	 their	 luggage	 before	 boarding	 the	
plane.	The	announcements	were	repeated	in	English,	yet	they	sounded	completely	
diﬀerent	in	the	two	languages.	In	German,	to	her,	it	sounded	like	a	demand	or	even	
an	 order,	 not	 just	 a	 piece	 of	 informa_on	 that	 was	 brought	 to	 people's	 ajen_on.	
Upon	 leaving	 the	 airport,	 Frau	 M.	 got	 into	 a	 taxi	 and	 told	 the	 driver	 about	 her	
sudden	 realisa_on.	He	 simply	 laughed	 it	 oﬀ	and	 said	 that	was	nothing	unusual;	 it	
was	"normal".		
Frau	M.	explained,		
"I	was	 a	 translator	 and	 interpreter	 in	 the	GDR,	 and	 I	was	 asked	 to	 talk	 to	
foreign	guests.	And	one	Sme	I	brought	a	foreign	guest	to	the	airport	…and	I	
had	 just	 said	 goodbye	 to	 them	 and	 then	 suddenly	 heard	 through	 the	
microphone	a	voice	saying	in	a	rough	tone,	"Es	ist	verboten	Messer,	Scheren	
und	spitze	Gegenstände	im	Gepäck	mitzunehmen..."	Es	wäre	eine	Verletzung	
der	DDR	Gesetze	und	wird	bestrar.	Sie	erwarten	das	alle	Passagiere	dieses	
Gesetz	einhalten".	The	tone	of	this	shocked	me.	(...)	Ok,	I	just	noSced	this	and	
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then	 I	 heard	 the	 same	 sentence	 again	 but	 in	 English.	 First	 of	 all	 the	 tone	
wasn't	there...	I	was	interested	how	they	would	translate	...'Sie	erwarten...'	
And	what	 it	said	was	 ‘We	ask	passengers	to'	 in	other	words...	and	as	 I	had	
oren	done	in	my	translaSons,	to	predy	up	the	whole	thing."	
"I	walked	out	of	the	airport...	I	wondered,	what	is	it	that...that...	shocks	me.	
What	is	that	I'm	objecSng	to,	really?	
And	I	walked	to	the	taxi.	I	was	working	for	the	ministry	of	culture	at	the	Sme,	
and	spoke	to	the	driver.	I	told	the	taxi	driver	what	I	had	just	experienced.	And	
I	ask	him,	does	this	"Wir	erwarten...",	this	expression,	‘do	you	also	object	to	
this?’	 and	 he	 laughed	 and	 said	 "no,	 not	 really	 I	 went	 to	 GDR	 children's	
holiday	camps	and	they	always	used	this	sort	of	terminology	there,	so	I	got	
used	to	it!"		
She	 points	 out	 that	 this	 simple	 situa_on	 portrays	 how	 people	 normalised	 state	
control	 in	 their	 lives,	 and	 even	 accommodated	 open	 aggression.	 This	 has	 been	
par_cularly	true	of	the	genera_on	that	had	been	born	in	the	GDR	and	had	spent	a	
signiﬁcant	 part	 of	 their	 young	 adult	 lives	 in	 the	 country.	 She	 described	 that	 this	
inevitably	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 interpersonal	 rela_onships,	 leading	 people	 to	 be	
cau_ous	and	distrusul.	
"I	felt	I	was	being	oppressed	by	that	sort	of	language	and	that	sort	of	tone.	
But	he	didn't.	It	was	normal.	Just	the	same,	it	also	became	a	normal	part	of	
peoples’	lives	to	know	that	those	who	were	their	best	friends	could	very	well	
be...also...be	reporSng	about	them	to	the	Stasi.	So	it	was	very	tricky	to	make	
new	friends	...”	
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She	stressed	the	destruc_ve	force	that	state	control	had	on	personal	rela_onships,	
saying	that	there	was	a	general	atmosphere	of	distrust.	She	had	herself	been	very	
much	involved	in	this	system	un_l	she	could	no	longer	bear	the	guilt.	
Frau	M.	made	 quite	 a	 grim	 and	 at	 _mes	 even	 unfriendly	 impression	 on	me.	 She	
seemed	miserable.	A`er	hearing	her	life	story,	though,	I	could	understand	why	it	is	
hard	to	interact	with	her.	It	was	clear	that	she	was	s_ll	very	much	preoccupied	with	
her	 past.	 She	 repeatedly	 told	me	 about	 her	 psychological	 problems	 and	 how	 her	
suﬀering	never	ended.	
Her	 extraordinary	 story	
demonstrates	 the	 powerful	
impact	 propaganda	 and	
ideology	 can	 have	 on	 young	
minds.	 As	 a	 young	woman,	 she	
truly	 believed	 that	 she	 was	
ﬁgh_ng	 for	 an	 honourable	
cause.	 Her	 trauma_sing	 past,	
ﬂeeing	 Nazi	 Germany,	 re-enforced	 the	 striving	 for	 a	 new	 bejer	 world.	 With	 her	
outsider's	 perspec_ve,	 she	 soon	 came	 to	 realise	 the	 dangerous	 system	 of	 control	
she	had	become	a	part	of.	In	the	GDR,	state	control	was	accepted	as	normal.	
Frau	 M.	 is	 very	 cri_cal	 of	 both	 German	 dictatorships	 these	 days.	 She	 sees	 the	
purpose	 of	 her	 life	 now,	 to	 tell	 the	 younger	 genera_on	 about	 the	 history	 and	
suﬀering	of	the	past	to	ensure	that	there	would	be	"no	forgeang".	She	is	now	very	
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ac_ve	 in	 the	 Jewish	community	and	has	wrijen	a	book	and	appeared	 in	many	TV	
interviews.	
Case	2:	Betrayal	and	Distrust	
Herr	K.		
Arranging	my	ﬁrst	mee_ng	with	Herr	K.	was	quite	unusual.	I	had	received	his	contact	
through	 the	 Berlin-based	 organisa_on	 Zeitzeugen	 Börse	 e.V..	 Before	 I	 could	 even	
reach	 him,	 I	 already	 received	 a	 phone	 call.	Without	much	 of	 an	 introduc_on,	 he	
asked	 what	my	 project	 was	 about,	 brieﬂy	 listened	 and	 then	 said	 "OK,	 when	 and	
where	shall	we	meet?".	A`er	no_cing	that	we	live	rela_vely	close	to	each	other,	he	
stated	that	he	would	prefer	to	come	and	see	me	at	the	place	where	I	was	staying.	
Unlike	my	other	 informants,	 he	did	 not	 give	 anything	 away	 about	 his	 background	
before	our	mee_ng.	
On	the	day,	he	arrived	very	punctually	at	my	house,	carrying	a	black	briefcase.	We	
went	 and	 sat	 in	 the	 living	 room.	And	although	he	made	a	 friendly	 impression,	he	
was	no_ceably	reserved.	When	we	sat	down	with	coﬀee	to	begin	our	interview,	he	
told	me	that	he	was	not	sure	whether	his	story	would	be	"useful"	to	me.	As	I	always	
did	 when	 I	 heard	 this	 statement,4	 I	 simply	 said,	 "anything	 you	 say	 is	 useful".	 He	
unpacked	various	books	and	papers,	which	he	laid	on	the	table.	A`er	showing	him	
the	research	informa_on	sheet,	he	quickly	began	telling	me	his	story.			
																																								 																				
4	During	many	interviews	interlocuters	were	at	first	reluctant	in	sharing	their	stories.	
They	would	often	say	 that	 it	may	be	"irrelevant"	or	"not	 interesting".	 In	general,	 I	
interpreted	this	as	an	expression	of	caution,	and	also	a	way	for	them	to	gauge	what	
my	intentions	were.	
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He	was	 born	 in	 1941,	 and	despite	 having	 only	 been	 four	 years	 old	when	 the	war	
ended,	 he	 could	 s_ll	 remember	 everything	 very	 well.	 He	 described	 his	 childhood	
and	 the	 way	 he	 and	 his	 friends	 would	 roam	 the	 streets	 and	 forests	 while	 their	
parents	 were	 working	 and	 rebuilding	 the	 country.	 Although	 these	 were	 diﬃcult	
_mes,	he	seemed	to	have	had	a	free	and	enjoyable	childhood.	He	then	went	on	to	
describe	 his	 adolescence	 and	 his	 appren_ceship	 in	 a	 communica_on	 technology	
company	that	he	began	as	a	14-year-old	boy.	He	proudly	told	me	about	a	lijle	ﬂag	
that	he	had	received	as	an	award	for	being	the	best	appren_ce.	Not	much	later,	he	
decided	to	join	a	congrega_on	of	young	Chris_ans	("Evangelische	Junge	Gemeinde")	
to	 the	 dismay	 of	 the	 poli_cal	 leadership	 in	 his	 region.	 At	 the	 _me,	 he	 did	 not	
conceive	the	far-reaching	consequences	this	would	have.	But,	soon	a`er,	he	lost	his	
job.	His	story	was	even	published	in	a	newspaper,	as	a	warning	to	others.	He	then	
began	studying	at	a	university	in	the	West	Berlin,	while	commu_ng	from	the	Soviet	
Occupa_on	Zone	(later	GDR).	
One	weekend	in	1961	he	went	on	a	trip	to	Warnemünde	on	the	Bal_c	Sea	with	his	
friends	 from	 the	 church	 youth	 group.	 For	 them,	 the	 religious	 aspect	 of	 the	 group	
was	not	so	important.	They	just	enjoyed	going	on	trips	together:	swimming,	playing	
table	tennis,	and	so	on.	They	did	not	seek	contact	with	the	state	or	poli_cs;	instead,	
they	 just	enjoyed	spending	_me	together.	But	 it	was	not	 long	before	the	shocking	
news	 reached	 them	 that	 the	 border	 had	 been	 closed	 and	 a	wall	 built,	 separa_ng	
East	 and	West	 Berlin.	 Hearing	 the	 news,	 Herr	 K.	 quickly	 made	 his	 way	 back.	 He	
arrived	in	East	Berlin	on	the	13th	of	August	by	train,	which	was	strictly	monitored	by	
police	and	military.	 In	 the	city,	he	recognised	the	hopelessness	of	 the	situa_on.	 In	
the	 coming	days,	he	was	 informed	 that	he	would	no	 longer	be	able	 to	 study	at	 a	
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university,	 but	 instead,	 would	 be	 expected	 to	 join	 the	 army.	 So,	 as	 soon	 as	 an	
opportunity	arose,	he	ﬂed	to	West	Berlin.			
He	 passed	 through	 the	 Notaufnahmelager	 Marienfelde5	 and	 in	 West	 Berlin,	 he	
quickly	began	a	new	job,	earned	money,	got	himself	a	place	to	live	and	con_nued	to	
study.	At	this	_me	he	was	s_ll	 in	touch	with	family	and	friends	in	the	East,	though	
the	separa_on	from	his	 loved	ones	was	very	tough.	He	read	me	one	of	the	 lejers	
from	his	parents	 that	he	had	kept,	wrijen	 in	1962.	As	he	read	 it,	he	became	very	
emo_onal.	Their	despera_on	to	 leave	the	East	was	clearly	palpable	 in	the	 lines	he	
read.	His	mother	was	very	 ill,	had	heart	problems	and	could	barely	walk.	She	was	
not	 receiving	 the	 right	 medica_on	 in	 the	 GDR.	 Of	 course,	 she	 would	 have	 never	
been	able	to	escape	by	climbing	fences	and	walls,	but	he	was	determined	to	get	her	
out.	 	He	came	up	with	an	elaborate	escape	plan.	For	this,	he	got	a	car	with	a	fake	
number	 plate,	 changed	 his	 appearance	 and	 took	 up	 the	 iden_ty	 of	 a	 foreign	
diplomat.	 He	 underwent	 lengthy	 prepara_ons	 including	 geang	 a	 fake	 diplomat	
passport,	gaining	graphics	and	prin_ng	exper_se	and	learning	enough	English	to	get	
by	without	arising	suspicions	of	 the	border	guards.	He	even	tried	to	adopt	certain	
"diplomat	 characteris_cs".	A`er	 successfully	bringing	 some	of	his	 family	members	
to	the	West,	he	con_nued	this	endeavor,	eventually	bringing	some	50	East	Germans	
across	the	border,	smuggling	back	large	quan__es	of	medica_ons	over	the	following	
years.			
																																								 																				
5	Emergency	Refugee	Centre	Marienfelde	received	East	German	refugees	arriving	 in	West	
Berlin,	where	 they	completed	 the	 formal	procedure	 to	obtain	 residency	permits	 for	West	
Germany	and	West	Berlin.	
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He	 told	 me	 how	 people	 pleaded	 him	 for	 help.	 There	 were	 families	 with	 small	
children	and	many	diﬃcult	cases,	but	he	was	lucky	enough	never	to	be	checked	at	
the	 border	 and	 successfully	 took	 them	 to	 the	 West.	 An	 elaborate	 and	 _me-
consuming	ac_vity.	
"Ich	 Weiss	 nicht	 ob	 sie	 sich	 vorstellen	 können,	 wie	 die	 Leute	 sie	
anﬂehen	können...da	waren	Eltern	mit	kleinen	Kindern...	also	ich	habe	
schwierige	Fälle	geholt	und	wir	wurden	nicht	kontrolliert."		
“I	 don’t	 know	 if	 you	 can	 imagine	 how	 people	 can	 beg…there	 were	
parents	 with	 small	 children…so	 I	 took	 the	 diﬃcult	 cases	 and	 they	
didn’t	check	us.”	
Yet,	 these	 undertakings	 were	 only	 possible	 because	 he	 regularly	 changed	 his	
iden_ty	and	appearance.	He	was	always	sure	to	conduct	all	his	missions	alone,	and	
not	many	people	knew	what	he	was	up	to.	Back	in	the	_me	when	he	was	s_ll	living	
in	East	Berlin,	 the	Stasi	noted	 in	his	 family's	ﬁle	 that	 they	were	deemed	"negaSve	
Elemente",	possibly	“nega_ve	elects	of	society”,	but	in	general	there	was	no	reason	
for	them	to	put	him	under	intense	surveillance—not	yet	at	least.		
Now,	however,	the	Stasi	were	fran_cally	searching	for	the	person	who	was	helping	
so	many	people	escape.	In	the	beginning,	they	found	it	diﬃcult	to	track	him	down	
and	to	know	whether	it	was	a	single	person	conduc_ng	these	elaborate	decep_ons.	
Although	 he	 was	 in	West	 Berlin,	 he	 became	 a	 highly	 suspicious	 person	 to	 them.	
Increasingly	he	found	that	his	room	in	the	student	halls	was	searched,	and	his	things	
were	 looked	through,	but	he	ensured	that	 they	were	unable	 to	ﬁnd	anything.	The	
Stasi	were	trying	to	ﬁnd	out	his	real	 iden_ty,	but	they	were	not	sure	 if	he	was	the	
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one	they	were	looking	for.	The	fact	that	the	person	they	were	looking	for	lived	in	the	
West,	made	it	hard	for	them	to	know	his	background,	exactly	where	he	came	from,	
and	what	his	name	was.	Only	through	undercover	spy	work,	they	slowly	got	an	idea	
of	what	the	name	of	the	person	they	were	searching	for	might	be.	They	had	a	list	of	
diﬀerent	versions	of	a	name	 that	 spies	had	overheard	 in	various	 conversa_ons.	 In	
his	 Stasi	 ﬁles,	 he	 found	 that	 they	 had	 an	 opera_on	 running	 to	 observe	 him	 –	 his	
code	name	was	"Adler"	-	"Eagle".	He	read	the	passage	from	the	copy	of	his	ﬁle	to	
me.	 It	was	a	detailed	descrip_on	of	his	person,	but	 it	was	 clear	 that	 they	did	not	
know	who	he	truly	was	because	of	his	ever-changing	iden_ty.	Some_mes	he	would	
enter	 the	 GDR	 with	 a	 foreigner's	 passport	 and	 leave	 with	 a	 diplomat's	 passport,	
always	 crossing	at	 Friedrichstraße	–	Checkpoint	Charlie	–	 a	 crossing	 that	was	only	
used	by	foreigners.		
At	some	point,	he	became	aware	that	the	Stasi	was	about	to	close	in	on	him.	He	told	
me	 that	 what	 eventually	 lead	 them	 to	 ﬁnd	 him	 was,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	
denuncia_on	 from	 someone	 close	 to	 him	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 his	 carelessness	
(“UnvorsichSgkeit”)	in	his	pursuit	to	help	others.	
He	read	a	sec_on	from	his	ﬁle	wrijen	by	an	‘IM',	an	unoﬃcial	collaborator,	who	was	
watching	both	him	and	his	GDR	network.	In	the	report,	the	IM	was	sharing	in_mate	
details	about	his	sexual	encounter	with	a	woman	who	he	believed	to	have	been	in	
contact	with	Herr	K.	Indeed,	Herr	K.	later	helped	her	escape,	but	had	not	known	her	
previously.	He	had	been	asked	by	her	Austrian	ﬁancé	to	help	her	get	out	of	the	GDR.	
When	the	_me	of	this	woman's	arranged	escape	ﬁnally	came,	the	Stasi	was	close	on	
their	heels.	The	records	illustrate	in	great	detail	how	the	woman	got	into	his	car	and	
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where	they	travelled.	He	had	ﬁnally	been	unmasked,	and	now	they	did	everything	in	
their	power	to	try	and	catch	him.	He	read	the	sec_on	of	the	drama_c	chase	from	his	
ﬁle—how	they	were	following	his	car,	and	how	he	stopped,	got	out,	and	confronted	
them,	asking	why	 they	were	 following	him.	At	 this	point,	he	 felt	 superior	 to	 them	
because	 he	 thought	 it	would	 not	 be	 easy	 for	 them	 to	 arrest	 a	 diplomat.	 Yet	 they	
con_nued	following	him	and	even	tried	shoo_ng	at	his	car.	He	managed	to	escape,	
but	the	experience	changed	everything	for	him.	He	was	no	longer	safe,	and	he	knew	
that	he	could	not	con_nue	as	he	had	previously.	
He	realised	that	someone	had	probably	denounced	him,	but	he	had	no	idea	who	it	
could	be,	so	he	distanced	himself	from	everyone	he	knew.	It	was	the	beginning	of	a	
long	period	of	isola_on	and	severe	distrust.	He	says	that	he	became	"psychoSc	and	
could	trust	no	one”	 -"ich	wurde	psychoSsch,	 ich	traute	gar	keinem	mehr".	 	He	was	
afraid	 to	 stay	 in	 touch	 with	 anyone	 and	 broke	 contact	 even	 with	 close	 rela_ves.	
Today	he	regrets	rejec_ng	their	ajempts	of	speaking	to	him.		
“I	regret	it	today…	even	when	my	relaSves	tried	to	get	in	touch	with	
me,	I	rigorously	dismissed	them”.	
"Ich	 bedauere	 es	 heute...auch	 bei	 Verwandten	 die	 Kontakt	
aufnehmen	wollten	habe	ich	es	rigoros	abgelehnt”.		
Shortly	 a`er	 Germany's	 reuniﬁca_on,	 he	 ﬁnally	 had	 the	 chance	 to	 view	 his	 Stasi	
ﬁles.	 The	 shocking	 revela_ons	 from	 his	 past	 caused	 him	 to	 have	 a	 severe	
psychological	breakdown.	He	says	that	viewing	the	ﬁles	broke	him.		
	 “Arer	this	ﬁle-viewing	arer	the	Wende,	I	was	broken”	
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	 "Nach	 dieser	 Akteneinsicht	 nach	 der	 Wende	 war	 ich	 eigentlich	
kapud".			
He	found	out	who	eventually	revealed	his	iden_ty	to	the	Stasi:	it	had	been	his	own	
sister.	 She	 lived	 in	 the	 GDR	 and	 in	 general,	 he	 thought	 that	 they	 had	 a	 good	
rela_onship	at	the	_me.	So,	he	oﬀered	to	take	her	and	her	family	to	West	Berlin	too.	
She	declined	the	oﬀer.	But	he	did	not	know	that	she	was	also	repor_ng	everything	
to	the	secret	police.	All	of	their	 interac_ons	were	on	record.	As	early	as	1962,	she	
reported	that	he	had	sent	her	a	Christmas	parcel	and	even	any	harmless	postcard	
was	delivered	directly	to	the	Stasi	as	he	later	found	in	his	ﬁles.	The	ministry	gained	a	
lot	of	informa_on	about	him	this	way,	and	at	some	point,	they	were	able	to	put	two	
and	two	together	and	ﬁgured	out	that	he	was	the	person	they	had	been	fran_cally	
searching	for.	Soon	a`er	the	Stasi	iden_ﬁed	him,	an	intense	manhunt	began.	From	
then	on	it	was	their	goal	to	catch	him	or	do	anything	in	their	power	to	stop	him	from	
taking	more	people	to	the	West.	
Not	 only	 did	 they	 ajempt	 to	 shoot	 him,	 but	 they	 also	 began	 using	 repressive	
opera_ve	 techniques	 on	 him,	 even	 while	 he	 was	 living	 in	 West	 Berlin.	 He	
experienced	house	searches	and	a	variety	of	 in_mida_on	methods,	which	put	him	
under	immense	psychological	pressure.	He	was	no	longer	sure	whom	it	was	safe	to	
trust.	In	our	interview,	he	revealed	how	isolated	he	became	for	years.	Only	when	he	
met	his	wife,	did	he	begin	building	new	friendships.	
In	the	records,	he	found	that	s_ll	 in	1984,	20	years	later	a`er	the	incident,	he	was	
being	observed.	He	read	that	he	had	also	been	denounced	by	people	in	his	sister's	
network,	especially	by	his	niece.	Apparently,	she	was	building	a	house	at	 the	_me	
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and	 wanted	 to	 show	 her	 apprecia_on	 for	 the	 state.	 In	 order	 to	 gain	 special	
permissions,	she	repeatedly	reported	on	him,	and	this	led	the	secret	police	to	start	
an	 en_re	 opera_on	 on	 him.	 Herr	 K.	 Said	 that	 this	 was	 traceable	 through	 the	
archived	 reports	 which	 had	 been	 passed	 along	 various	 regional	 Stasi	 oﬃces	 and	
departments.	
To	this	day,	he	suﬀers	 immensely	from	the	consequences	of	the	persecu_on.	He	is	
s_ll	 very	 cau_ous	 in	 his	 personal	 interac_ons	 and	 only	 recently	 has	 he	 found	 the	
courage	to	get	back	in	touch	with	his	friends	from	the	past.	 	To	me,	his	story	truly	
demonstrated	the	destruc_veness	that	distrust,	generated	by	the	state,	can	have	on	
personal	 rela_onships.	 He	 described	 the	 complicated	 rela_onship	 that	 he	 and	 his	
sister	con_nue	to	have	to	this	day.	He	never	confronted	her	with	his	discovery	that	
she	was	 the	 one	who	 betrayed	 him.	 He	 thinks	 that	 it	 would	 be	 pointless,	 as	 she	
would	deny	everything	since	she	"sSll	believes	in	socialism".	He	says	that	even	today	
she	s_ll	has	a	subscrip_on	to	the	former	oﬃcial	party	newspaper:	"Sie	ist	heute	noch	
AbonnenSn	 von	 Neues	 Deutschland".	 Nevertheless,	 he	 con_nues	 to	 stay	 in	 touch	
with	her.	He	says	that	he	does	it	out	of	a	sense	of	obliga_on	because	she	is	family.	
He	and	his	wife	visit	her	twice	a	year,	but	for	him,	it	is	tough	every	_me.			
He	says	that	her	aatude	towards	him	con_nues	to	be	very	nega_ve,	even	when	he	
tries	to	please	her	with	small	gestures.	During	GDR	_mes	he	had	even	bought	a	car	
for	her,	which	she	happily	accepted	but	never	showed	thanks.	He	says	that	talking	to	
her	 is	 pointless,	 as	 they	always	end	up	arguing.	When	 I	 asked	him	how	he	would	
describe	 their	 rela_onship,	 he	 stated	 that	 superﬁcially	 they	 are	 rela_vely	 friendly;	
but	under	no	circumstances	is	their	rela_onship	"normal".	Too	much	had	happened.	
He	recalled	one	_me	when	he	visited	her,	and	she	was	hos_ng	a	garden	party,	which	
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many	former	Stasi	oﬃcials	ajended.	He	told	me	that	this	event	made	him	sick	and	
gave	him	nightmares	for	weeks.	
To	 me,	 this	 con_nua_on	 of	 a	 rela_onship	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 most	 severe	
betrayal	is	par_cularly	striking.	In	East	Germany	and	many	other	post-socialist	states	
this	 is	 common	because	 the	 lines	between	vic_m	and	perpetrator	were	 so	blurry,	
everyone	played	some	role	in	the	system.	Therefore,	silence	and	to	a	certain	extent	
even	denial	are	common.	In	this	thesis,	I	will	explore	how	this	can	be	interpreted	as	
a	con_nua_on	of	years	of	state-imposed	silencing,	secrecy	and	social	control.		
Speaking	 to	 Herr	 K.,	 I	 got	 the	 impression	 that	 trust	 and	 distrust	 s_ll	 play	 a	 very	
signiﬁcant	role	in	his	life.	He	s_ll	seems	to	suﬀer	under	the	burden	of	his	inability	to	
trust	friends	and	family,	feeling	uncertain	of	who	is	"really	on	his	side".	Even	in	our	
interac_ons,	 I	 could	 sense	 cau_on	 (e.g.,	 in	 phone	 calls	 and	 emails	 he	 did	 not	
men_on	his	name)	and	he	told	me	that	he	had	never	given	an	interview	before	and	
was	unsure	whether	he	would	do	it	again.	The	interview	was	very	emo_onal,	and	he	
was	 visibly	 shaken	 by	 recoun_ng	 his	 memories.	 He	 told	 me,	 now	 that	 he	 is	 a	
pensioner,	he	has	begun	to	engage	more	ac_vely	with	his	past.	He	has	for	example	
made	a	scrapbook	collec_ng	photos,	newspaper	ar_cles,	copies	of	archival	records	
and	personal	accounts.	Perhaps	this	engagement	is	a	way	to	come	to	terms	with	his	
trauma.	
S_ll,	Herr	K.’s	example	demonstrates,	like	no	other,	the	extent	to	which	the	pain	and	
sorrow	of	the	past	can	con_nue	to	impact	a	person's	wellbeing	in	the	long	term.	At	
the	 same	_me,	 it	 illustrates	 how	 the	 human	psyche	 can	 suppress	 certain	 reali_es	
even	in	the	face	of	severe	betrayal.	The	example	of	Herr	K.	is	quite	drama_c,	yet	it	
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gives	a	glimpse	into	the	way	in	which	many	East	Germans	choose	to	move	forward	
and	even	con_nue	distrus_ng	rela_onships.	As	I	will	show	in	this	thesis,	this	denial	
and	 silencing	 surfaces	 in	many	 situa_ons,	 one	example	 is	 the	 fact	 that	many	 East	
Germans	 refuse	 to	 view	 their	 Stasi	 ﬁles	 for	 fear	 of	 ﬁnding	 out	 something	
disappoin_ng	about	somebody	close	to	them.		
Case	3:	Trauma	and	Resilience	
Frau	L.	
	I	 conducted	 this	 interview	 in	 a	 small	 central	 German	 town.	 Frau	 L.	 was	 a	 close	
friend	of	the	family	that	I	was	staying	with.	She	was	an	elegant,	well-kept	woman	in	
her	 mid-for_es.	 At	 ﬁrst,	 she	 studied	 me	 carefully	 and	 le`	 me	 with	 a	 reserved	
impression.	Our	host	had	prepared	coﬀee	and	water	on	 the	dining	room	table,	 so	
she	 just	 helped	 herself	 and	 seemed	 to	 feel	 quite	 at	 home.	 This	 relaxed	 the	
atmosphere	a	lijle.			
I	presented	her	with	my	informa_on	sheet	and	brieﬂy	explained	what	my	project	is	
about.	So,	in	turn,	she	began	asking	me	several	ques_ons	about	why	I	am	doing	this,	
how	 I	 came	up	with	 the	 research	ques_on,	 and	where	exactly	 I	 am	 from	 (East	 or	
West).	 I	 felt	 a	 bit	 like	 she	 was	 tes_ng	 me,	 even	 trying	 to	 understand	 my	 true	
inten_ons.	 I	 readily	 explained	 everything	 to	 her,	 and	 she	 seemed	 more	 or	 less	
sa_sﬁed.	
She	then	began	recalling	her	childhood	and	told	me	that	she	had	two	siblings.	One	
year	they	went	on	vaca_on	to	the	Bal_c	Sea,	 just	as	 they	had	always	done.	When	
the	holiday	came	to	an	end,	her	parents	announced	that	they	had	managed	to	get	
an	extra	visa	for	Hungary	and	that	they	would	all	go	there	to	visit	a	rela_ve.	So	they,	
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indeed,	made	 their	way	 towards	 the	Hungarian	border.	 In	 reality,	her	parents	had	
obtained	 fake	 passports	 from	 an	 organisa_on	 based	 in	 West	 Germany,	 which	
claimed	to	help	GDR	ci_zens	to	get	out	of	the	country.	They	made	a	lot	of	money	by	
selling	 fake	papers	 to	 those	who	were	desperate	 to	escape.	Yet,	 shockingly,	at	 the	
same	_me	they	actually	received	money	from	the	Stasi,	as	they	would	expose	their	
clients	 to	 them.	 So,	 whenever	 someone	 had	 obtained	 a	 fake	 passport	 and	
ajempted	to	leave,	the	secret	police	were	already	informed	and	ready	to	strike	at	
the	border	crossing.	Of	course,	for	those	aﬀected,	this	had	serious	consequences.	As	
any	“illegal”	ajempt	to	 leave	the	GDR	was	deemed	a	criminal	oﬀence,	 this	meant	
that	these	individuals	would	be	prosecuted.	Frau	L.	told	me	that	years	later,	one	of	
these	 exposed	 East	 Germans	 who	 had	 been	 imprisoned	 by	 the	 Stasi	 for	
"Republikﬂucht"	 tracked	 down	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 criminal	 organisa_on,	 which	
supplied	the	Stasi	with	informa_on,	and	shot	him	dead.		
My	informant's	parents	suﬀered	a	similar	fate.	When	they	approached	the	passport	
control,	they	were	quickly	found	out	by	the	border	guards.	Before	the	eyes	of	their	
children,	they	were	arrested.	They	were	then	all	ﬂown	to	Berlin,	where	her	parents	
were	 imprisoned.	 The	 children	 were	 to	 live	 with	 their	 grandparents.	 The	 en_re	
situa_on	 was	 very	 trauma_c	 for	 her	 and	 her	 siblings,	 as	 she	 recalls	 having	 been	
terriﬁed.	The	sight	of	her	parents	being	handcuﬀed	is	a	painful	memory.	At	the	_me	
she	did	not	understand	what	was	happening,	in	her	mind,	her	parents	had	not	done	
anything	wrong.	Following	the	arrest,	the	children	were	not	allowed	to	see	or	speak	
to	 their	 parents,	 only	 later	were	 they	 allowed	 to	write	one	 lejer	 a	month,	which	
was	 read	 and	 censored	 by	 the	 authori_es.	 	 Life	with	 their	 grandparents	was	 very	
strict,	as	they	were	devoted	socialists	and	party	members.	
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Luckily,	 due	 to	 an	 oﬃcial	 state	 amnesty	 on	 a	 na_onal	 celebra_on,	 her	 parents'	
prison	 sentences	 was	 shortened	 from	 3.5	 years	 to	 1.5	 years.	 When	 they	 were	
eventually	 released	 from	 prison,	 they	 were	 reunited	 with	 their	 children.	 Her	
experience	with	those	surrounding	her	during	her	parent's	imprisonment	and	a`er	
their	 release	 was	 two-fold.	 There	 were	 those	 who	 were	 very	 much	 pro-GDR	 -	
"Systemtreu"6.	A`er	what	they	had	done,	the	family	were	regarded	as	criminals.		
In	the	small	town,	her	grandfather	was	a	very	well-known	and	respected	man.	The	
news	of	his	son's	ajempted	escape	spread	fast,	and	the	family	became	the	talk	of	
the	 town.	He	was	 afraid	 that	 the	 reputa_on	 could	harm	his	 career,	 and	upon	 the	
couple's	release	from	prison	limited	contact	with	them,	especially	since	his	son	had	
applied	 for	 emigra_on.	 Frau	 L.	 described	 that,	 especially	 amongst	 their	 rela_ves,	
many	 decided	 to	 act	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 state	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 family.	 Some,	who	
already	had	to	deal	with	disadvantages—such	as	academics,	or	those	who	were	in	
the	opposi_on	movement—also	distanced	themselves.	These	people	were	already	
on	the	Stasi's	radar,	and	their	involvement	with	the	family	could	have	exposed	them	
to	 further	 repression	 by	 the	 secret	 police.	 Many	 people	 turned	 away,	 stopped	
speaking	 to	 them,	 and	 they	 eventually	 lost	 touch.	 This	 feeling	 of	 rejec_on	was	 a	
prominent	one	during	this	period	of	her	childhood.		
It	 is	remarkable,	that	 in	spite	of	Frau	L.'s	trauma_c	account	of	severe	betrayal	and	
injus_ce,	 she	made	 a	 point	 to	 embrace	 the	 posi_ve	 gains	 she	 received	 from	 the	
experience,	 especially	 in	 regard	 to	 certain	 rela_onships.	 Although	 she	 had	
experienced	 rejec_on	 from	 some	 people,	 others	 acted	 in	 the	 complete	 opposite	
																																								 																				
6	Literally	means	being	loyal	to	the	political	system.	
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way.	First	and	foremost	of	this	group	was	her	best	friend.	When	Frau	L.	ﬁrst	moved	
to	her	grandparent's	house,	she	dreaded	going	back	to	school	a`er	the	summer.	In	
the	 small	 town	 where	 she	 lived,	 everyone	 knew	 what	 had	 happened.	 People	
pointed	at	her	on	 the	street	and	spoke	behind	her	back.	But	 this	par_cular	 friend	
stood	by	her	no	majer	what	everyone	said.	Although	she	was	only	a	lijle	girl	at	the	
_me,	 she	 showed	great	 strength	of	 character	 in	 this	 situa_on.	On	 the	ﬁrst	 day	of	
school,	 she	 rang	 her	 doorbell	 and	 picked	 her	 up	 to	walk	 to	 school	 together	 as	 if	
nothing	had	happened	over	the	summer.	She	told	her:	"You	were	my	friend	before.	
Nothing	has	changed,	you	will	always	be	my	friend".	This	gave	her	hope	and	showed	
her	that	there	were	people	who	could	be	trusted	even	in	such	diﬃcult	_mes.	They	
shared	a	special	bond,	strengthened	her	belief	in	people.		
"Well,	 the	Sme	when	 they	were	 in	prison	was	very	uncomfortable	because	people	
showed	 (how	 they	 felt).	 Just	 imagine	 that	 in	 this	 society,	many	 people	 were	 very	
poliScally	 loyal…they	 then	 looked	 at	 my	 family	 and	 to	 them	 we	 were	 pracScally	
criminals.	We	 felt	 that,	 of	 course…but	 I	 have	 to	 say	 there	 were	 also	 really	 great	
friends…"	
"Die	Zeit	danach	war...ähm...	na	ja	die	Zeit,	als	sie	im	Gefängnis	waren,	(war)	
insofern	auch	sehr	unangenehm,	weil	alle	anderen	das	auch	sehr	gezeigt	
haben.	Wenn	man	sich	vorstellt,	dass	ja	diese	Gesellschar	oder	sehr	viele	
davon	natürlich	sehr	poliSsch	treu	waren,...die	haben	dann	auf	mich	oder	
meine	Familie	geguckt	und	(wir)	waren	für	viele	dann	prakSsch	Verbrecher.	
Das	hat	man	natürlich	auch	zu	spüren	bekommen,	...wobei	ich	auch	sagen	
muss,	es	gab	ganz	tolle	Freunde…”		
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She	believes	that	this	behaviour	and	how	one	handles	such	a	situa_on	is	a	majer	of	
character.	 Some	 people	 just	 make	 a	 decision	 and	 are	 consistent	 in	 the	 way	 they	
approach	 their	 rela_onships.	 For	 her,	 her	 loyal	 childhood	 friend	 is	 the	 prime	
example	of	this,	as	she	con_nued	to	 live	 in	such	a	manner,	even	un_l	today,	while	
others	were	afraid	of	disadvantages	or	perhaps	they	simply	chose	to	be	loyal	to	the	
poli_cal	system.		
“Everyone	has	 to	come	to	terms	with	their	own	behaviour.	 It	 is	a	mader	of	
personality.	There	were	those,	 like	my	friend,	who	said	 ‘You	were	my	friend	
and	you	will	stay	my	friend,	nothing	will	change’.	She	conSnued	living	her	life	
that	 way	 and	 then	 there	 were	 others,	 who	 did	 not	 handle	 it	 like	
that…whether	this	was	due	to	disadvantages	or	to	be	poliScally	loyal	to	the	
system,	I	don’t	know.”		
"Das	Verhalten	muss	jeder	mit	sich	ausmachen.	Das	ist	eine	Entscheidung	des	
persönlichen	Charakters.	Da	waren	so	welche	wie	meine	Freundin,	die	gesagt	
hat,	 'Du	warst	meine	Freundin	und	bleibst	auch	meine	Freundin,	da	ändert	
sich	nichts.'	So	hat	sie	auch	(ihr)	ganzes	Leben	weiterhin	gestaltet	und	dann	
gibt	es	andere,	die	das	nicht	so	gehandhabt	haben,...ob	wegen	der	Nachteile	
oder	Systemtreu,	ich	weiß	es	nicht."		
Eventually,	 a`er	 the	 applica_on	 period	 (to	 emigrate)	 passed,	 she	 and	 her	 family	
were	ﬁnally	granted	permission	to	leave	the	GDR,	which	came	as	a	great	relief.	S_ll	
to	this	day,	she	has	intensely	nega_ve	feelings	towards	the	GDR	and	East	Germans.	
She	 avoids	 going	 to	 Eastern	 Germany	 whenever	 she	 can	 and	 thinks	 that	 most	
Easterners	are	s_ll	very	diﬀerent	from	Westerners.	
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She	said	that	her	trauma_c	past	in	the	GDR	con_nues	to	impact	her	life	signiﬁcantly.	
First,	 in	 the	way	 she	 sees	 the	 East	 and	 the	way	 its	 history	 is	 dealt	with	 in	 public	
discourse.	 She	 feels	 that	 there	 has	 been	 no	 real	 eﬀort	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 past.	
Second,	 the	 fact	 is	 that	 East	German	 is	 s_ll	 part	 of	 her	 iden_ty,	 even	 though	 she	
does	not	like	to	be	associated	with	the	GDR	in	any	way.	She	told	me	how	she	always	
hesitates	when	people	ask	about	her	place	of	birth.	In	her	profession,	this	ques_on	
is	o`en	asked	and	carries	signiﬁcant	meaning.	She	said	that	she	hates	having	to	say	
that	she	was	born	in	the	East	because	people	immediately	draw	conclusions	about	
her	in	the	West,	assuming	she	studied	in	the	GDR.	To	her,	this	is	s_ll	a	burden.	
Her	story	gives	great	 insight	 into	human	nature.	Although	Frau	L.	undoubtedly	s_ll	
suﬀers	 from	the	 injus_ce	endured,	she	places	great	emphasis	on	the	strength	and	
resilience	of	human	character	and	 that	even	 in	 the	most	adverse	situa_on	certain	
people	can	be	counted	on.	
So,	these	brief	case	studies	illustrate	how	East	Germans	manifested	their	beliefs	or	
indeed	became	disillusioned	with	the	socialist	state.	The	stories	give	an	indica_on	of	
the	broad	spectrum	of	experiences,	while	reﬂec_ng	the	main	themes	that	emerged	
_me	and	_me	again,	throughout	my	ﬁeldwork.	In	the	following	chapter,	I	would	like	
to	take	a	more	detailed	look	at	surveillance	in	the	GDR.	
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Chapter	Four:	The	Ministry	of	State	Security	(MfS)	
	
To	gain	a	better	understanding	of	surveillance	practices	in	the	former	GDR,	this	
chapter	will	examine	the	Ministry	of	State	Security’s	work,	how	it	was	perceived	by	
East	Germans	and	their	attempts	at	coming	to	terms	with	its	legacy	through	the	
engagement	with	personal	records.	Chapter	four	is	comprised	of	three	parts:	Part	I	
briefly	reviews	the	institutions’	mode	of	conduct	and	governance,	Part	II	shows	
ethnographic	accounts	about	former	GDR	citizens’	perceptions	of	surveillance	and	
Part	III	engages	with	the	records	in	the	Stasi	file	archive.	
Part	I:	The	Ministry	of	State	Security	or	“Stasi”	-	A	brief	introduction	
The	German	Democra_c	Republic	(GDR),	was	essen_ally	a	one-party	state,	ruled	by	
the	 Socialist	 Unity	 Party	 (SED)	 for	 four	 decades.	 The	GDR's	 living	 condi_ons	were	
rela_vely	 good	 compared	 to	most	other	 socialist	 states	of	 the	_me.	Nevertheless,	
life	in	the	small	country	was	characterised	by	oppression,	shortages,	and	social	and	
environmental	 problems	 (Baer	 1992;	 1995).	 The	 state's	 leadership	 severely	
mistrusted	its	popula_on	and	as	a	result	built	a	massive	security	apparatus,	aiming	
to	take	control	over	all	areas	of	life.	
The	 socialist	 ideology	 of	 the	 produc_ve	 Arbeiter	 und	 Bauernstaat	 (Worker’s	 and	
Farmer’s	state)	was	enforced	through	strict	employment	and	family	poli_cs.	Socialist	
propaganda	 was	 widely	 distributed:	 in	 the	 workplace,	 on	 television	 and	 radio,	
newspapers,	 schools	 and	 universi_es.	 The	 state	 inﬁltrated	 and	 interconnected	 all	
areas	 of	 life	 by,	 for	 instance,	 linking	 companies	 (Betrieb)	 with	 schools	 and	
kindergartens	 and	 sending	 all	 children	 to	 the	 same	 summer	 camp.	 Similarly,	 co-
workers	would	spend	their	summer	vaca_ons	together	at	designated	holiday	homes	
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(FDGB/	 VEB	 Ferienheime).	 By	 merging	 work	 and	 private	 life,	 the	 state	 exercised	
maximum	 control	 and	 inﬂuence	 on	 the	 popula_on,	 and	 could	 at	 the	 same	 _me	
“foster	a	sense	of	community”	(Gemeinscharsgefühl).		
Virtually	every	aspect	of	 life	was	to	be	transformed	to	ﬁt	the	new	“socialist	state”.	
The	aim	of	crea_ng	a	“real	exis_ng”	socialist	state	was	achieved	by	taking	a	highly	
systema_c	 approach.	 Indeed,	 the	 state	 followed	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 “Scien_ﬁc	
Socialist”,	a	uniquely	systema_c,	scien_ﬁc	approach	to	crea_ng	a	socialist	economy	
but	 also	 the	 poli_cal	 police	 system.	 For	 instance,	 “in	 the	 Stasi	 regula_ons	 on	 the	
IMs,	 the	 words	 that	 recur	 (such	 as	 planned,	 concrete,	 raSonal,	 quality	 control,	
precisely	directed,	eﬀecSve	conspiraSonal)	have	a	dis_nctly	 social	 scien_ﬁc	 ring	 to	
them.	 The	 inten_on	 of	 the	 Stasi	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 to	 create	 a	 ‘scien_ﬁc’	 and	
thoroughly	 modern	 approach	 to	 obtaining	 ‘complete	 coverage’	 of	 the	 country”	
(Gallately	1997,	p.212).	
Therefore,	to	ensure	that	all	ci_zens	adhered	to	the	new	ideology	and	obeyed	the	
restric_ve	law,	an	eﬃcient,	but	ruthless,	secret	police	force	was	employed.	The	
Ministry	of	State	Security,	in	colloquial	terms	known	as	the	“Stasi”,	was	founded	
1950.	The	ins_tu_on	was	the	main	pillar	in	the	state’s	aim	to	gain	full	control	and	
inﬂuence	over	the	GDR’s	popula_on.	They	were	considered	the	“shield	and	sword”	
of	the	SED.	The	MfS	was	built	and	established	under	the	guidance	of	the	Soviet	
secret	service	(later	KGB).	It	served	as	the	na_onal	internal	secret	police,	prime	
inves_ga_ng	agency	and	foreign	secret	service.	It	had	its	own	interroga_on	prisons	
and	even	armed	forces	(BStU	2014).		
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The	Stasi	spied	on	GDR	ci_zens	by	reading	their	mail,	tapping	their	phone	lines	and	
bugging	their	homes,	house	searches,	following	their	every	step	and	prying	on	their	
personal	lives	by	gaining	as	much	informa_on	as	possible	through	undercover	spies	
(Kowalczuk	2013;	BStU	2013;	Funder	2003).	To	make	mass-surveillance	on	such	a	
large	scale	possible,	the	secret	police	was	an	ever	expanding	ins_tu_on.	In	1989	
there	were	approximately	91	000	oﬃcial	employees	and	at	least	189	000	unoﬃcial	
collaborators	also	known	as	IM,	“and	perhaps	ten	_mes	that	many	occasional	
informants”	(BStU	2014;	Rosenberg	1995).	There	were	also	IMs	in	West-Germany	
who	spied	for	the	Stasi	in	the	West.	The	ministry	received	support	in	its	endeavour	
from	the	country’s	police	force,	the	customs	oﬃce	and	many	other	GDR	ins_tu_ons.	
There	were	approximately	2171	mail	readers,	1486	phone	tappers	and	another	
8426	phone	and	radio	broadcast	monitors	(Rosenberg	1995).	The	ministry’s	ac_ons	
permeated	all	areas	of	GDR	ci_zens’	lives	in	its	strive	to	eliminate	any	“nega_ve	
enemy	elements”.	(BStU	2016	-	Stasi	File	Archive).	Anyone	who	was	cri_cal	of	the	
regime	was	seen	as	an	enemy	of	the	state	leading	to	poten_ally	horriﬁc	
consequences	for	them,	their	friends	and	families.	
In	the	early	years	of	the	Stasi's	existence,	the	ministry	primarily	made	use	of	overtly	
hos_le	 and	 aggressive	 control	methods.	 But,	 as	 _me	went	 by,	 the	 SED	 leadership	
made	 a	 conscious	 eﬀort	 to	 improve	 its	 reputa_on	 and	 gain	 interna_onal	
acknowledgement.	 It	 was	 decided	 that	 the	 Stasi's	 techniques	 needed	 to	 become	
more	subtle	and	coercive	 to	uphold	 the	 image	of	a	 state,	which	honoured	human	
rights	and	valued	peace.	Open	aggression	was	to	be	avoided.	Instead,	the	ministry	
developed	and	executed	covert	and	less	obvious	methods	of	control	and	repression	
(BStU	2016).	
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One	such	method	was	known	as	“Zersetzung”,	which	was	characterised	by	the	
exer_on	of	extreme	psychological	pressure	and	based	on	principles	of	so-called	
“opera_ve	psychology”7	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	200,	p.51).	This	involved	the	
applica_on	of	principles	of	social	and	clinical	psychology	and	their	deliberate	
misuse.	The	Legal	and	Police	College	in	Potsdam	developed	the	psychological	
techniques,	which	were	used	in	observa_on	and	repression,	as	well	as	
interroga_ons	and	imprisonment.		Doctoral	theses	were	wrijen	on	poli_cal	
dissidents	and	the	eﬀec_veness	of	psychological	techniques	in	interroga_ons	and	
other	opera_ve	methods	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.56).	The	aim	of	
“Zersetzung”	was	to	destabilise	the	personality	of	those	who	had	undesirable	
convic_ons	and	who	were	deemed	as	"opponents	of	Socialism",	employing	
psychological	"dissolu_on",	the	Stasi	was	supposedly	combaang	hos_le	ideologies	
(Behnke	&	Fuchs,	1995).	With	the	abuse	of	these	psychological	techniques,	the	main	
aim	was	to	damage	a	person's	principles	of	self-worth	by	focussing	speciﬁcally	on	a	
person's	weaknesses.	They	wanted	to	elicit	self	-doubt	(Gauck,	1991)	and	destabilise	
their	enemies	(Galletely	1997;	Trobisch-Lütge	2010).	The	Stasi	also	intruded	deeply	
into	people's	private	lives	by	searching	their	houses,	moving	and	removing	objects,	
crea_ng	further	feelings	of	uncertainty	and	fear.	
For	those	targeted	by	the	opera_ve	processes,	adverse	social	condi_ons	were	
created,	such	as	social	isola_on,	psychological	insecurity	and	damaging	personal	
reputa_ons.	They,	for	instance,	blackmailed	people	using	lejers	or	recorded	phone	
conversa_ons.	They	spread	rumours	and	false	accusa_ons,	caused	problems	in	or	
																																								 																				
7	MfS	jargon:	‘operative	Psychologie’	-	psychological	techniques	to	aid	and	develop	
operative	processes	(OV)	
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hindered	careers,	and	interfered	in	
children's	educa_onal	advancement	
(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009;	
Behnke	&	Fuchs	1995;	Fuchs	2009;	
Gallately	1997).	
The	secret	police	even	made	use	of	so-
called	"Romeos",	men	(and	women)	
who	started	aﬀairs	with	a	targeted	
person	or	their	spouse	in	order	to	
deliberately	break	up	marriages	or	
rela_onships.	Some_mes	they	forged	love	lejers,	which	were	sent	to	a	couple's	
address	aiming	to	provoke	conﬂict.	Other	personal	rela_onships	were	also	
destroyed	by	"sending	compromising	photos	and	anonymous	lejers	with	false	
allega_ons	to	friends	or	neighbours,	or	fostering	malicious	gossip	that	the	alleged	
"enemy"	worked	for	the	Stasi,	was	a	counterrevolu_onary,	or	had	a	"loose	tongue"	
and	could	not	be	trusted"	(Gallately	1997,	p.214).	Most	notable	is	the	fact	that	
these	"opera_ons	were	designed	to	mobilise	ordinary	men	and	women	beyond	the	
ranks	of	the	police	to	put	pressure	on	suspects	and	to	destabilise	those	deﬁned	as	
enemies".	
	Peters	(1991)	considers	the	Stasi’s	methods	as	a	systema_c	form	of	torture.	He	lists	
the	Stasi’s	destruc_ve	methods	as	follows:	Interroga_ons,	ostracisa_on,	abuse,	
embarrassment,	social	degrada_on,	execu_on	of	unlawful	ac_ons/lack	of	jus_ce,	
conveying	feelings	of	uncertainty	of	fate,	threatening	lives	and	defama_on.	Indeed,	
some	of	those	considered	poli_cal	dissidents	were	imprisoned	under	terrible	
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condi_ons,	this	is	evident	in	former	prisons	such	as	Berlin	Hohenschönhausen	
(central	remand	prison	of	the	GDR),	Bautzen,	colloquially	known	as	the	“Gelbes	
Elend”	-	“Yellow	Misery”	or	Hoheneck	(women’s	prison),	naming	only	a	few.	Here,	
forms	of	torture	involved	being	locked	up	in	small	spaces	in	the	cold	and	darkness,	
sleep	depriva_on	and	switching	the	lights	on	and	oﬀ	arbitrarily	(at	night	_me)	
(Peters	1991).	Un_l	1987,	a	death	penalty	existed	in	the	GDR	and	in	the	course	of	
the	state’s	40-year	existence,	the	oﬃcial	record	claims	that	at	least	230	people	were	
sentenced	to	death	(stern.de	2006;	welt.de	2013).	The	real	numbers	of	how	many	
people	were	killed	are	unknown	to	this	day,	as	the	Stasi	is	suspected	to	have	
planned	and	executed	numerous	murders	by	for	instance	manipula_ng	car	breaks	or	
radia_on	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.52).		
The	Stasi’s	torturous	methods	resulted	in	a	broad	range	of	harmful	physical	and	
psychological	condi_ons.	Peters	(1991),	for	example,	calls	the	long-las_ng	nega_ve	
eﬀects	a	“Stasi-persecu_on-syndrome”	-	“Stasi-Verfolgten-Syndrom”.	According	to	
Peters,	symptoms	include	persistent	fears	and	paranoiac	persecu_on	anxie_es	that	
can	easily	be	triggered	by	par_cular	situa_ons,	realis_c	fear	and	persecu_on	
dreams,	emo_onal/depressed	moods,	sleep	disorders,	feelings	of	exhaus_on,	
suicide	ajempts	as	well	as	social	distrust	and	feeling	misunderstood	by	one's	
surroundings	(1991,	p.251).	Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	(2009),	Trobisch-Lütge	
(2010),	Priebe	et	al.	(1996)	and	Freyberger	et	al.	(2003)	also	conducted	detailed	
inves_ga_ons	into	the	long-term	consequences	of	so-called	"poli_cal	
trauma_sa_on"	resul_ng	from	imprisonment	and	persecu_on.	In	this	thesis,	I		shed	
light	on	exactly	these	trauma_sing	experiences	that	my	interlocutors	encountered	
during	the	SED-regime	(and	a`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall).	It	is	important	to	note	here,	
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that	it	is	this	unique	systema_c	socio-psychological	approach	of	the	former	East	
German	state	security	service,	which	sets	it	apart	from	any	other	secret	police	force.	
Gallately	(1997)	studied	and	compared	the	denunciatory	prac_ces	of	the	NS	secret	
police	-	the	Gestapo,	and	the	Stasi.	He	found	that	although	a	few	similari_es	
between	the	ins_tu_ons	exist,	there	are	also	some	signiﬁcant	diﬀerences.	The	Stasi	
used	more	sophis_cated	psycho-social	repressive	techniques.	They	systema_cally	
pressurised	and	oppressed	ci_zens	on	a	large	scale.	It	was	their	aim	to	destabilise	
their	vic_ms	both	in	their	social	standing	and	psychologically,	something	that	the	
Gestapo	did	not	engage	in,	to	the	same	extent.	The	Stasi's	approach	was	an	en_rely	
new	form	of	policing.	Most	interes_ng	is	the	way	in	which	people	responded	to	this	
extreme	pressure:	self-policing	within	the	popula_on	became	the	key	aspect	mass-
surveillance	in	the	GDR.	
No	doubt	during	the	Nazi	regime	pressure	was	also	exerted,	yet	in	a	far	less	
organised	fashion.		As	Gallantly	writes,	"for	example,	against	spouses	in	mixed	
marriages	with	Jews	–	but	such	tac_cs	were	not	employed	quite	so	systema_cally	as	
in	the	GDR.	The	preferred	method	under	Nazism	was	the	less	‘socialized',	more	
‘individualized'	one	of	marking,	exclusion,	conﬁnement,	and	destruc_on"	(Gallately	
1997,	p.	214).	Of	course,	it	must	be	emphasised	that	GDR	repression	did	not	come	
close	to	the	Nazi	terror	of	persecu_on	and	extermina_on.	Diﬀerences	can	be	
observed	in	the	use	of	the	general	popula_on	for	denunciatory	prac_ces.	The	
Gestapo	relied	on	unoﬃcial	collaborators	who	voluntarily	provided	informa_on	on	
an	occasional	basis.	However,	such	services	were	not	subject	to	many	guidelines.	
"Leaders	of	the	Nazi	police	issued	no	more	than	a	handful	of	guidelines	and	
reminders	in	the	press	on	the	topic	of	denuncia_on,	and	in	fact	much	of	the	concern	
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was	to	warn	people	about	oﬀering	false	informa_on	or	making	careless	charges"	
(Gallately	1997,	p.	211).	In	contrast,	the	Stasi's	use	of	"unoﬃcial"	sources	was	highly	
regulated	with	hundreds	of	guidelines	(1997,	p.211).	Contrary	to	the	NS	secret	
police,	they	viewed	"casual	collaborators"	with	a	large	amount	of	scep_cism,	
shedding	some	light	on	the	high	level	of	paranoia	and	distrust	that	the	SED-regime	
felt	towards	its	own	ci_zens	and	even	Stasi	people.	Indeed,	the	ministry	spent	a	
considerable	amount	of	_me	and	resources	on	"preliminary	inves_ga_ons	and	
background	checks"	of	unoﬃcial	collaborators.	"Stasi	boss	Mielke	o`en	alluded	to	
the	"wisdom"	of	such	(alleged)	Cheka	procedures.	Various	kinds	of	reliability	tests	
con_nued	throughout	the	career	of	the	IM.	This	thorough,	systema_c	approach	
represents	a	drama_c	contrast	to	the	prac_ces	of	the	Na_onal	Socialist	period"	
(Gallately	1997,	p.212).	
In	the	GDR	there	was	an	aim	to	create	and	mould	humans	into	becoming	“	good	
socialists”	who	obeyed	to	the	regime’s	laws	and	rules,	no	majer	what	it	would	take.	
This	was	the	jus_ﬁca_on	behind	the	widespread	use	of	destruc_ve	Stasi	techniques.		
Overall,	what	set	the	work	of	the	East	German	Ministry	of	State	Security	apart	from	
many	other	ins_tu_ons	of	state	surveillance,	was	its	highly	systema_c	and	regulated	
nature,	as	well	as	its	far-reaching	psycho-social	repressive	techniques.	Large	scale	
par_cipa_on	of	the	general	popula_on	led	denuncia_on	to	become	
ins_tu_onalised.	The	result	was,	therefore,	as	Gallately	suggests,	that	the	GDR	
became	a	panop_c,	"self-policing	society"	(1997,	p.210).	As	I	show	in	the	following	
chapters,	this	had	wide-ranging,	long-term	consequences.	Indeed,	Gallately	points	
out,	"these	psychological	aspects	of	self-policing-	involving	subjec_ve	psychological	
dimensions	such	as	self-surveillance,	self-discipline,	and	self-censorship	of	
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behaviour,	opinion,	wri_ngs,	and	even	thoughts	seem	to	play	a	very	important	role	
in	modern	dictatorships	but	so	far	have	received	rela_vely	lijle	ajen_on"	(Gellately	
1997,	p.220).	
Indeed,	as	I	argue	in	this	thesis,	due	to	the	unique	socio-psychological	approach	of	
the	East	German	secret	police,	control	and	monitoring	of	(and	within)	the	
popula_on	became	normalised,	crea_ng	adverse	condi_ons	both	for	GDR	ci_zens'	
individual	and	collec_ve	wellbeing.	
Part	II:	Ethnographic	Findings	
	
"I	was	helping	to	build	a	just	society	in	which	there	would	be,	not	only,	no	war	and	
anSsemiSsm	but	also	where	there	would	be	equality	and	greater	jusSce...	A	beder	world!"		-
Frau	M.		
In	this	ethnographic	study,	I	have	been	par_cularly	(but	not	exclusively)	interested	in	
the	impact	that	the	large	number	of	undercover	agents	had	on	the	popula_on.	It	
was	especially	condi_ons	of	uncertainty,	not	knowing	whether	the	person	you	were	
interac_ng	with	could	be	trusted,	which	exerted	pressure	to	conform	and	made	the	
building	of	personal	rela_onships	diﬃcult.	But	what	mo_vated	people	to	report	on	
their	friends	and	family?	In	the	GDR	this	was	not	straighorward,	as	I	will	show	in	
the	following	chapters.	Repor_ng	and	being	reported	on	were	perceived	in	a	variety	
of	ways.	
Surveillance	was	an	unques_oned	reality	in	Eastern	Germany.	Everyone	was	to	some	
extent	aware	of	state	control	and	its	enforcement.	As	I	will	show	through	numerous	
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examples,	 this	 control	 became	 normalised	 over	 the	 40	 years	 of	 the	 country's	
existence.	 Addi_onally,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 individuals	 experienced	 state	 power	
varied	 signiﬁcantly.	 This	 diversity	 paints	 a	 complex	 picture	 of	 East	 Germans'	
psychosocial	 reali_es,	 not	 only	 regarding	 the	 percep_on	 of	 surveillance	 then,	 but	
also	 of	 the	 way	 the	 state	 is	 seen	 retrospec_vely.	 It	 makes	 East	 Germany	 an	
incredibly	 exci_ng	 region	 of	 study	 because	 its	 social	 history	 embodies	 the	
complexity	 and	 contradic_ons	 of	 human	 interac_ons,	 rarely	 seen	 elsewhere.	 This	
study	reveals	the	human	capacity	for	betrayal	as	well	as	for	forgiveness—hope	and	
despera_on	 along	with	 indiﬀerence	 and	 the	 suppression	of	 reali_es,	 feelings,	 and	
memories.	
Many	believed	the	Stasi	to	be	a	necessary	evil,	to	make	the	socialist	cause	possible.	
The	 state	 ins_tu_on	 provided	 security	 and	 order.	 By	 fulﬁlling	 their	 du_es,	 the	
unoﬃcial	collaborators	(IM),	showed	their	loyalty	to	the	regime.	One	informant	told	
me	about	her	occasional	involvement	with	the	Stasi	during	her	professional	work	in	
the	foreign	trade	department.	At	the	peak	of	the	Cold	War,	many	trade	restric_ons	
were	imposed	on	the	Soviet	Bloc.	The	GDR	was	par_cularly	aﬀected	by	the	embargo	
on	 new	 technologies.	 To	 her,	 a	 devoted	 socialist,	 these	 limita_ons	 were	 grossly	
unfair.	She	wanted	to	build	a	socialist	state	that	would	grow	and	prosper	and	told	
me	that	she	would	have	done	anything	to	achieve	that.	The	West	had	tried	to	slow	
their	progress!	She	says	that,	had	she	been	in	the	posi_on,	she	would	have	worked	
with	the	Staatssicherheit	to	avoid	these	imposed	embargo	restric_ons.	
	“If	I	had	worked	there	by	chance,	I	would	have	commided	myself	completely	
to	break	through	these	embargo	restricSons.	Because	they	were	unfair…only	
in	order	to	cut	us	oﬀ	of	world	development.”		
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"Wenn	 ich	durch	Zufall	dort	gearbeitet	häde,	 ich	häde	meine	ganze	Person	
dazu	 eingesetzt,	 um	 mit	 Hilfe	 der	 Staatssicherheit	 diese	
EmbargobesSmmungen	zu	durchbrechen.	Weil	sie	waren	einfach	anmaßend,	
ungerecht,	...nur	um	uns	von	der	Weltentwicklung	abzukoppeln."	(Frau	J.)		
To	her,	 the	Staatssicherheit8	was	 a	necessary	 ins_tu_on	 in	 the	 state's	 ambi_on	 to	
achieve	 the	 socialist	 ideal.	 For	 others,	 the	 secret	 police	 and	 par_cularly	 its	
collaborators	 were	 a	 normal	 part	 of	 everyday	 life,	 especially	 within	 professional	
seangs	 (Betriebe).	 I	 was	 repeatedly	 told	 about	 workplaces	 where	 several	 people	
reported	 to	 the	 Stasi	 but	 were	 apparently	 never	 secre_ve	 about	 it,	 and	 it	 was	 a	
commonly	accepted	fact.	For	example,	a	woman	explained	that	individuals	who	had	
previously	been	 imprisoned	and	were	being	"reintegrated",	had	to	report	to	these	
designated	employees	who	fulﬁlled	du_es	for	the	Stasi	in	the	workplace.	Those	who	
were	supposedly	being	reintegrated	into	the	collec_ve	were	ques_oned	on	a	regular	
basis	 and	 checked	 whether	 they	 were	 abiding	 by	 the	 rules.	 She	 did	 not	 see	 this	
nega_vely.	Overall,	she	was	rather	indiﬀerent	towards	surveillance.	Surveillance	was	
such	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 everyday	 life	 that	 it	 even	 became	 widely	 accepted.	 Like	
many	others,	 Frau	 F.	 knew	 stories	 of	 acquaintances	 of	whom	 she	did	 not	 suspect	
their	 unoﬃcial	 duty	 to	 the	 Stasi.	 Their	 collabora_on	 with	 the	 secret	 police	 was	
found	out	a`er	the	Wende,	and	the	revela_ons	came	as	a	surprise.	S_ll,	she	had	a	
sympathe_c	aatude.	She	explained	that	those	were	the	people	who	had	“goden	up	
to	something	previously”	and	were	blackmailed	by	the	Stasi.	Here,	she	is	alluding	to	
the	fact	that	people	had	no	choice	but	to	comply,	explaining:	“SomeSmes	we'd	say:	
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that	poor	guy,	he	just	couldn't	say	no”.	This	points	to	a	sense	of	powerlessness	that	
many	East	Germans	felt	towards	this	seemingly	almighty	state	apparatus.		
Moreover,	surveillance	was	a	part	of	GDR	culture	that	everyone	was	aware	of,	but	
that	 was	 rarely	 discussed	 openly.	 The	 nature	 of	 spying	 inevitably	 involves	 an	
element	 of	 secrecy,	 silence	 and	 silencing.	 Frau	 F.	 recalled	 an	 occasion	where	 she	
herself	was	pursued	as	a	possible	undercover	 informant.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	she	
was	 aware	 that	 her	 husband	 had	 had	 an	 extremely	 trauma_c	 history	 of	 mental	
illness	and	imprisonment	a`er	an	ajempted	escape,	the	Stasi's	proposal	was	not	a	
big	concern	 for	her.	The	exact	details	of	her	husband's	past	were	unknown	to	her	
because	he	had	"signed	a	paper".	 In	other	words,	he	had	 signed	a	non-disclosure	
agreement	about	his	 arrest	and	 imprisonment,	 so	he	never	 spoke	of	 it	 again.	 The	
prac_ce	 of	 silencing	 and	 denial	 even	 of	 the	 most	 trauma_c	 experiences	 were	
commonplace.	
The	issue	would	be	pushed	aside	seemingly	carelessly.	As	Frau	F.	Said,	
“Oh	well,	whatever,	one	person	or	another	gained	something	from	it.	It’s	like	
that	in	every	state.	If	you	are	close	to	the	state,	you	are	likely	to	gain	certain	
privileges	from	it.	And	yet	another	person	just	couldn’t	say	no.”	
”Na	ja	was	soll's,	der	eine	oder	andere	hade	seinen	Nutzen,	das	ist	in	jedem	
Staat	so.	Dass	man,	wenn	man	staatsnah	ist	besSmmte	Vorteile	davon	hat.	
Und	andere	konnten	nicht	nein	sagen"	(Frau	F.).		
Although	Frau	F.	undoubtedly	recognises	the	nega_ve	sides	to	state	control,	she	 is	
not	openly	cri_cal	of	it.	In	fact,	her	view	may	appear	rather	opportunis_c.	She	said	
people	spied	covertly	because	there	was	something	to	gain	from	it.	She	then	went	
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on	 to	 explain	 in	 great	 detail	 about	 gi`s	 that	 the	 Stasi	 gave	 out	 for	 providing	
informa_on.	 Such	 presents	 could,	 for	 instance,	 be	 nylon	 stockings	 (Dederon	
Strump~osen),	which	were	notoriously	diﬃcult	to	get	hold	of	in	the	GDR.	Of	course,	
she	claimed	that	she	never	received	any	such	gi`s.	The	act	of	repor_ng,	in	this	case,	
is	 interpreted	 rather	 opportunis_cally	 as	 a	 means	 to	 an	 end,	 namely	 receiving	
goods,	services	or	personal	advantages.	It	was	not	done	out	of	the	convic_on	of	the	
socialist	cause.	She	blanked	out	the	reality	of	what	surveillance	meant.	
It	 can	be	said	 that	 in	 the	advancing	process	of	 the	normalisa_on	of	control	 in	 the	
GDR,	 feelings	 about	 Stasi	 spying	 were	mixed	 among	 the	 popula_on.	While	 some	
viewed	 the	 Stasi	 as	 a	 necessary	 tool	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 state	 security	 and	 the	
advancement	 of	 the	 socialist	 cause	 and	 certain	 people	 enjoyed	 the	 perks	 they	
received	by	providing	the	occasional	report,	there	were	also	numerous	nega_ve	and	
highly	trauma_c	accounts.		
The	most	 severe	cases	are	 to	be	 found	amongst	 individuals	 (or	groups)	who	were	
ac_vely	 repressed	 and	 surveilled	 (OperaSver	 Vorgang	 and	 Zersetzung)	 and	
imprisoned.	Through	the	systema_c	use	of	 sophis_cated	psychological	 techniques,	
vic_ms	were	frightened	and	in_midated,	with	the	aim	to	destabilise	their	sense	of	
self.	 This	 was,	 for	 instance,	 achieved	 through	 constant	 monitoring,	 spreading	 of	
rumours	 and	 breaking	 apart	 of	 rela_onships.	Most	 signiﬁcantly,	 those	 exposed	 to	
the	 repressive	 techniques	 were	made	 extremely	 distrusul	 of	 their	 environment.	
Stefan	 Trobisch-Lütge,	 a	 Berlin-based	 psychiatrist	 who	 has	 been	 working	 with	
poli_cally	 trauma_sed	 East	 Germans	 for	 years,	 likens	 the	 Stasi	 to	 the	 all-
encompassing	and	 intrusive	nine-headed	mythological	 snake	Hydra,	whose	poison	
slowly	spreads	and	taints	all	human	rela_onships,	even	to	this	day	 (Trobisch-Lütge	
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2010	p.12).	In	his	book	Das	Späte	Gir,	which	literally	translates	to	"The	late	venom"	
he	 shows	 how	 vic_ms'	 emo_onal	 scars	 are	 reproduced	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways,	
crea_ng	complex	trauma	which	con_nues	to	impact	lives	severely.		
Indeed,	conversa_ons	with	some	of	my	interlocutors	revealed	the	con_nuing	impact	
of	 Stasi	 surveillance,	 especially	 on	 interpersonal	 rela_onships,	 as	 I	 have	 shown	 in	
the	example	of	Herr	K.,	the	man	who	had	been	found	out	by	the	Stasi	a`er	helping	
over	50	people	escape	to	the	West.		Although	he	was	living	in	West	Berlin,	the	Stasi	
were	s_ll	somehow	observing	him,	and	his	ﬂat	was	repeatedly	searched.	He	became	
increasingly	 fearful	 and	 paranoid.	 He	 knew	 that	 someone	 must	 have	 denounced	
him,	but	since	he	had	no	idea	who	it	could	be,	he	distanced	himself	from	everyone	
he	knew	including	family	and	friends.	For	him,	it	was	impossible	to	trust	anyone.	He	
said	 "I	 grew	 psychoSc,	 I	 trusted	 no	 one"-	 "ich	 wurde	 psychoSsch,	 ich	 traute	 gar	
keinem	mehr."	Instead,	he	isolated	himself	because	the	incessant	surveillance	made	
him	feel	insecure.	He	was	unsure	where	and	when	he	was	safe	at	all.		
“This	non-stop	surveillance,	I	didn’t	know	where,	in	what	place	I	was	safe.”	
”Diese	pausenlose	Überwachung,	 ich	wusste	 überhaupt	 nicht	mehr,	wo,	 an	
welcher	Stelle	ich	sicher	bin."	(Herr	K.)	
Indeed,	this	distressing	state	of	uncertainty	led	him	to	cut	_es	with	his	rela_ves	and	
close	friends.	In	our	interview,	he	was	very	emo_onal,	as	he	now	feels	many	regrets	
for	having	rejected	their	ajempts	at	geang	in	touch	with	him.	Only	in	recent	years	
has	he	ﬁnally	found	courage	begun	to	rekindle	old	rela_onships.	For	instance,	now	
he	meets	his	friends	from	the	Junge	Gemeinde	(church	youth	group)	once	a	year.	He	
read	extracts	from	several	lejers	to	me,	by	which	he	was	visibly	touched.	
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He	read	the	beginning	of	one	postcard	that	a	friend	had	sent	him.	It	hints	at	the	fact	
that	many	of	his	old	friends	did	not	know	where	he	was	or	what	had	happened	to	
him:9		
"Hello…,	you	will	be	surprised	by	this	leder.	We	plan	to	hold	a	meeSng	of	the	
evangelical	youth	group	of	1960	in	Köpenick.Your	address	was	not	known	to	
the	 organisers	 so	 that	 an	 invitaSon	 was	 not	 sent.	 If	 you’re	 nevertheless	
interested	 in	 the	memorable	photographs	and	 list	of	addresses,	please	 call	
someone	...	"	
"Hallo…,	du	wirst	dich	über	diese	Post	wundern,	wir	halten	 in	Köpenick	ein	
Treﬀen	der	evangelischen	Jugend	aus	der	Zeit	von	1960.	Deine	Adresse	war	
den	Organisatoren	nicht	bekannt,	sodass	eine	Einladung	nicht	erfolgt	ist.	Wir	
würden	 uns	 freuen,	 wenn	 du	 Interesse	 an	 den	 Erinnerungsfotos	 und	 der	
Adressenliste	hädest,	ruf	doch	mal	jemanden	an..."	
And	a	further	lejer	from	2002	began	like	this:		
"Dear…,	you	were	right	in	wriSng	that	I	would	be	a	bit	surprised	and	at	the	
same	Sme	I	was	quite	happy.	In	1962	we	tried	to	make	contact	several	Smes,	
but	since	there	was	no	reply,	we	assumed	that	you	surely	had	your	reasons	
..."	
"Lieber…,	mit	Recht	schreibst	du,	dass	 ich	mich	etwas	gewundert	habe	und	
gleichzeiSg	ziemlich	gefreut.	Wir	haden	1962	einige	Male	versucht,	Kontakt	
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aufzunehmen,	 aber	nachdem	keine	ReakSon	 kam,	nahmen	wir	 an,	 dass	du	
sicher	deine	Gründe	hadest..."		
And	another	lejer	from	a	woman	whom	he	had	helped	to	escape:	"Dear…,	I	
would	 like	 to	 thank	 you	 for	 your	 Christmas	 greeSng,	 I	 was	 very	 happy	 to	
receive	 it.	Did	you	know	that	we	were	looking	for	you	and	your	address	for	
years?	Apparently,	no	one	knew	where	you	were.	 I	have	always	wanted	 to	
tell	 you	 how	 grateful	 and	 happy	 I	 am,	 that	 you	 enabled	me	 to	 get	 to	 the	
West.	With	horror,	I	imagine	how	my	life	in	the	GDR	could	have	ended.	The	
gain	of	personal	freedom	in	a	democracy	...	"	
"Lieber…,	 ich	 bedanke	 mich	 ganz	 herzlich	 für	 deinen	 Weihnachtsgruß,	 ich	
habe	mich	sehr	gefreut	darüber.	Weißt	du	eigentlich,	dass	wir	dich	bzw.	deine	
Adresse	 jahrelang	 gesucht	 haben?	 Angeblich	 wusste	 niemand	 etwas	 über	
deinen	Verbleib.	 Ich	wollte	 dir	 immer	 sagen,	wie	 dankbar	 und	glücklich	 ich	
bin,	durch	dich	in	den	Westen	gelangt	zu	sein.	Mit	Grausen	denke	ich	daran,	
wie	 mein	 Leben	 in	 der	 DDR	 sicherlich	 geendet	 häde.	 Der	 Gewinn	 der	
persönlichen	Freiheit	in	einer	DemokraSe..."	
These	 lejers	 exemplify	 the	 great	 destruc_on	 that	 the	 Stasi's	 repressive	 methods	
had;	 tearing	 apart	 friendships	 and	 families.	 Surveillance	 did	 not	 just	 target	 one	
person,	 but	 quite	 o`en	 networks	 of	 people.	 This	 meant	 that	 especially	 family	
members	 suﬀered	 in	 the	a`ermath,	 some_mes	even	 intergenera_onally.	 	As	 I	will	
explore	 in	 greater	detail	 in	 the	 following	 chapters,	 the	 regime's	 legacy	 is	 certainly	
one	of	genera_ng	widespread	social	distrust.	
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	Frau	 L.'s	 account	 (Ethnographic	 Case	 Study	 3)	 of	 her	 trauma_c	 childhood	
experience	 exempliﬁes	 how	 she	 learned	 to	 hate	 the	 Stasi	 and	 the	 state	 she	 was	
living	in	at	a	young	age.	Her	parents'	ajempted	to	escape,	and	imprisonment	meant	
that	the	state	separated	her	family	and	placed	heavy	restric_ons	on	her	life,	even	as	
a	 young	 child.	 At	 the	 _me	 she	 could	 barely	 understand	 what	 had	 happened.	
Naturally,	she	did	not	see	her	parents	as	criminals.	A`er	all,	her	father	was	a	doctor;	
she	knew	that	he	was	helping	people.	He	simply	wanted	to	live	in	a	just	state.	The	
adults	 surrounding	 her	 tried	 to	 make	 her	 believe	 otherwise.	 Later	 on,	 when	 her	
parents	were	released	and	oﬃcially	applied	for	emigra_on,	she	was	regularly	asked	
to	see	the	school	headmaster	who	tried	to	convince	her	to	sign	a	paper	that	would	
ensure	that	she	would	stay	in	the	country	even	if	her	parents	were	allowed	to	leave.	
She	 says	 that	 these	 experiences	 impacted	 her	 percep_on	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	
people	who	embodied	it	signiﬁcantly.				
"When	my	parents	were	 released	 from	prison,	 I	 thought	 about	 it	more.	 At	
that	moment	the	state	was	my	personal	enemy	since	 it	had	 imprisoned	my	
parents…	How	was	I	supposed	to	understand	that	at	the	age	of	twelve?	My	
father	was	a	doctor,	he	helped	others	and	never	killed	anyone.	He	wanted	to	
live	 in	 a	 just	 state.	 And	 so,	 we	were	 certainly	 criScal	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	
people	who	embodied	it…"	
"Als	 meine	 Eltern	 aus	 der	 Har	 freikamen,	 hab'	 ich	 mir	 da	 schon	 mehr	
Gedanken	 gemacht.	 In	 dem	 Moment	 war	 der	 Staat	 ja	 mein	 persönlicher	
Feind,	er	hade	ja	meine	Eltern	verharet....	Wie	sollte	ich	das	mit	zwölf	Jahren	
verstehen?	Mein	Vater	war	Arzt,	der	hat	anderen	geholfen	und	niemanden	
umgebracht.	 Er	 wollte	 in	 einem	 gerechten	 Staat	 leben,	 und	 da	 haben	 wir	
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schon	 den	 Staat	 und	 die	 Menschen,	 die	 ihn	 verkörpert	 haben,	 kriSsch	
gesehen...(Frau	L.)	
Percep_ons	of	spying	varied	temporally	too.	What	was	once	seen	as	a	ﬁght	for	the	
advancement	 of	 the	 socialist	 state,	 could,	 upon	 reﬂec_on,	 be	 interpreted	 en_rely	
diﬀerently.	Not	only	did	the	system	of	control	get	more	intrusive	over	the	years,	but	
the	 reali_es	of	 life	under	 socialist	 rule	 also	 came	 to	 light	 (i.e.	 shortages,	 injus_ce,	
repression).	One	 informant	 (Frau	M.)	who	was	 an	 undercover	 spy	 for	many	 years	
(spying	on	close	family,	friends	and	even	her	husband)	lived	through	such	a	radical	
transforma_on.	 It	 led	her	 to	 confess	 the	 truth	 about	 the	double	 life	 that	 she	was	
leading,	to	everyone	she	knew.		
When	 she	 confessed	 that	 she	had	 spied	on	her	 husband,	 he	was	devastated.	 She	
told	me,	
"He	 was	 very	 shocked.	 He	 didn't	 talk	 to	 me	 for	 months.	 He	 never	 really	
forgave	me.	We	had	already	parted,	but	we	sSll	had	two	children."	All	these	
years	he	had	not	 suspected	anything.	 So	 I	 asked,	 "But	he	didn't	 know	 that	
you	worked	for	 the	Stasi	at	any	point?”	She	replied,	“He	knew	that	 I	was	a	
very	 convinced	 communist	 and	 he	 tried	 to	 show	me	 GDR	 realiSes,	 but	 he	
didn't	 know	 I	 was	 working	 for	 the	 Stasi.	 The	 Stasi	 forbade	 you	 to	 talk	 to	
anyone	about	it.	I	was	quite	scared...	But	then	back	in	the	80's...	I	couldn't…	
It	was	against	my	conscience.	And	the	people	that	I	told	it	to	knew	that	they	
couldn't	tell	anyone	about	it.	Otherwise,	they	could	get	into	a	lot	of	trouble.	"	
(Frau	M.)		
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The	realisa_on	that	the	GDR	was	not	the	state	she	had	idealised	previously	led	her	
to	this	decision.	 It	was	the	knowledge	that	she	was	suppor_ng	a	dictatorship	with	
no	 freedom	of	expression,	which	 laid	heavy	on	her	conscience.	The	recogni_on	of	
the	reali_es	of	the	dictatorship	and	her	ac_ve	role	in	the	system	of	control	led	her	to	
grow	increasingly	doubul,	as	she	elaborated,	
"20	 years	 experiencing	 the	 autocracy	 of	 the	 GDR,	 of	 the	 repression,	 of	
realising	 in	1984,...	 I	had	come	to	the	GDR	in	1963,	that	people	were	being	
put	in	jail	for	saying	their	opinions,	telling	jokes	or	whatever	and	that	there	
was	 no	 freedom	 of	 speech,	 no	 freedom	 of	 expression,	 no	 freedom	 of	 the	
press.	There	was,	in	fact,	no	public	voice	in	the	GDR,	eine	Öﬀentlichkeit	did10	
not	exist	in	the	GDR.	This	did	not	exist,	nothing	that	was	not	dictated	by	the	
party."		
Indeed,	she	said:	"I	felt	my	conscience	telling	me	that	I	should	tell	the	people	who	I	
had	 close	 contact	 to,	 what	 I	 had	 done,	 which	 I	 did...in	 1987."	 (Frau	 M.)	 	 So,	
eventually,	she	broke	out	of	the	double	life	she	was	leading,	by	confessing	to	those	
around	her.	
Her	confession	is	quite	excep_onal;	for	many	East	Germans	s_ll	living	were	at	some	
point	 approached	 by	 the	 Stasi	 and	 informed	 on	 friends	 and	 family.	 This	 in	 itself	
could	pose	a	great	moral	dilemma.	What	was	the	"right	 thing	to	do"?	Was	one	to	
serve	the	state	(and	apparently	the	greater	good)	or	was	it	bejer	to	avoid	betrayal	
and	protect	 loved	ones	 from	poten_al	state	violence?	One	 informant,	a	successful	
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surgeon	 in	a	hospital,	 told	me	 that,	 although	he	was	 fearful	of	 the	 regime	he	 s_ll	
engaged	in	small	acts	of	resistance.		
He	found	ways	to	"get	around	the	system"	and	could	occasionally	risk	saying	his	true	
opinion	because	of	his	high	posi_on	in	the	hospital.	He	was	needed	by	the	state	and	
says	that	he	could	probably	get	away	with	more	than	many	other	people.	He	never	
joined	the	SED	party,	and	even	when	the	Stasi	approached	him	for	informa_on,	he	
did	everything	not	to	comply.	He	described	one	incident	where	he	was	approached	
by	Stasi	men	on	a	ward	round.	They	enquired	about	a	young	colleague	from	another	
department,	suspec_ng	that	she	may	have	ﬂed	the	GDR.	So	they	asked	for	him	to	
call	the	surgery	to	ﬁnd	out	if	she	was	at	work.	He	refused,	excusing	himself	by	saying	
"No,	she's	young	and	beauSful,	how	would	that	look!?	If	I	call	to	ask	if	she	is	around,	
by	 tomorrow,	 the	 whole	 hospital	 will	 be	 talking..."	 In	 this	 way,	 he	 avoided	 the	
situa_on	of	telling	on	her.	It	was	these	small	everyday	incidents	which	may	appear	
unremarkable,	but	in	a	regime	such	as	the	GDR,	the	consequences	were	poten_ally	
severe.			
The	repressive	powers	of	the	Stasi	really	came	to	the	forefront	in	situa_ons	where	
they	invested	par_cularly	great	eﬀorts	to	keep	someone	from	leaving	the	state.	This	
was	 seen	 when	 individuals	 applied	 for	 emigra_on	 (submission	 of	 an	
"Ausreiseantrag").	 A	 57-year-old	 woman	 told	 me	 that,	 upon	 handing	 in	 her	
applica_on	 (Ausreiseantrag),	 an	 extended	 period	 of	 intense	 surveillance	 and	
interroga_ons	ensued	for	her	and	her	husband.	Since	she	knew	that	the	Stasi	saw	
people	who	wanted	to	leave	for	poli_cal	reasons	as	"State	enemies",	she	was	very	
cau_ous	about	what	she	told	the	authori_es.	She	and	her	husband	were	regularly	
ques_oned	by	the	Stasi	and,	knowing	the	risks,	they	made	sure	to	say	that	they	only	
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wanted	to	move	to	the	West	because	they	had	inherited	a	house.	They	wanted	to	
show	 that	 they	 had	no	poli_cal	mo_va_ons	whatsoever.	 In	 a	 long	 process	 of	 two	
and	 a	 half	 years,	 the	 Stasi	 con_nuously	 probed	 their	 true	 incen_ves	 and	 during	
ques_onings,	 posed	 various	 trick	 ques_ons.	 Addi_onally,	 the	 Stasi	 employed	 a	
variety	 of	 techniques	 to	make	 those	 trying	 to	 leave,	 feel	 insecure	 and	 discourage	
them	from	their	decision.	The	agents	le`	no	op_on	untouched,	even	ajemp_ng	to	
destabilise	the	couple's	rela_onship.	She	recalled	that	they	would,	for	instance,	ask	
her	husband	"Do	you	 really	 think	 your	wife	 is	always	 faithful?	 Is	 she	 trustworthy?	
Would	 you	 really	 want	 to	 go	 to	 the	 West	 with	 her?".	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 this	
applica_on	period,	 the	ministry	 tried	everything	 to	 convince	 the	 couple	 to	 stay	 in	
the	GDR.	They	in_midated	them	with	severe	threats,	yet	again	ins_lling	a	sense	that	
Stasi	 informers	were	ubiquitous,	 that	 "nowhere	was	 safe".	 The	oﬃcials	 told	 them	
that	 they	 "had	 people	 everywhere",	 even	 in	 the	West.	 They	 threatened	 them	 by	
claiming	that	people	could	track	them	down	anywhere,	even	in	hospitals.	They	even	
said	 things	 such	 as	 "SomeSmes	 people	 could	 just	 get	 run	 over..."	 	 Un_l	 the	
applica_on	was	approved,	their	family	home	was	also	under	close	observa_on	and	
bugged,	so	they	avoided	having	any	meaningful	conversa_on	in	the	house.	Instead,	
they	usually	went	out	 into	a	ﬁeld	 to	 talk	 in	private,	 crea_ng	a	very	 small	niche	of	
privacy	for	themselves.	Under	these	extremely	distressing	condi_ons,	interpersonal	
rela_onships	were	undoubtedly	jeopardised.			
In	our	conversa_on,	she	told	me	that	she	suspects	that	there	were	even	IM's	in	her	
family,	but	she	does	not	want	to	know	who	had	reported	on	her.	She	is	aware	that	
their	neighbours	must	surely	have	been	approached	too,	but	she	and	her	husband	
	 135	
want	to	move	forward,	they	do	not	want	to	view	their	ﬁles.	The	experience	is	in	the	
past,	and	she	thinks	that	they	would	not	get	anything	out	of	it.	
"We	 never	 viewed	 our	 ﬁles,	 because	 we	 thought	 there	 was	 nothing	 to	 be	
gained	from	ﬁnding	out	who,…	for	example	our	neighbours…of	course,	they	
were	quesSoned	too.	We	said,	we	don't	want	to	see	the	ﬁles,	it's	over."	
“Wir	 haben	 unsere	 Akten	 nie	 angeschaut,	 weil	 wir	 dachten,	 es	 bringt	 uns	
nichts	zu	erfahren,	wer,	...	zum	Beispiel	Nachbarn,	natürlich	wurden	die	auch	
befragt.	Wir	haben	gesagt,	wir	wollen	die	Akten	nicht	einsehen,	es	ist	vorbei"	
(Frau	T).	
Indeed,	as	I	will	show	in	the	following	sec_on,	the	decision	to	apply	to	view	personal	
records	 can	 become	 a	 trauma_c	 experience	 in	 itself.	 Although	 numbers	 of	 ﬁle	
viewings	are	s_ll	increasing,	it	remains	a	debated	issue	in	many	East	Germans’	lives.	
Part	III:	Stasi	Files:	Records	of	the	Ministerium	für	Staatssicherheit	
The	Agency	of	the	Federal	Commissioner	for	the	Stasi	Records	(BStU)		
	
The	Agency	of	the	Federal	Commissioner	for	the	Stasi	Records	(BStU)	safeguards	
and	administers	the	records	of	the	former	State	Security	Service	of	the	GDR.	In	
December	1991	the	Stasi	Records	Act	(StUG)	came	into	eﬀect	and	by	January	1992	
ci_zens	were	able	to	view	their	ﬁles	for	the	ﬁrst	_me.	From	1991	up	to	the	end	of	
2014,	the	archive	received	6.91	million	requests	and	pe__ons,	out	which	3.05	
million	individual	ci_zens	requested	to	view	and	obtain	their	records.	The	sheer	
amount	of	surveillance	material	housed	in	the	archive	is	astonishing.	It	amounts	to	
111	shelf	kilometres	(ca.	887	million	pages)	of	documents	as	well	as	photos,	
nega_ves	and	slides	(1.7	million);	ﬁlm,	video	and	audio	recordings	(30.100);	and	
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fragmented	material	in	more	
than	15.000	bags	(all	
informa_on	directly	retrieved	
from	BStU	2016).	
The	headquarters	of	the	Stasi	
ﬁle	archive	are	located	near	the	
former	city	centre	of	East	Berlin	
-	Alexander	Platz.	The	BStU	is	
based	in	a	large,	daun_ng,	
typical	GDR-style	building.	
During	my	ﬁeldwork,	I	had	the	
chance	to	visit	the	archive	several	_mes.	One	_me,	I	signed	up	for	an	organised	talk	
about	the	ins_tu_on	and	a	guided	tour	around	the	site.	With	its	long,	seemingly	
never-ending	corridors,	the	place	has	a	maze-like	feel	to	it.	Prior	to	commencing	our	
tour,	the	guide	warned	us	to	s_ck	to	the	small	group	in	order	not	to	get	lost.	He	also	
advised	us	that	a	security	guard	would	accompany	us,	throughout	the	walk.	Also,	
should	anyone	feel	panicked	or	unwell,	there	were	chairs	to	sit	on	and	the	said	
person	could	be	escorted	out	at	any	point.	As	we	navigated	through	the	long	rows	
of	shelves,	stacked	to	the	brim	with	papers	and	ﬁles,	I	understood	how	this	place	
could	create	feelings	of	claustrophobia	and	panic.	And	indeed,	a	mere	ﬁ`een	
minutes	into	our	tour,	a	woman	from	our	group	had	an	emo_onal	outbreak.	In	
tears,	she	voiced	her	frustra_on	that	the	"archive	hadn't	handed	out	her	ﬁle	to	
her",	she	told	us	that	she	has	been	in	an	out	of	psychiatric	treatment	for	years	now	
and	that	she	was	s_ll	"not	treated	fairly".	The	tour	guide,	discernibly	familiar	with	
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this	type	of	reac_on,	remained	calm	and	
collected.	He	enquired	further,	and	it	
turned	out	that	the	woman	had	applied	
to	view	her	ﬁles	several	years	previously	
and	none	had	been	found.	The	BStU	
employee	advised	her	to	submit	a	
further	applica_on.	She	was	appalled.	
As	we	learnt,	the	material	is	
con_nuously	reconstructed	and	re-
evaluated,	this	means	that	some	people	
have	to	apply	to	view	their	records	several	_mes.	For	a	few,	records	are	never	
uncovered	because	they	are	either	lost	or	were	deliberately	destroyed	by	the	Stasi	
when	the	regime	broke	down.	This	situa_on	illustrates	on	the	one	hand,	how	
vic_ms	of	the	regime	con_nue	to	feel	powerless	and	treated	unfairly.	Con_nued	
distrust	seems	to	be	felt	towards	state	ins_tu_ons	and	those	who	embody	them,	
those	aﬀected	are	under	the	impression	that	injus_ce	and	arbitrariness	persist.	
(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009;	Trobisch-Lütge	2010).	On	the	other	hand,	the	
woman's	clear	despera_on	and	despair	show	just	how	diﬃcult	vic_ms'	healing	
processes	are	when	no	process	of	coming	to	terms	with	the	past	can	take	place.	For	
some	East	Germans,	the	ability	to	view	their	ﬁle	may	relieve	their	feelings	of	
uncertainty	and	empower	them.	East	German	civil	ac_vist	groups	immediately	
recognised	the	signiﬁcance	of	ci_zen's	records	and	called	for	access	to	them,	as	the	
peaceful	revolu_on	took	its	course.	
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Indeed,	in	a	world-wide	unique	process,	the	former	Ministry	of	State	Security	of	the	
GDR	(MfS)	was	occupied	by	demonstrators	in	1989/90,	forcing	the	dissolu_on	of	
the	secret	police.	The	buildings	of	the	central	Stasi	headquarters	in	Berlin	
Normannenstraße	were	occupied	to	stop	the	destruc_on	of	ﬁles,	by	the	oﬃcials	
who	tried	to	cover	up	their	terrible	deeds.	Civil	ac_vists	demanded	for	everyone	
concerned	to	have	the	legal	right	to	access	their	records.	And	eventually,	ci_zens'	
will	and	the	freely	elected	parliament	of	the	GDR	paved	the	way	for	the	
safeguarding	and	controlled	opening	
up	of	Stasi	ﬁles	soon	a`er	(BStU	
2016).	
Applying	to	view	Stasi	records	
The	 decision-making	 process	 to	 ask	
to	 view	 one's	 ﬁles	 at	 the	 Stasi	
archive	 is	 o`en	 a	 conten_ous	 and	
arduous	one.	What	 is	at	stake	when	
you	 see	 your	 ﬁle?	 For	 some,	 there	
may	 be	 no	 records	 to	 be	 found	 or	
only	 a	 small	 collec_on	 of	
bureaucra_c	notes.	For	others,	it	can	conﬁrm	exis_ng	suspicions,	and	for	yet	others,	
it	can	mean	life-changing	revela_ons.	Out	of	my	informants,	all	of	whom	knew	that	
they	had	been	subject	to	Stasi	inves_ga_ons	(to	varying	extents),	many	viewed	their	
own	ﬁles	or	those	of	family	members,	and	others	did	not.	
Some	already	decided	to	apply	in	the	1990's,	while	the	majority	have	only	begun	to	
engage	 with	 their	 past	 in	 recent	 years.	 As	 this	 genera_on	 has	 gojen	 older	 and	
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re_red,	some	have	felt	more	inspired	to	reﬂect	on	their	lives.	One	of	my	informants	
said	that	now	that	he's	re_red	he	has	enough	_me	for	 in-depth	inves_ga_ons	into	
the	archival	records	of	his	life.	As	I	men_oned	previously,	he	even	made	a	lijle	book	
with	 lejers,	 newspaper	 clippings,	 photos	 and	 copies	 of	 his	 Stasi	 ﬁles.	He	 told	me	
that	he	wanted	to	collect	everything	that	could	ﬁnd	about	his	 life,	 for	himself	and	
his	daughters.		
Many	others	whom	I	 interviewed	and	spoke	to	informally	told	me	that	they	would	
rather	not	see	their	ﬁles.	One	woman	who	had	moved	to	the	West	in	the	1980's	by	
being	granted	emigra_on,	said	that	she	wants	to	look	forward.	By	the	_me	the	ﬁles	
became	available,	she	had	already	worked	through	her	troubling	experiences	years	
ago.	In	her	mind,	she	had	dealt	with	the	issue	for	a	while	already.	She	would	rather	
leave	the	past	behind	now.	
Another	woman	said	that	she	does	not	want	to	see	her	Stasi	ﬁle	 for	 fear	of	being	
disappointed,	 she	 is	 afraid	 that	 she	may	 have	 judged	 someone	 in	 the	wrong	way	
a`er	all	-"It	is	the	fear	of	being	disappointed"	-	"Es	ist	die	Angst	darin	Menschen	zu	
ﬁnden,	in	denen	ich	mich	vielleicht	doch	geirrt	habe...	das	ist	die	Angst	endäuscht	zu	
werden."	(Frau	T.)		
Shocking	RevelaLons		
As	 men_oned	 previously,	 the	 possible	 revela_ons	 and	 repercussions	 of	 reports	
could	 range	 from	minimal	 to	 devasta_ng.	 Frau	 M.	 had	 spied	 on	 her	 friends	 and	
family,	yet	upon	viewing	her	own	ﬁle,	she	was	surprised	to	ﬁnd	that	she	had	been	
under	 observa_on	 herself.	 It	 had	 been	 a	 close	 friend,	 who	 had	 embarked	 on	 a	
similar	quest	to	the	GDR	as	her,	in	the	hope	of	ﬁnding	an	ideal	society	and	was	later	
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disappointed	with	 the	 reali_es	 of	 the	 state	 and	 commijed	 suicide.	When	 I	 asked	
whether	she	viewed	her	Stasi	ﬁle,	right	a`er	the	wall	came	down,	she	replied:	"No,	
...in	the	90's	I	think	it	was.	Not	immediately."		I	then	asked	whether	she	found	that	
any	of	 her	 friends	had	 spied	on	her,	 she	 told	me	 "Only	 one	person...	 that	 he	 had	
spied	on	me...	it	shocked	me."	She	went	on	saying,	”…	he	later	commided	suicide.	He	
was	 one	 of	 the	Dunera	 boys	who	 came	back	 from	Australia	 and	 realized	 by	 1980	
that	this	GDR	was	not	what	he	had	though	for	all	his	life."	(Frau	M.)		
A	man	 from	a	 town	 in	Saxony,	who	had	been	 imprisoned	as	a	"poli_cal	dissident"	
and	was	later	‘bought	out’	by	the	FRG,	also	applied	to	view	his	ﬁles	a`er	the	Wende.	
He,	on	the	other	hand,	said	that	the	revela_ons	did	not	surprise	him	much.	 In	the	
ﬁle	 he	 read	 that	 there	 were	 two	 main	 IMs	 who	 observed	 him.	 He	 had	 already	
suspected	them	previously;	one	of	them	was	a	woman	he	had	worked	with	and	had	
known	for	many	years.	She	was	a	secretary	in	the	construc_on	company	where	he	
had	been	employed.	 Indeed,	she	had	even	openly	discussed	the	fact	 that	she	was	
wri_ng	reports	about	him	at	the	_me.	He	explained	that	he	felt	bad	for	her	because	
she	"didn't	have	a	choice".	Apparently,	she	had	had	an	aﬀair	with	someone	before,	
and	the	Stasi	blackmailed	her	with	that	informa_on,	asking	her	to	report	on	people.	
As	outlined	above,	Stasi	spying	did	not	only	target	one	person	alone	but	more	o`en	
a	whole	network	of	individuals;	it	could	be	friendship	groups,	colleagues	and	en_re	
families.	This	meant	that	numerous	people	could	be	directly	aﬀected	by	spy	ac_vity	
at	 once.	 As	 I	 men_oned	 previously,	 if	 denunciatory	 suspicions	 arose,	 it	 could	
nega_vely	impact	networks	of	people,	fostering	distrust	and	paranoia.		
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Not	 all	were	 aware	 to	what	 extent	or	by	whom	 they	were	being	 targeted.	 In	one	
narra_ve,	a	woman	in	her	for_es	explained	how	her	whole	family	was	devastated	by	
the	revela_ons	of	their	ﬁle.	Upon	viewing	their	records	a`er	the	Wende,	they	found	
out	that	a	very	close	family	friend	had	been	spying	and	repor_ng	on	them	for	years.	
None	 of	 them	 had	 had	 any	 idea,	 and	 the	 revela_on	 came	 as	 a	 great	 shock.	 The	
sense	 of	 betrayal	 was	 worsened	 by	 the	 realisa_on	 that	 his	 ac_vi_es	 had	 directly	
impacted	 her	 educa_on	 and	 career	 opportuni_es	 in	 a	 nega_ve	 way.	 She	 was	 a	
member	of	 the	 Junge	Gemeinde	 (Church	youth	organisa_on)	and	 therefore	not	 in	
line	with	the	state	doctrine.	She	found	that	he	had	been	signiﬁcant	in	the	decision-
making	 of	 not	 allowing	 her	 to	 proceed	 to	 the	 Oberschule	 (secondary	 school)	 or	
higher	educa_on.	It	was	her	dream	to	become	a	doctor,	and	she	worked	extremely	
hard	to	ﬁnd	a	way	to	achieve	this,	volunteering	for	many	hours	at	her	local	hospital	
and	 taking	 extra	 classes	 at	 the	 college	 (Volkshochschule).	 But	 all	 her	 hard	 work	
remained	unrecognised	and	instead	she	was	designated	to	do	an	appren_ceship	to	
become	a	bricklayer.	Eventually,	a`er	1989,	she	was	able	 to	go	to	a	West	German	
university	and	realised	her	ambi_on.		
At	the	_me	of	viewing	the	ﬁle,	the	family	friend	had	already	passed	away.	Two	years	
earlier	he	had	suﬀered	a	heart	ajack,	gojen	 into	an	accident,	and	died.	His	wife,	
who	had	been	involved	in	the	repor_ng	ac_vi_es,	did	not	want	to	stay	in	touch	or	
talk	about	what	had	happened.	Frau	D.'s	family	respected	this	decision	and	just	let	
the	 issue	go.	But	 for	Frau	D.	 it	 is	not	as	easy	to	come	to	terms	with	the	past.	 It	 is	
something	 that	 s_ll	 aﬀects	 her,	 remaining	 a	 ‘sore	 spot',	 as	 there	 are	 many	
unanswered	 ques_ons.	 She	wishes	 that	 she	 could	 have	 spoken	 to	 him	 and	 asked	
him	about	his	mo_va_on	to	work	for	the	Stasi.	
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"He	himself	was	a	surgeon.	Two	years	before	my	parents	read	their	ﬁles;	he	
had	a	heart	adack	and	it	took	his	life.	It	becomes	a	sore	point	in	one's	life	
when	you	can't	talk	about	it	with	that	person	anymore.	
His	wife,	who	seems	to	have	parScipated	too,	broke	oﬀ	all	contact	with	my	
parents	very	quickly.	Yes	...	Out	of	shame	or	something	...	My	parents	have,	
of	course,	never	tried	again	to	get	in	touch	with	her	to	talk.	It	was	very	hard	
for	her	too;	it	took	a	bad	course.	She	was	not	old	when	her	husband	died.		A	
bad	situaSon...	But	maybe	it	would	have	been	easier	if	they	could	have	
talked	with	the	person.	Just	to	ask	'why	did	you	do	something	like	that?'	...	It	
remains	an	unanswered	quesSon."	(Frau	D.)	
"Er	 selber	 war	 Chirurg,	 er	 hade	 zwei	 Jahre,	 bevor	 meine	 Eltern	 ihre	 Akte	
gelesen	haben,	einen	Herzinfarkt	und	ist	dabei	tödlich	verunglückt.	Das	bleibt	
dann	so	ein	wunder	Punkt	im	Leben,	wenn	man	mit	derjenigen	Person	nicht	
mehr	darüber	sprechen	kann.		
Seine	 Ehefrau,	 die	 da	 ja	wohl	mitgemacht	 hat,	 hat	 den	Kontakt	 zu	meinen	
Eltern	 ganz	 schnell	 abgebrochen.	 Ja...aus	 Schamgefühl	 oder	 was...	 Meine	
Eltern	 haben	 da	 natürlich	 nicht	 auch	 nochmal	 versucht,	 da	 Anstalten	 zu	
machen,	sich	mit	ihr	in	Verbindung	zu	setzen,	um	mit	ihr	zu	sprechen.	Für	sie	
ist	es	ja	auch	schlimm,	für	sie	ist	es	dann	ja	auch	sehr	schlimm	gelaufen.	Sie	
ist	ja	noch	nicht	alt	gewesen,	als	ihr	Mann	gestorben	ist.	'Ne	schlimme	Sache,	
aber...vielleicht	wär's	einfacher	gewesen,	wenn	man	häde	mit	der	Person	mal	
sprechen	können.	Um	zu	 fragen,	 'warum	hast	du	denn	so	was	gemacht?'...	
das	steht	jetzt	so	im	Raum."	(Frau	D.)	
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Looking	 back,	 the	 family	 has	 come	 to	 some	 grave	 realisa_ons	 regarding	 the	
friendship	they	had	entertained	for	many	years.	Right	a`er	the	Wende,	their	friends	
had	tried	to	let	the	contact	die	down.		She	and	her	parents	had	been	puzzled	by	this	
behaviour,	but	upon	reading	the	Stasi	ﬁles,	it	all	made	sense	now.		
“She	blocked	it	and	tried	to	let	the	contact	with	our	family	die	down	arer	the	
opening	of	the	borders.	And	we	did	not	know	why	they	never	had	Sme,	why	
they	never	came	to	Birthday	parSes	anymore.	But	when	one	read	the	Stasi	
ﬁle,	one	could	understand	why."	(Frau	D.)	
"Sie	hat	das	abgeblockt	und	versucht,	schon	nach	der	Wende	den	Kontakt	zu	
unserer	Familie	einschlafen	zu	lassen.	Und	wir	wussten	nicht,	warum	die	nie	
mehr	Zeit	haden,	nicht	mehr	zum	Geburtstag	kamen.	Aber	als	man	dann	die	
Stasi-Akte	gelesen	hade,	konnte	man	sich	das	alles	erklären."	(Frau	D.)		
The	case	of	Frau	D.	 illustrates	not	only	how	Stasi	ac_vi_es	could	directly	 impact	a	
person's	 life	 course.	 It	 also	 shows	 how	 the	 revela_ons	 of	 the	 ﬁles	 elicit	 intense	
feelings	of	betrayal,	not	only	aﬀec_ng	a	single	person	but	some_mes	whole	families.	
Moreover,	the	nature	of	covert	spying	meant	that	o`en	people	did	not	even	suspect	
that	a	person,	with	whom	they	thought	they	had	a	close,	trus_ng	bond	could	betray	
them	 in	 such	a	 fundamental	way.	 In	 the	a`ermath	of	 the	 revela_ons,	 this	 further	
leads	the	aﬀected	people	to	ques_on	everything	that	had	happened	over	the	years.	
A	 reevalua_on	 of	 the	 past	 takes	 place.	 As	 is	 o`en	 the	 case	 in	 situa_ons	 of	 great	
disappointment	and	betrayal,	moments	are	relived,	conversa_ons	are	played	out	in	
the	 mind	 and	 interac_ons	 are	 weighed.	 But	 how	 should	 one	 react	 in	 such	 a	
situa_on?	 For	 many	 East	 Germans,	 issues	 remain	 unresolved	 partly	 because	 it	 is	
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impossible	to	engage	with	the	person	as	in	Frau	D.'s	case,	or	the	emo_onal	wounds	
are	too	deep	to	embark	on	the	painful	path	of	reconcilia_on.	
In	 the	 drama_c	 case	 of	 Herr	 K.	 (see	 chapter	 3),	 upon	 viewing	 his	 Stasi	 ﬁles	 he	
suﬀered	immensely.	He	told	me	that	for	many	years	he	did	not	engage	with	his	past,	
he	 had	 tried	 to	move	 forward	 and	was	 busy	 with	 his	 work	 and	 family.	When	 he	
ﬁnally	decided	to	visit	the	Stasi	archive	he	was	faced	with	a	devasta_ng	revela_on	
that	his	 sister	 (and	 later	on	his	niece	 too)	had	systema_cally	 reported	on	him.	As,	
outlined	 previously,	 she	 had	 been	 the	 driving	 force	 in	 his	 being	 found	 out	 and	
persecuted	by	the	Stasi.	He	was	astonished	when	he	read	about	his	sister's	betrayal:		
"When	 I	 read	 that,	 I	 collapsed	 ...	 I	 had	 to	 get	 out	 of	 there;	 I	 did	 not	 say	
anything.	 I	 then	called	 fourteen	days	 later	again	and	said	 that	 they	 should	
send	me	something	again	...	they	did.	And	only,	let's	say	around	three	years	
later,	 did	 I	 apply	 again	 to	 view	 the	 same	 ﬁles.	 By	 then	 they	 had	 changed.	
Some	 things	were	added,	 some	were	 removed.	 I	 don't	 know	why.	 It's	 their	
own	system.	"	(Herr	K.)	
"Als	 ich	 das	 gelesen	 hab’,	 bin	 ich	 zusammengeklappt...ich	musste	 dann	 da	
raus.	Ich	hab	auch	nichts	gesagt.	Ich	hab,	dann	vierzehn	Tage	später	nochmal	
angerufen	 und	 hab	 gesagt,	 die	 sollen	mir	 doch	 noch	mal	was	 zuschicken...	
Das	haben	sie	dann	auch	gemacht,	und	erst,	sagen	wir	mal,	drei	Jahre	später	
habe	 ich	 dann	 noch	 mal	 einen	 Antrag	 gestellt	 und	 noch	 mal	 die	 gleichen	
Akten	 eingesehen.	 Inzwischen	 haben	 die	 sich	 auch	 verändert.	 Da	 sind	
manche	Sachen	hinzugekommen,	andere	wurden	herausgenommen.	Warum	
weiß	ich	nicht.	Das	ist	deren	eigenes	System."	(Herr	K.)		
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In	the	coming	years	he	viewed	his	ﬁles	several	_mes,	and	each	_me	the	content	of	
the	 ﬁles	 had	 changed.	 He	 found	 it	 puzzling	 that	 they	 just	 removed	 and	 changed	
certain	 things.	But	as	 I	 discovered	when	 I	 spoke	 to	employees	at	 the	BStU,	 this	 is	
fairly	 standard	 prac_ce	 when	 new	 informa_on	 is	 added,	 as	 new	 ﬁles	 are	
reconstructed	and	worked	through	con_nuously.	This	also	impacts	informa_on	and	
names	of	people	involved	that	are	blackened	out	for	data	protec_on	reasons.		
The	above	short	stories	illustrate	the	large	spectrum	of	ways	in	which	the	records	of	
the	Staatssicherheit	are	dealt	with	and	received	by	those	aﬀected.	Signiﬁcantly,	the	
repercussions	are	felt	on	both	sides,	by	the	vic_m	and	the	perpetrator.		But,	as	we	
have	seen	even	those	lines	are	blurred	since	those	who	spied,	were	generally	under	
observa_on	themselves.	The	Stasi	was	constantly	collec_ng	new	informa_on	about	
GDR	 ci_zens,	 as	 well	 as	 con_nually	 recrui_ng	 new	 informants	 in	 the	 process.	
Occasionally	 they	 were	 not	 even	 aware	 that	 they	 were	 being	 used.	 Rosenberg	
suggests	 that	 "perhaps	 this	was	 the	 idea:	East	Germany	would	be	 safe	only	when	
every	 East	German	was	 Stasi,	 a	 chain	of	 people	each	 informing	on	 the	others,	 16	
million	long"	(Rosenberg	1995,	p.302).		
In	 the	 book	Stasi	 Kinder,	Hoﬀmann	 (2012)	 examines	 in-depth	 the	way	 children	 of	
Stasi	 oﬃcials	 perceived	 the	 all-encompassing	 control,	 which	 their	 families	 had	 to	
endure.	As	I	explained	in	Chapter	2,	the	social	pressure	exerted	by	the	community	of	
Stasi	 oﬃcials	 -	 amongst	 themselves	 -	was	 tremendous.	 As	 Paul	 Bejs	 has	wrijen,	
“the	Stasi	subculture	was	one	built	on	a	severe	code	of	conformity,	superiority,	and	
model	citizenship,	whose	repressive	politics	were	geared	towards	itself	as	much	as	
to	‘asocials’”(Betts	2010,	p.34).	In	her	analysis,	Rosenberg	(1995)	also	examines	the	
way	 in	 which	 "social	 pressure	 was	 created	 from	 within"	 in	 other	 oﬃcial	 state	
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posi_ons.	 Here,	 she	 explores	 how	 border	 guards	 were	 pressured	 to	 follow	 the	
orders	to	shoot	at	escapees.	She	explains	that	guards	felt	that	there	was	no	"choice"	
of	 whether	 to	 shoot	 or	 not.	 The	 repercussions	 of	 leang	 someone	 escape	 would	
have	been	immense,	not	only	for	one	person	but	indeed,	for	the	en_re	regiment.	It	
was	 this	 threat	 that	 heightened	 the	 pressure	 from	 within.	 She	 further	 quotes	 a	
Catholic	priest,	Father	Durstewitz,	who	worked	as	a	counsellor	to	the	former	border	
guards.	His	statement	illustrates	the	internal	pressure	that	guards	were	exposed	to	
very	clearly.			
"The	young	men	say	that	if	there	was	an	escape	at	the	border,	an	immense	
repressive	system	almost	automa_cally	came	into	play.	It	wasn't	just	against	the	
individual	soldier	who	let	the	escape	succeed	but	against	the	whole	group,	to	create	
more	pressure	within	the	regiment.	The	whole	group	was	eliminated	from	socialist	
honours.	The	soldiers	never	got	a	clear	answer	as	to	whether	they	could	be	locked	
up	if	they	refused.	But	it	was	very	simple	if	someone	said,	‘I'm	not	prepared	to	
shoot,	everyone	thought	he	would	suﬀer."	(Rosenberg	1995,	p.	287)	
As	I	will	demonstrate	in	detail	in	the	following	chapters,	we	can	see	how	the	
panop_c	gaze	is	not	merely	directed	from	the	state	to	the	“inmate”,	but	condi_ons	
are	created	where	the	“inmates”,	monitor	one	another,	building	a	socially	complex	
and	morally	ambiguous	environment.	Once	again,	it	becomes	clear	how	deeply	
intertwined	and	integrated	state	control	was	in	the	GDR,	and	ﬁrst	and	foremost	in	
East	Germans'	personal	rela_onships.	This	is	reﬂected	in	the	decision-making	
process	of	opening	ﬁles,	but	also	in	the	a`ermath	of	the	revela_ons	that	ensue.	As	I	
argue,	it	is	these	complex	and	highly	sensi_ve	issues	which	con_nue	to	impact	
people's	lives,	albeit	to	varying	extents,	even	to	this	day.	In	the	following	chapter,	I	
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will	explore	further	how	the	experience	of	mass	surveillance	and	state	control	was	
mediated	in	an	everyday	context.	In	rela_on	to	this,	I	will	inves_gate	how	privacy	is	
valued	and	understood	and	ul_mately	how	it	shapes	people's	sense	of	wellbeing.	
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Chapter	Five:	Privacy	and	the	State			
	
Die	Gedanken	sind	frei,	wer	kann	sie	erraten,	
sie	ﬂiegen	vorbei	wie	nächtliche	Schaden. 
Kein	Mensch	kann	sie	wissen,	kein	Jäger	erschießen 
mit	Pulver	und	Blei:	Die	Gedanken	sind	frei! 
	
Thoughts	are	free,	who	can	guess	them?	
They	ﬂy	by	like	nocturnal	shadows.	
No	man	can	know	them,	no	hunter	can	shoot	them	
with	powder	and	lead:	Thoughts	are	free!	
From	the	German	folk	song	"	Die	Gedanken	sind	Frei"	-	Hoﬀman	von	Fallersleben	(1842)		
	
Before	 I	 le`	 for	 my	 ﬁeldwork,	 the	 topic	 of	 surveillance,	 in	 general,	 was	 rarely	
addressed	 in	 the	 media	 or	 public	 debate.	 Yes,	 there	 had	 been	 some	 discussions	
about	 the	 reten_on	 of	 ci_zens'	 data	 by	 telecommunica_ons	 companies,	 but	 ever	
since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 spying	 and	 surveillance	 was	 le`	 for	 the	 plots	
Hollywood	movies	and	TV	shows	(E.g.	Bond,	Homeland,	24,	Bourne	trilogy).	 It	was	
not	 un_l	 a	 few	months	 into	my	 prepara_ons	 to	 enter	 the	 ﬁeld	 in	 the	 summer	 of	
2013;	 that	 Edward	 Snowden	 revealed	 to	 the	 world	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 US	
government	had	been	spying,	not	only	on	foreign	ci_zens	and	poli_cians	but	their	
own	people.	 It	was	 as	 though	 someone	 had	 opened	 a	 can	 of	worms	 and	 all	 of	 a	
sudden	 the	 topic	 of	 surveillance	 received	massive	media	 ajen_on	 and	 became	 a	
much-debated	 issue	 in	 everyday	 conversa_on.	 Many	 ques_ons	 remain:	 Is	 it	
jus_ﬁed?	 Is	 this	 protec_ng	 us	 from	 terrorists?	 What	 does	 this	 surveillance	 even	
entail;	if	it's	not	no_ceable,	why	does	it	majer?	
In	 Germany,	many	 people	were	 uncomfortable	with	 the	 thought,	 that	 a	 "friendly	
ally",	a	fellow	member	of	the	NATO,	and	the	self-proclaimed	champion	of	freedom	
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and	democracy	would	feel	the	need	to	spy	on	innocent	people.	There	was	outrage	
when	it	was	discovered	that	the	NSA	had	been	eavesdropping	on	Chancellor	Angela	
Merkel's	 private	 phone	 conversa_ons.	 She's	 not	 a	 likely	 terror	 suspect,	 so	 what	
jus_ﬁed	spying	on	her?	
As	_me	went	by	the	public	outcry	quieted	down.	Although,	newspaper	ar_cles	were	
wrijen,	and	journalists	reported	and	discussed	the	issue,	the	general	public	did	not	
seem	too	worried	by	the	increasingly	alarming	revela_ons.	When	it	became	part	of	
the	 daily	 news,	 it	 was	 also	 quickly	 forgojen,	 par_cularly	 by	 younger	 people	who	
themselves	had	not	grown	up	in	the	GDR.	Even	speaking	to	many	East	Germans	of	
the	older	genera_ons,	I	couldn't	help	but	no_ce	a	certain	despondency,	some_mes	
even	cynicism	towards	the	revela_ons.	"So	what?"	people	would	say,	"They	spied	on	
us	 back	 then,	 of	 course,	 they're	 sSll	 spying	 on	 us	 now;	 I'm	 not	 surprised".	 I	 was	
intrigued	 by	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Germans	 dealt	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 contemporary	
surveillance.	 I	 wondered	 how	my	 informants	would	 react,	 these	 people	who	 had	
experienced	the	most	trauma_sing	moments	in	their	lives	due	to	state	surveillance.	
Would	it	make	a	diﬀerence	to	them	or	would	they	consider	this	type	of	monitoring	
to	 be	 harmless?	 I	 also	 wondered	what	 the	 younger	 genera_on	would	 think.	 This	
genera_on	 is	 so	 accustomed	 to	 sharing	 large	 amounts	 of	 personal	 informa_on	
through	 social	media;	would	 it	 even	majer	 if	 another	 pair	 of	 eyes	 saw	how	 they	
present	themselves	on	the	internet?	
As	I	explored	these	ques_ons,	I	became	increasingly	interested	in	the	concept	of	
privacy.	What	does	privacy	mean	to	East	Germans,	especially	those	who	lived	under	
communist	rule,	and	how	has	this	meaning	shi`ed	over	almost	three	decades?	How	
does	my	genera_on	conceive	privacy?	It	feels	like	two	extreme	worlds	are	colliding	
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when	looking	at	it	from	an	intergenera_onal	point	of	view.	My	parents'	genera_on's	
extreme	protec_veness	over	their	privacy	lies	in	stark	contrast	with	my	own	
genera_on's	eagerness	to	share	the	most	in_mate	informa_on	with	the	world	
through	the	internet.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	explore	the	many	diﬀerent	facets	of	
privacy.	I	will	enquire	into	the	various	meanings	of	privacy	from	a	social	science	
perspec_ve	and	how	it	varies	throughout	cultural	contexts.	I	will	look	at	the	way	in	
which	privacy	was	understood	and	mediated	in	the	GDR	and	how	former	ci_zens	
feel	about	it	today.	Finally,	I	will	compare	and	contrast	contemporary	surveillance	
and	Stasi	surveillance	in	the	GDR,	exploring	how	limited	privacy	impacted	GDR	
ci_zens’	wellbeing.	
What	is	Privacy?		
	
The	topic	of	privacy	is	an	elusive	concept,	which	is	ever-changing,	situa_onal,	as	well	
as	 culturally	 rela_ve.	 Its	 meaning	 varies	 across	 _me	 and	 genera_ons.	
Anthropologists,	 psychologists,	 and	 sociologists	 have	 analysed	 this	 concept	 in-
depth,	while	examining	it	in	the	context	of	related	no_ons	such	as	culture,	iden_ty	
and	 sense	of	 self.	 The	 topic	has	also	been	 studied	by	philosophers,	biologists	 and	
most	recently	in	the	ﬁeld	of	surveillance	studies.	The	study	of	privacy	is	problema_c	
as	 its	 theore_cal	 and	 philosophical	 roots	 lie	 in	 a	 western-centric	 liberal	
individualism,	 addressing	 no_ons	 of	 the	 self	 in	 rela_on	 to	 the	 state.	 Deﬁning	 the	
concept	 as:	 "Privacy.	 .	 .	 is	 about	 the	 protec_on	 of	 the	 self,	 from	 the	 state,	 from	
organisa_ons	 and	 other	 individuals.	 Privacy,	 therefore,	 tends	 to	 reinforce	
individua_on,	 rather	 than	 community,	 sociability,	 trust	 and	 so	 on.	 It	 is	 about	me,	
and	nobody	else"	(Bennet	2011,	p.	493).	
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Privacy	has	been	discussed	by	scholars	of	many	disciplines.	Daniel	Solov	(2007)	has	
looked	at	the	topic	from	a	philosophical	as	well	as	a	legal	standpoint.	He	challenges	
the	popular	argument	that,	concerning	surveillance,	one	has	nothing	to	worry	if	you	
have	nothing	to	hide.	He	analyses	the	many	concepts	of	privacy	and	concludes	that	
the	challenges	in	protec_ng	privacy	partly	lie	in	the	ambiguity	of	the	concept	itself.	
"Because	 privacy	 involves	 protec_ng	 against	 a	 plurality	 of	 diﬀerent	 harms	 or	
problems,	 the	 value	 of	 privacy	 is	 diﬀerent	 depending	 upon,	 which	 par_cular	
problem	or	harm	is	being	protected.	Not	all	privacy	problems	are	equal;	some	are	
more	 harmful	 than	 others.	 Therefore,	 we	 cannot	 ascribe	 an	 abstract	 value	 to	
privacy.	 Its	worth	will	 diﬀer	 substan_ally	 depending	 upon	 the	 kind	 of	 problem	or	
harm	 we	 are	 safeguarding	 against.	 Thus,	 to	 understand	 privacy,	 we	 must	
conceptualise	 it	 and	 its	 value	 more	 pluralis_cally.	 Privacy	 is	 a	 set	 of	 protec_ons	
against	 a	 related	 set	of	problems.	 These	problems	are	not	all	 related	 in	 the	 same	
way,	but	they	resemble	each	other.	There	is	a	social	value	in	protec_ng	against	each	
problem,	and	that	value	diﬀers	depending	upon	the	nature	of	each	problem"	(Solov	
2007	p.763	–	764).	Schneider	(1977)	also	inves_gated	privacy	along	with	shame	and	
exposure	from	a	theore_cal	point	of	view,	examining	the	classic	works	of	Nietzsche,	
Freud	 and	 Sartre.	 Consequently,	 he	 addresses	 the	 contemporary	 deteriora_on	 of	
the	private	sphere,	defending	our	human	need	for	privacy,	claiming	that,	along	with	
shame,	it	is	a	protec_ve	mechanism	of	the	self.		
There	 have	 been	 numerous	 sociological	 compila_ons	 of	 the	 study	 of	 privacy.		
Nippert-Eng'	 s	 edited	 volume	 for	 example,	 focuses	 on	 ethnographic	 accounts	 of	
"Islands	 of	 privacy",	 illustra_ng	 how	 people	 of	 all	 ages	 maintain	 small	 niches	 of	
privacy	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives,	 what	 they	 choose	 to	 share	with	 others,	 and	what	
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they	prefer	to	keep	to	themselves.	To	me,	this	idea	of	pockets	of	privacy	very	much	
resonates	with	my	own	research,	 in	 that	 it	 is	 these	small	details	of	day-to-day	 life	
that	gave	people	the	ability	to	disappear	from	the	prying	eyes	of	others.	Plänkers	et	
al.	 (2005)	have	also	asserted	 the	 importance	of	 “niche	 cultures”	 in	GDR	 socie_es,	
these	 could	 be	 found	 amongst	 friends,	 the	 home,	 church	 groups	 or	 even	 some	
psycho-therapeu_c	ins_tu_ons	(p.166-167).	
In	fact,	Günter	Gaus	(1989)	wrote	that	the	GDR	was	a	“niche	Society”,	explaining	
that	the	niche	presented	an	“apolitical	private	sphere	into	which	East	Germans	
retreated	in	order	to	withdraw	from	a	system	that	they	opposed	and	from	its	public	
institutions	and	spaces.	Thus,	the	niche	allow(ed)	the	pursuit	of	individual	interests	
beyond	the	reach	of	state	control.”	Despite	having	received	a	great	deal	of	criticism	
due	to	its	reductionist	nature	(i.e.	simply	assuming	that	everyone	was	against	the	
GDR’s	form	of	socialism),	the	concept	of	“niche	society”	has	also	been	used	by	other	
scholars	to	explain	a	variety	of	social	phenomena	or	processes,	in	West	Germany	
and	other	Eastern	Bloc	States	(in	Müller	2013).		
Many	 inves_ga_ons	 of	 privacy	 in	 Eastern	 Germany	 come	 from	 the	 ﬁeld	 of	 social	
history.	As	I	men_oned	earlier,	Paul	Bejs's	(2010)	edi_on	Within	Walls:	Private	Life	
in	 the	 German	DemocraSc	 Republic	provides	 an	 excellent	 account	 of	 exactly	 how	
GDR	ci_zens	managed	to	ﬁnd	small	niches	of	privacy	in	their	everyday	lives	and	how	
they	managed	 to	maintain	 them	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	oppressive	 state.	He	 contends	
that	 privacy	 was	 of	 par_cularly	 high	 value,	 enabling	 a	 “cherished	 locus	 of	
individuality,	 alterna_ve	 iden_ty-forma_on,	 and/or	 dissent	 and	 resistance"	 (Bejs	
2010,	p.	238).		
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Privacy	and	Anthropology	
Anthropologists	spend	much	of	their	ﬁeldwork	_me	trying	to	understand	the	nature	
of	 people's	 private	 lives.	 Indeed,	 within	 Anthropology	 the	 study	 of	 privacy	 is	
some_mes	 regarded	 with	 scep_cism	 as	 it	 is	 considered	 a	 Western	 concept.	
However,	 people	 around	 the	 world	 o`en	 engage	 in	 behaviours	 which,	 from	 a	
Western	scholarly	perspec_ve	may	be	seen	as	an	expression	of	privacy,	even	if	it	is	
not	described	as	such	within	the	given	culture	(see	Yan	2003,	p.134).	Anthropology	
has	regarded	the	role	of	privacy	in	various	ethnographic	contexts.	There	are	far	too	
many	 to	 men_on	 here.	 Instead,	 I	 will	 explore	 in	 greater	 detail	 two	 ethnographic	
accounts	that	illustrate	our	innate	need	for	privacy.	These	ethnographies	allow	us	to	
understand	privacy	as	it	is	experienced	within	two	very	diﬀerent	cultural	contexts.	
Yan	 Yunxiang	 conducted	 ethnographic	 ﬁeldwork	 in	 a	 village	 in	 northeast	 China	
during	the	Communist	era,	examining	privacy	and	family	life	as	it	transformed	a`er	
the	 Maoist	 revolu_on.	 Yunxiang	 pays	 par_cular	 ajen_on	 to	 no_ons	 of	 emo_on,	
in_macy,	 conjugality,	 and	 individuality,	 giving	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 way	 family	
members	manage	their	own,	o`en	limited	privacy	within	the	household	home.	She	
describes	her	informants'	concep_on	of	privacy	as	such:	
"It	should	be	noted	that	Xiajia	villagers	do	not	use	the	term	privacy	per	se	and	are	
unfamiliar	 with	 the	 trendy	 term	 yinsi,	 which	 is	 the	 Chinese	 transla_on	 of	 the	
Western	no_on	of	privacy	 (...)	villagers	o`en	gave	 fangbian	 (convenience)	as	 their	
reason	for	house	remodelling,	and	some	used	the	word	freedon	(ziyou)	to	describe	
their	 experience	of	 having	more	personal	 space.	When	pressed	 further	 about	 the	
meaning	of	convenience	and	freedom,	several	used	a	similar	image:	"You	can	sleep	
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on	the	bed	during	daySme	without	worrying	about	being	seen	or	gossiped	about	by	
anyone"	(2003,	p.134-135).	
In	 rela_on	 to	 the	 modernisa_on	 and	 remodelling	 of	 village	 family	 homes,	 she	
emphasises	the	no_ceable	shi`	towards	seeking	more	privacy,	both	spa_ally	and	to	
family	rela_ons,	love	and	in_macy.	She	concludes:	
"...Puang	 these	 pieces	 together,	 I	 am	 convinced	 that,	 without	 resor_ng	 to	 the	
urban	 no_on	 of	 yinsi	 (privacy),	 Xiajia	 villagers	 actually	 have	 begun	 to	 pursue	 and	
protect	their	privacy	at	both	the	family	and	individual	levels."	(Yan	2003	p.135)			
On	the	other	hand,	Thomas	Gregor	(1980)	conducted	his	ﬁeldwork	in	Central	Brazil	
with	 the	Mehinaka	 tribe.	He	examined	 the	way	 in	which	 ins_tu_onalised	 isola_on	
becomes	 a	 tool	 for	 ensuring	 some	 level	 of	 privacy	 within	 an	 environment	 where	
everyone	knows	everything	about	one	another.	He	describes	how	the	Mehinaka	are	
extremely	 visible	 and	 audible	 to	 one	 another	 in	 everyday	 life,	 leading	 to	 a	 highly	
developed	 gossip	 network	 amongst	 all	members	 of	 the	 tribe.	He	writes	 that	 "the	
Mehinaka	are	masters	of	indirect	observa_on",	as	members	of	the	tribe	are	able	to	
recognise	 one	 another's	 footprints	 in	 the	 sand	 (1980	 p.	 82).	 So	when	 people	 are	
walking	around	together,	they	inevitably	leave	a	visual	record.	Tribe	members	make	
a	habit	of	interpre_ng	these	traces.	He	writes:	"The	print	of	heels	or	bujocks	on	the	
ground	may	 be	 enough	 to	 show	 that	 a	 couple	 stopped	 and	 had	 sexual	 rela_ons	
alongside	the	path"(1980	p.83).	Audibility	within	the	village	also	poses	challenges	to	
people's	privacy,	 as	 conversa_ons	 can	easily	be	overheard.	 Some_mes	people	will	
be	wrapped	 in	 a	 hammock	 and	 eavesdrop	 into	 conversa_ons	 nearby.	 Even	 inside	
their	 homes,	 the	Mehinaka	o`en	whisper	 to	maintain	privacy	 as	 their	 neighbours	
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might	 hear	 them	 otherwise.	 Gregor	 describes	many	ways	 in	which	 the	Mehinaka	
conceal	 their	 ac_ons	 or	 hide	 from	 the	 prying	 eyes	 of	 others:	 "Opportuni_es	 for	
privacy	must	be	consciously	sought	a`er	and	manipulated	before	an	individual	can	
really	 gain	 control	 over	what	others	 know	about	him"	 (1980,	p.	 87).	He	describes	
how	 ins_tu_onalised	 seclusion	 helps	 to	 relieve	 social	 tensions	 within	 the	 village,	
especially	in	rela_on	to	gossip,	illness,	death	and	accusa_ons	of	witchcra`.	A	person	
will	 move	 into	 seclusion	 crea_ng	 not	 only	 privacy	 for	 himself,	 but	 also	 for	 those	
around	 him.	 Therefore,	 seclusion	 acts	 as	 an	 an_dote	 to	 social	 surveillance.	
"Mehinaku	seclusion	(is)	an	adap_ve	device	that	maintains	the	ﬂow	of	informa_on	
and	the	rate	of	social	engagement	within	tolerable	extremes."	(1980,	p.97)	Gregor	
concludes	 that	 excessive	 exposure	 is	 a	 stress	 factor	 that	 those	 who	 live	 in	 small	
socie_es	such	as	the	Mehinaka	must	adapt	to.	
Some	scholars	maintain	that	privacy	could	even	be	considered	an	innate,	biological	
human	 need:	 "Biologist	 Peter	 Wajs	 makes	 the	 point	 that	 a	 desire	 for	 privacy	 is	
innate:	mammals,	in	par_cular,	don't	respond	well	to	surveillance.	We	consider	it	a	
physical	 threat	 because	 animals	 in	 the	 natural	 world	 are	 surveilled	 by	 predators.	
Surveillance	 makes	 us	 feel	 like	 prey,	 just	 as	 it	 makes	 the	 surveillors	 act	 like	
predators."	(Schneier	2015,	p.126-127)	
Bruce	Schneier	writes	that	"Privacy	is	an	essen_al	human	need,	and	central	to	our	
ability	 to	 control	 how	 we	 relate	 to	 the	 world.	 Being	 stripped	 of	 privacy	 is	
fundamentally	dehumanising,	and	it	makes	no	diﬀerence	whether	the	surveillance	is	
conducted	 by	 an	 undercover	 policeman	 following	 us	 around	 or	 by	 a	 computer	
algorithm	 tracking	 our	 every	 move."	 (Schneier	 2015,	 p.7)	 He	 argues	 that	 in	 our	
modern,	digital	 age	 it	 is	 a	 common	misconcep_on	 that	privacy	 is	not	 important	 if	
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you	 have	 nothing	 to	 hide.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 he	 highlights	 that	 there	 are	 things	we	
would	rather	keep	private,	even	if	we	are	not	doing	anything	wrong.	Yes,	there	are	
things	 we	 would	 only	 tell	 certain	 people;	 however,	 nowadays	 social	 media	 blurs	
those	lines.	What	is	acceptable	to	be	shared	with	one	person	versus	another?	In	her	
ethnography	 InSmacy	 at	 Work	 (2015)	 Stefana	 Broadbent	 similarly	 looks	 at	 this	
paradox	of	modern	life	where	private	and	work	life	become	inseparable	through	the	
use	of	social	media.	For	Broadbent	privacy	is	also	considered	a	fundamental	human	
right,	 _ghtly	 intertwined	with	 concepts	 of	 personal	 dignity	 and	 respect	 as	well	 as	
the	agency.	In	many	ways,	a	loss	of	privacy,	is	not	only	an	intrusion,	even	viola_on,	
of	the	self,	but	 it	 is	also	a	 loss	of	control.	Privacy	viola_ons	can	take	many	shapes,	
and	forms	and	those	who	are	in	marginal	socio-economic	situa_ons	are	aﬀected	in	
par_cular,	including	those	in	powerful	posi_ons,	as	they	are	dependent	on	peoples'	
approvals.	 Schneier	warns	 that	 today	 "Our	 privacy	 is	 under	 assault	 from	 constant	
surveillance"	 leading	 to	dehumanisa_on,	 loss	of	dignity	and	ul_mately	challenging	
people's	wellbeing.				
Sloan	 and	 Warner	 (2016)	 inves_gate	 privacy	 from	 Georg	 Simmel's	 standpoint,	
looking	at	"privacy	in	public".	They	compare	contemporary	state	surveillance	by	the	
NSA	 and	 other	 agencies	 with	 the	 methods	 prac_sed	 by	 the	 East	 German	 Stasi.	
Despite	signiﬁcant	problems	in	comparing	the	two,	they	conclude	that	modern-day	
surveillance,	 like	that	of	the	Stasi,	has	an	adverse	 impact	on	people's	sense	of	self	
and	privacy.	Indeed,	the	Stasi	used	surveillance	as	a	repressive	tool	on	a	large	scale,	
which	is	not	as	no_ceable	in	contemporary	surveillance.	However,	they	write:	
"Current	 surveillance	 undermines	 privacy	 in	 public	 by	 undermining	 norm-enabled	
coordina_on.	 The	 1950	 to	 1990	 East	 German	 Stasi	 illustrates	 the	 threat	 to	 self-
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realiza_on.	 The	 'hidden,	 but	 for	 every	 ci_zen	 tangible	 omnipresence	 of	 the	 Stasi,	
damaged	 the	 very	 basic	 condi_ons	 for	 individual	 and	 societal	 crea_vity	 and	
development:	Sense	of	one's	self,	Trust,	Spontaneity.'"	(Sloan	and	Warner	2016,	p.1-
2)		
Sociologist	 Sami	 Coll	 (2012)	 also	 considers	Georg	 Simmel's	 theories	 on	 secrecy	 to	
understand	 privacy	 as	 a	 protec_on	 against	 surveillance	 interven_ons.	 Simmel	
contends	that	secrecy,	and	therefore	also	privacy,	is	a	necessity	for	a	stable	society.	
As	 life	 in	 an	 environment	 of	 "full	 publicity"	 would	 be	 stressful	 and	 unbalanced	
(Simmel	1950;	Coll	2012).	An	element	of	secrecy	is,	therefore,	necessary	in	personal	
interac_ons.	
"According	 to	 Simmel,	 interac_ons	 are	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 social	 structures	 of	 power	
(Simmel	1950b;	Coser	1977).	The	social	dynamics	of	secrecy	are	not	an	excep_on.	
Rather	 than	being	 a	 social	 fact	 in	which	we	 should	protect	 an	 individual's	 privacy	
and	 liberty,	 informa_on	 (and	 its	 partner,	 secrecy)	 is	 thus	 cons_tu_ve	 of	 the	
individual	 and	 her	 social	 rela_ons.	 In	 other	 words,	 when	 a	 certain	 boundary	
between	 disclosure	 and	 concealment	 is	 repeated	 through	 certain	 types	 of	 social	
rela_ons,	 it	 becomes	 a	 structure,	 and	 then	 a	 collec_ve	 fact.	 	 As	 the	 capacity	 to	
withhold	 speciﬁc	 informa_on	 becomes	 a	 commodity	 cons_tu_ve	 of	 power	 and	
social	 stra_ﬁca_on	 (Simmel	 1950a,	 338),	 secrecy	 (which	 is,	 again,	 in	 Simmel's	
language,	privacy)	has	an	important	collec_ve	implica_on,	one	which	is	defended	by	
those	 scholars	 wishing	 to	 retain	 privacy	 as	 a	 collec_ve	 good”	 (see	 Wes_n	 2003;	
Regan	1995;	Regan	2011	cited	in	Coll	2012).		
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In	 other	 words,	 the	 concept	 of	 privacy	 is	 socially	 constructed	 and	 variable.	 This	
means	that	par_cular	social	contexts	can	be	either	advantageous	or	detrimental	to	
one's	 health.	 Therefore,	 privacy	 should	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 "collec_ve	 fact,	 as	 a	
contextual	 integrity	and	as	an	individual	fact"	(Coll	2012).	We	can	hence	conclude,	
that	privacy	 is	 essen_al	 in	human	 interac_ons,	 and	most	 importantly,	 it	 is	 socially	
constructed	 and	 mediated,	 beneﬁang	 our	 sense	 of	 wellbeing.	 In	 the	 following	
sec_on,	I	will	explore	how	privacy	is	challenged	in	the	face	of	the	state	surveillance.		
Self-Policing	in	the	German	DemocraLc	Republic	(GDR)		
In	chapter	2,	I	contemplated	which	model	of	surveillance	applies	most	to	the	mass-
surveillance	of	the	GDR.		I	argued	that	building	on	the	theory	of	Foucault’s	famous	
Panop_con,	surveillance	not	only	changed	people's	way	of	thinking	and	controlling	
their	behaviour	but	it	also	changed	social	processes	and	challenged	their	
interpersonal	rela_onships.		
Crea_ng	an	ambience	of	distrust	where	people	would	fear	standing	out	and	being	
targeted	by	the	Stasi,	the	government	forced	people	to	recede	to	the	privacy	of	
their	homes	and	in	extreme	cases	their	own	minds.	Privacy	became	a	precious	
thing,	the	only	space	where	one	could	act	freely	without	the	interven_on	of	the	
state.	Fearful	of	losing	this	precious	privacy,	people	would	act	accordingly	to	what	
was	expected	from	communist	ci_zens.	
The	produc_on	of	strict	division	between	public	and	private	sphere	was	an	everyday	
fact	for	most	GDR	ci_zens,	even	from	a	very	young	age.	Frau	D.	recalls	having	spent	
her	childhood	living	in	two	worlds:	her	family	home,	where	she	felt	safe,	protected	
and	where	 she	 could	 freely	 express	 her	 thoughts.	 And	 then	 there	was	 the	 public	
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realm,	where	the	state	with	its	norms	and	restric_ons	was	ever	present.	For	her,	this	
realm	extended	to	kindergarten,	school	and	even	her	friends.	
"Even	 as	 a	 child,	 you	 noSced	 that	 you	 were	 living	 in	 a	 divided	 world.	 At	
home,	you	felt	sheltered,	that's	where	you	are	protected,	where	everything	is	
ok.	And	then	there's	the	state	side:	school,	kindergarten…also	friends"	(Frau	
D.)	
"Da	merkte	man	als	Kind	schon,	dass	man	in	einer	zwei-geteilten	Welt	 lebt.	
Zuhause	wo	man	sich	behütet	 fühlt,	wo	man	beschützt	wird,	da	 ist	Alles	 in	
Ordnung	 und	 eben	 die	 Staatliche	 Seite:	 Schulen,	 Kindergärten...auch	 die	
Freunde"	(Frau	D.)	
For	those	unlucky	to	lose	their	privacy	to	the	bugging	and	constant	watchful	eye	of	
the	state,	a	creeping	sense	that	everything	they	did	was	scru_nised	would	imprison	
them	in	their	minds,	the	last	refuge	of	privacy.	Their	Panop_c	prison	would	become	
mental	as	well	as	physical.	
One	informant,	for	example,	described	the	immense	psychological	pressure	that	he	
was	 exposed	 to	 by	 being	 unable	 to	 speak	 his	 mind	 while	 feeling	 the	 constant	
pressure	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 system.	 He	 says	 that	 surveillance	 or	 simply	 the	
possibility	 that	 someone	 was	 not	 conforming,	 would	 create	 ever	 more	 pressure.	
Indeed,	 it	was	this	extreme	pressure	to	conform	that	caused	so	much	distress.	For	
him,	 it	was	this,	and	living	 in	a	state	of	con_nuous	cogni_ve	dissonance,	having	to	
act	 and	 speak	 contrary	 to	 his	 own	 beliefs,	 which	 made	 life	 in	 the	 dictatorship	
unbearable.		
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“Surveillance	or	 the	knowledge	that	someone	did	not	conform,	 led	to	more	
pressure	being	exerted.	This	pressure	to	conform	is	so	unpleasant.	I	felt	that	
this	was	really	awful,	that	you	couldn’t	say	what	you	wanted…	This	pressure	
to	 conform	 and	 having	 to	 say	 something	 diﬀerent	 from	 what	 you	 are	
thinking.”	
"Überwachung	 oder	 Erkenntnisse,	 dass	 jemand	 nicht	 angepasst	 ist,	 führen	
dazu,	 dass	mehr	 Druck	 ausgeübt	 wird.	 Dieser	 Anpassungsdruck,	 der	 ist	 so	
unangenehm.	Ich	habe	das	als	ganz	schrecklich	empfunden,	dass	man	nicht	
das	 reden	 konnte,	was	man	wollte...	 Dieser	 Druck	 zur	 Anpassung	 und	was	
anderes	zu	sagen,	als	was	man	denkt."	(Herr	Z.)		
Beyond	the	real	life	PanopLcon:	Auto-Governmentality	
To	an	extent,	Foucault’s	classic	model	of	the	Panop_con	certainly	applied	to	
people's	behaviour	during	the	communist	era	in	Eastern	Germany.	Their	own	
country	(the	GDR)	had	become	a	prison	of	sorts	and	the	Stasi	(and	other	state	
ins_tu_ons),	along	with	unoﬃcial	informants	became	the	metaphorical	“prison	
guards”.	As	outlined	previously,	one	may	even	wonder	whether	the	power	of	the	
"invisible"	prison	guards	was	extended	in	the	GDR,	considering	that	the	popula_on	
as	a	whole	was	exposed	to	state	control	in	a	variety	of	forms.	State	ins_tu_ons	(and	
its	supporters)	exerted	their	power	primarily	through	repression	and	mass-
surveillance,	ranging	from	“basic”	everyday	surveillance	(e.g.	phone	lines	being	
tapped,	mail	read,	comings	and	goings	of	a	household	recorded	in	Hausbücher)	to	
extreme	measures	such	as	house	searches,	house	bugging,	being	followed,	being	
interrogated,	being	exposed	to	destruc_ve	repressive	techniques	such	as	
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Zersetzung,	and	even	being	imprisoned.	The	seemingly	almighty	power	of	the	state	
was	therefore	reﬂected	in	many	everyday	situa_ons,	star_ng	from	the	way	people	
interacted,	dressed	and	spoke	to	how	they	worked	and	enjoyed	their	free	_me.	
Although,	the	extent	to	which	people	in	East	Germany	experienced	and	were	aware	
of	surveillance	varied	signiﬁcantly,	self-policing,	a	reac_on	to	the	threat	of	state	
violence,	became	an	integral	aspect	of	GDR	culture.	Most	importantly,	although	the	
state	was	the	prime	"watchman",	ci_zens	were	constantly	suspicious	of	one	
another's	inten_ons,	always	on	guard	and	therefore	turning	into	watchmen	
themselves,	crea_ng	an	atmosphere	of	collec_ve	fear	and	paranoia.		
Keeping	this	in	mind,	we	can	understand	why	less	powerful	individuals	may	have	
been	ascribed	greater	power	than	they	actually	had	in	the	imagina_on	of	the	
populous.	Since	no	one	could	be	trusted	100	%	and	the	way	people	were	observed	
varied	so	much,	a	person	would	never	know	who	was	listening,	recording	and	
repor_ng	their	every	move	and	would	never	know	what	eﬀect	their	words	and	
ac_ons	had.	This	created	a	situa_on	of	extreme	uncertainty;	uncertainty	regarding	
who	could	be	trusted	(see	sec_on	on	distrust)	but	moreover	an	uncertainty	about	
the	eﬀect	of	one's	ac_ons	and	even	one's	thoughts.		
Paul	Bejs	(2010)	has	said	that	“citizens	were	trained	to	view	each	other	
suspiciously	in	a	world	of	mutual	surveillance.	This	was	the	dark	side	of	the	social	
contract	between	the	GDR	state	and	its	citizenry,	but	it	is	one	that	went	far	beyond	
the	classic	bargain	of	exchanging	freedom	for	security.	In	this	case	it	was	a	strictly	
private	agreement	between	the	state	and	its	citizens,	based	on	material	rewards	for	
snitching	and	snooping”	(2010,	p.49).		
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I	argue	that	the	uncertainty	created	made	people	hypersensi_ve	to	the	scru_ny	of	
others.	What	were	they	watching?	What	did	they	know?	What	did	they	think	about	
you?	And	most	importantly,	did	one	stand	out?	Did	you	appear	diﬀerent	from	
others?	As	I	was	told,	"There	was	a	general	atmosphere	of	distrust"	(Frau	M.).	In	this	
world	of	uncertainty	keeping	under	the	radar	was	people's	only	way	of	achieving	
some	sort	of	sense	of	safety.	Betts	(2010)	does	not	believe	that	Foucault’s	idea	of	
the	Panopticon	is	sufficient	in	understanding	Stasi	surveillance.	Instead	he	sees	it	as	
“a	world	based	on	private	bargains	in	exchange	for	cooperation	and	
complicity”(2010,	p.49).	He	writes	that	“over	time	GDR	citizens	learnt	to	‘speak	
Bolshevik’	in	the	GDR,	both	internalizing	and	mastering	the	language	(and	practices)	
of	power	offered	to	them	by	the	regime.
	
Denunciations	were	therefore	a	kind	of	
citizen	activity	in	their	own	right,	one	of	the	few	powerful	forms	of	agency	available	
to	them”	(Betts	2010,	p.49).	
Socialist	 collec_ves	 in	 work,	 family	 life,	 schooling,	 sports	 and	 many	 other	 state-
organised	 ac_vi_es	 constantly	 exposed	people	 to	 the	 scru_ny	 of	 others.	One	was	
involved	 in	social	ac_vi_es	at	all	_mes.	Of	course,	this	allowed	the	state	to	spread	
propaganda,	 but	 it	 also	 allowed	 the	 state	 to	 exert	 its	 power	 in	 all	 areas	 of	 life	
("crea_ng	the	good	communists").	As	people	faced	the	judgment	of	others	to	ﬁt	into	
the	 communist	 ideal,	 it	 was	 subtly	 turning	 any	 GDR	 ci_zen	 into	 one	 of	 these	
"invisible	prison	guards".	Since	the	majority	of	people	were	poten_ally	judging	one's	
behaviour	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another,	 East	 Germans	 were	 constantly	 self-monitoring.	
Fiang	 in	 was	 the	 main	 objec_ve	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 its	 ci_zens.	 Many	 felt	 the	
burden	 of	 this	 arrangement	 and	 the	 pressure	 of	 con_nuous	 social	 surveillance,	
struggling	with	 their	 cogni_ve	dissonance.	 Certainly,	 for	 some	people	 this	 created	
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no	 problems	 whatsoever	 and	 many	 East	 Germans	 are	 nostalgic	 about	 these	
collec_ve	ac_vi_es	(work	ou_ngs,	par_es,	FDGB	Ferienheime)	and	being	constantly	
socially	ac_ve.	
One	informant	men_oned	that	the	one	thing	about	the	GDR	that	she	misses	is	the	
"Gemeinscharsgefühl"	-	the	community	spirit	and	friendships.	Everyone	had	a	very	
ac_ve	social	life,	people	used	to	visit	each	other	o`en.	Back	then,	few	people	had	a	
telephone	in	their	house,	so	you	had	to	visit	them	in	order	to	speak	to	them	directly.	
So,	o`en	people	would	end	up	staying	for	a	glass	of	wine	and	a	chat.	She	says	that	
many	 people	 she	 knows	miss	 this	 today,	 saying	 “We	 saw	 each	 other	much	more	
oren.	We	had	such	nice	evenings	together…”	Yet,	she	recognises	that	this	sense	of	
community	emerged	by	default.		“The	sense	of	community	-	but	of	course	that	was	
born	out	of	necessity…”-	”Das	Gemeinscharsgefühl	–	aber	das	war	natürlich	auch	
aus	der	Not	geboren..."	 (Frau	D.).	Despite	her	nostalgia	 for	 this	aspect	of	GDR	 life	
and	although	she	felt	that	in	the	GDR	certain	friendships	were	stronger,	she	would	
not	want	to	relive	the	experience	because	much	of	the	_me	she	felt	pressurised	and	
restricted	in	her	everyday	life.			
Another	informant	men_oned	the	close	rela_onships	between	work	colleagues	who	
were	 helpful	 and	 sympathe_c	 towards	 one	 another.	 For	 instance,	 during	 the	 long	
work	hours	(in	the	GDR	the	majority	of	the	popula_on	was	in	full	_me	work)	when	
someone's	child	was	sick	and	needed	to	be	picked	up	from	school,	colleagues	were	
understanding	 and	 helpful.	 They	 helped	 one	 another	 out	 because	 they	 knew	 the	
same	 thing	 could	 happen	 to	 them.	 She	 is	 convinced	 that	 this	 stemmed	 from	 the	
humanis_c	culture	 that	was	cul_vated	 in	 the	socialist	 state.	Yet,	 she	says	 that	 this	
was	not	because	“they	were	beder	people	but	simply	out	of	necessity	-	because	they	
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were	 all	 in	 the	 same	 situaSon”.	 "Das	 ist	 nicht	 weil	 die	 Menschen	 besser	 sind,	
sondern	weil	sie	in	der	gleichen	SituaSon	sind"	(Frau	J.).		
Hence,	we	can	see	that	in	the	socialist	regime’s	inﬂuence	was	far	reaching,	directly	
impac_ng	 people's	 personal	 lives;	 shaping	 their	 rela_onships	 both	 posi_vely	 and	
nega_vely.	 The	 popula_on's	 common	 struggles	 led	 to	 the	 forma_on	 of	 strong	
friendships,	whether	 these	were	 created	out	 of	 necessity,	 to	 gain	 certain	 beneﬁts	
("Vitamin	B")	 or	 because	 they	were	 truly	nurturing	 and	 trus_ng	 (see	 also	Berdahl	
1999).	 The	 state's	 infringement	 on	 personal	 life	 was	 undeniable,	 narrowing	 the	
space	of	the	private	sphere	signiﬁcantly	and	increasing	the	scope	of	social	control.		
Examples	 of	 this	 are	 common	 throughout	 the	 world.	 In	 many	 cultures,	 it	 is	
manifested	 in	the	 innate	fear	of	witchcra`,	as	 it	oﬀers	powerful	methods	of	social	
control.	Not	only	are	these	people	fearful	of	the	secret	power	of	an	o`en	powerless	
person,	but	the	fear	of	being	judged	as	a	witch	or	sorcerer	obliges	individuals	to	act	
according	 to	 social	norms.	Envy	and	"the	evil	eye"	also	produce	similar	eﬀects,	as	
the	 fear	 of	 the	 power	 of	 envious	 eyes	 forces	 them	 to	 have	humility	 and	 to	 share	
their	good	fortune	with	the	rest	of	the	community.	Sickness	caused	by	the	evil	eye	
or	 witchcra`	 may	 act	 as	 a	 deterrent	 to	 act	 against	 social	 norms,	 yet	 it	 has	 an	
intangible	nature,	unlike	the	Stasi's	ac_ons	no	one	could	really	be	sure	if	the	disease	
came	 from	 the	witch	 or	 if	 it	was	 just	 a	 stroke	of	 bad	 luck.	 In	 these	 communi_es,	
there	 are	 spaces	 for	 social	 resistance,	 by	 using	 charms	 and	 contras	 one	 can	 act	
against	social	norms	without	the	fear	of	geang	sick.	For	East	Germans,	any	space	of	
social	 resistance	 could	 make	 life	 even	 more	 challenging,	 yet	 people	 did	 them	
anyway	in	the	hope	that	the	privacy	of	their	most	in_mate	moments	would	not	be	
breached.	
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To	 summarise,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 the	 social	 dynamics	 of	 the	 regime	 created	
“invisible	prison	guards”,	or	in	other	words	it	built	a	system	of	auto-governmentality.	
In	 fact,	many	people	may	have	never	been	aware	of	having	been	part	of	 this	self-
perpetua_ng	 system,	 even	 to	 this	 date.	 But,	 perhaps,	 this	 is	what	made	 it	 all	 the	
more	 powerful.	 Because	 behaving	 as	 one	 such	 guards	 manifested	 itself	 in	 many	
ordinary	ways,	from	no_cing	that	someone	was	wearing	clothing	from	the	West	and	
casually	men_oning	it	 in	conversa_on	to	calling	someone	out	for	not	keeping	their	
front	 yard	 in	 order	 to	 ﬁt	 the	 community's	 standards.	 Certainly	 social	 control	 is	 a	
fairly	 universal	 feature	of	 human	 social	 interac_ons,	 but	 I	 believe	 that	 in	 the	 East	
German	 context	 it	 created	 unique	 dynamics,	 as	 the	 ambience	 of	 distrust	 and	
uncertainty	over	being	watched	–	and	by	whom	–	 created	a	greater	 fear	of	being	
pointed	out.	As	a	doctor	in	his	60,'s	pointed	out,	the	primary	cause	of	his	suﬀering	
was	the	incessant	pressure	to	to	ﬁt	 in–	“Anpassungsdruck”.	Stasi	surveillance	itself	
did	not	necessarily	cause	anxiety,	as	it	was	not	always	percep_ble,	but	it	was	rather	
the	psycho-social	dynamics	 that	 it	 created	amongst	 the	popula_on	which	 led	 to	a	
culture	of	forced	conforma_on	and	social	pressure.		
“One	did	not	suﬀer	so	much	from	surveillance	since	that	was	not	constantly	
noSceable.	The	things	that	caused	suﬀering	was	the	pressure	to	adapt.”	
"Unter	der	Überwachung	hat	man	eigentlich	nicht	geliden,	weil	man	die	 ja	
nicht	 immer	 gemerkt	 hat.	 Worunter	 man	 leiden	 konnte,	 das	 war	 der	
Anpassungsdruck."	(Herr		Z.)		
Abiding	by	social	 rules,	being	orderly,	neat,	 conscien_ous	and	polite	 (or	any	other	
socialist	ideal)	were	valued	greatly	in	a	society	which	was	less	focussed	on	monetary	
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success	 and	more	on	 socialist	 ideology	and	 social	 interac_ons.	 This	 ideal	 not	only	
inﬂuenced	how	people	acted	but	transformed	the	individual	in	a	very	in_mate	and	
profound	way.	The	perfect	German	communist	had	to	abide	by	the	rules	or	fear	the	
reprisal	 of	 society	 and	 the	 state.	 Even	 to	 this	 day,	 East	 Germans	 appear	 to	 be	
especially	adept	at	abiding	by	social	norms	and	rules	(see	research	by	Bertelsmann	
S_`ung	 2013/2014),	 and	 (superﬁcially,	 at	 least)	 people	 o`en	 appear	 very	 much	
concerned	with	the	way	their	immediate	community	sees	them.		
Herr	 Z.	 remembers	 GDR	 _mes	 as	 a	 _me	 of	 oppression	 and	 being	 silenced,	
explaining:			
"If	 you	 were	 smart	 enough	 not	 say	 your	 opinion	 publicly	 and	 kept	 your	
mouth	shut,	you	had	no	pressure.	Those	who	conformed	felt	no	pressure.	"				
	"Die	die	sich	angepasst	haben,	haden	keinen	Druck."	
This	statement	in	itself	points	towards	a	vicious	circle	where	those	complying	with	
the	system,	appeared	to	feel	no	pressure.	Yet,	this	statement	could	be	challenged,	
ques_oning	 whether	 the	 whole	 purpose	 of	 conforming	 was	 to	 avoid	 social	
repercussions	 in	the	ﬁrst	place.	Herr	Z.	says	that	he	was	suﬀering	mostly	 from	the	
burden	of	his	own	 fears	 -	or	 "cowardice"	as	he	calls	 it.	 I	believe	 the	cowardice	he	
refers	 to	 was	 the	 fear	 of	 voicing	 his	 true	 opinion	 and	 speaking	 up	 against	 the	
injus_ces	 imposed	 by	 the	 regime.	 He	 thinks	 that	 East	 Germans	 know	 par_cularly	
well	what	it's	 like	to	comply	with	a	par_cular	poli_cal	system.	He	also	says	that	he	
has	a	special	sense	for	recognising	these	pajerns	because	of	his	experience	and	he	
can	even	tell	when	people	comply	with	a	par_cular	system	in	the	West,	no_cing	a	
similar	“pressure	to	adapt	in	the	West”	–“Anpassungsdruck	im	Westen".	He	believes	
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that	in	the	East	it	was	more	about	complying	to	a	poli_cal	ideology,	whereas	in	the	
West	conformity	takes	place	on	a	more	a	personal	level,	saying	for	example	"When	
someone's	boss	is	an	asshole,	but	he	sSll	conSnues	to	work	with	him	and	complies	
with	the	system,	that's	just	as	bad.	"	(Herr	Z.).	
Indeed,	how	can	we	relate	this	to	life	in	the	West?	Is	the	GDR	a	unique	example	of	
an	extraordinary	social	process	incited	by	neo-totalitarianism.	Or,	perhaps	we	have	
reached	a	_me	in	which	we	also	feel	a	pressure	to	conform?	In	this	vain,	I	would	like	
to	 take	 a	 short	 detour	 and	 consider	 how	privacy,	 conformity	 and	 surveillance	 are	
understood	and	experienced	in	a	contemporary	context.		
Contemplating	contemporary	privacy:	Facebook,	Twitter	and	others…	
Being	a	 so-called	 "millennial"	and	having	grown	up	 in	 the	age	of	 the	 internet	and	
more	recently	social	media,	my	concep_on	of	privacy	is	much	more	ﬂuid	than	that	
of	my	parent's	genera_on.	However,	having	been	born	in	East	Germany	and	having	
ac_vely	engaged	with	the	experience	of	Stasi	surveillance	in	my	own	family	history,	I	
conceive	 the	 genera_onal	 diﬀerences	 with	 par_cular	 intensity.	 I	 have	 come	 to	
wonder	what	 privacy	 really	meant	 before	 the	Wall	 came	 down.	Was	 true	 privacy	
non-existent	or	was	it	in	fact	more	highly	valued	and	precious	than	anywhere	else?		
With	some	people	experiencing	the	infringement	of	privacy	and	personal	liber_es	to	
such	a	signiﬁcant	extent	that	their	basic	human	rights	were	violated,	was	there	any	
way	to	maintain	a	sense	of	privacy?	
I	once	heard	a	talk	by	a	fellow	anthropologist	speaking	about	her	ﬁeldwork	in	China	
and	the	non-existence	of	privacy	within	the	family	home	un_l	the	recent	emergence	
of	 smart	phones.	 It	 got	me	 thinking	about	 the	 circumstances	under	which	people	
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across	 the	 globe	 ensure	 a	 small	 piece	 of	 privacy	 in	 their	 lives.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	
concept	of	privacy	is	much	more	complex	than	we	may	think.	What	is	highly	valued	
privacy	 to	 one	 person,	may	 be	 a	 given	 to	 others.	 The	 statement	 that	 there	 is	 no	
privacy	 in	 a	 given	 society	 is	 highly	 problema_c.	 I	 believe	 that	 people	 create	 their	
own	niches	of	privacy,	however,	big	or	small.	Of	course	in	extreme	situa_ons	such	as	
imprisonment	 human	 privacy	 becomes	 diminished	 to	 the	 point	 were	 it	 is	 barely	
existent.	But	even	in	these	cases,	there	is	s_ll	the	private	arena	of	the	mind	-	just	as	
it	 is	 celebrated	 in	 Hoﬀmann	 von	 Fallersleben's	 famous	 song	 "Die	 Gedanken	 sind	
Frei"	(The	Freedom	of	Thoughts).	Yet,	even	the	mind	can	be	corrupted,	and	one	can	
monitor	 one's	 own	 thoughts	 under	 condi_ons	 of	 extreme	 control.	 S_ll,	 the	mind	
and	our	thoughts	are	the	ul_mate	niche	of	privacy	and	the	ul_mate	space	of	social	
resistance.	 A`er	 all	 the	mind	 is	 the	 ul_mate	 place	 of	 non-control,	 feared	 by	 any	
authoritarian	government.	
As	men_oned	above,	my	ﬁeldwork	 revealed	 that	 for	 some	of	my	 informants	 their	
immediate	 family	and	 their	 family	home	 represented	 their	private	niche.	This	was	
where	many,	sadly,	not	all,	could	freely	express	their	true	opinions,	be	themselves,	
and	trust	that	personal	concerns	would	not	be	shared	with	anyone	else.	For	many,	
what	 happened	 in	 the	 home	 or	 what	 was	 read,	 watched,	 listened	 and	 discussed	
rarely	le`	the	four	walls.	This	created	a	unique	sense	of	in_macy	and	comfort,	which	
is	once	again	idealised	and	missed	by	many	nostalgic	East	Germans.	What	would	my	
parent's	genera_on	see	as	appropriate	to	share	with	others,	and	what	would	they	
see	as	ﬁt	to	discuss	or	do	in	public	or	even	amongst	friends?	This	is	a	hard	ques_on	
to	 answer	 since	 I	 can	 only	 relate	 to	my	 family	 –	 how	 can	we	 know	what	 private	
majers	 are	 really	 shared	 if	 you	 do	 not	 know	 a	 person	 par_cularly	well?	 You	will	
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rarely	get	access	to	their	in_macy	group	and	even	if	you	could	you	would	never	get	
access	to	the	true	mental	privacy.	
In	many	ways,	this	protec_on	of	privacy	and	sharing	of	personal	majers	is	especially	
apparent	retrospec_vely.	It	seems	that	people	were	par_cularly	afraid	of	discussing	
things	 that	 happened	before	 the	wall	 came	down.	 In	 the	 course	 of	my	ﬁeldwork,	
this	became	very	obvious	to	me,	and	I	o`en	found	myself	holding	back	on	ques_ons	
as	 I	 was	 afraid	 of	 infringing	 the	 privacy	 of	 those	 who	 now	 gave	 me	 their	 trust.	
Speaking	 to	 family	 members,	 this	 was	 a	 constant	 balancing	 act	 of	 trying	 to	 be	
objec_ve	 and	 asking	 ra_onal/jus_ﬁed	 ques_ons	 and	 staying	 away	 from	 sensi_ve	
topics.	I	did	not	want	to	make	people	uncomfortable,	but	I	am	also	aware	that	there	
was	always	a	lingering	fear	of	what	I	might	ﬁnd	out.	
	To	 my	 parents,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 unthinkable	 to	 share	 in_mate	 details	 about	
rela_onships,	religious	or	poli_cal	views	and	everyday	ac_vi_es	with	a	stranger	(like	
an	ethnographer)	and	much	less	to	wider	audience	(such	as	the	internet).	To	them,	
the	idea	of	ac_vely	deciding	to	make	these	things	public	is	inherently	dangerous	and	
also	socially	inappropriate.	Looking	at	this	genera_onal	gap,	one	can	observe	how	in	
present	day	Germany	there	is	a	very	wide	spectrum	of	what	is	deemed	private	and	
what	 is	 not.	 Thus	 I	 ask	myself,	what	 is	 the	mo_va_on	behind	exposing	 such	 large	
amounts	of	informa_on	and	why	is	it	so	common	in	my	genera_on?		
To	 address	 this	 ques_on,	 we	 must	 brieﬂy	 inquire	 what	 privacy	 means	 to	
contemporary	East	Germans	or	Europeans	more	generally?	Having	spoken	to	young	
East	Germans,	there	is	no	obvious	diﬀerence	in	the	way	they	conduct	themselves	in	
the	 public	 sphere,	 more	 speciﬁcally	 the	 Internet,	 compared	 to	 other	 Western	
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Europeans	of	my	genera_on.	Regarding	their	online	social	media	use	and	sharing	of	
personal	 informa_on,	 many	 feel	 somewhat	 relaxed.	 As	 one	 informant	 asked	 me	
rhetorically	"everyone	does	it,	what	diﬀerence	does	it	make	what	I	share?".		
An	 actual	 concern	 about	 an	 infringement	 of	 privacy	 or	Privatsphäre	per	 se	 rarely	
came	 up	 in	 conversa_on.	 Another	 exchange	 with	 a	 28-year-old	 woman	 revealed	
that	 she	 takes	care	of	what	 she	posts	online,	as	 she	would	not	want	 to	 risk	being	
scru_nised	by	her	current	or	future	employer.	While	many	agree	that	their	parents	
are	 somewhat	 suspicious	of	 social	media,	 others	 (whose	 families	were	also	 ac_ve	
online)	voiced	concern	about	"adding	them	as	friends	on	Facebook",	as	they	did	not	
want	 them	 to	 see	everything	 they	 got	up	 to.	 Indeed,	 it	 seems	 that	many	 "ensure	
their	privacy"	by	using	Facebook's	feature	of	placing	their	"friends"	 into	categories	
such	as	"close	friends"	or	"acquaintances",	allowing	diﬀering	degrees	of	visibility	of	
their	proﬁles.	Others	seem	to	consciously	categorise	those	they	connect	with	on	any	
par_cular	 form	 of	 social	 media.	 Therefore,	 while	 the	 majority	 of	 young	 East	
Germans	 use	 social	 media	 such	 as	 Facebook,	 Instagram,	 LinkedIn	 and	WhatsApp	
quite	 liberally,	 their	concern	about	privacy	 is	generally	restricted	to	those	who	are	
poten_ally	"visible"	in	their	oﬀ-line	life	(e.g.	parents,	family,	employer,	teachers).	
So	what	about	less	visible	forms	of	surveillance	that	go	beyond	the	people	we	know,	
such	as	governments	and	corpora_ons?	To	what	extent	are	we	shedding	our	privacy	
willingly	 (or	as	Zygmunt	Bauman	describes	 it	 as	DIY	 [‘Do	 it	 yourself’]	 surveillance)	
and	why?	We	must	understand	that	our	own	willingness	to	supply	in_mate	details—
through	 the	 use	 of	 smartphones,	 smartwatches	 and	 social	 media,	 as	 well	 as	
indirectly	 by	 other	means	 such	 as	 tracking	 (GPS)	 or	 use	 of	 credit	 cards	 or	 Oyster	
card—is	a	dras_cally	diﬀerent	 yet	a	much	more	eﬀec_ve	way	of	 surveillance	 than	
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anything	used	by	the	GDR.	Our	bodies	have	become	enhanced	by	this	technology	in	
many	ways,	reaching	the	point	where,	with	our	ﬁtness	trackers	and	smart	devices,	
we	have	become	cyborgs	(Gray	1995;	Amber	Case	2010;	2014).		
Consequently,	surveillance	technology	has	also	become	an	extension	of	ourselves.	It	
is	ac_ve	24/7,	and	so	are	we,	always	in	touch	with	the	World	Wide	Web	and	those	
in	 it,	 including	 governments	 and	 corpora_ons	 who	 are	 incessantly	 gathering	
informa_on.	We	are	constantly	available	and	through	 instant	messaging	apps	such	
as	Facebook	and	WhatsApp	we	also	feel	in	demand	all	the	_me.	People	see	whether	
we	 are	 "online"	 or	 when	 we	 have	 read	 their	 messages.	 While	 these	 messaging	
services	 convey	 a	 feeling	 of	 in_macy	 (since	 we	 are	 perpetually	 in	 touch)	 this	
in_macy	is	somewhat	superﬁcial.	Messages	can	be	typed	quickly	and	to	a	number	of	
people	 at	 once.	 It	 doesn't	 require	 much	 eﬀort	 of	 commitment.	 Those	 who	 are	
communica_ng	do	not	even	have	to	be	in	the	same	city,	country	or	even	con_nent.	
While	we	 feel	 that	 this	 new	 type	 of	 communica_on	 has	made	 our	 lives	 bejer	 in	
many	ways	 (staying	 in	 touch	with	 those	 abroad/	 communica_on	 is	 easier/	 always	
being	 in	 contact	 with	 the	 world),	 there	 are	 also	 downsides	 to	 these	 forms	 of	
technological	 innova_ons.	 They	 create	 new	 types	 of	 rela_onships,	 which	 may	
otherwise	 never	 occur.	 New	 forms	 of	 in_macy	 are	 built,	 which	 are	 somewhat	
detached	from	our	life	oﬀ-line.		
Social	media	has	also	made	our	 informa_on	a	commodity	 for	use	by	corpora_ons	
and	governments	alike.	It	is	a	self-perpetua_ng	system,	since	everyone	is	using	it	we	
feel	a	sense	of	peer	pressure	to	use	it	as	well.	This	is	a	social	anxiety	to	miss	out	on	
important	 social	 contact	 if	 one	 does	 not	 par_cipate.	 Our	 ability	 to	 see	 when	
someone	is	ac_ve	in	social	media	at	any	given	_me	turns	us	into	surveillance	tools	
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too.	It	creates	social	pressure	to	partake	in	online	ac_vi_es	and	respond	to	them	as	
quickly	 as	 possible.	 Our	 lives	 online	 are	 dominated	 by	 the	 pressure	 of	 instant	
gra_ﬁca_on.	 The	 nature	 or	 validity	 of	 en_re	 rela_onships	 can	 be	 ques_oned	 or	
determined	by	the	speed	of	a	reply,	the	non-response	to	a	message	and	the	way	a	
single	message	is	phrased.	
Much	like	those	invisible	prison	guards	in	the	everyday	life	of	East	Germany,	social	
media	 sites	 (and	 in	 par_cular	 Facebook)	 create	 an	 environment	 where	 everyone	
watches	everyone,	only	this	_me	around	people	are	not	only	aware	of	the	profound	
social	and	psychological	eﬀect	of	this	type	of	surveillance.	People	in	fact	know	they	
are	being	watched	yet	only	exploit	 it	to	present	themselves	 in	a	par_cular	way,	an	
idealised	digital	 image	of	 themselves	 (Albrechtslund	2008).	This	not	only	concerns	
friendships	and	personal	ac_vi_es	but	poli_cal	views,	forcing	one	to	disclose	one's	
poli_cal	views	and	judge	others	openly.			
This	once	again	became	crystal	clear	with	the	terrorist	ajacks	in	Paris	of	November	
2015.	 The	 response	 to	 this	 event	 regarding	 public	 statements,	 ar_cles	 and	 posts	
shortly	 a`er	 the	 event	 was	 par_cularly	 telling	 of	 projected	 poli_cal	 ideals.	 I	 was	
par_cularly	surprised	by	Facebook's	very	quick	response	in	enabling	people	to	add	a	
French	ﬂag	ﬁlter	to	their	proﬁle	picture	and	also	for	the	ﬁrst	_me	to	have	discovered	
their	"Safety	Check"	feature	which	allows	people	to	mark	themselves	or	friends	as	
safe	 a`er	 a	 disaster.	 While	 the	 Safety	 Check	 feature	 is	 undoubtedly	 helpful	 and	
reassuring,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 only	 no_ceable	 for	 Paris	 and	 not	 similar	 recent	
events	in	Beirut	or	Baghdad	said	a	lot	about	Facebook's	poli_cal	views.	The	display	
of	solidarity	 through	the	proﬁle	picture	ﬁlter	was	another	majer,	oﬀering	a	space	
for	a	highly	poli_cal	statement	that	inﬂuenced	how	people	show	their	digital	avatar.	
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The	majority	of	 individuals	may	not	be	aware	of	 it,	but	it	 is	a	symbolic	act.	Openly	
portraying	themselves	not	only	as	represen_ng	all	that	the	French	ﬂag	symbolises,	
but	 making	 a	 public	 stance	 against	 the	 ‘other',	 the	 enemy	 who	 dared	 ajack	 the	
Western	world.	
The	fact	that	Facebook	added	this	feature	within	less	than	24	hours	a`er	the	ajack	
created	a	powerful	dynamic.	People	were	s_ll	in	shock,	as	they	slowly	learned	about	
what	had	happened,	and	numerous	drama_c	videos	 (mostly	 recorded	by	people's	
smartphones)	 emerged.	When	 I	 checked	my	 Facebook	 feed	 the	day	 following	 the	
event,	about	half	of	my	Facebook	friends	had	already	changed	their	pictures.	That	
evening	I	spoke	to	a	French	friend	of	mine	who	works	as	a	journalist	(most	recently	
in	 Pakistan	 and	Morocco).	We	 were	 discussing	 why	 she	 had	made	 the	 conscious	
decision	not	to	change	her	proﬁle	picture,	sta_ng	that	she	did	not	agree	with	what	it	
stood	for.	At	the	same	_me,	she	openly	voiced	her	concern	about	how	this	decision	
may	make	her	look	in	front	of	her	friends.	She	told	me	that	she	almost	feels	a	social	
pressure,	since	all	her	French	friends	had	already	done	it,	and	she	was	the	odd	one	
out.	 She	 feared	 returning	 to	 France	 at	 Christmas	 _me,	 and	 that	 she	 would	 be	
exposed	 to	 ques_ons	 of	 why	 she	 did	 not	 par_cipate	 in	 this	 act	 of	 solidarity.	 Her	
anxiety	demonstrated	the	powerful	poli_cal	inﬂuence	Facebook	has	on	its	users	and	
global	poli_cs.	More	importantly,	it	reveals	how	its	users	reinforce	this	inﬂuence	by	
par_cipa_ng	on	the	one	hand	and	ac_ng	as	surveillance	on	the	other.	In	this	way,	it	
ascribes	poli_cal	and	even	religious	beliefs	to	its	users.	
Our	willingness	to	give	data	about	our	personal	life	in	subtle	and	not	so	subtle	ways	
has	 had	 many	 eﬀects	 on	 how	 our	 genera_on	 behaves.	 Not	 only	 are	 we	 deeply	
inﬂuenced	 by	 the	 opinion	 of	 others	 in	 this	 "digital	 Panop_con"	 but	 we	 also	 are	
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forced	to	deal	with	the	reali_es	of	digital	 life	without	really	knowing	how	to	do	 it.	
Being	in	the	vanguard	of	the	digital	revolu_on	has	shoved	us	into	uncharted	social	
territory.	 We	 are	 not	 only	 forced	 out	 of	 our	 private	 lives	 but	 also	 forced	 into	
unstable	 and	 o`en	 non-existent	 social	 rela_onships.	 Beyond	 this,	 the	 fact	 of	
immortalising	our	data	 in	 the	 form	of	bits	and	bytes	has	had	many	consequences	
more	or	less	new	to	us,	to	which	we	have	had	to	adapt.	
Losing	the	Ephemeral:	Contemporary	online	records	and	The	Records	of	
the	GDR	State	Security	Service		
One	of	the	most	challenging	issues	of	online	privacy	in	the	age	of	"Big	Data",	is	the	
loss	of	the	ephemeral.	Certainly,	there	is	an	element	of	this	of	"never	forgeang"	in	
the	vast	amount	of	ci_zens'	ﬁles	stored	 in	the	Stasi	headquarters.	Even	more	than	
25	years	a`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall,	reading	old	Stasi	ﬁles,	East	Germans	are	reminded	
of	events	of	the	distant	past	and	are	astounded	by	things	they	had	forgojen	about	
long	ago.	Nevertheless,	 the	recording	of	data	today	 is	unsurpassed.	Everything	we	
do	today	is	remembered,	stored,	and	ul_mately	it	will	also	"be	associated	with	you	
forever."	(Schneier	2015,	p.129)	
It	 is	also	 important	to	keep	this	eternal	record	 in	mind	 in	rela_on	to	 interpersonal	
rela_onships,	since	our	ability	to	forget	things	that	we	(or	others)	may	have	said	or	
done	at	a	given	_me,	enables	forgiving	(see	Gathman	2008).	I	believe	that	the	ability	
to	 forget	 has	 helped	 to	 heal	many	wounds	 of	 the	 past,	 not	 just	 in	 East	Germany.	
Nevertheless,	 once	 East	 Germans	 were	 able	 to	 view	 their	 Stasi	 ﬁles,	 those	 old	
wounds	were	broken	again.	Indeed,	Stasi	ﬁles	are	not	merely	bureaucra_c	records,	
but	rather	moments	captured	on	paper.	They	immortalised	real	events,	words	that	
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were	 spoken	 and	 rela_onships	 that	 were	 cul_vated.	 Of	 course,	 not	 everything	
recorded	in	these	ﬁles	is	the	truth,	since	this	type	of	surveillance	was	conducted	by	
human	 beings	 and	 not	 by	 computer	 algorithms	 capturing	 meta-data.	 Yet,	 what	
these	recordings	of	the	past	provide,	is	a	glimpse	into	a	secre_ve	system	that	existed	
alongside	normal	everyday	life	during	that	_me.	Some_mes	people	suspected	that	a	
given	person	was	repor_ng	on	them.	Perhaps	what	they	read	in	their	ﬁle	comes	as	
no	 big	 surprise.	 Yet	 for	 others,	 the	 revela_ons	 of	 viewing	 their	 Stasi	 ﬁles	 can	 be	
devasta_ng.	 Beliefs	 and	 memories	 of	 former	 events	 and	 rela_onships	 can	 be	
challenged	fundamentally.	Therefore,	 it	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	 the	Stasi	
ﬁle	 archive	 (BStU)	 provides	 psychological	 counselling	 to	 those	 experiencing	
trauma_c	realisa_ons	as	they	view	their	personal	records.		
Here,	 we	 can	 observe	 two	 fundamental	 diﬀerences	 between	 contemporary	
(especially	digital)	 surveillance,	 and	 surveillance	 conducted	by	 the	Secret	Police	 in	
East	 Germany.	 Historic	 spying	 contained	 inaccuracies	 due	 to	 human	 error	 or	
deliberately	falsiﬁed	records.	In	contemporary	spying,	false	conclusions	occur	too	by	
oversimpliﬁed	 informa_on	 processing	 and	 data	 proﬁling.	 Nevertheless,	 online	
records	and	archival	records	share	their	non-ephemeral	nature.		
To	conclude,	it	can	be	said	that	contemporary	ideas	about	privacy,	especially	online,	
stand	 in	 stark	 contrast	with	privacy	 in	 the	GDR.	 Secret	 Police	 spying	was	 at	_mes	
extremely	invasive,	and	its	a`ermath	haunts	many	lives	to	this	day.	I	argue	that	Stasi	
spying	was	perceived	as	far	more	threatening	by	the	popula_on	than	contemporary	
online	surveillance	is.	The	observa_on	was	conducted	by	real	human	beings,	leading	
to	 the	 permea_on	 of	 distrust	 into	 many	 personal	 rela_onships	 and	 therefore	
elici_ng	a	higher	protec_veness	of	privacy.	Modern	day	digital	recording	of	data	 is	
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regarded	as	less	threatening,	as	it	is	invisible	and	if	there	is	an	awareness,	it	is	seen	
as	 the	mere	collec_on	of	"numbers,	data…"	and	so	on,	although	this	new	form	of	
surveillance	 is	 poten_ally	 signiﬁcantly	 more	 comprehensive	 and	 large-scale	 than	
spying	in	the	GDR	ever	was.	Perhaps	it	is	too	soon	to	tell	what	the	consequences	of	
the	modern	day	deteriora_on	of	the	private	sphere	will	mean	for	individuals,	yet	we	
can	assume	that	a	narrowing	private	sphere	leaves	more	room	for	social	control.	
Zygmunt	Bauman	(2015)	has	suggested	that	nowadays	we	willingly	oﬀer	our	most	
in_mate	and	private	 informa_on	to	the	world	 in	order	 to	be	seen,	because	of	our	
species'	innate	fear	of	being	alone	we	have	sacriﬁced	our	privacy	for	the	superﬁcial	
feeling	 of	 community.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 East	 Germany	 people	 were	 o`en	 forced	 to	
partake	 in	 social	 interac_ons	 and	 community	 mee_ngs.	 Indeed,	 the	 community	
spirit	was	 highly	 valued	 by	most	 GDR	 ci_zens	 and	 as	 one	 informant	 told	me,	 the	
community	 spirit,	 working	 for	 the	 greater	 good,	 was	 deeply	 ingrained	 in	 GDR	
culture,	no	majer	how	devoted	to	the	state	a	person	was.	
“No	mader	whether	one	was	for	or	against	the	government,…but	in	the	East	
everything	was	based	on	the	assumpSon	that	work	serves	the	community,	as	
well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 community	 serves	 me	 and	 my	 educaSon	 and	 to	
secure	 my	 employment	 possibiliSes.	 For	 GDR	 ciSzens,	 besides	 a	 few	
excepSons,	 this	 became	 ingrained.	 It	 already	 started	 in	 kindergarten.	 They	
were	brought	up	to	be	mindful	of	the	community…It	was	deeply	rooted,	even	
in	people	who	didn’t	necessarily	stand	for	the	defence	of	the	government,	yet	
they	were	somehow	involved.”	(Frau	J.)	
	 177	
"Ob	 für	oder	gegen	die	Regierung,	 ...aber	 im	Osten	waren	wir	alle	geprägt	
von	 dem	 Gedanken,	 unsere	 Arbeit	 dient	 der	 Gemeinschar,	 so	 wie	 die	
Gemeinschar	 mir	 dient	 und	 meine	 Ausbildung	 und	 meine	
Arbeitsmöglichkeiten	 zufriedenstellend	 sichern...Das	 war	 den	 Leuten	 in	 der	
DDR,	mit	einigen	Ausnahmen,	in	Fleisch	und	Blut	übergegangen.	Das	ﬁng	im	
Kindergarten	 schon	 an.	 Sie	 wurden	 so	 erzogen,	 auf	 die	 Gemeinschar	 zu	
achten	und	alles...Das	war	Sef	verwurzelt,	selbst	bei	Leuten,	die	 in	der	DDR	
gar	nicht	so	für	die	Verteidigung	der	Regierung	standen,	aber	doch	waren	sie	
irgendwie	miteinbezogen"	(Frau	J.)		
As	I	men_oned	before,	this	communal	feeling	is	what	some	East	Germans	are	very	
nostalgic	about.	Many	East	Germans	say	that	they	miss	the	helpfulness,	the	fact	that	
people	met	up	spontaneously	and	visited	each	other	in	their	homes.	In	many	ways,	
GDR	ci_zens	were	rarely	alone.	Many	people	were,	willingly	or	not,	ac_ve	members	
of	 their	 local	 community.	 This	 constant	 exposure	 to	 the	public	 sphere	 (and	hence	
poli_cal	 scru_ny)	 reinforced	 peoples'	 needs	 for	 privacy.	 Private	 life	 also	 became	
highly	 valued	 and	 was	 sought	 a`er	 even	 in	 the	 most	 diﬃcult	 and	 oppressive	
situa_ons	(see	also	Baer	1998).	This	need	for	privacy	is	due	in	part	to	the	fact	that	
their	 ac_ons	 had	 almost	 immediate	 consequences,	 making	 the	 "sense	 of	
community"	a	double-edged	sword.	
Perhaps	 we	 will	 begin	 to	 see	 a	 similar	 trend	 in	 our	 digital	 world.	 As	 the	 social	
pressure	and	obliga_on	of	being	part	of	 some	online	network	 increase	and	online	
surveillance	begins	having	a	real-life	impact,	people	will	once	again	value	the	small	
niches	of	privacy	that	are	le`.	We	can't	live	without	privacy.	As	I	men_oned,	many	
anthropological	 examples	 illustrate	 how	 people	 around	 the	 world	 live	 under	
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condi_ons	 where	 they	 seemingly	 have	 no	 or	 barely	 any	 privacy.	 Yet,	 almost	
universally,	we	can	observe	ways	in	which	people	ensure	small	niches	of	privacy	for	
themselves.	The	fact	that	privacy	is	considered	a	human	right	by	the	United	Na_ons	
(Ar_cle	12	–	UN	Declara_on	of	Universal	Human	Rights),	shows	that	it	 is,	 in	fact,	a	
basic	human	need	and	essen_al	for	human	wellbeing.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 179	
Chapter	Six:	The	Role	of	Ideology	and	Power	-	How	Conformity	was	
achieved	in	the	GDR.	
	
Building	on	the	theoretical	background	I	layed	out	in	Chapter	2,	I	would	like	to	
return	to	the	notions	of	power	and	ideology	and	how	these	forces	enabled	the	neo-
totalitarian	system	to	function.		
Fullbrook	 (2005)	writes	 that	 “power	 spread	 like	a	dye	 through	 the	wider	 fabric	of	
society,	 colouring	 great	 patches	 of	 all	 areas	 of	 professional	 occupa_on	 and	 social	
ac_vity,	in	some	areas	visible	and	benign,	in	others	dark	and	disturbing”	(Fullbrook	
2005,	p.	249).	This	quote	alludes	to	the	versa_lity	of	the	concept	in	the	context	of	
the	former	SED-regime.	A	large	body	of	literature	exists	on	ideas	of	power	and	what	
it	 means	 in	 diﬀerent	 contexts.	 On	 a	 basic	 level,	 Benedict	 Anderson	 (1972)	 sees	
power	 as	 a	 rela_onship	 between	 two	 par_es,	 in	 which	 one	 obeys	 the	 other's	
demands.	The	link	that	is	created	by	these	behaviours	is	the	power	rela_onship.	As	I	
outlined	 in	 detail	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 (see	 for	 example	 1977;	 2006	 (1991))	
examined	power	rela_onships	at	great	length,	his	key	premise	being	the	idea	of	the	
opera_on	 of	 power	without	 people's	 knowledge.	 According	 to	 Foucault,	 power	 is	
“not	 an	 ins_tu_on,	 and	 not	 a	 structure;	 neither	 is	 it	 a	 certain	 strength	 we	 are	
endowed	with;	it	is	the	name	that	one	ajributes	to	a	complex	strategical	situa_on	
in	a	par_cular	society”	(Foucault	1990,	p.93).	As	we	have	seen	thus	far,	in	the	GDR	
power	was	exercised	by	the	state	but	also	by	its	own	ci_zens.	Foucault’s	principle	of	
the	Panop_con	suggests	that	there	 is	power	 in	concealment	and	the	unknown.	As	
Gallinat	writes,	“MfS	surveillance	and	state	control	were	a	‘public	secret’	in	Taussig’s	
sense:	they	were	generally	known	but	impossible	to	ar_culate	in	their	speciﬁci_es.”	
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(Gallinat	 2015).	 The	 secrecy	 surrounding	 the	 Stasi	 incited	 rumours	 about	 its	
almighty	power.	“Myths	and	the	 ‘paranoid	 fantasy’	about	 its	power	and	 inﬂuence,	
and	whispers	about	the	Stasi’s	technical	sophis_ca_on	(…)	served	(…)	as	informal	of	
its	alleged	omnipresence”	(Gallately	1997,	p.218).	Therefore,	“…subjec_ve	forms	of	
self-policing	were	fuelled	not	only	by	the	secrecy	surrounding	Stasi	ac_vi_es	and	the	
possibility	that	a	Stasi	agent	might	be	physically	present	but	also	by	worry	that	party	
or	state	 ‘authori_es’	might	 learn	one	way	or	another	of	 informa_on	that	could	be	
considered	subversive.”	(Gallately	1997,	p.	220)		
Pierre	Bourdieu	(1991)	rejected	the	idea	that	power	is	only	embedded	in	formal	
social-structural	rela_ons	and	maintained	by	overt	force.	His	stance	was	that	power	
is	o`en	applied	in	understated	ways.	The	Ministry	of	State	Security's	work	is	a	good	
example	of	this	principle,	as	it	operated	largely	secre_vely	by	ins_lling	fear	and	
exer_ng	social	pressure.	An	"invisible	power	that	can	be	exercised	only	with	the	
complicity	of	those	who	do	not	want	to	know	that	they	are	subject	to	it	or	even	that	
they	themselves	exercise	it"	(Bourdieu	1991,	p.164).		The	Ministry's	1950's	shi`	
towards	more	“subtle”	opera_ve	techniques	is	a	good	example	of	the	way	in	which	
power	was	exerted	in	an	indirect,	coercive	fashion.	Further,	symbolic	power	was	
displayed	in	East	German	everyday	prac_ce	and	language,	as	it	is	nicely	illustrated	
by	Frau	M.'s	anecdote	of	the	"oppressive	language"	she	no_ced	at	the	airport.	As	I	
have	shown,	there	are	direct	and	indirect	ways	a	state	can	exercise	its	power	on	a	
popula_on.	Next,	I	will	take	a	closer	look	at	how	this	power	translates	to	control.	So,	
what	is	the	purpose	of	control	and	how	is	it	achieved?		
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Propaganda	
One	 way	 to	 stabilise	 the	 state’s	 posi_on	 was	 through	 gaining	 the	 popula_on’s	
support.	Stefes	and	colleagues	(2013)	 iden_ﬁed	three	pillars	of	stability	found	in	
any	model	of	authoritarian	rule:	 legi_ma_on,	repression	and	co-opta_on.	Once	
any	of	these	pillars	are	weakened,	the	regime	is	threatened.	Therefore,	even	in	the	
most	 authoritarian	 regime,	 some	 par_cipa_on	 and	 ac_ve	 engagement	 of	 the	
popula_on	 is	 necessary,	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 the	 regime's	 con_nued	 existence.	 The	
distribu_on	 of	 propaganda	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 this.	 The	 state	 is	 to	 appear	
benevolent	and	concerned	with	the	"common	good"	of	its	people,	while	in	actuality	
it	pursues	its	interests	and	thereby	threatens	that	very	concept.	“Modern	states	are	
everywhere	 based	 on	 the	 asser_on	 of	 a	 common	 good	 that	 necessarily	masks	 or	
misrepresents	 key	 social	 rela_onships	 –	 especially	 those	 based	 on	 inequality.	
Because	the	state	depicts	itself	as	the	guardian	of	a	mythical	general	interest	that	is	
contradicted	 by	 the	 very	 social	 rela_ons	 it	 is	 compelled	 to	 reproduce,	 there	 are	
always	 truths	 about	 the	 social	 order	 that	 must	 be	 concealed,	 that	 cannot	 be	
acknowledged	in	discourse.	As	a	result,	state	processes	inevitably	conjure	into	being	
powerful	 phantoms	 that	 are	 said	 to	 provoke	 the	 disorder	 that	 state	 ac_vi_es	
generate	(or	encourage),	and,	in	the	process,	threaten	the	common	good”	(Krupa	&	
Nugent	2015,	p.209).	 	 Following	 this	 asser_on,	 it	 is	 deemed	 legi_mate	by	 society,	
that	“imagined	en__es”	need	to	be	organised,	recorded,	“controlled	and	surveilled”	
(Krupa	&	Nugent	2015;	Scoj	1998).		
One	way	to	persuade	a	popula_on	to	take	on	and	sustain	a	par_cular	belief	system	
is	 to	create	a	dehumanised	view	of	 the	state	enemy	and	 therefore	 the	 ideological	
enemy	(i.e.in	the	case	of	the	GDR	this	was	anyone	who	did	not	believe	in	socialism).	
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This	enemy	is	portrayed	in	a	way	that	suggests	that	he	ac_vely	tries	to	invade	and	
destroy	 the	current	 ideological	 system.	 In	 the	context	of	na_on	states,	 this	means	
that	such	an	enemy	is	threatening	state	security	(Majelart	2010;	Taylor	2004).	Thus,	
it	becomes	the	state's	aim	to	preserve	and	spread	ideology,	at	the	same	_me	ridding	
the	society	of	possible	security	threats.	This	goal	can	only	be	achieved	if	everyone	is	
kept	under	strict	surveillance.	Hence	surveillance,	repression	and	control	become	a	
form	of	governance,	or	in	fact	a	form	of	state	terror.	
In	 The	 GlobalizaSon	 of	 Surveillance	 Majelart	 (2010)	 studies	 newer	 forms	 of	
surveillance.	 The	 example	 of	 the	 United	 States	 stands	 out,	 with	 its	 governmental	
jus_ﬁca_ons	 for	 extensive	 civilian	 control	 and	 surveillance	 a`er	 9/11.	 In	 order	 to	
gain	public	support	for	such	undertakings,	here	too,	a	 large	propaganda	apparatus	
was	at	work.	Majelart	(2010)	outlines	how	propaganda	is	designed	and	shaped	by	
in-depth	knowledge	of	a	society	and	is	in	turn	distributed	and	nurtured	in	all	areas	
of	life.	Mass	control	can	be	achieved	through	gaining	power	over	public	opinion.	He	
writes,"the	popula_on	viewed	from	the	standpoint	of	its	opinions,	its	ways	of	doing	
things,	its	behaviours,	its	habits,	its	fears,	its	prejudices,	its	demands,	whatever	can	
be	 aﬀected	 by	 educa_on,	 campaigns	 or	 convic_ons"	 (2010,	 p.9).	 By	 making	 the	
'state	 enemy'	 out	 to	 be	 a	 threat	 to	 a	 society's	 values	 and	 therefore	 to	 a	 state's	
security,	state	control	is	no	longer	solely	prac_sed	through	disciplinary	measures	but	
through	 genera_ng	 fear	 and	 crea_ng	 a	 'security	 society'.	 In	 East	 Germany,	 much	
literature	 indicates	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 propaganda	 was	 employed	 in	 order	
disseminate	socialist	ideology	and	no_ons	of	security	played	a	signiﬁcant	role	in	the	
state's	persuasive	techniques	(see	for	example	Fulbrook	1995).	
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Moreover,	 history	 was	 re-wrijen,	 and	 ﬁc__ous	 statements	 were	 disseminated	
among	the	popula_on	in	order	to	legi_mate	the	desired	ideology.	As	Funder	(2003)	
writes:	"In	the	GDR	people	were	required	to	acknowledge	an	assortment	of	ﬁc_ons	
as	 fact.	 Some	 of	 these	 ﬁc_ons	 were	 fundamental,	 such	 as	 the	 idea	 that	 human	
nature	is	a	work	in	progress,	which	can	be	improved	upon,	and	that	Communism	is	
the	 way	 to	 do	 it.	 Others	 were	 more	 speciﬁc:	 that	 East	 Germans	 were	 not	 the	
Germans	 responsible	 (even	 in	 part)	 for	 the	Holocaust;	 that	 the	GDR	was	 a	mul_-
party	democracy;	that	socialism	was	peace-loving;	that	there	were	no	former	Nazis	
in	the	country;	and	that,	under	socialism,	pros_tu_on	did	not	exist"	(Funder	2003,	p.	
96).		Therefore,	the	en_re	premise	of	the	Wall	was	sold	to	the	popula_on,	not	as	a	
way	 to	 imprison	 them	 in	 their	 own	 state,	 but	 to	 protect	 them	 from	 the	 security	
threat	of	the	neighbouring	Western	countries.		
A	 signiﬁcant	 inﬂuence	 on	 public	 opinion	 within	 a	 state	 is	 the	 media;	 hence	 it	 is	
unsurprising	 that	 it	 is	 o`en	 used	 by	 state	 actors	 to	 accomplish	 certain	 goals.	
Lasswell	 claims	 that	 a	 role	 of	 the	media	 is	 to	 report	 but	 also	 to	 "surveillance	 the	
social	environment"	(2010,	p.35).	In	the	GDR,	a	totalitarian	socialist	regime,	the	role	
of	 the	media	was	 hardly	 that	 of	 an	 ins_tu_on	 that	 cri_cally	 evaluated	 life	 in	 East	
Germany.	On	the	contrary,	the	media	was	used	as	a	vital	propaganda	tool.	
In	his	1992	ar_cle,	Hans	A.	Baer	describes	his	experiences	of	doing	ﬁeldwork	in	East	
Germany	before	and	a`er	the	wall	fell.	He	describes	the	GDR's	situa_on	before	the	
collapse	of	communism	as	a	'legiSmaSon	crisis'.	He	outlines	his	impressions	of	life	in	
the	GDR	with	its	ironies	and	contradic_ons.	He	traces	much	of	ci_zen	unhappiness	
back	to	the	fact	that	the	popula_on	had	been	indoctrinated	about	the	advantages	of	
socialist	life	for	years,	yet	could	not	recognise	the	beneﬁts	for	themselves.	Everyone	
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knew	about	the	 ideas	of	Marx	and	Engels,	but	the	real_es	of	 life	 in	the	GDR	were	
disheartening.	There	were	huge	discrepancies	between	the	 ideology	and	reality	of	
socialism.	He	talks	about	people's	discontent	of	the	role	of	the	Stasi,	ci_ng	how	his	
informants	frequently	refer	to	the	ins_tu_on	as	"a	state	within	a	state".	The	media	
in	 the	GDR	was	 full	 of	 propaganda,	 and	 as	 Baer	writes,"many	GDR	 ci_zens	 found	
informa_on	disseminated	on	GDR	 television	and	 radio,	 in	Neues	Deutschland	 (the	
SED	 daily	 newspaper),	 in	 local	 newspapers,	 and	 in	 GDR	 state-operated	 popular	
magazines,	 simplis_c,	 propagandis_c,	 and	 boring.	 Intellectuals	 also	 lamented	 that	
the	state	permijed	limited	opportuni_es	to	publish	cri_cal	analyses	of	GDR	society"	
(1992,	p.	326).	
	Understanding	 the	 role	 of	 propaganda	 is	 important	within	my	 inves_ga_on,	 as	 it	
helps	 to	 recognise	 how	 people	 are	 persuaded	 to	 behave	 in	 a	 certain	 way	 in	 the	
context	 of	 a	 poli_cal	 regime.	 Looking	 at	 experimental	 social	 psychology,	 evidence	
suggests	 that	 behaviours	 are	 heavily	 inﬂuenced	 by	 sugges_on	 and	 propaganda.	
Zimbardo	(2007)	wrote	about	the	power	of	propaganda	and	the	way	in	which	it	can	
elicit	evil	in	people.	He	explains	that	"systems	create	hierarchies	of	dominance	with	
inﬂuence	and	communicaSon	going	down	–	rarely	up	–	the	line.	When	a	power	elite	
wants	 to	 destroy	 an	 enemy	 naSon,	 it	 turns	 to	 propaganda	 experts	 to	 fashion	 a	
program	 of	 hate".	 Dehumanising	 the	 other	 person,	 crea_ng	 stereotyped	
concep_ons,	crea_ng	a	par_cularly	evil	image,	an	"abstract	monster",	"the	other	as	
a	fundamental	threat	to	our	cherished	values	and	beliefs",	crea_ng	drama_c	visual	
images	are	all	aspects	of	distribu_ng	propaganda.	
Historically,	we	look	back	on	the	impact	propaganda	can	have	and	how	it	can	aﬀect	
human	behaviour	 in	 the	most	 atrocious	ways.	 In	 the	past,	 this	 has	 been	not	 only	
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true	 for	 states	but	also	 for	 religious	 ins_tu_ons.	By	 looking	at	 the	Chris_an	witch-
hunts,	astounding	parallels	become	clear.	These	persecu_ons	primarily	took	place	in	
Europe	 and	 North	 America	 between	 the	 13th	 and	 18th	 centuries	 and	 were	 the	
Catholic	church's	aim	to	'purify	the	world	of	evil',	but	at	the	same	_me,	reaﬃrm	its	
status	 quo	 and	 power.	 Those	 who	 ac_vely	 or	 seemingly	 threatened	 the	 current	
system	 including	 those	who	 simply	 thought	diﬀerently	became	 scapegoats	of	evil.	
They	would	be	declared	as	witches	were	seen	as	 the	embodiment	of	evil,	directly	
under	the	inﬂuence	of	the	devil.	The	only	way	to	stop	the	spread	of	evil,	according	
to	the	Catholic	Church,	was	witch-hunts.	Their	approach	was	to	ﬁnd	the	witch,	get	
her	to	confess	heresy	and	destroy	her	or,	execute	her	regardless	of	what	she	said.	In	
order	 to	 ﬁnd	witches	 a	 special	 system	was	 in	 place:	 "ﬁnd	 out	 through	 spies	who	
among	the	popula_on	were	witches,	test	their	witchy	natures	by	geang	confessions	
using	 various	 torture	 techniques,	 and	 kill	 those	 who	 failed	 the	 test."	 (Zimbardo	
2008,	p.9)	
Arthur	 Miller	 wrote	 his	 famous	 play	 The	 Crucible	 (1953)	 is	 an	 excellent	
representa_on	of	this	eﬀect,	though	set	 in	a	diﬀerent	_me	period.	The	story	takes	
place	 during	 the	 witch-hunts	 in	 North	 America,	 namely	 the	 town	 of	 Salem,	
Massachusejs.	 Based	 on	 a	 true	 story,	 Miller's	 characters	 become	 increasingly	
entangled	in	a	web	of	lies.	The	story	begins	with	a	few	girls	being	caught	in	a	forest	
while	 appearing	 to	 perform	 witchcra`.	 Knowing	 the	 possible	 consequences	 of	
witchcra`	 accusa_ons,	 the	 girls	 try	 to	 cover	 up	 the	 incidence	 by	 pretending	 that	
they	 themselves	had	been	bewitched.	As	_me	goes	by,	more	and	more	people	 in	
the	town	become	involved	in	the	shi`ing	of	blame.	Suddenly,	one	person	is	accusing	
another	of	being	a	witch	or	of	working	with	the	devil.	Eventually,	the	accusa_ons	get	
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completely	out	of	hand,	as	people	begin	to	blame	one	another	for	personal	beneﬁt.	
This	 pajern	 is	 emphasised	 through	 the	 character	 of	 Abigail	 Williams,	 who	 had	
previously	had	an	aﬀair	with	the	farmer,	John	Proctor,	and	thus	accuses	his	wife	of	
witchcra`	in	order	to	get	rid	of	her	so	that	she	can	marry	him.	
What	 is	 interes_ng	 here	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Miller	 manages	 to	 convey	 the	
atmosphere	of	the	_me	and	most	importantly	the	impact	of	the	witch-hunt	had	on	
human	rela_onships.	By	 looking	at	this	 literary	example,	we	 learn	much	about	the	
eﬀects	of	mass	hysteria	and	 the	 fear	of	denuncia_on;	 for	 the	play	very	accurately	
represents	the	way	power	can	be	abused	and	how	espionage	into	people's	poli_cal	
convic_ons	can	create	collec_ve	anxiety	and	paranoia.	
As	it	is	demonstrated	through	Arthur	Miller's	personal	life	history,	the	phenomenon	
conveyed	 in	 his	 play	 is	 not	 a	 unique	 one	 in	 history.	 Indeed,	 The	 Crucible	 was	 a	
commentary	 on	 the	 poli_cal	 situa_on	 in	 the	US	 at	 the	 _me,	 alluding	 to	 paranoia	
over	 communists	 in	 the	 McCarthy	 Era.	 At	 the	 _me,	 US	 authori_es	 also	 became	
suspicious	 of	 Miller,	 forcing	 him	 to	 provide	 informa_on	 on	 fellow	 authors	 with	
communist	tendencies.	He,	however	refused	to	give	away	anything	and	was	sent	to	
prison.	Hence,	he	became	the	vic_m	of	a	witch-hunt	of	 sorts	upon	publishing	 the	
play.	The	magazine	The	New	Yorker	(1996)	once	wrote	that	"Miller	understood	the	
universal	experience	of	being	unable	to	believe	that	the	state	has	lost	its	mind".		
Similarly,	 in	 the	 GDR,	 the	 state	 became	 increasingly	 paranoid	 of	 its	 popula_on,	
especially	supposed	"poli_cal	dissidents"	threatening	the	regime,	in	order	to	control	
the	 popula_on	 the	 state	 employed	 extensive	 surveillance	 and	 repressive	
techniques.	From	the	above	examples,	 it	can	be	concluded	that	the	state	not	only	
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acts	 in	ways	which	 transform	socie_es	 to	ﬁt	poli_cal	 (or	even	 religious)	 ideals	but	
within	 imposing	 controlling	 measures	 it	 also	 can	 alter	 core	 human	 moral	
percep_ons	and	values.		
S_ll,	 we	must	 consider	 Havel’s	 (1985)	 standpoint	 as	 valid,	 too.	 Not	 everyone	was	
convinced	 by,	 or	 genuinely	 believed	 in	 the	 ideology	 of	 socialism,	 but	 rather	 they	
learnt	 to	 accept	 rules	 and	 enacted	 everyday	 rituals	 in	 order	 to	 appear	 as	 an	
obedient	ci_zen.		
Hence,	we	learn	that	there	are	two	sides	to	ideology.	It	convinces	people	to	agree	to	
and	to	support	poli_cal	systems	and	ac_ons	(such	as	war	and	violence).	Accordingly,	
it	normalizes	and	legi_mizes	(at	_mes)	immoral	behavior.	On	the	other,	hand	in	the	
neo-totalitarian	system	ideology	was	an	excuse,	a	façade	to	uphold	the	system.	This	
leads	 us	 to	 the	 following	 sec_on,	 inves_ga_ng	 ques_ons	 of	 conformity	 and	
resistance	in	the	GDR.		
Conformity	in	the	GDR	
What	is	it	that	leads	people	to	comply	and	ac_vely	par_cipate	in	a	dictatorship,	and	
what	are	long-term	implica_ons	for	their	wellbeing?		
There	are	various	ways	in	which	the	GDR	gained	support	from	its	ci_zens	or	at	the	
very	least	secured	their	par_cipa_on	in	the	regime	for	over	40	years.	Many	people	
were	 indeed	convinced	by	the	communist	cause.	A`er	the	Second	World	War,	 the	
country	was	to	be	rebuilt,	while	the	Eastern	zone	was	occupied	by	the	Soviet	Union.	
Rosenberg	writes,	 "Communism	was	 imposed	 from	outside	everywhere	 in	Eastern	
Europe,	 but	 it	 was	 less	 resented	 in	 Germany,	 where	 suppor_ng	 the	 SED	 was	 a	
natural	 reac_on	 to	 the	 shame	of	 the	Nazi	 era.	 The	 communist's	 an_-Nazi	 posture	
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helped	 to	 legi_mise	 the	 Party"	 (Rosenberg	 1995).	 I	 would	 add	 that	 many	 young	
people,	especially	young	women,	were	determined	to	build	a	new	country	based	on	
socialist	 principles,	 with	 the	 hope	 that	 the	 atroci_es	 of	 the	War	 would	 never	 be	
repeated.		
During	 the	 ﬁrst	 years	 of	 the	 GDR's	 existence,	 there	 was	 open	 opposi_on	 against	
socialist	propaganda,	which	led	to	a	mass	exodus	to	the	West	and	eventually	to	the	
building	 of	 the	Wall.	 Between	 1949	 and	 1961,	 around	 2.7	million	 people	 le`	 the	
GDR	for	the	Federal	Republic	(FRG)	(BStU	2016).	
Before	the	Wall	was	built,	many	young	professionals	ﬂed	to	the	West.	Apparently	
one	year	the	Law	Faculty	of	Leipzig	University	lost	its	en_re	staﬀ	(Rosenberg	1995,	
p.	269).	S_ll,	the	ideal	of	socialism	had	many	supporters	who	truly	believed	in	the	
poten_al	of	this	new	social	order.	When	the	GDR	was	founded,	the	Ministerium	für	
Staatssicherheit	had	2700	employees,	by	1990	it	had	91.015	oﬃcial	and	around	
189.000	unoﬃcial	employees	(IMs),	yet	these	numbers	do	not	include	SED	party	
members,	Gesellscharliche	Mitarbeiter	(GM)	or	anyone	who	casually	passed	on	
informa_on	to	IMs	(BStU	2016).	Over	the	years	the	surveillance	apparatus	grew	
immensely	both	in	labour	force	and	their	impact	on	the	general	popula_on.	
As	contradic_ons	between	the	socialist	ideal	and	the	reali_es	of	everyday	life	grew,	
the	 power	 of	 the	 Stasi	 increased,	 with	 their	 goal	 to	 control	 and	 repress	 the	
popula_on.	 As	 previously	 men_oned,	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 was	 not	 only	 the	 Stasi	 who	
exerted	the	control	but	in	fact	the	popula_on,	many	of	whom	became	guards	in	the	
panop_c	 sense.	 They	 did	 not	 exert	 the	main	 control	 in	 the	 GDR,	 but	 they	 added	
another	 dimension	 to	 exis_ng	 Stasi	 repression.	 This	 dynamic	 reinforced	 social	
	 189	
distrust	 and	 exposed	 many	 to	 the	 psychological	 and	 social	 pressure	 to	 conform	
("Anpassungsdruck").	This	also	meant	that	control	was	so	deeply	engrained	in	GDR	
culture,	that	it	became,	especially	in	later	years,	normalised.	
Apathy	and	normalisation	of	control		
Addressing	 ques_ons	 of	 how	 dictatorships	 receive	 the	 support	 of	 the	 popula_on	
Hannah	 Arendt	 illustrated	 the	 way	 in	 which	 a	 regime	 can	 lure	 ci_zens	 into	
compliance	by	giving	them	not	only	a	sense	of	security	but	also	through	the	apathy	
created	 by	 comforts	 and	mundani_es	 of	 everyday	 life.	 Certainly,	 the	 comforts	 of	
everyday	 life	 are	 not	 necessarily	 the	 only	 reasons	 to	 ac_vely	 support	 a	 poli_cal	
system,	 but	 they	 reduce	 incen_ves	 to	 oppose	 the	 system.	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 these	
beneﬁts,	no	majer	how	small,	which	led	people	to	become	lethargic.	This,	perhaps	
coupled	with	a	sense	of	defeat,	caused	people	 to	give	up	and	 (at	 least	outwardly)	
comply	with	the	regime.	
The	 ethnographic	 accounts	 of	 East	 Germans	 suggest	 that	 many	 people	 were	
par_cularly	compliant	if	they	had	a	rela_vely	comfortable	life.	Ac_ng	out	of	line	with	
the	 system	may	 have	 posed	 a	 threat	 to	 their	 lifestyle	 and	 created	 disadvantages.	
One	woman	in	her	50's	felt	that	compliance	with	the	dictatorship	and	its	impact	was	
more	 extreme	 in	 the	 younger	 genera_on.	 She	 thinks	 this	 trend	 stemmed	 from	
“convenient	 adjustment	 to	 the	 given	 circumstances”	 -	 “bequeme	 Anpassung".	
People	avoided	asking	too	many	ques_ons.	She	says	that	many	GDR	ci_zens	felt	that	
they	were	"taken	care	of	by	the	state",	allowing	the	state	to	exert	control	“under	the	
guise	of	public	welfare”	-	“Unter	dem	Deckmantel	der	Fürsorge".	
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Certainly,	 everything	 was	 taken	 care	 of;	 everyone	 had	 a	 job,	 food,	 money	 and	
housing.	 The	 state	 provided	 these	 services	 to	 its	 ci_zens.	 This	 all-encompassing-
provision	meant	that	for	one,	a	great	deal	of	the	existen_al	uncertain_es	(that	many	
people	grapple	with	nowadays)	were	taken	care	of,	but	it	also	meant	that	the	state	
had	 a	 maximum	 of	 control	 over	 its	 popula_on's	 life	 choices	 (e.g.	 careers).	 The	
informant	 believes	 that,	 since	 many	 diﬃcul_es	 had	 been	 taken	 oﬀ	 their	 hands,	
people	did	not	think	much	about	or	hardly	ques_oned	the	system	that	they	were	so	
deeply	engrained	in.	She	says	that	this	state	made	many	people	“inacSve”	–"träge".		
For	some	people	surveillance	was	simply	another	form	of	security	–	a`er	all,	there	
was	 apparently	 "no	 crime,	 nothing	 bad	 could	 happen	 and	 children	 were	 looked	
arer".	 Frau	 T.	 decided	 to	 leave	 the	 GDR	 because	 to	 her,	 these	 people	 were	
overlooking	 the	 real	 problems	 of	 a	 dictatorship,	 simply	 saying:	 "We	 are	 actually	
well-oﬀ"	 -"Es	 geht	 uns	 doch	 eigentlich	 gut".	 Leading	 up	 to	 her	 applica_on	 to	
emigrate	the	country,	she	no_ced	that	par_cularly	by	the	1980's	state	control	had	
become	 fairly	 normalised.	 She	 says	 that	 “surveillance	 displayed	 itself	 in	
conformaSon,	 indiﬀerence	 and	 complacency.	 And	 so	 one	 just	 accepted	 it”	 -	 "Die	
Überwachung	hat	 sich	 als	 Anpassung,	GleichgülSgkeit,	 Bequemlichkeit	 dargestellt.	
Und	da	hat	man	das	so	hingenommen".	(Frau	T.)		
As	 Frau	M.	 described,	 living	 under	 surveillance	 became	 a	 part	 of	 everyday	 life:	 ”I	
realized	at	one	stage,	the	vast	majority	of	GDR	people	didn't	even	register	that	they	
were	 living	a	 repressive	 society...	 because	 they	didn't	 know	anything	else."	Having	
had	 the	 experience	 of	 living	 abroad,	 she	 no_ced	many	 people's	 blind	 compliance	
with	 the	 system	 they	 were	 living	 in,	 recognising	 the	 way	 they	 avoided	 open	
discussions	and	voicing	their	true	opinions.	She	told	me,		
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“The	arbitrariness	of	the	state	horriﬁed	me	and	I	had	had	the	experience...	I	
was	used	to	poliScal	discussions	in	Australia	and	the	West.	Everyone	grew	up	
with	a	right	to	their	opinion."	Frau	M.	stressed	that	she	missed	a	culture	of	
debate:	 “When	 I	 said	 to	 people	 'Lasst	 uns	 einig	 sein,	 um	uneinig	 zu	 sein'11	
they	looked	at	me	as	though	I	was	talking	Chinese.	They	didn't	have	such	a	
concept	even,	they	didn't	know	what	I	was	talking	about."	(Frau	M.)	
Those	 who	 did	 speak	 their	 mind,	 were	 o`en	 met	 with	 judgement	 and	 social	
pressure	 to	 adjust.	 At	 _mes	 this	was	 due	 to	 the	 danger	 of	 repercussions	 of	 state	
control	and	 fear	of	disadvantages,	not	necessarily	because	people	were	convinced	
by	 the	 socialist	 cause.	 An	 informant	 in	 her	 40's	 described	 how	 friends	 and	 family	
had	 shunned	 her	 when	 they	 found	 out	 that	 her	 parents	 had	 submijed	 an	
applica_on	to	leave	the	GDR.	However,	as	soon	as	the	borders	opened	and	Germany	
was	reunited,	they	got	back	 in	touch	with	them	and	were	happy	to	see	them.	She	
believes	 that	 they	 had	 feared	 the	 repercussions	 of	 associa_ng	 with	 poli_cal	
dissidents.		
“…But	 I	 can’t	 imagine	 why	 someone	 wouldn’t	 want	 to	 see	 their	 son	 just	
because	he	applied	 to	 emigrate…	But	perhaps	nowadays	we	 can’t	 imagine	
such	 a	 thing	 anymore,	 because	 luckily	 these	 horrible	 Smes	 are	 over,	 …but	
um…I	 don’t	 know,	 if	 it	 was	 just	 the	 disadvantages	 or	 whether	 they	 were	
really	so	loyal	to	the	poliScal	system.	I	can’t	make	judge	that.	 I	think	it	was	
primarily	 the	 potenSal	 disadvantages,	 because	 when	 the	 borders	 opened,	
they	all	came	back	to	us.”	
																																								 																				
11	“Let’s	agree	to	disagree”	
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"...	Aber	ich	kann	mir	auch	nicht	vorstellen,	wie	man	seinen	Sohn	nicht	mehr	
sehen	will,	wenn	der	einen	Ausreiseantrag	stellt...Aber	vielleicht	können	wir	
uns	heute	so	was	einfach	nicht	mehr	vorstellen,	weil	es	ja	zum	Glück	so	eine	
furchtbare	Zeit	nicht	mehr	gibt,...aber	ähm...	 ich	weiß	nicht,	ob	es	 jetzt	nur	
die	Nachteile	waren	 oder	 ob	 sie	wirklich	 so	 systemtreu	waren.	 Ich	 kann	 es	
nicht	beurteilen.	Ich	denke	überwiegend	waren's	die	Nachteile,	weil,	als	sich	
dann	die	Grenzöﬀnung	entwickelte,	kamen	sie	ja	alle	wieder	an.		
Also	als	wir	dann	hier	waren,	wir	sind	ja	'81	ausgereist,	und	dann	die	Wende	
kam,	waren	 sie	 alle	wieder	 da.	 Haben	 sich	 gefreut,	 eingeladen	 zu	werden,	
und	wir	 haben	auch	 sie	besucht.	Aber	dieses	 Thema,	denke	 ich,	 hat	 immer	
eine	Rolle	gespielt".	(Frau	L.)	
Another	informant	had	a	similar	experience.	When	he	submijed	his	Ausreiseantrag,	
his	 decision	 was	 received	 with	 incomprehension	 by	 friends	 and	 acquaintances.	
People	would	say	to	him	"What	more	do	you	want?	You	have	a	car,	a	(Neubau)	ﬂat,	
money,	 your	 mother	 is	 in	 the	 West	 and	 sends	 you	 things...".	 But	 to	 him,	 these	
apparent	privileges	were	meaningless	because	he	wanted	freedom.	He	would	say:	
“What	shall	I	do	with	the	money?	I	want	my	freedom.	I	want	to	be	able	to	visit	my	
mother	when	it	pleases	me”	-	"Was	soll	ich	mit	dem	Geld	anfangen?	Ich	will	meine	
Freiheit	haben.	Ich	will	meine	Muder	besuchen	können..."	(Herr	A).	
Frau	 T.	 explained	 how,	 in	 the	 psychologically	 tedious	 process	 of	 her	 emigra_on	
applica_on,	 her	 local	 church	 community	 helped	 her.	When	 she	 and	 her	 husband	
submijed	 their	Ausreiseantrag,	 their	 exposure	 to	 Stasi	 surveillance	 became	more	
extreme	 with	 interroga_ons,	 being	 followed	 and	 placed	 under	 close	 observa_on	
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even	 in	 their	 own	 house.	 Indeed,	 the	 community	 within	 the	 church,	 her	 own	
intellectual	 curiosity	 and	 reading	 alterna_ve	 literature	 helped	 her	 in	 this	 stressful	
_me	and	further	encouraged	her	desire	to	leave.	Indeed,	it	was	"a	strong	desire	for	
freedom"	 that	mo_vated	 her.	 She	 says	 that	 she	was	 not	 concerned	with	material	
things.	Yes,	they	were	nice	but	did	not	majer	much.		
Her	desire	to	emigrate	really	cemented	itself	when	she	had	her	ﬁrst	child.	It	was	her	
cri_cal	view	of	the	aforemen_oned	all-encompassing	and	self-perpetua_ng	system	
of	 control,	 that	 led	 her	 to	 that	 decision.	When	 her	 daughter	 was	 born,	 she	 was	
immediately	urged	to	apply	for	a	nursery	place.	Yet,	she	did	not	want	her	child	to	be	
exposed	to	this	system	of	surveillance	from	such	a	young	age.	 	When	she	rebelled	
against	the	state-imposed	ideas	and	insisted	on	raising	her	daughter	at	home	un_l	
she	was	3,	this	was	not	accepted.	It	was	frowned	upon	and	she	was	told	that	such	
children	could	not	be	easily	integrated	into	the	GDR's	educa_onal	system.	
Frau	T.	primarily	opposed	the	control	and	indoctrina_on	that	children	were	exposed	
to.	 She	 feared	 that	 this	 would	 worsen	 in	 the	 next	 genera_on,	 as	 there	 was	 no	
escape.	She	says	that	when	she	was	young,	her	parents	had	more	freedom	to	create	
alterna_ve	spaces	for	expression,	separate	from	the	state	system.	Her	own	nursery	
and	school	 teachers	had	grown	up	 in	a	diﬀerent	_me	and	 took	a	 slightly	diﬀerent	
approach	 to	 educa_on,	 while	 the	 teachers	 of	 the	 younger	 genera_on	 had	 been	
brought	 up	 in	 a	 system	 where	 state	 power	 was	 all-encompassing.	 As	 I	 outlined	
previously,	control	was	normalised;	it	was	very	much	embedded	in	people's	minds.	
When	the	couple	submijed	their	applica_on	to	leave,	other	mothers	were	outraged	
asking	"How	can	you	do	such	a	thing	to	your	child?”-“Wie	kannst	du	deinem	Kind	so	
etwas	antun?"	.	
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There	 was,	 indeed,	 a	 lot	 of	 uncertainty	 about	 what	 could	 happen	 once	 the	
applica_on	was	submijed.	There	had	been	rumours	that	children	were	taken	away	
from	 their	 parents.	 There	 was	 also	 the	 knowledge	 that	 they	 could	 be	 facing	 an	
insecure	future	in	the	West.	S_ll,	they	knew	that	leaving	was	the	right	decision	and	
this	received	with	incomprehension.	The	mothers	of	other	children	whom	she	knew	
could	not	understand	why	she	was	willing	to	take	the	risk.	They	were	more	prepared	
to	adjust	and	play	along	with	whatever	was	dictated	by	the	state.	She	was	shocked	
that,	 in	their	heads,	the	right	thing	to	do	was	to	stay.	They	never	even	ques_oned	
the	current	state	of	the	system	they	were	living	in.	They	never	wondered	what	the	
problem	was	with	a	system	where	a	mother	could	poten_ally	be	separated	from	her	
child	 merely	 because	 she	 had	 diﬀerent	 opinions.	 Instead,	 they	 made	 Frau	 T.	
responsible,	because	according	to	them	she	should	have	complied	with	the	system.			
A	 further	 interview	revealed	how	closely	conformity	was	 linked	with	convenience,	
personal	 circumstances	 (educa_on,	 profession,	 loca_on,	 etc.),	 and	 individual	
privileges.	Frau	F.	recalled	a	trip	that	she	took	in	1989,	where	she	got	permission	to	
accompany	 her	 mother	 to	 the	West	 for	 her	 aunt's	 funeral.	 During	 their	 journey,	
whilst	 stopping	 at	 a	 Western	 train	 sta_on,	 they	 saw	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 ﬁrst	 East	
German	refugee	train	coming	from	Prague.	They	saw	how	people	stormed	into	the	
shops	 buying	 coﬀee,	 cake	 and	 fruit.	 She	 was	 shocked!	 She	 says	 that	 she	 was	
ashamed	of	her	fellow	GDR	ci_zens,	because	"it	hadn't	been	that	bad	in	the	GDR"	-	
"Ich	habe	mich	für	unsere	DDR	Bürger	geschämt.	So	schlecht	 ist	es	uns	 in	der	DDR	
nicht	 gegangen"	 (Frau	 F.).	 I	 found	 this	 statement	 par_cularly	 interes_ng	 because	
shortly	 beforehand	 she	 had	 told	 me	 that	 through	 her	 employment	 at	 a	 large	
chemical	plant	in	Saxony,	she	had	signiﬁcantly	bejer	access	to	food	and	products	in	
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general.	 She	was	 not	 as	 severely	 aﬀected	 by	 shortages	 as	 the	 general	 popula_on	
and	the	fact	that	her	life	was	rela_vely	comfortable,	surely	impacted	her	view	of	her	
posi_on	 within	 the	 state.	 As	 I	 was	 told	 by	 many	 people	 there	 was	 a	 culture	 of	
“suppression	and	denial”.	This	tendency	to	block	out	certain	reali_es	seems	to	have	
lived	on.	As	one	 informant	 cri_cised,	even	 in	 the	a`ermath	of	 the	collapse	of	 the	
regime,	 many	 East	 Germans	 chose	 to	 move	 forward	 and	 simply	 leave	 memories	
behind	without	engaging	with	their	own	past	within	the	dictatorship.	
The	Turning	point:	Wende	
In	 the	 ﬁnal	 years	 of	 the	 GDR's	 existence,	 as	 shortages	 increased	 and	 the	
contradic_ons	 of	 everyday	 life	were	more	 apparent,	 voices	 of	 discontent	 became	
louder	amongst	the	popula_on.		
Frau	J.,	a	94-year-old	woman	who	has	been	a	devoted	socialist	all	her	life	explained	
that	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 GDR	 was	 caused	 by	 an	 "implosion".	 She	 says	 that	 the	
socialist	 system	 could	 not	 survive;	 because	 the	 contradic_ons	 and	 injus_ces	 of	
everyday	 life	 were	 not	 resolved,	 there	 was	 no	 development.	 She	 says	 that	 this	
inability	to	move	forward	can	be	ascribed	to	the	abuse	of	power	by	poli_cal	elites,	
who	had	 lost	 touch	with	 the	reali_es	of	 life	within	 the	state.	She	says	 it	was	 their	
hunger	 for	 power,	which	 led	 them	 to	 act	 contrary	 to	 their	 original	 convic_ons	 of	
crea_ng	a	humanis_c	social	order,	saying	that	“The	most	horriﬁc	temptaSon	of	all,	is	
the	temptaSon	of	power”	-	"Die	furchtbarste	Aller	Versuchungen,	ist	die	Versuchung	
der	Macht"	 .	According	 to	Frau	 J.,	“The	more	power	 they	 (ruling	elite	gained),	 the	
more	they	lost	sight	of	the	socialist	cause”	-	"Je	mehr	Macht	sie	haden	umso	mehr	
haben	sie	den	Bezug	zu	ihrer	humanitären	FunkSon	verloren."		
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 younger	 genera_on	wanted	 reforms	 and	 felt	 that	 the	 old	
leadership	was	 stagnant	 and	 policies	were	 no	 longer	 up	 to	 date.	 Previous	 events	
such	as	the	forced	exile	of	singer	and	songwriter	Wolf	Biermann	demonstrated	the	
state's	 _ghtening	 of	 control	 and	 ajempt	 at	 elimina_ng	 dissent.	 In	 par_cular	
churches	 became	 spaces	 for	 open	 cri_que	 and	 discussion	 (for	 a	 detailed	
inves_ga_on	see	Grünbaum	2011).		
Frau	 T.	who	emigrated	 from	 the	GDR,	 described	 the	 important	 role	of	 the	 church	
community	 during	 the	 last	 years	 that	 she	 spent	 in	 the	 state.	 To	 her,	 the	 church	
represented	a	place	where	she	felt	free	and	it	was	safe	to	express	her	opinions.	Her	
local	 congrega_on	 provided	 her	 with	 a	 lot	 of	 support	 and	 gave	 her	 strength,	
especially	 during	 the	 _me	of	 the	 applica_on	 to	 emigrate.	 She	 described	 her	 _me	
there	as	intellectually	s_mula_ng	and	nurturing,	saying	“The	church	in	the	GDR	was	
the	best	of	my	 life.”	 	She	found	the	people	to	be	“authenSc,	creaSve	and	 in	touch	
with	their	emoSons”.	-	“Die	Kirche	der	DDR	war	die	beste	Kirche	meines	Lebens.	Das	
war	 was	 ganz	 besonderes.	 Das	 war	 ehrlich,	 die	 Leute	 waren	 kreaSv	 und	 ganz	
emoSonal."	 It	 appears	 that	 there	 was	 a	 diﬀerent	 character	 to	 the	 community,	
incomparable	to	churches	in	the	West	for	example.		“The	churches	that	I	know	in	the	
West	are	good,	but	they	just	don’t	compare.”	-	”Kirchen	die	ich	im	Westen	kenne,	die	
sind	gut	aber	die	kann	man	nicht	vergleichen"	(Frau	T.)			
Indeed,	the	church	and	religion	 in	general	was	viewed	with	suspicion	by	the	state,	
and	in	later	years	were	targeted	with	par_cular	intensity	by	the	Stasi.	Nevertheless,	
it	was	a	space	were	alterna_ve	intellectual	discourses	could	take	place	without	the	
judgmental	 aatude	 that	 people	 were	 exposed	 to	 in	 everyday	 life.	 Hence,	 it	
contributed	signiﬁcantly	as	a	source	of	comfort	and	strength.		
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Because	of	its	key	role	in	providing	shelter	for	more	cri_cal	voices,	the	church	soon	
became	 a	 space	 for	 poli_cal	 discussions.	 In	 the	 later	 years	 of	 the	 regime,	 people	
gathered	mostly	 in	churches	and	created	the	civil	ac_vist	movement	Neues	Forum	
(Kukutz	 2009).	 It	was	 there	 that	 they	 organised	 demonstra_ons,	which	 ul_mately	
led	to	the	peaceful	revolu_on	and	the	fall	of	the	Wall.	There	were	calls	for	change,	a	
reforma_on	 of	 GDR	 policies	 with	 more	 freedom	 to	 travel.	 Therefore,	 it	 must	 be	
noted	that	 it	would	be	a	misconcep_on	to	assume	that	this	movement	was	aimed	
purely	at	achieving	the	reuniﬁca_on	of	Germany	(and	ul_mately	being	taken	over	by	
the	FRG).	Many	people	were	unhappy	with	the	status	quo,	but	not	all	wanted	the	
state	to	collapse	all	together.		
Nearly	all	of	my	informants,	no	majer	how	devoted	they	were	to	the	state,	cri_cise	
the	way	in	which	GDR	history	is	addressed	in	the	public	discourse	today,	especially	
those	who	were	cri_cal	of	 the	regime	feel	 that	a	process	of	coming	to	 terms	with	
the	past	never	 really	 took	place.	Not	only	did	 the	euphoria	of	change	 in	 the	early	
1990's	overpower	any	engagement	with	the	legacy	of	the	socialist	dictatorship;	the	
quick	poli_cal	change	also	le`	many	feeling	disillusioned	and	disenfranchised.		
Accountability			
	“As	Germany	sweeps	up	its	broken	glass	for	the	second	Sme	in	ﬁry	years,	the	
border	guards’	trial	reveals	that	many	of	the	issues	involved	have	not	changed:	the	
quesSon	of	obedience	to	a	higher	authority,	of	prosecuSon	for	crimes	that	had	been	
given	the	stamp	of	law,	of	the	responsibility	of	the	individual	in	a	totalitarian	state.”	
(Rosenberg	1995,	p.	264)			
	
In	 the	 years	 following	 Germany's	 reuniﬁca_on,	 some	 eﬀort	 was	 made	 to	 reveal	
former	 Stasi	 employees,	 but	 a	 process	 of	 reconcilia_on	 for	 vic_ms	 of	 the	
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dictatorship	 is	yet	 to	 take	place.	Those	who	were	 trauma_sed	by	state	oppression	
suﬀer,	in	par_cular,	as	they	feel	that	certain	"old	structures"	con_nue	to	exist	in	the	
East	and	former	perpetrators	con_nue	to	hold	 inﬂuen_al	posi_ons	 in	society.	 	The	
persistent	silence	and	reluctance	of	vic_ms	to	come	forward	stems	from	a	sense	of	
defeat,	due	to	the	belief	that	old	power	structures	con_nue	to	exist,	leaving	them	in	
a	 powerless	 posi_on.	 Many	 feel	 that	 their	 suﬀering	 is	 not	 taken	 seriously,	 while	
some	fear	that	the	Stasi	past	is	gloriﬁed	by	popular	culture.	Yet,	others	feel	betrayed	
when	they	see	nega_ve	accounts	about	the	GDR	in	the	media.	
Frau	 L.	 told	 me	 that	 she	 feels	 like	 in	 the	 East,	 some	 old	 GDR	 regime	 structures	
con_nue	to	exist.	She	says	that	while	many	things	had	changed,	she	s_ll	recognizes	
certain	 mannerisms	 and	 characteris_cs	 in	 people,	 especially	 those	 working	 in	
council	oﬃces,	who	remind	her	of	Stasi	oﬃcials.	She	thinks	that	she	could	never	go	
back	to	live	in	the	region	because	the	past	has	never	really	been	evaluated	and	dealt	
with.		
She	 says	 that	 even	 a`er	 all	 these	 years	 she	 can	 s_ll	 feel	 the	 impact	 of	 Stasi	
surveillance:		
"These	monitoring	 structures,	 the	people	 in	 these	oﬃces,	 I	 can	 sSll	 feel	 it.	 I	 noSce	
exactly	who	sSll	has	certain	characterisScs,	certain	features,	and	I	could	never,	never	
live	there	again.	Although	it	is	now	beauSful,	it	has	changed	a	lot,	but	we	both	feel	
that	certain	structures	sSll	exist	and	personally		we	would	not	be	able	to	live	in	the	
region."	
	"Diese	Überwachungsstrukturen,	die	Menschen	in	diesen	Ämtern,	 ich	spüre	
das	immernoch.	Ich	merke	genau,	die	haben	noch	besSmmte	Eigenscharen,	
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besSmmte	 Wesensmerkmale,	 und	 ich	 könnte	 nie,	 nie	 da	 leben	 wieder.	
Obwohl	 es	 jetzt	 schön	 ist,	 es	 hat	 sich	 ja	 einiges	 Verändert	 aber	 gewisse	
Strukturen	spüren	wir	beide	und	uns	persönlich	wäre	es	unmöglich	in	dieser	
Region	noch	leben	zu	können."	(Frau		L.).	
Indeed,	she	is	convinced	that	even	today	the	East-West	border	is	present	in	people's	
minds.	When	 she	 visits	 the	 East,	 she	 is	 always	 happy	 to	 be	 able	 to	 return	 to	 the	
West	eventually.	Somehow	the	place	and	the	people	s_ll	make	her	“feel	somewhat	
restricted”	-		"es	engt	mich	ein"	(Frau	L.).	
Like	 for	many	 others,	 the	 old	 surveillance	 structures	 s_ll	 challenge	 their	 sense	 of	
wellbeing,	and	in	par_cularly	prominent	cases	leading	them	to	avoid	the	region	all	
together.	 It	 appears	 that	 due	 to	 the	 rapid	 unravelling	 of	 the	 SED	 regime,	 certain	
structures	 of	 the	 dictatorship	 and	 the	 culture	 surrounding	 them	 are	 s_ll	 present	
because	they	were	never	challenged	enough.		
Another	informant	told	me	that	there	was	no	real	process	of	reconcilia_on	in	which	
the	 true	burden	of	 the	 regime	was	addressed.	There	 is	not	enough	 recogni_on	of	
the	tragedy	behind	the	dictatorship	because	the	euphoria	of	freedom	to	travel	and	
materialism	overshadowed	it.		
"I	think	that	certain	structures	are	sSll	there,	and	I	have	the	feeling	the	past	
was	not	worked	through	properly	because	the	process	was	overwhelmed	by	
materialism,	everyone	was	glad	to	be	able	to	travel	now…	While	the	gravity	
of	 this	 dictatorship	was	 not	 addressed...it	 is	 sSll	 not	 recognised.	When	we	
start	such	discussions	in	the	family,	it	is	impossible.	"	(Frau	T.)	
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"Ich	 glaube	 das	 gewisse	 Strukturen	 immernoch	 da	 sind.	 Und	 ich	 habe	 das	
Gefühl	 das	 wurde	 nicht	 richSg	 aufgearbeitet.	 Das	 wurde	 vom	Materiellen	
übergestülpt,	alle	waren	froh,	jetzt	reisen	zu	können,	wo	jetzt	diese	Schwere	
dieser	 Diktatur,	 ...	 das	 ist	 immer	 noch	 nicht	 aufgearbeitet.	 Das	 wird	 auch	
immer	noch	nicht	erkannt.	Wenn	wir	dann	in	der	Familie	solche	Diskussionen	
anfangen,	das	geht	gar	nicht."	(Frau	T.)		
Frau	T.	migrated	to	the	West	before	the	fall	of	the	Wall	and	addressing	the	past	 in	
family	 discussions	 in	 the	 East	 con_nues	 to	 be	 extremely	 diﬃcult.	 As	 I	 have	 heard	
from	many	others	who	also	le`	the	GDR	before	1989,	the	legi_macy	and	validity	of	
their	claims	is	o`en	challenged	by	those	who	stayed	in	the	country	un_l	the	end.		
Striking	up	a	conversa_on	about	state	control	in	the	former	GDR	is	pointless	in	her	
opinion	 as	 people	 have	 not	 learnt	 anything	 from	 the	 past.	 She	 thinks	 that	 the	
opportunity	to	learn	from	past	mistakes	has	been	wasted.	The	past	has	never	been	
collec_vely	reprocessed	-	"aufgearbeitet".			
"This	great	potenSal	to	learn	from	the	past	has	been	wasted,	I	think,…	it	has	
not	been	processed."	
"Dieses	große	Potenzial	 davon	 lernen	 zu	 können,	hat	man	vergeudet,	ﬁnde			
ich,...man	hat	es	nicht	aufgearbeitet".	(Frau	L.)		
Meanwhile,	those	who	suﬀered	immensely	under	state	control	are	taken	aback	by	
the	contemporary	idealisa_on	of	the	past,	both	by	individuals	and	the	media	alike.	
The	trend	of	"Ostalgie”	(see	for	example	Pence	&	Bejs	2008;	Berdahl	2009),	a	kind	
of	nostalgia	for	the	GDR,	is	met	with	dismissal	and	incomprehension.	In	fact,	some	
say	that	Stasi	spying	is	at	_mes	gloriﬁed	in	popular	culture.	One	informant	told	me	
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that	 the	 award-winning	Hollywood	ﬁlm,	 "The	 Lives	 of	 the	Others"	 (2006)	 aﬀected	
her	immensely.	She	feels	that	the	Stasi	oﬃcials	were	not	portrayed	realis_cally	and	
it	 bothers	 her	 that	 in	 par_cular	 the	 lead	 actor,	 Ulrich	 Mühe	 (an	 actor	 "whom	
everyone	loves")	portrayed	his	Stasi	oﬃcer	character	as	too	likeable,	giving	viewers	
the	impression	that	"it	wasn't	so	bad	arer	all".	She	feels	that	the	opposite	was	true,	
saying	 that	 in	 her	 experience	 dealing	with	 Stasi	 oﬃcials	 was	 awful.	 For	 her,	 they	
were	"disgus_ng".	It	makes	her	angry,	that	people	are	mislead.		
“There	 is	 this	movie,	 ‘The	 lives	of	 the	others’,	 ...	wonderful	actors,	Mühe,12	
everyone	loves	him,	as	a	Stasi	oﬃcer,	...	that	has	totally	annoyed	me.	I	never	
met	such	a	person.	Maybe	there	were	ones	like	that,	maybe	weren't	not	all	
so	awful.	But	 if	you	do	a	ﬁlm	with	a	Stasi	oﬃcer	who	plays	a	posiSve	role,	
many	might	think,	 'It	was	not	so	bad'.	And	it	was	bad!	Such	ﬁlms	make	me	
angry	...	Perhaps	they	have	to	do	this	for	the	cinema,	otherwise,	no	one	can	
go	 in	 there	 ...	 But	 really,	 they	were	 not	 like	 that.	 They	were	 disgusSng!	 It	
makes	me	angry."	(Frau	T.)		
"Es	gibt	 ja	diesen	Film,	 ‘Das	Leben	der	anderen’,…wunderbare	Schauspieler,	
der	Mühe,	jeder	liebt	ihn,	der	als	Stasi-Oﬃzier,...das	hat	mich	total	aufgeregt.	
So	einen	hab	 ich	nie	getroﬀen	Vielleicht	gab	es	die,	 ...es	waren	sicher	nicht	
alle	 so	 schlimm.	Aber	wenn	man	einen	 Film	macht	mit	 einem	Stasi-Oﬃzier	
der	 eine	 posiSve	 Rolle	 spielt,	 könnten	 viele	 denken,	 'So	 schlimm	war's	 gar	
nicht'.	Und	es	war	schlimm!	Solche	Filme	machen	mich	wütend...	Die	müssen	
																																								 																				
12	The	German	actor	Ulrich	Mühe	played	the	lead	role	 in	the	2006	movie	‘The	lives	of	the	
others’.	The	movie	received	many	awards	included	an	Oscar	for	‘Best	foreign	film’.	
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das	 ja	 vielleicht	 machen	 fürs	 Kino,	 sonst	 geht	 da	 ja	 keiner	 rein...Aber	 so	
waren	die	nicht.	Die	waren	eklig!	Das	macht	mich	wütend.”	(Frau	T.)	
Frau	T.’s	emo_onal	response	demonstrates	the	extent	to	which	the	suﬀering	of	past	
trauma	s_ll	surfaces	 in	everyday	 life.	 It	also	points	towards	a	 lack	of	public	debate	
and	 recogni_on	 of	 former	 East	 Germans’	 suﬀering.	 Those	who	 are	 aﬀected	 o`en	
feel	that	the	past	is	misrepresented,	diminishing	the	true	tragedy	of	the	experience	
of	repression	and	persecu_on.		
One	informant	cri_cised	the	fact	that	there	is	no	real	dialogue	about	the	reali_es	of	
the	dictatorship,	but	instead	there	is	a	focus	on	an	idealisa_on	of	everyday	life	in	the	
GDR.	 She	 says	 that	 people	 choose	 to	 discuss	 material	 things	 or	 their	 travels.	 It	
appears	 that	 now,	 more	 than	 25	 years	 a`er	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Wall,	 	 certain	 topics	
associated	with	the	GDR	past	are	s_ll	“oﬀ-limits”.	Indeed,	as	I	men_oned	previously,	
when	it	comes	to	the	acknowledgment	of	the	suﬀering	endured	in	the	regime,	there	
is	 a	 culture	 of	 silence.	 Many	 discussions	 and	 public	 representa_ons	 of	 the	 GDR	
centre	around	light-hearted	topics.	
Frau	 T.	 recalled	 a	 phone	 conversa_on	 in	 which	 an	 old	 friend	 from	 the	 GDR	
contemplated	why	people	o`en	 forget	about	all	 the	good	 things	of	 the	old	_mes.	
She	 said	 that	 she	 could	 not	 respond	 to	 that	 claim.	 She	 told	me	 that	 to	 her	 it	 is	
shocking	that	a	man	of	60	years	could	draw	such	a	posi_ve	conclusion	of	the	past.	
She	 thinks	 that	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 he	 did	 not	 understand	 anything	 about	 the	 state	
that	he	was	living	in.	I	am	wondering,	perhaps	he	does	not	want	to	seriously	reﬂect	
on	it.	She	is	exasperated	at	the	fact	that	he	can	so	nonchalantly	say	“It	was	actually	
quite	good”	-	“Es	war	doch	eigentlich	ganz	gut”,	about	a	state	that	was	surrounded	
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by	a	wire	fence.	In	her	opinion,	many	people	argue	for	the	comfort	of	things	of	the	
old	days,	such	as	good	child	care	provisions	:“the	children	were	well	taken	care	of…”-	
”die	Kinder	waren	doch	versorgt...".	But,	 they	are	 failing	 to	cri_cally	 reﬂect	on	 the	
reality	that	they	were	locked	in.	Frau	T.	believes	that	people	tend	to	“suppress	the	
actual	tragedy	of	the	poliScal	system	that	they	were	living	in”	-"	Man	verdrängt	die	
eigentliche	Tragik	des	Systems"	(Frau		T.)		
	Herr	A.,	a	man	in	his	60's,	told	me	that	even	nowadays	he	s_ll	gets	emo_onal	when	
people	defend	the	GDR	or	praise	communism.	It	makes	him	lose	his	temper.	Indeed,	
he	considers	himself	as	having	been	an	"enemy	of	the	state".		
“If	 someone	 praises	 the	 GDR	 or	 praises	 the	 communists,	 I	 can	 also	 go	
ballisSc…I	really	hated	this	state.	It	had	to	collapse.	That	is	why	I	was	a	real	
enemy	of	the	state.	Just	not	everyone	knew	this.”	(Herr	A.)	
"Wenn	 einer	 die	 DDR	 lobt	 oder	 die	 Kommunisten	 lobt,	 da	 kann	 ich	 auch	
ausrasten...	 Diesen	 Staat	 hab	 ich	wirklich	 gehasst.	 Der	musste	 untergehen.	
Deshalb	war	ich	ein	wirklicher	Staatsfeind.	Nur	das	hat	nicht	jeder	gewusst."	
(Herr		A.)	
Some	people	simply	changed	their	convic_ons	and	opinions	to	suit	the	new	system,	
virtually	 overnight.	 All	 of	 a	 sudden,	 they	 claimed	 that	 they	 had	 never	 believed	 in	
socialism	or	the	state.	One	informant	gives	the	example	of	a	friend's	sister	who	had	
worked	for	the	Stasi	as	a	secretary,	in	the	main	oﬃces	in	Berlin.	A	few	years	ago	she	
sent	her	a	postcard	from	a	trip	to	Paris	on	which	she	wrote	"how	nice	that	we	can	
do	 this	now"	 -	 "wie	 schön	dass	wir	das	 jetzt	können."	 She	 found	 this	peculiar	and	
also	 ironic,	as	 this	woman	may	have	only	been	a	 secretary	but	 she	"was	probably	
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typing	up	some	prisoner's	reports".	Indeed,	some	people	just	changed	their	aatude	
and	have	gojen	into	inﬂuen_al	posi_ons	once	again.	
Those	of	my	informants	who	suﬀered	greatly	by	being	exposed	to	the	arbitrariness	
of	 the	 state	 s_ll	 fear	 a	 loss	 of	 control,	 giving	 them	 a	 con_nued	 sense	 of	
powerlessness.	 The	 possibility	 of	 being	 controlled	 by	 unchecked	 powers	 causes	 a	
great	deal	of	anxiety.	The	suspicion	(and	occasionally	proof)	that	some	Stasi	oﬃcials	
managed	to	get	into	inﬂuen_al	posi_ons	a`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall,	exacerbates	this	
feeling,	further	challenging	the	healing	process.	In	an	anecdote,	one	informant	(who	
had	been	exposed	to	the	Stasi's	"Zersetzung"	method	in	past)	describes	a	Stasi	party	
he	had	witnessed	at	his	sister's	house,	where	many	former	state	employees	debated	
and	distributed	posi_ons	within	local	councils	in	the	early	1990's.	It	was	a	summer	
garden	 party,	 a	 big	 event	 hos_ng	 around	 40	 or	 50	 guests,	 including	many	 former	
party	members	 and	 Stasi	 oﬃcials	who,	 standing	 on	 the	 lawn,	wine	 glass	 in	 hand,	
discussed	how	they	would	exchange	and	move	around	posts	within	 local	 coun_es	
and	cons_tuencies,	securing	inﬂuen_al	posi_ons	such	as	mayors.	
"I	then	said	arerwards,	that	was	a	real	Stasi	party.	They	debated	about	how	
to	 divide	 the	 departments	 in	 (town	 in	 North-East	 Germany)13,	 so	 that	 as	
many	people	as	possible	could	get	a	job	...	And	that	was	done	with	a	glass	of	
wine	 in	hand	on	 the	garden	 lawn	 ....	 'So	 then	you'll	 get	 this	 village	 ...,	 this	
village	 has	 so-and-so	 many	 inhabitants,	 so	 you	 can	 be	 used	 as	 the	 main	
oﬃcial	mayor'	...	And	so	on	...	"	(Herr	K.)	
																																								 																				
13	town	name	removed	by	author	
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"Ich	hab	dann	hinterher	gesagt,	 das	war	 'ne	 richSge	 Stasi-Party.	Da	wurde	
dann	 darüber	 debaert,	 wie	 man	 in	 …,	 wie	 man	 die	 Dezernate	 aureilt,	
damit	möglichst	 viele	 der	 Leute	 einen	 Posten	 kriegen...Und	 das	 wurde	mit	
einem	 Glas	 Wein	 in	 der	 Hand	 im	 Garten	 auf	 der	 Wiese	 debaert....'Also	
dann	 kriegst	 du	 noch	 dieses	 Dorf	 dazu...,	 dieses	 Dorf	 hat	 so-und-so	 viele	
Einwohner,	 da	 kannst	 du	 als	 Hauptamtlicher	 Bürgermeister	 eingesetzt	
werden'...Und	so	weiter..."	(Herr	K.)	
Upon	witnessing	this,	Herr	K.	and	his	wife	quickly	le`	the	event.	But	this	experience	
caused	so	much	emo_onal	upheaval	that	he	could	not	sleep	for	several	nights	a`er	
the	party,	bringing	old	anxie_es	back	to	light.	Understandably	so,	as	someone	who	
was	 trauma_sed	by	extensive	 repression	 and	persecu_on,	 the	 knowledge	 that	his	
perpetrators	are	s_ll	 in	posi_ons	of	power,	makes	a	coming	to	terms	with	the	past	
extremely	diﬃcult.		
Indeed,	Herr	K.’s	story	exempliﬁes	a	reality	that	many	East	Germans	are	confronted	
with	on	an	everyday	basis.	According	to	a	recent	inves_ga_on	(2009),	around	17,000	
former	 employees	 of	 the	 GDR	 Ministry	 of	 State	 Security	 (MfS)	 are	 said	 to	 have	
remained	 in	 the	public	 service	of	East	German	state	administra_ons.	According	 to	
the	 evalua_on,	 there	 are	 s_ll	 2247	 in	 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,	 2942	 in	
Brandenburg,	 800	 in	 Thuringia,	 4400	 in	 Saxony-Anhalt,	 2733	 in	 Berlin	 and	 4101	
employees	 in	 Saxony,	 the	 "Financial	 Times	 Deutschland"	 reported.	 Although	
extensive	 checks	 took	 place	 a`er	 the	Wende,	 The	 Federal	 Criminal	 Police	 Oﬃce	
(Bundeskriminalamt,	BKA)	too,	conﬁrms	that	some	former	Stasi-people	were	taken	
over	 a`er	 reuniﬁca_on.	 The	 exact	 numbers	 remain	 unclear	 but	 Klaus	 Schroeder,	
head	of	the	research	group	SED	State	of	the	Free	University	of	Berlin,	es_mates	that	
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there	 are	 several	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 former	 unoﬃcial	 staﬀ	 of	 the	 Stasi	 to	
ministries	 and	 authori_es.	 Of	 course,	 such	 revela_ons	 have	 a	 severe	 emo_onal	
impact	 on	 those	 Easterners	 who	 were	 trauma_sed	 in	 the	 GDR.	 Accordingly,	 one	
could	 pose	 the	 ques_on	 as	 to	 whether	 a	 healing	 process	 is	 possible	 at	 all	 if	
individuals	 are	 constantly	 confronted	with	 the	 presence	 of	 their	 perpetrators	 and	
the	knowledge	that	they	s_ll	hold	power.	Vic_ms	tend	to	feel	defeated,	as	there	is	
lijle	public	 ini_a_ve	to	change	the	current	situa_on.	Coupled	with	this,	 is	the	fact	
that	 some	 people	 are	 s_ll	 in	 support	 of	 the	 dictatorship	 and	 perhaps	 idealise	 its	
existence	in	retrospect.	
They,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 argue	 that	 the	 legacy	of	 Stasi	 surveillance	 is	 drama_sed	
and	over-exaggerated.	For	them,	the	trauma	of	the	collapse	of	the	state	and	socio-
economic	consequences	stand	 in	 the	 forefront.	Frau	F.,	 for	example,	 is	par_cularly	
concerned	about	the	eﬀect	that	the	fall	of	the	Wall	had	on	those	GDR	ci_zens	who	
felt	 happy	 and	 comfortable	 in	 the	 state.	 In	 the	 1980's	 she,	 herself,	 had	wanted	 a	
renewed	 leadership	 in	 the	 GDR.	 She	 thinks	 that	 the	 ideologies	 of	 socialism	 and	
communism	were	essen_ally	a	good	idea.	Alluding	to	the	increased	suicide	rates	in	
East	 Germany	 in	 the	 early	 1990's,	 she	 emphasised	 that	 not	 all	 who	 commijed	
suicide	 a`er	 the	 fall	 of	 the	Wall	 were	 former	 Stasi	 people,	 but	 they	were	 simply	
overwhelmed	by	the	new	state	system,	the	novel	situa_on	of	having	a	lack	of	money	
and	unemployment.		
She	 feels	 that	 people	 were	 tricked	 by	 the	 apparent	 abundance	 of	 material	
possessions,	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 West	 everything	 was	 bright	 and	 colourful.	 She	
remarked	that	it	never	made	a	diﬀerence	to	her	if	a	plas_c	bag	had	colourful	wri_ng	
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on	it	or	if	it	was	plain,	a`er	all,	what	diﬀerence	did	it	make?	It	was	disappoin_ng	to	
her	that	GDR	ci_zens	were	won	over	so	easily	by	such	superﬁcial	material	things.	
"If	you	think	about	how	many	people	took	their	lives	arer	the	reuniﬁcaSon,	
they	were	certainly	not	all	members	of	the	state	security,	but	simply	because	
they	 could	not	 come	 to	 terms	with	 the	new	situaSon,	with	unemployment,	
not	 being	 able	 to	 aﬀord	 anything…	 All	 these	 things	 in	 the	 shops	 and	 the	
colours,	which	were	more	adracSve,	...	I	do	not	care	whether	a	bag	is	grey	or	
white	 and	 labelled,	 but	 it	 seems	 that	 such	 a	 thing	 madered	 to	 the	 GDR	
ciSzen	at	the	Sme	...	"	(Frau	F.)	
"Wenn	 man	 sich	 überlegt,	 wie	 viele	 sich	 nach	 der	 Wende	 das	 Leben	
genommen	 haben,	 die	 waren	 besSmmt	 nicht	 alle	 bei	 der	 Staatssicherheit.	
Sondern	 ganz	 einfach,	 weil	 sie	 mit	 der	 neuen	 SituaSon,	 mit	 der	
Arbeitslosigkeit,	nicht	zu	Rande	gekommen	sind.	Die	sahen	zwar	alle	Dinge	in	
den	 Geschären	 und	 die	 bunten	 Farben,	 die	 adrakSver	 waren,	 ...das	 ist	
meines	Erachtens	vollkommen	egal,	ob	die	Tüte	nun	grau	oder	weiß	 ist	und	
beschriret,	aber	auf	so	was	hat	der	DDR	Bürger	damals	wohl	Wert	gelegt..."	
(Frau	F.)		
Towards	the	end	of	my	interview	with	Frau	F.,	her	partner	spontaneously	joined	us.	
He	seemed	par_cularly	concerned	that	the	GDR	was	misrepresented	nowadays	and	
immediately	 challenged	 whether	 I	 would	 “distort	 the	 past”	 -	 “die	 Vergangenheit	
verzerren”,	 in	 my	 study.	 He	 seemed	 frustrated	 with	 the	 current	 situa_on	 of	 	 the	
reuniﬁed	Germany	 and	 argued	 that	 life	 in	 the	GDR	 is	 en_rely	misrepresented.	He	
pointed	out	that	now	they	had	to	bajle	existen_al	fears	and	this	led	many	to	regret	
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the	end	of	the	GDR.	He	says	that	he	valued	the	security	that	the	state	provided	the	
most.	All	of	that	is	lost	now.		
Frau	 F.	 and	 her	 partner	 are	 convinced	 that,	 if	 people	 had	 an_cipated	 what	
eventually	happened	a`er	Germany's	reuniﬁca_on,	surely	they	would	have	seen	the	
Wende	diﬀerently.		
“I	suppose,	if	some	people	would	have	foreseen	what	was	in	store	for	them,	
they	would	have	reacted	diﬀerently	during	the	reuniﬁcaSon.”	(Frau	F.)	
"Ich	nehme	an,	dass,	wenn	manch’	einer	geahnt	häde	was	auf	ihn	zukommt,	
häde	er	anders	reagiert	während	der	Wende."	(Frau	F.)	
There	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 sense	 of	 betrayal	 felt	 by	 those	who	wanted	 to	 ensure	 the	
state's	reform,	as	opposed	to	its	collapse.	Especially	during	the	emigra_on	wave	in	
1989	 they	 found	 it	 incomprehensible	 how	people	 could	 go	 to	 such	 great	 lengths,	
just	to	leave	the	GDR.	One	woman	told	me	to	think	about	those	images	they	show	
on	TV	of	East	German	refugees	who	were	occupying	the	FRG's	embassy	in	Prague,	in	
the	hope	of	being	sent	to	the	West,	in	1989.	Obviously,	they	had	been	seduced	by	
materialism	 and	 ﬁnancial	 aspira_ons	 of	 the	West.	 She	 is	 disappointed	 that	 these	
people	never	 thought	 about	 the	GDR	 ci_zens	 they	were	 leang	down,	 the	people	
who	had	provided	them	with	a	good	educa_on.	
“When	 you	 look	 at	 the	 images	 of	 how	 young	 people	 drove	 to	 the	 Prague	
embassy,	with	Trabis	and	someSmes	even	Wartburgs.	They	were	all	well	fed,	
well	dressed.	The	children	looked	great.	You	can	see	they	were	not	badly	oﬀ.	
The	possibiliSes,	and	what	they	could	shop,	and	that	they	thought	they	could	
possibly	 earn	more,	 that	naturally	 seduced	 them.	But	 they	did	not	 think	of	
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the	 people	 of	 the	 GDR,	 who	 they	 let	 down,	 who	 had	 given	 them	 a	 good	
educaSon.”	(Frau	J.)	
"Wenn	 sie	 sich	mal	 die	 Bilder	 angucken,	 wie	 die	 Jungen	Menschen	 da	 zur	
Prager	Botschar	gefahren	sind,	mit	Trabis	und	manchmal	sogar	Wartburgs.	
Die	waren	alle	gut	genährt,	gut	gekleidet.	Die	Kinder	sahen	blühend	aus.	Da	
sah	 man,	 es	 ging	 ihnen	 nicht	 schlecht.	 Die	 Möglichkeiten,	 und	 was	 sie	
einkaufen	 konnten,	 und	 dass	 sie	 dachten,	 sie	 können	 vielleicht	 mehr	
verdienen,	 das	 hat	 natürlich	 verführt.	 Dabei	 haben	 sie	 aber	 nicht	 an	 die	
Menschen	 in	 der	 DDR	 gedacht,	 die	 sie	 im	 SSch	 laßen,	 die	 ihnen	 eine	 gute	
Bildung	ermöglicht	haben."	(Frau	J.)		
This	statement	shows	that	the	former	German	Democra_c	Republic	 is	a	great	case	
study	for	the	way	in	which	humans	interpret	a	par_cular	social	system	that	they	are	
living	in.	Rosenberg	(1995)	cri_ques	people’s	reluctance	to	admit	their	own	roles	in	
the	 dictatorship,	 hin_ng	 at	 the	morally	 highly	 ambiguous	 ques_on	 of	 who	was	 a	
vic_m	or		perpetrator.	She	asserts,	“unlike	under	Hitler,	the	people	who	suﬀered	at	
the	 hands	 of	 East	 German	 communism	 really	 were	 East	 Germans.	 And	 although	
most	 were	 pillars	 of	 the	 system	 in	 addi_on	 to	 vic_ms,	 it	 is	 natural	 for	 people	 to	
focus	only	on	their	suﬀering	and	not	on	their	complicity.	Most	learned	to	live	within	
the	system,	but	most	also	resented	it	–	only	communism	needed	a	Wall.”	(p.	319)		
My	interlocutors’	accounts	reﬂect	how	varied	and	at	_mes	conﬂicted	East	Germans	
understanding	 of	 the	 past	 and	 present	 are.	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 this	 large	 range	 of	
impressions	within	the	popula_on,	which	poses	great	challenges	 for	 the	vic_ms	 in	
their	healing	process.	Since	there	 is	such	a	huge	spectrum	of	voices;	 ranging	 from	
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supporters	of	the	state	s_ll	mourning	its	collapse,	to	those	who	had	to	endure	great	
suﬀering	 and	 distress	 caused	 by	 state	 violence.	 And,	 yet	 others	 who	 are	 largely	
indiﬀerent	 to	 the	 dictatorship's	 legacy,	 merely	 adap_ng	 to	 whichever	 poli_cal	
system	happens	to	be	prominent	at	a	given	_me.	This	broad	range	of	 impressions	
and	personal	experiences	draws	a	complex	picture	of	East	Germany	today.		
Interpersonal	Relationships	after	the	Fall	of	the	Wall		
Within	families,	a	person's	posi_on	on	the	past	dictatorship	and	their	role	within	it	
shape	 and	 impact	 rela_onships	 to	 this	 day.	One	woman	who	was,	 despite	 having	
had	 some	 nega_ve	 experiences	 early	 in	 life,	 very	 much	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 state,	
described	the	conﬂicts	that	dominate	the	rela_onships	with	her	rela_ves.		She	says	
that	 nowadays	 she	 is	 no	 longer	 in	 touch	 with	 them	 (only	 the	 bare	 minimum	 on	
holidays)	 because	 she	 knows	 that	 when	 they	 interact,	 they	 get	 into	 arguments	
about	their	religious	orienta_on	and	diﬀering	worldviews.		
A	man	 in	his	 late	60's	who	was	 imprisoned	and	"bought	out"	 -	"rausgekaur",	 told	
me	about	the	disappointment	he	felt	a`er	reuniﬁca_on.	When	he	was	in	the	West,	
he	 had	 always	 sent	 parcels	 to	 friends	 and	 family	 in	 the	 East,	 spending	 a	 lot	 of	
money.	Then,	a`er	the	Wende	when	he	visited	them,	they	s_ll	expected	him	to	give	
them	gi`s	despite	never	making	an	eﬀort	to	stay	in	touch.	They	never	even	called,	
saying	 that	 it	was	 "too	 expensive".	 He	 told	me	 that	many	 friendships	 ended	 that	
way.	These	supposed	friends	only	made	an	eﬀort	while	there	was	something	to	be	
gained.			
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“So	many	West	Germans	say	that,	they	were	world-class	at	accepSng	(girs)	
and	saying	thank	you,	but	when	they	didn’t	need	you	anymore,	they	wanted	
to	have	nothing	to	do	with	you.”	(Herr	A.)	
"Das	 sagen	 so	viele	Westdeutsche,	 im	Nehmen	und	 im	Danke-sagen	waren	
sie	Weltspitze,	 aber	 als	 sie	 sie	 nicht	mehr	 brauchten,	wollten	 sie	mit	 ihnen	
nichts	mehr	zu	tun	haben.”	(Herr	A.)	
Indeed,	while	many	true	friendships	persisted	over	the	years,	others	that	had	been	
established	out	of	mere	necessity,	began	to	crumble	swi`ly	a`er	the	wall	fell.	These	
types	of	rela_onships	were	in	colloquial	terms	known	as	"Vitamin	B",	"B"-	referring	
to	the	word	Beziehungen.	In	other	words,	rela_onships	established	in	order	to	gain	
(o`en	 mutual)	 beneﬁts	 such	 as	 the	 unoﬃcial	 trading	 of	 goods	 or	 services,	 the	
speeding	 up	 of	 applica_ons	 to	 gain	 permission	 to	 do	 something,	 such	 as	 house	
construc_on	for	example.		
Some	others	may	feel	the	burden	of	denuncia_on	and	betrayal.	As	illustrated	earlier	
in	 the	 case	 of	 Herr	 K.,	 who	 found	 out	 that	 his	 own	 sister	 had	 fundamentally	
betrayed	him,	but	s_ll	con_nues	to	stay	in	touch	with	her,	out	of	a	sense	of	duty	-	
"because	 she	 is	 family".	 Yet	 their	 interac_ons	 are	 diﬃcult	 and	mostly	 superﬁcial,	
born	 out	 of	 deep	 distrust.	 He	 says	 that	 they	 have	many	 disagreements	 and	 their	
rela_onship	cannot	be	described	as	"normal".			
“Well,	 it’s	 not	 a	 normal	 relaSonship.	 It	 is	 superﬁcial.	 I	 feel	 obligated.	 Since	
she’s	 a	 relaSve,	 I	 go	 to	 see	her.	My	wife	 takes	 a	more	 laid-back	approach,	
even	though	they	also	end	up	arguing.”	
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"Na	 ja,	 ein	 normales	 Verhältnis	 ist	 das	 nicht.	 Es	 ist	 oberﬂächlich.	 Ich	 fühle	
mich	 verpﬂichtet.	 Es	 ist	 ja	 Verwandtschar,	 ich,	 fahre	 da	 schon	 hin.	Meine	
Frau	 sieht	 das	 ein	 bisschen	 lockerer.	 Obwohl	 sie	 auch	 immer	
aneinandergeraten..."	(Herr	K.)	
In	the	sec_on	Records	and	Files	of	the	MfS,	 I	shed	some	light	on	the	way	in	which	
Stasi	 records	 and	 post-reuniﬁca_on	 revela_ons	 impacted	 and	 con_nue	 to	 impact	
East	Germans'	lives.	As	I	brieﬂy	touched	upon	earlier,	those	who	le`	the	GDR	prior	
to	its	collapse,	either	by	oﬃcial	emigra_on	(by	means	of	an	Ausreiseantrag),	escape	
or	being	bought	by	the	West	during	imprisonment,	all	report	on	challenges	in	their	
family	rela_onships	and	some_mes	friendships.	Frau	T.	who	had	moved	to	the	West	
in	the	mid-1980's	told	me	she	feels	isolated	from	other	East	Germans,	due	to	their	
diﬀering	 experiences	of	 the	 state.	 She	 is	 under	 the	 impression	 that	 East	Germans	
who	 stayed	do	not	 consider	her	 suﬀering	 and	 cri_cism	as	 valid,	 since	 she	did	not	
stay	un_l	the	state	collapsed.	By	now,	she	and	her	family	have	lived	in	the	West	for	
30	 years.	 Therefore,	 her	 extended	 family	 thinks	 she	 “has	 no	 right	 to	 bring	 up	 the	
topic	of	the	GDR”.	She	feels	that	they	get	defensive	when	the	conversa_on	moves	in	
this	direc_on.	(Frau	T.)	
As	illustrated	by	the	examples	above,	East	Germans’	experiences	of	the	reuniﬁca_on	
are	mul_dimensional:	 they	 encompass	 the	 adjustment	 to	 a	 new	 social	 order,	 the	
reali_es	 of	 capitalism	 and	 along	 with	 that	 socio-economic	 factors.	 Further,	 the	
psycho-social	 legacy	 of	 dictatorship	 shapes	 interpersonal	 rela_onships	 and	
percep_ons	of	“the	East”.		
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Ossis	and	Wessis:	Germany	as	a	divided	country	
Regardless	of	people's	stance	on	the	GDR,	all	my	informants	agreed	that	there	are	
s_ll	 signiﬁcant	 cultural	 diﬀerences	 between	 East	 and	West	Germany.	Having	 been	
brought	 up	 and	 socialised	 in	 two	 en_rely	 diﬀerent	 poli_cal	 and	 social	 systems	
con_nues	to	shape	German	iden_ty.	There	are	s_ll	many	cliches	and	preconcep_ons	
surrounding	 "Ossis	 and	Wessis".	 One	 very	 common	 prejudice	 brought	 up	 by	 East	
Germans	 (34	 percent)	 in	 a	 2015	 study	 is	 that	 Wessis	 are	 arrogant	 and	 full	 of	
themselves.	As	I	have	outlined	previously	many	East	Germans	take	great	pride	in	the	
posi_ve	 "Interpersonal	 Rela_onships"	 cul_vated	 in	 the	 GDR.	 	 Although	 in	 recent	
years	there	has	been	a	clear	trend	moving	away	from	these	cliches,	a	recent	study	
(2015)	 concluded	 that	 71	 per	 cent	 of	 East	 Germans	 think	 that	 there	 are	 s_ll	
signiﬁcant	diﬀerences	between	East	and	West	Germans.	(Damm	et	al.	2015;	see	also	
yougov.de).	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 it	 takes	 more	 than	 one	 genera_on	 for	 some	 form	 of	
cultural	adjustment	to	occur.		
Another	study	conducted	22	years	a`er	the	reuniﬁca_on	showed	that	there	are	s_ll	
some	 reserva_ons,	 in	 par_cular	 with	 regard	 to	 travelling	 to	 the	 respec_ve	 other	
side.	This	reluctance	is	par_cularly	true	for	West	Germans,	of	whom	one	in	ﬁve	(21	
per	cent)	have	never	visited	East	Germany.	East	Germans,	on	the	other	hand,	have	
been	 a	 lijle	 more	 mobile,	 with	 only	 nine	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 popula_on,	 who	 have	
never	visited	the	West.	
IdenLfying	as	East	German	and	Avoidance	Behaviour	
	For	some	of	my	informants,	travelling	to	the	East,	s_ll,	carries	signiﬁcant	(at	_mes	
nega_ve)	meaning	and	creates	feelings	of	oppression	and	anxiety.	Iden_fying	
oneself	as	being	from	the	East	is	a	sensi_ve	issue	for	many.	In	addi_on,	my	research	
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has	shown	that	some	form	of	avoidance	behaviour	is	apparent	in	those	who	
experienced	trauma	in	the	regime,	in	line	with	Linden's	proposed	symptoma_c		
criteria	 for	 a	 condi_on	 he	 calls	 Post-Trauma_c	 Embijerment	 Disorder	 (PTED)	
(Linden	et	al.	2008;	Rosen	&	Lilienfeld	2008).		
For	Frau	L.,	iden_fying	as	East	German	is	s_ll	problema_c.	She	le`	the	GDR	in	1981	
and	has	lived	in	a	West	German	town	near	Frankfurt	am	Main	for	many	years	now.	
She	 feels	 that	West	German's	percep_on	of	East	Germans	varies	by	 region.	Those	
who	 live	 closer	 to	 the	 East	 German	 border	 see	 them	 in	 a	 rather	 nega_ve	 light,	
because	 shortly	 a`er	 the	 reuniﬁca_on,	many	Easterners	moved	 to	 the	 region	and	
were	accordingly	perceived	as	a	 threat	 (for	 instance	as	 there	were	 fears	 that	 they	
would	 "take	 people's	 jobs").	 In	 her	 experience,	 people	 living	 further	West,	 like	 in	
Hamburg	 for	example,	have	a	 less	biased	view	of	 the	East.	 She	 told	me	 that	 for	a	
long	_me	she	suppressed	her	memories	of	her	childhood	in	an	East	German	small	
town.	
Indeed,	she	outlined	how	she	takes	great	care	 in	protec_ng	her	privacy	and	rarely	
men_oning	her	birthplace.	She	says	that	she	chooses	very	carefully	"whom	she	tells	
what".	 The	 story	 of	 her	 parents'	 imprisonment	 is	 especially	 something	 that	 she	
rarely	 discusses.	 She	 feels	 that	most	 people	 would	 not	 understand	 or	 be	 able	 to	
empathise	with	her	 personal	 history.	 Both	 in	 the	 former	GDR	and	 the	West	 alike,	
there	are	inevitably	nega_ve	connota_ons	ajached	to	imprisonment	and	especially	
former	poli_cal	 prisoners	 con_nue	 to	 experience	 s_gma.	 	When	people	hear	 that	
someone	was	detained	for	something,	 they	automa_cally	assume	that	 this	person	
must	have	commijed	a	serious	crime.	They	are	labelled	as	criminals.	She	says	that	
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this	 is	 partly	 why	 she	 does	 not	 recount	 her	 personal	 story	 lightly.	 She	 would	 for	
instance,	never	bring	this	up	 in	conversa_on	with	her	work	colleagues	 in	her	ﬁrm,	
because	it	would	be	too	personal.			
In	our	 conversa_on,	 she	made	clear	 that	 such	a	personal	history	 can	only	be	 told	
within	a	par_cular	context.	 It	can	only	be	told	to	someone	who	has	the	necessary	
maturity	and	background	knowledge.	She	thinks	that	to	the	majority	of	people	her	
story	 is	not	understandable.	She	 feels	 somewhat	 isolated	as	not	many	people	can	
relate	to	her	experience.	
"The	 further	 away	 you	 get	 away	 from	 the	 border	 area,	 it's	 a	 completely	
diﬀerent	story.		I	think	it's	important	to	know	how	to	deal	with	your	history.	
I'm	 happy	 today	 that	 I	 can	 deal	with	 it,	 that	 today	 I	 can	 decide	who	 I	 tell	
about	it.	
And	I	have	also	had	years	where	I	really	did	not	want	to	talk	about	it	at	all,	
because	 I	believe	that	for	a	 large	number	of	people	 it	 is	 inconceivable	 ...	or	
'why	is	someone	in	prison'?	Murder,	ther,	personal	injury,	whatever.	But	the	
fact	 that	 someone	 is	 in	prison	 for	poliScal	 reasons,…because	he	wanted	 to	
live	 diﬀerently,	 these	 are	 things	 you	 cannot	 discuss	 with	 just	 anyone,	 you	
have	to	meet	the	right	listeners.	
If	I	were	to	say	spontaneously	to	someone	in	my	oﬃce,	'Yes,	my	parents	were	
also	 in	 prison',	 they	 would	 think	 ‘Well,	 what's	 wrong	 with	 her?'	 So	 you	
cannot	just	sit	down	in	front	of	anyone	and	tell	them	something	like	that.	It	
must	be	done	 in	context,	and	that	must	be	before	people,	who	also	have	a	
certain	maturity	and	age	for	 it,	and	who	have	also	engaged	with	the	topic.	
	 216	
For	all	the	others,	it	is	not	the	right	topic,	and	it	is	not	comprehensible	what	it	
means	to	be	a	reunited	family	with	two	suitcases,	and	a	father	knows	that	he	
has	a	good	qualiﬁcaSon,	but	he	does	not	automaScally	have	a	job.	And	who	
also	does	not	know	how	to	feed	his	family.	Well,	and,	and	...	these	fears,…one	
certainly	noSced."	(Frau	L.)	
"Je	 weiter	 man	 hier	 von	 dem	 Grenzgebiet	 wegkommt,	 ist	 das	 ein	 ganz	
anderer	 Umgang.	 Also	 denke	 ich	 auch,	 dass	 es	 darauf	 ankommt,	wie	man	
umgeht	mit	der	eigenen	Geschichte.	Ich	bin	heute	froh	dass	ich	heute	damit	
umgehen	kann.	Das	ich	heute	entscheiden	kann,	wem	ich	was	erzähle.		
Und	habe	aber	auch	Jahre	gehabt,	wo	ich	eigentlich	überhaupt	nicht	drüber	
sprechen	 wollte,	 weil	 ich	 glaube,	 dass	 für	 eine	 Großzahl	 der	Menschen	 es	
nicht	vorstellbar	ist,	...	oder	'warum	ist	jemand	im	Gefängnis',	das	verbindet	
man	ja	or	mit	mit	Mord,	Diebstahl,	Körperverletzung,	wie	auch	immer.	Aber	
das	 jemand	 im	 Gefängnis	 ist	 aus	 poliSschen	 Gründen,	 und	 weil	 er	 anders	
leben	 wollte,	 das	 sind	 so	 Sachen,	 da	 muss	 man	 auch	 auf	 den	 richSgen	
Zuhörer	 treﬀen.	Wenn	 ich	 jetzt	 spontan	 jemandem	 in	meinem	 Büro	 sagen	
sollte,	'Ja	meine	Eltern	waren	auch	mal	im	Gefängnis',	da	würden	die	denken,	
'Ja	 was	 hat	 die	 denn?'	 Also	 man	 kann	 sich	 nicht	 vor	 irgendjemanden	
hinsetzen	und	denen	so	etwas	erzählen.	Das	muss	 im	Zusammenhang	sein,	
und	das	muss	vor	Menschen	sein,	die	auch	eine	gewisse	Reife	und	auch	Alter	
dafür	haben	und	die	sich	auch	schon	mal	damit	beschärigt	haben.	Für	alle	
anderen	 ist	 das	 nicht	 das	 richSge	 Thema	 und	 das	 ist	 auch	 nicht	
nachvollziehbar,	was	es	heißt,	als	wiederzusammengeﬂickte	Familie	die	mit	
zwei	Koﬀern	ausreist,	und	der	Vater	weiß,	dass	er	einen	guten	Beruf	hat,	aber	
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noch	 lange	 keine	 Stelle	 hat.	 Und	 auch	 nicht	 weiß,	 wie	 er	 seine	 Familie	
ernähren	 soll.	 Und	 ob	 er	 auch	 eine	 Stelle	 bekommt,	 und,	 und,	 und...Diese	
Ängste,	...	ich	denke	das	hat	man	schon	mitbekommen."	(Frau	L.)	
Many	 of	my	 interviewees,	 especially	 those	who	 suﬀered	 from	 state	 violence,	 feel	
alone	and	misunderstood.	Along	with	this	 feeling	of	 isola_on	 is	the	sense	that	the	
current	 reunited	state	 is	not	doing	enough	 to	 rehabilitate	 them	and	recognise	 the	
injus_ce	they	experienced.	A`er	one	interview,	for	instance,	my	informant	emailed	
me	a	series	of	lejers,	which	he	had	previously	sent	to	the	Berlin	senate	complaining	
about	the	fact	that	the	PDS	(now	Die	Linken),	a	le`ist	party	which	partly	evolved	out	
of	 the	 SED,	had	 some	power	 in	Berlin.	He	 forcefully	warned	 them	of	 the	possible	
repercussions	this	could	have.	His	tone	in	these	lejers	was	very	diﬀerent	from	the	
way	 I	 had	 perceived	 him	 when	 we	 met,	 he	 had	 appeared	 reserved.	 From	 the	
wri_ng,	 however,	 it	 was	 easy	 to	 gauge	 that	 he	 was	 very	 angry.	 The	 lejers	
demonstrated	 that	 he	 iden_ﬁes	 the	 presence	 of	 these	 poten_ally	 powerful	
individuals	who	are	 linked	 to	 the	 former	SED	 regime,	as	a	 con_nued	 threat.	 Their	
inﬂuen_al	posi_on	is	also	a	persistent	reminder	of	the	denial	of	injus_ce	that	many	
vic_ms	con_nue	 to	 feel.	 For	him,	any	 reminder	of	his	endured	suﬀering	 triggers	a	
strong	emo_onal	response.			
Several	 people	 who	 managed	 to	 move	 to	 the	 West	 before	 1989	 told	 me	 that	
especially	their	children	avoided	telling	people	where	they	were	from,	par_cularly	in	
the	early	years,	in	an	ajempt	to	adjust	to	life	in	the	West,	very	much	in	line	with	my	
own	experience.	Perhaps	 this	diﬃculty	of	 iden_fying	as	 East	German	 can	be	 seen	
par_cularly	 in	 the	 younger	 genera_on	 due	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 poli_cal	 and	
social	 code	 in	 the	 East.	Which	 part	 of	 “being	 East	 German”	 should	 young	 people	
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who	 only	 remember	 fragments	 of	 the	 GDR	 iden_fy	 with?	 There	 is	 much	 moral	
ambiguity	involved.	What	was	one’s	parent’s	role	in	the	system	and	how	was	their	
experience?	And	would	one	want	to	be	associated	with	a	dictatorship	or	is	it	bejer	
to	 adopt	 the	 role	 of	 the	 vic_m?	 These	 are	 important	 ques_ons	 with	 no	 simple	
answers.	 I	 argue	 that	 one	 could	 even	 speculate	 that	 this	 anxiety	 points	 to	 some	
intergenera_onal	 trauma.	 My	 own	 anxie_es	 about	 my	 background	 may	 be	 an	
example	of	this.	
While	some	who	le`	the	GDR	say	that	they	would	not	choose	to	move	back	to	the	
East	today,	several	people	even	ac_vely	avoid	travelling	there.	The	aforemen_oned	
informant	 (Frau	 B.)	 s_ll	 associates	 the	 East	 with	 nega_ve	 childhood	 memories.	
While	she	 likes	Berlin	and	occasionally	even	visits	East	Berlin	areas	 like	Prenzlauer	
Berg,	she	says	the	city	is	a	special	case.	If	she's,	for	instance,	travelling	somewhere	
on	the	Autobahn,	she	will	s_ll	ac_vely	avoid	the	route	that	goes	through	the	East.	
Even	now,	when	certain	parts	of	the	Autobahn	are	much	bejer	in	the	East,	she	s_ll	
chooses	to	travel	through	the	Western	towns.	
"I	sSll	do	not	like	to	go	there,	I	have	a	few	places	where	I	go,	I	 like	to	go	to	
Erfurt,	and	I	like	to	go	to	Berlin	or	East	Berlin,	Prenzlauer	Berg	or	that	area,	
but	that	is	a	diﬀerent	type	of	East.	Berlin	is	rather	special...So	I	would	exclude	
Berlin.	 But,	 apart	 from	 that,	 I	 travel	 relaSvely	 lidle	 to	 the	 East.	 So	 if	 I	 can	
choose	where	 to	 go,	 whether	 I	 drive	 through	 the	 East	 or	 whether	 I	 go	 up	
through	Hanover,	Braunschweig,	 I	would	somehow	always	choose	Hanover.	
Even	though	the	motorway	is	great	now,	but	umm	....	"	(	Frau	L.)	
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"Hinfahren	tue	ich	nach	wie	vor	nicht	gerne.	Es	gibt	Orte,	wo	ich	hinfahre.	Ich	
bin	gerne	mal	in	Erfurt,	und	ich	bin	auch	gerne	mal	in	Berlin	oder	Ost-Berlin,	
Prenzlauer	Berg	oder	so	die	Ecke,	aber	ich	das	ist	auch	noch	mal	ein	anderer	
Osten.	Berlin	ist	ja	eher	speziell....Also	Berlin	würde	ich	da	außen	vornehmen.	
Also	abgesehen	davon,	reise	ich	relaSv	wenig	in	den	Osten.	Also	wenn	ich	mir	
aussuchen	kann	wo	 ich	hinfahre,	ob	 ich	durch	den	Osten	 fahre	oder	ob	 ich	
oben,	 Hannover,	 Braunschweig	 fahr',	 würde	 ich	 irgendwie	 immer	 wieder	
Hannover	 aussuchen.	 Obwohl	 die	 Autobahn	 jetzt	 toll	 ist,	 aber	 ähmm...."	
(Frau	L.)	
	
Beyond	the	facades		
	
In	 the	 following	 quote,	
Frau	 L.	 eloquently	
captures	 how	 many	
Germans	 feel	 who	
experienced	 injus_ce	
and	 suﬀering	 in	 the	
former	 GDR.	 To	 these	
individuals,	it	is	diﬃcult	
to	 come	 to	 terms	with	 the	past,	 because	of	 several	 factors,	 ﬁrstly	 because	of	 the	
temporal	aspect.	The	German	reuniﬁca_on	took	place	26	years	before	my	ﬁeldwork,	
a	rela_vely	short	amount	of	_me.	This	means	that,	secondly,	a	fair	amount	of	people	
who	 were	 ac_vely	 engaged	 in	 the	 regime,	 are	 s_ll	 ac_ve	 members	 in	 German	
society	and	even	poli_cally	 ac_ve	and	 in	decision-making	posi_ons.	 Third,	despite	
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the	 governmental	 and	 non-governmental	 push	 towards	 public	 engagement	 and	
reconcilia_on	of	 the	past,	 this	push	has	 taken	place	mostly	on	a	 superﬁcial	public	
plaorm	as	opposed	to	an	individual	one.	This	superﬁcial	engagement	with	the	past,	
which	 has	 been	 cri_cised	 extensively	 by	 the	majority	 of	 my	 interviewees,	 means	
that	 there	 con_nues	 to	 be	 a	 condoning	 and	 silencing	 of	 nega_ve	 aspects	 of	 the	
dictatorship.		
	Here	Frau	L.	explains	that	she	is	s_ll	not	keen	on	visi_ng	the	East.	To	her,	there	are	
s_ll	 major	 diﬀerences	 in	 language,	 mentality	 and	 even	 the	 way	 in	 which	 people	
dress.	 The	 East	 generally	 evokes	 nega_ve	 memories	 from	 her	 childhood.	 She	
especially	 has	mixed	 feelings	 about	 the	 Bal_c	 seaside	 towns.	 In	 recent	 years	 this	
region	has	seen	a	fast	development,	with	investors	buying	and	renova_ng	many	of	
the	 beau_ful	 turn-of-the-century	 villas.	 Many	 new	 hotels	 have	 been	 built	 or	
renewed.	Now	seaside	towns	such	as	Bansin	and	Heringsdorf,	tradi_onally	popular	
holiday	des_na_ons	of	the	GDR,	are	also	beginning	to	ajract	a	growing	number	of	
Western	and	 foreign	 tourists.	She	says	 that	 the	 front	 row	of	houses	along	 the	sea	
are	now	renovated,	they	have	beau_ful	new	facades	but	behind	them	lie	the	real,	
old	East,	with	everything	that	it	encompasses.			
"It's	just	something,	...	not	burdened,	but	...	It	sSll	maders…	even	years	later	
...	
So	 the	 last	Sme	 I	was	 in	Warnemünde	and	Rostock,	because	we	wanted	to	
show	our	son,	I	thought	that	this	place	does	not	necessarily	adract	me.	
I	sSll	do	not	like	Rügen	or	the	BalSc	Sea.	I	have	the	feeling	that	the	ﬁrst	two	
rows	of	houses	are	redeveloped,	and	then	the	East	starts	again,	with	all	the	
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trimmings.	And	I	ﬁnd	it	sSll	...	I	do	not	need	Sylt14	for	me	to	say	"Wow",	but	...	
There	are	great	corners	too	at	the	BalSc	Sea,	Bansin	and	so	on,	but	I	ﬁnd	that	
you	 are	 always	 reminded	 that	 it	 is	 sSll	 the	 East.	 For	 example,	 we	were	 in	
Prerow	 last	 summer.	 I	 think	 it's	 the	 language,	 the	 clothes	or	 the	mentality,	
that	you	feel.	I	do	not	think	it's	completely	the	same.	"(Ms	L.)		
"Es	 ist	 einfach	 noch	 etwas,	 ...nicht	 belastet,	 aber	 ...hängt	 so'n	 bisschen	
einfach	 noch.	 Also	 auch	 noch	 Jahre	 später...	 Also	 das	 letzte	Mal	 als	 ich	 in	
Warnemünde	war,	was	wir	unserem	Sohn	zeigen	wollten,	und	Rostock,	hab’	
ich	auch	so	gedacht.	Mich	zieht's	nicht	unbedingt	hierher.		
Ich	mag	auch	immer	noch	nicht	gerne	Rügen	oder	sonst	die	Ostsee,	ich	habe	
da	das	Gefühl,	 die	 ersten	 zwei	Reihen	der	Häuser	 sind	 saniert,	 und	danach	
fängt	dann	wieder	der	Osten	an,	mit	allem	drum	und	dran.	Und	ich	ﬁnde	es	
nach	wie	vor...	ich	brauche	nicht	Sylt,	um	mir	zu	sagen,	um	zu	sagen	"Wow",	
aber...	Es	gibt	tolle	Ecken	auch	an	der	Ostsee,	Bansin	und	so	weiter,	aber	ich	
ﬁnde,	dass	man	immer	wieder	merkt,	dass	es	noch	Osten	ist.		
Wir	waren	 jetzt	 letzten	Sommer	 in	Prerow.	 Ich	ﬁnde	 jetzt,	sei's	die	Sprache,	
die	Kleidung	oder	die	Mentalität,	das	man's	immer	noch	spürt.	Ich	ﬁnde	nicht	
dass	es	kompled	gleich	ist."	(Frau	L.)	
	I	 believe	her	 example	 is	 a	 good	 illustra_on	of	 the	way	 those	who	 suﬀered	under	
state	control	 in	the	GDR	feel	 today.	 It	 reﬂects	their	 lingering	feeling	that,	although	
																																								 																				
14	West	German	island	in	the	North	Sea	known	for	its	luxurious	holiday	resorts	and	celebrity	
holidaymakers.	
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there	have	been	many	changes	and	a	new	poli_cal	system	is	in	power,	certain	social	
dynamics	con_nue	to	exist.	
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Chapter	Seven:	Trauma	and	Wellbeing	in	Contemporary	East	Germany		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	would	like	to	focus	on	the	long-term	eﬀects	of	state	control	and	
surveillance	on	East	German's	wellbeing.	I	will	be	shedding	light	on	the	way	in	which	
ci_zens	perceived,	experienced	and	reported	trauma.	Ul_mately,	I	will	address	the	
ques_on	of	whether	a	healing	process	has	been	possible,	and	how	this	displayed	
itself.	
Anthropological	ethnography	is	useful	in	examining	East	Germans’	coming	to	terms	
with	the	past,	as	those	who	were	trauma_sed	most	by	state	violence	suﬀer	
primarily	socially	as	well	as	psychologically.	Medical	Anthropology,	more	speciﬁcally,	
oﬀers	a	lens	through	which	to	inquire	into	people’s	suﬀering	and	its	social	and	
cultural	components.	It	allows	an	in-depth	understanding	of	the	experienced	illness	
and	the	social	rela_ons	of	sickness.		
Wohlbefinden		
In	the	case	of	this	study,	I	explore	the	concept	of	wellbeing	speciﬁcally	and	
inves_gate	East	German's	Wohlbeﬁnden.	In	interviews,	I	deliberately	avoided	
dwelling	too	much	on	asking	about	my	informants'	health	–	Gesundheit.	In	a	culture	
where	western	biomedical	concepts	of	medical	dualism	are	very	much	ingrained,	
there	would	have	been	a	danger	that	something	may	have	been	lost	in	applying	
such	a	narrow	concept.	Therefore,	I	chose	to	focus	on	Wohlbeﬁnden,	as	this	term	is	
more	inclusive.	The	concept	signiﬁes	physical,	mental,	and	emo_onal	wellbeing.		
Indeed,	I	gained	a	broad	impression	of	my	informant’s	interpreta_on	of	their	own	
wellbeing	and	with	that,	their	suﬀering	experience.	The	ethnographic	examples	
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below	provide	an	impression	of	the	complex	landscape	of	trauma	East	Germans	are	
confronted	with.	
InterpretaLons	of	wellbeing		
My	ethnographic	ﬁeldwork	revealed	that	my	informant’s	concep_on	of	their	
personal	wellbeing	is	generally	judged	within	two	dis_nc_ve	_me	frames:	“GDR-
_mes”	-	“Zu	DDR-Zeiten”	and	a`er	the	fall	the	Wall	-	“Nach	der	Wende”.	This	
temporal	divide	stands	out	in	most	East	Germans’	life	story	narra_ves.		
As	I	was	told,	wellbeing	in	the	GDR	also	had	to	be	viewed	from	dual	perspec_ves:	
percep_ons	of	the	private,	and	the	public	sphere.	Under	condi_ons	of	intense	
surveillance	and	intrusion	of	the	state	in	most	areas	of	life,	those	small	niches	that	
were	“private”-	most	o`en	the	close	family	and	home	-	gained	a	higher	value	and	
were	interpreted	very	posi_vely.	In	the	comfortable,	familiar	space	of	home	life	and	
family,	personal	wellbeing	is	remembered	as	having	been	especially	good.	Indeed,	
these	close-knit	connec_ons	to	the	family	are	a	source	of	nostalgia,	even	for	many	
of	those	who	were	cri_cal	of	the	state.	A	further	source	of	comfort	was	the	church.	
Notably,	some	of	the	informants	who	applied	for	emigra_on	felt	that	their	
involvement	with	the	church	signiﬁcantly	improved	their	wellbeing.	This	was	not	
always	ajributed	to	the	prac_ce	of	religion	per	se,	but	rather	church	provided	a	
space	for	free	expression	and	a	sense	of	connectedness	with	like-minded	people.		
The	applica_on	to	emigrate	also	meant	that	these	individuals	were	confronted	with	
in-depth	Stasi	interroga_ons	and	constant	surveillance,	causing	increased	anxiety	
and	stress.	Weekly	mee_ngs	with	church	organisa_ons,	such	as	the	Junge	
Gemeinde,	provided	some	relief	during	this	tense	period.	As	one	informant	told	me,	
it	gave	her	the	strength	to	con_nue	the	applica_on	process.	
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S_ll,	others	told	me	that	GDR	_mes	were	the	best	_mes	of	their	lives.	The	stability	
and	security	that	the	state	provided	was	essen_al	to	their	wellbeing.	This	changed	
drama_cally	as	the	state	collapsed.	A`er	the	Wende	they	were	forced	to	enter	a	
new	era	of	their	lives,	where	the	new	state	no	longer	provided	the	structure	and	
support	that	they	craved.	To	them,	the	end	of	socialism	was	a	trauma_c	event.	
Today,	wellbeing	in	the	GDR	con_nues	to	be	regarded	in	mul_ple	ways.	While	some	
suﬀered	immensely	from	the	state	collapse,	or	rather	the	a`ermath	of	
unemployment	and	insecurity,	others	con_nue	to	suﬀer	from	the	trauma	of	state	
repression	and	violence.	At	_mes,	these	two	factors	may	even	coincide.	Some	
people	who	were	treated	unfairly	during	socialism	may	feel	that	in	the	new	state	
they	are	s_ll	exposed	to	injus_ce	and	their	suﬀering	is	not	recognised.		
In	regard	to	previous	trauma,	wellbeing	may	be	challenged	periodically.		Informants	
o`en	described	this	in	terms	of	“sore	spots”	-	“Wunder	Punkt”.	In	other	words,	they	
feel	well	in	general,	but	under	certain	condi_ons,	they	may	relive	old	pain.	This	is	
true	when	they	are	reminded	of	their	trauma_c	experience,	for	example	by	certain	
conversa_ons	they	recall,	or	by	the	memories	or	how	the	GDR	past	is	interpreted	in	
public	discourse.	As	seen	in	cases	of	trauma,	par_cularly	PTSD,	this	seems	to	be	a	
common	occurrence.			
The	same	is	true	for	unresolved	issues	of	injus_ce	and	betrayal.	Here,	my	informants	
reported	a	challenge	to	their	wellbeing	when	it	came	to	their	disturbed	
rela_onships	with	those	friends	or	family	members	who	either	reported	on	them	or	
betrayed	them	by	abandoning	them	in	favour	of	the	state.	And	conversely,	a	
par_cularly	posi_ve	view	of	personal	wellbeing	was	provided	by	those	who	
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consciously	recognise	how	they	beneﬁjed	from	the	reuniﬁca_on	and	value	their	
new	freedom.	The	following	sec_on	will	explore	the	trauma_c	impact	of	state	
control	on	the	lives	of	East	Germans.	
State	terror	and	its	traumatizing	consequences	
In	the	beginning	of	this	thesis	I	gave	three	ethnographic	examples	of	East	Germans’	
life	histories,	illustra_ng	the	role	that	the	regime	played	in	their	lives	and	its	various	
consequences.	For	many,	but	not	all	of	these	interlocutors,	the	mere	men_oning	of	
the	East	Germany’s	secret	police	force	was	associated	with	trauma_c	memories.		
During	the	period	of	my	ﬁeldwork,	I	spoke	to	three	individuals	who	had	been	
imprisoned	as	poli_cal	dissidents	in	the	GDR	(or	previously	Eastern	occupied	zone).	
Their	stories	were	ripe	with	gruesome	images	of	dehumanisa_on	and	humilia_on,	
such	as	being	locked	up	in	_ny	unhygienic	prison	cells	and	forced	to	partake	in	
interroga_ons	that	some_mes	lasted	days	or	even	weeks,	employing	torturous	
techniques	like	sleep	depriva_on.	In	two	of	these	accounts,	the	vic_ms	had	already	
been	trauma_sed	by	the	atroci_es	of	the	Second	World	War	and	had	ﬁrst-hand	
experience	of	the	Soviet	occupa_on.	Both	had	been	imprisoned	by	Soviet	oﬃcials	
shortly	a`er	the	war—one	in	a	secret	underground	prison	in	Berlin,	and	the	other	at	
the	former	concentra_on	camp,	Sachsenhausen.	Those	who	were	sentenced	in	the	
GDR	were	trauma_sed	in	mul_ple	ways,	o`en	through	Stasi	surveillance	prior	to	
and	a`er	imprisonment,	as	well	as	the	interroga_on	period	and	_me	in	prison.	
Other	trauma_c	experiences	were	linked	directly	to	surveillance	and	ac_ve	
repression,	as	I	outlined	earlier.	Signiﬁcantly,	these	individuals	felt	that	they	were	
never	“safe”	because	the	Stasi’s	power	was	so	almighty.	With	this	came	the	
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systema_c	ins_lla_on	of	overall	fear	and	a	distrusul	atmosphere	amongst	friends	
and	family,	leaving	vic_ms	feeling	lonely	and	isolated,	unsure	of	their	own	sense	of	
self	or	the	true	inten_ons	of	others	(Trobisch-Lütge	2010).	Coupled	with	this	fear,	
was	the	general	pressure	to	conform	within	the	popula_on,	a	manifesta_on	of	the	
internalisa_on	of	years	of	state	control.	As	I	discussed	in	chapter	two,	these	
symptoms	are	characteris_c	of	systema_c	state	terror.	
A	person’s	role	in	the	System:	Personal	and	wider	repercussions	
	
Further	trauma_c	events	ensued	a`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall	and	Germany's	
reuniﬁca_on.	These	events	came	in	two	forms.	For	some,	the	breakdown	of	the	GDR	
meant	an	end	to	a	state	system	they	had	helped	to	build	over	the	years.	Here,	ideals	
that	were	once	valued	were,	virtually	overnight,	apparently	no	longer	valid.	Thus,	
even	a`er	the	ﬁrst	wave	of	euphoria	about	newly	acquired	freedoms,	
disillusionment	set	in	fast	when	state-owned	companies	closed	down	and	
unemployment	rates	started	soaring.	Many	found	it	hard	to	adjust	to	the	new	
system.	To	those	who	were	made	redundant,	it	was	a	great	shock	from	which	some	
s_ll	have	not	managed	to	recover.	As	the	ideal	of	being	a	produc_ve	member	of	
society	held	such	high	value	in	the	GDR,	being	unemployed	meant	a	severe	loss	of	
purpose	and	value	as	a	human	being.	
Second,	the	integra_on	of	the	“Neue	Bundesländer”	into	the	Federal	Republic	of	
Germany	brought	front	and	centre	a	new	democra_c	poli_cal	system	which	
condemned	such	extreme	state	control.	Those	who	once	thought	they	were	helping	
the	communist	cause,	were	suddenly	labelled	as	oﬀenders.	Another	dimension	was	
added	when	the	records	of	the	Staatssicherheit	were	made	available.	This	new	and	
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startling	informa_on	created	unexpected	controversies	regarding	an	individual's	
roles	and	responsibili_es	within	the	regime;	but	most	signiﬁcantly	for	this	study,	it	
also	elicited	trauma_c	responses	from	those	who	were	spied	upon.	Here,	it	must	be	
emphasised	that	in	the	a`ermath	of	the	SED-regime,	it	is	diﬃcult	to	apply	the	usual	
roles	of	"perpetrator	versus	vic_m".	The	lines	between	the	two	are	o`en	blurred	
since	the	Stasi	received	so	much	support	and	assistance	from	the	general	
popula_on	(Fuchs	1990).		"Not	everyone	listed	in	(a)	ﬁle	as	an	informer	was	a	
scoundrel.	Many	informers	reported	tremendously	harmful	informa_on	on	close	
friends	and	family	–	without	realising	it.	The	poison	of	the	informa_on	in	the	ﬁles	
only	some_mes	reﬂected	a	corresponding	evil	on	the	part	of	its	provider.	The	Stasi	
ﬁles	reveal	a	system	of	mad	genius.	Oﬃcials	boasted	that	even	the	purest	soul	
would	eventually	turn	into	an	informer,	and	they	were	nearly	right."	(Rosenberg	
1995,	p.	298).			
Therefore,	it	can	be	concluded	that	East	German	trauma	(about	the	state	and	state	
control)	is	mul_faceted.	This	is	the	case	both,	in	the	nature	of	the	trauma	
experienced	and,	as	I	will	elaborate	in	the	following	sec_on,	in	the	possibili_es	of	
healing	and	transcendence	required	to	overcoming	it.	
Anxiety	and	Trauma	
	
This	ethnographic	study	of	life	under	extreme	state	control	in	the	former	GDR	and	
its	a`ermath	has	shown	that	East	Germans	were	exposed	to	numerous	trauma_c	
incidences	caused	either	directly	or	indirectly	by	state	terror.	In	recent	years,	
abundant	literature	has	emerged	which	features	narra_ve	accounts	and	tes_monies	
of	trauma	experiences	in	the	GDR	(see,	for	example,	Hoﬀmann	2012;	Michael	1994;	
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Paul	2008;	Knabe	2012).	Various	authors,	in	par_cular	psychiatrists	and	
psychologists,	have	discussed	how		the	Zersetzung	method	had	devasta_ng	and	
long-las_ng	eﬀects	on	peoples’	lives,	breaking	apart	families	and	friendships	and	
leaving	vic_ms	with	severe	psychological	damage.	Authors	include	Peters	1991;	
Seidler	&	Froese	2006;	Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009;	Trobisch-Lütge		2010;		
Priebe	et	al.	1996	and	Freyberger	et	al.	2003.		
Psychiatrist	Stefan	Trobisch-Lütge	specialises	in	the	therapy	of	poli_cal	trauma	of	
the	former	GDR.	In	“Das	späte	Gir”	he	describes	the	nature	of	his	pa_ents’	
psychological	traumas	and	stresses	that	in	most	cases	the	psychological	wounds	are	
s_ll	painful	more	than	20	years	a`er	the	end	of	socialism.	Indeed,	some	East	
Germans	only	begin	to	feel	the	long-term	aﬀects	of	their	trauma	now.	The	_tle	of	
the	book	“Late	Venom”	alludes	to	his	argument	that	the	Stasi’s	surveillance	and	
repression	poisons	people’s	souls	and	their	social	rela_onships	many	years	later,	s_ll	
impac_ng	many	peoples’	lives	nega_vely.			
Bomberg	and	Trobisch-Lütge	emphasize	that	GDR	-	trauma_sa_on	must	be	
considered	within	the	cultural-historical	context	of	the	SED-dictatorship,	in	order	to	
grasp	its	complexity.	Due	to	the	coercive	nature	of	the	Stasi’s	extensive	surveillance	
of	the	popula_on,	it	is	not	easy	to	dis_nguish	who	was	“ac_vely”	repressed	(e.g.,	
through	the	use	of	the	Zersetzung	method).	It	cannot	always	be	proven	either.	Stasi	
ﬁles	are	not	always	available	or	may	be	incomplete.	This	lack	of	evidence	makes	
dealing	with	trauma	all	the	more	diﬃcult.	A`er	the	collapse	of	the	GDR,	poli_cal	
trauma_sa_on	was	ini_ally	barely	ever	diagnosed	or	recognised,	especially	in	
rela_on	to	the	eﬀects	of	imprisonment.	In	1999,	only	5%	of	those	aﬀected,	were	
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oﬃcially	recognised	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.38,	see	also	Freyberger	et	
al.	2003).	
Trobisch-Lütge	emphasises	that	it	is	extremely	diﬃcult	to	pin	down	to	what	extent	a	
person	is	trauma_sed	and	from	where	exactly	this	trauma	originates,	par_cularly	
amongst	those	East	Germans	who	had	not	been	imprisoned.	Those	who	were	under	
long-term	surveillance,	or	even	those	to	whom	it	had	merely	been	suggested	that	
they	were	being	watched,	might	also	suﬀer	from	severe	psychological	symptoms	
(2010,	p.30).	The	fact	that	their	suspicions	cannot	always	be	proven	exacerbates	the	
problems	at	hand,	as	pa_ents	feel	that	the	public	is	not	taking	them	seriously.	
Maercker	et	al.	(2013)	have	found	that	pa_ents	diagnosed	with	PTSD	caused	by	
poli_cal	persecu_on	in	the	GDR,	feel	that	they	receive	very	lijle	recogni_on	and	
acceptance	from	their	surroundings,	compared	to	other	PTSD	suﬀerers.		
Only	in	recent	years,	has	the	public	recogni_on	of	vic_m’s	suﬀering	gained	more	
momentum,	as	is	evidenced	by	a	growing	body	of	psychology	and	psychiatric	
literature,	which	engages	with	pa_ent’s	case	vignejes	of	therapy	and	long-term	
implica_ons	of	imprisonment	and	persecu_on	(see	for	example	Plänkers	T.,	Bahrke	
U.,	Waltzer	M.	et	al.	2005;	Behnke,	K.	&	Trobisch,	S.	1998;	Trobisch-Lütge,	2010;	
Seidler	&	Froese		2006).	The	advancing	engagement	of	medical	professionals	with	
the	ﬁeld	has	also	ﬁnally	brought	some	advancements	in	disputes	concerning	
compensa_on	(in	2008	new	state	regula_ons	came	into	power)	(Bomberg	&	
Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.41-42).	S_ll,	vic_m	support	organisa_ons	remain	cri_cal	of	
the	public	processes	and	lack	of	recogni_on	of	SED-dictatorship	vic_m’s	suﬀering.	
Pa_ent's	extreme	social	distrust,	then,	not	only	makes	their	personal	encounters	
problema_c	but	also	causes	great	diﬃculty	in	psychotherapy.	Trobisch-Lütge	
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highlights	the	severe	consequences	of	poli_cal	trauma,	which	include	PTSD,	
depression,	anxiety	and	psychosoma_c	symptoms	(2010,	p.	29-30).	
There	are	numerous	empirical	studies	inves_ga_ng	the	eﬀect	of	GDR	persecu_on	
and	imprisonment	on	pa_ent’s	health.	Most	of	these	studies	are	concerned	with	the	
diagnosis	and	treatment	of	poli_cal	trauma.	There	is	clear	evidence	that	persecu_on	
and	especially	imprisonment	lead	to	a	high	rate	of	depression,	personality	disorders	
and	other	mental	health	issues	(Bauer	et	al.	1993;	Bauer	&	Priebe	1994;	Priebe	et	al.	
1993;	Priebe	et	al.	1994;	Bandemer-Greulich	et	al.	1998).	Indeed,	at	least	one-third	
of	former	poli_cal	prisoners	s_ll	suﬀer	severely	from	PTSD,	to	this	day	(Bomberg	&	
Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.61).	A	review	of	qualita_ve	and	quan_ta_ve	data	
demonstrate	that	those	aﬀected,	con_nue	to	suﬀer	long-term	mental-health	and	
social	limita_ons	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.63).	
Pa_ents	suﬀer	from	a	deforma_on	of	self-organisa_on,	leading	to	a	serious	change	
in	personality.	Symptoms	include	distancing,	isola_on,	self-destruc_ve	behaviour	
and	great	diﬃcul_es	in	judging	internal	and	external	reali_es.	When	trauma	does	
not	heal,	long-term	post-trauma_c	stress	and	related	dissocia_ve	disorders	are	likely	
to	occur.	A	general	phenomenon	seen	in	this	par_cular	group	of	poli_cally	
trauma_sed	individuals	is	their	damaged	social	communica_on	skills	and	their	
diﬃcul_es	in	interac_ng	normally	in	everyday	social	rela_onships	(Trobisch-Lütge	
2010,	p.89).		
While	it	is	abundantly	clear	that	state	control	in	the	GDR	has	le`	the	popula_on	
with	signiﬁcant	trauma,	the	type	of	trauma	and	anxiety	they	experience	can	hardly	
be	summed	up	into	one	East	German	condi_on.	Instead,	as	Plänkers	et	al.	(2005)	
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and	Trobisch-Lütge	(2010)	have	shown,	the	landscape	of	trauma	in	East	Germany	is	
very	complex.	The	pa_ent	cases	that	they	present	illustrate	the	complexity	of	
trauma,	which	some_mes	combines	previous	nega_ve	personal	experiences	in	
family	rela_onships	and	upbringing	with	the	long-term	debilita_ng	consequences	of	
state-sponsored	violence.	This	combina_on	has	given	rise	to	a	mul_tude	of	
trauma_c	incidences.	Yet,	as	I	have	shown,	the	state's	intrusion	into	ci_zens'	
everyday	lives	was	so	intense	that	it	is	extremely	diﬃcult	to	separate	ins_tu_onal	
from	personal	trauma.	As	we	have	seen,	state	control	directly	incorporated	and	
used	GDR	ci_zens	in	its	self-perpetua_ng	system,	which	created	deeply	intertwined	
nega_ve	experiences	involving	family	and	state.Indeed,	while	many	of	the	
symptoms	experienced	by	my	informants	and	those	described	in	exis_ng	literature	
show	similari_es	with	PTSD,	the	ques_on	remains	as	to	whether	or	not	it	is	possible	
to	talk	of	a	collec_ve	form	of	post-trauma_c	stress	disorder	experienced	by	all	East	
Germans	as	a	result	of	their	history	of	more	than	40	years	of	repression	and	state	
violence.	
The	study	of	trauma	is	a	rela_vely	recent	one,	which	is	s_ll	constantly	expanded.	
First	accounts	of	trauma	were	recorded	at	the	beginning	of	the	20th	Century:	
"Shellshock"	emerged	in	the	ﬁrst	World	War	out	of	an	exposure	to	extreme	
violence.	Situa_ons	where	a	person	is	unable	to	escape	a	threat,	their	survival	is	
dependent	on	mere	fate	and	they	feel	totally	powerless,	make	them	par_cularly	
vulnerable	to	trauma	(Fischer	&	Riedesser	1999,	p.	132).	Post-trauma_c	stress	
disorder	(PTSD)	was	ﬁrst	oﬃcially	recognised	as	a	psychiatric	disorder	in	1980	when	
it	was	added	to	the	Diagnos_c	and	Sta_s_cal	Manual	(DSM)	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-
Lütge	2009).	More	recently	the	research	ﬁeld	of	PTSD	has	expanded	greatly	and	
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now	includes	ﬁndings	of	physical	evidence	(Neuroendocrinological	and	
Psychobiological),	as	well	as	the	psychological	and	social	impact	trauma	(Van	der	
Kolk	1996;	Kirmeyer	et	al.	2007;	Shalev	et	al.	2000).	Rosen	and	Lilienfeld	(2008)	have	
cri_cally	evaluated	the	exis_ng	literature	of	PTSD	and	concluded	that	much	about	
the	condi_on	is	s_ll	unknown.	Research	indicates	that	the	currently	exis_ng	
deﬁni_on	of	PTSD	as	it	is	found	in	the	DSM	is	s_ll	insuﬃcient	in	covering	the	
complexity	of	PTSD	as	a	mental	illness,	sugges_ng	that	new	sub-categories	are	
necessary	in	illustra_ng	the	broad	spectrum	of	symptoms.	The	disorder,	as	well	as	
the	use	of	the	term	"trauma",	remain	contested		for	anthropologists	and	
psychologists	alike	(Shalev	et	al.	2000;	Young	1995;	Antze	&	Lambek	1996;Alexander	
et	al.	2004;	Kirmayer	et	al.	2007;	Fassin	&	Rechtman	2009;	Argen_-Pillen	2016)15.	
Indeed,	trauma	is	a	profoundly	moral	and	poli_cal	concept.	A`er	the	second	World	
War,	in	Germany,	there	was	a	reluctance	of	medical	professionals	to	oﬃcially	
recognise	the	eﬀects	of	extreme	trauma	that	vic_ms	of	the	Holocaust	had	been	
exposed	to	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.40).	Especially,	inves_ga_ons	into	
extreme	trauma	con_nue	to	be	a	highly	challenged	ﬁeld	of	study.	Bohleber	speaks	
of	a	“strange	ambivalence”	when	it	comes	to	the	clinical	and	theore_cal	analysis	of	
trauma	as	a	result	of	socio-poli_cal	violence,	and	as	literature	indicates	this	is	
certainly	a	great	concern	for	poli_cally	trauma_sed	East	Germans	who	feel	
marginalised	and	isolated	in	their	suﬀering	(Mearcker	2013;	Trobisch-Lütge	2010).	
Both,	their	recogni_on	or	denial	of	status	as	“vic_ms”	of	the	SED-regime	carries	
heavy	moral	judgement,	as	I	will	explore	further	in	the	following	sec_on.			
																																								 																				
15	There	is	a	large	body	of	literature	on	the	study	of	trauma,	here	I	just	mention	some	of	the	
key	texts.	
	 234	
	
A	condition	of	East	German	Angst?	
“If	we	have	learned	anything	from	the	long	history	of	post-traumaSc	studies,	and	
the	shorter	history	of	PTSD,	it	is	that	mulSple	factors	and	their	complex	interrelaSons	
result	in	variable	outcomes	that	are	unlikely	to	be	explained	by	a	single	disorder	in	
nature.”		(Rosen	&	Lilienfeld	2008,	p.	858)		
Many	scholars	are	now	broadening	their	approach	to	trauma	and	other	disorders	
that	arise	from	it.		Michael	Linden	(2003)	proposed	a	new	sub-category,	which	he	
found	to	be	very	prevalent	among	(although	not	limited	to)	ci_zens	of	the	former	
GDR.	This	condi_on	is	merely	one	type	of	post-trauma_c	experience	that	is	widely	
evidenced	amongst	East	Germans.	He	describes	what	he	calls	"post-trauma_c	
embijerment	disorder",	a	cluster	of	symptoms	that	are	similar	to	PTSD	yet	possess	
some	dis_nct	and	unique	features	characterised	by	a	strong	feeling	of	
embijerment.	Among	his	pa_ents,	he	encountered	numerous	East	Germans	who	
experienced	the	end	of	socialism	and	Germany's	reuniﬁca_on	as	especially	
challenging.	He	found	that	these	strong	feelings	of	embijerment	o`en	grew	out	of	
a	direct	threat	to	a	person's	basic	beliefs.	Linden	(2003)	outlines	how	feelings	of	
embijerment	were	experienced	by	the	majority	of	the	East	German	popula_on:	
“The	model	of	violaSon	of	basic	beliefs	can	explain	why	the	prevalence	of	this	
disorder	must	increase	in	Smes	of	social	change,	and	the	German	reuniﬁcaSon	is	a	
good	example.	Just	as	PTSD	can	be	observed	in	higher	rates	in	Smes	of	war	or	in	
populaSons	exposed	to	major	catastrophes	that	threaten	the	life	of	many	people,	so	
social	changes	can	be	expected	to	increase	the	risk	of	PTED.	During	the	nineSes	most	
East	Germans	underwent	enormous	changes	in	their	biographies,	almost	everybody	
had	to	cope	with	fundamental	changes	in	their	work	situaSon	and	in	their	families,	
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and	many	saw	their	value	systems	called	into	quesSon.	Even	those	who	seem	to	be	
beder	oﬀ	today	than	before	live	under	greater	uncertainty	in	respect	to	their	
individual	future	compared	to	their	lives	under	the	socialist	regime.	There	are	men	
and	women	who	feel	that	much	of	their	life	has	been	wasted	because	of	the	old	
system,	and	even	those	who	hoped	for	a	new	beginning	in	the	new	system	oren	
found	that	they	were	cheated,	let	down,	or	set	aside”	(Linden	2003,	p.200).			
Post-trauma_c	embijerment	disorder	is	unique	in	the	sense	that	pa_ents	feel	not	
only	a	“threat	to	personal	integrity	as	a	key	feature	of	the	disorder	but	any	viola_on	
of	basic	beliefs”	(Linden	et	al.	2007).	Moreover,	contrary	to	Ehlers	&	Clark’s	(2000)	
deﬁni_on	of	PTSD,	pa_ents	with	PTED	tend	to	express	embijerment	as	the	main	
emo_on,	not	anger	as	it	is	common	in	PTSD.	Linden	et	al.	(2003;	2008)	contrast	the	
two	condi_ons	as	such:	
"There	are	similariSes	like	their	reacSve	nature,	their	prolonged	course,	
intrusions	and	a	mulStude	of	addiSonal	symptoms.	However,	PTSD	is	the	
result	of	an	iniSal	anxiety	or	panic	provoking	event	and	can,	in	essence,	be	
understood	as	an	anxiety	disorder.	In	contrast,	PTED	is	a	disorder	
characterised	by	embiderment,	hosSlity,	aggression,	etc.	Clinically	these	are	
very	disSnct	phenomena	which	also	need	diﬀerent	treatment	approaches."	
(2008	p.55).	
As	the	example	of	diagnos_c	diﬀeren_a_on	outlined	above	demonstrates,	trauma	is	
a	mul_dimensional	concept	and	its	a`ermath	can	take	many	shapes	and	forms.	As	
Trobisch-Lütge	(2010),	Plänkers	et	al.	(2005)	and	Linden	et	al.	(2005;	2008)	
demonstrate,	from	a	psychological	standpoint	East	Germans	have	dealt	in	a	
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mul_tude	of	ways	with	life	under	socially	and	psychologically	adverse	condi_ons.	In	
the	GDR	state	control	that	was	prac_sed	by	means	of	the	Stasi's	sophis_cated	
psychological	methods	of	repression,	crea_ng	condi_ons	of	normalised	social	
control.	Further,	the	fundamental	social	and	poli_cal	transi_on	of	the	region,	make	
East	Germany	a	unique	area	of	inves_ga_on.	Taking	these	par_cular	circumstances	
into	considera_on,	I	argue	that	one	condi_on	may	not	suﬃce	as	a	diagnosis	since	
the	East	German	example	is	so	mul_-facejed	in	the	way	trauma	is	and	was	
experienced.	More	o`en	than	not,	trauma_c	experiences	were	repeated	or	
ongoing.	One	could	say	that	in	the	case	of	my	informants'	trauma_c	incidents	
accumulated,	not	exclusively	origina_ng	in	state	control.	Plänkers	et	al.	(2005)	have	
also	emphasized	East	Germans’	varied	psychological	responses	to	the	GDR	past	and	
the	transi_on	to	the	united	Germany.	They	describe	that	an	exposure	to	the	
repressive	dictatorship	on	the	one	hand,	could	cause	extensive	damage	to	people’s	
psychological	wellbeing.	On	the	other,	some	East	Germans	suﬀered	ever	more	a`er	
the	collapse	of	the	regime	and	mourned	the	loss	of	a	“suppor_ve	system”.	In	such	
cases,	they	men_on	mechanisms	of	“psychological	decompensa_on”	–	some_mes	
referred	to	as	“Wendekrankheit”,	which	may	be	characterized	by	high	levels	of	
anxiety	par_cularly	amongst	men	and	a	high	number	of	ea_ng	disorders	especially	
amongst	women	(see	Plänkers	et	al.2005,	p.	14).	Nevertheless,	they	stress	that	the	
case	of	the	GDR	is	unique	in	that	the	symptoms	and	expression	of	trauma	are	
unspeciﬁc	and	are	highly	dependent	on	individual	factors.	
Lijlewood	(2002)	has	cri_cally	approached	the	ques_on	of	what	should	be	
considered	pathological	behaviour	and	what	social	meaning	par_cular	pathologies	
take	on.	He	writes	“rather	than	assume	that	a	salient	‘pathology’	necessarily	
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presents	an	image	of	its	society,	we	can	start	more	modestly	from	the	idea	that	
where	some	general	category	of	illness	(or	other	loss	of	personal	agency	as	in	
witchcra`	accusa_ons	or	latah)	is	locally	recognised,	this	category	is	then	deployed	
through	the	prac_cal	interests	of	experts,	vic_ms	and	others”	(Lijlewood	2002,	p.	
76).	Indeed,	trauma	is	morally	complex,	as	it	is	highly	dependent	on	the	way	
suﬀering	is	judged	by	individuals	and	ins_tu_ons	in	rela_on	to	their	own	
experiences	and	agendas.	“Thus	trauma,	o`en	unbeknowest	to	those	who	promote	
it,	reinvents	“good“and	“bad“	vic_m,	or	at	least	a	ranking	of	legi_macy	among	
vic_ms“	(Fassin	&	Rechtman	2009,	p.282).	
	Lijlewood	(2002)	also	sheds	light	on	the	moral	ambiguity	of	trauma,	while	looking	
at	the	example	of	PTSD	in	war	veterans	in	the	US.	The	diagnosis	and	recogni_on	of	
trauma	as	an	illness16,	placed	soldiers	in	new	moral	landscape	where	they	were	
suddenly	regarded	as	the	suﬀerers.	“The	diagnosis	of	PTSD	allowed	those	soldiers	
guilty	of	sexual	massacre	and	rape	in	Vietnam	to	become	vic_ms	in	their	turn,	
vic_ms	of	the	“trauma”of	war	in	general;	atrocity	becomes	the	natural	act	of	the	
trauma_zed”	(Lijlewood	2002,	p.	124).	
	As	Fassin	and	Rechtman	(2009)	rightly	say	“trauma	today	is	a	moral	judgement“.	In	
the	case	of	the	GDR	the	ques_on	of	legi_macy	among	vic_ms	is	par_cularly	morally	
complex,	ﬁrstly	due	to	the	blurred	lines	between	vic_ms	and	perpetrators,	and	
secondly	due	to	their	ambivalent	public	image	(e.g.	how	these	individuals	are	seen	
in	East	and	West	Germany,	Interna_onally	but	also	the	morally	ambiguous	image	of	
self-proclaimed	vic_ms	and	state	employees).	Because	who	is	to	say	that	a	Stasi	
																																								 																				
16	Facilitated	by	US	war	veteran	associations.	
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collaborator	who	was	pressured	and	observed	by	his	colleagues	at	the	MfS,	did	not	
suﬀer	the	same	trauma	as	a	poli_cal	dissident?	Such	judgements	are	highly	personal	
and	poli_cal	in	the	case	of	East	Germany.		In	the	Empire	of	Trauma,	Fassin	and	
Rechtman	explore	the	history	of	trauma	as	psychiatric,	social,	and	poli_cal	category.	
In	par_cular,	they	examine	how	and	whether	vic_ms	of	trauma	are	recognized.	
Using	a	mul_tude	of	ethnographic	examples,	they	demonstrate	the	moral	
complexity	of	trauma.	Indeed,	they	believe	that	“the	truth	of	trauma	lies	in	(…)	the	
moral	economy	of	contemporary	socie_es”	(Fassin	&	Rechtman	2009,	p.276).	In	
their	view	trauma	is	not	merely	a	label	for	a	psychiatric	condi_on,	but	rather	“the	
product	of	a	new	rela_onship	to	_me	and	memory,	to	mourning	and	obliga_ons,	to	
misfortune	and	the	misfortunate.”	(Fassin	&	Rechtman	2009,	p.276)	This	inevitably	
evokes	the	ques_on	of	who	is	considered	a	vic_m	and	perhaps	more	to	the	point,	
who’s	suﬀering	is	deemed	as	legi_mate?	Trauma	gives	legi_macy	to	people’s	
suﬀering,	even	though	their	suﬀering	is	not	necessarily	conﬁned	to	the	experience	
of	a	single	nega_ve	event.	O`en-_mes	people	already	suﬀered	a	mul_tude	of	
traumas	prior	to	the	event	which	is	deemed	“legi_mately	trauma_c”by	society.	
“Trauma	is	not	only	silent	on	these	reali_es,	it	actually	obscures	them.	As	a	focus	of	
consensus,	it	eliminates	individual	features.	We	can	therefore	understand	that	it	is	
claimed	by	vic_ms	themselves,	that	is,	by	members	of	society	who	deﬁne	
themselves	as	vic_ms.	Trauma	oﬀers	a	language	in	which	to	speak	of	the	wounds	of	
the	past	–	of	slavery,	coloniza_on,	or	apartheid“	(Fassin	&Rechtman	2009,	p.281).	As	
I	have	illustrated	in	my	interlocutors’	personal	accounts,	East	Germans	suﬀered	a	
mul_tude	of	traumas,	therefore	I	look	to	Scaer’s	approach	to	being	trauma	viewed	
on	a	spectrum,	rather	than	necessarily	origina_ng	from	a	single	event.	
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East	German	Trauma	spectrum	and	“Little	traumas”	
Robert	Scaer	(2005)	takes	a	unique	approach	to	trauma.	He	argues	that	trauma	is	
not	at	all	an	unusual	occurrence	across	socie_es.	Indeed,	he	claims	that	social	
control	is	in_mately	intertwined	with	the	systema_c	inﬂic_ng	of	trauma.	
Persecu_on	and	discrimina_on	in	all	modern	socie_es	are	used	as	a	method	of	
controlling	popula_ons.	This	is	achieved	in	various	ways,	including	the	distribu_on	
and	redistribu_on	of	wealth,	the	law	and	how	it	is	unequally	applied,	and	in	the	
aliena_ng	or	usurping	of	religious	ins_tu_ons	to	meet	poli_cal	objec_ves.		
A	certain	amount	of	control	is,	of	course,	essen_al	to	ensure	that	a	popula_on	is	
managed	and	safe—in	other	words,	in	order	to	ensure	that	chaos	does	not	ensue.	
When	this	control	creates	condi_ons	where	individuals	can	no	longer	act	
autonomously,	are	conﬁned	and	experience	helplessness,	trauma_c	experiences	
may	proliferate.	Scaer	writes,	“the	concept	of	‘control’	in	this	sense	intrinsically	
implies	a	reduc_on	in	op_ons	and	a	subtle	movement	away	from	empowerment	
and	towards	helplessness”	(Scaer,	2005	p.127).	
Scaer	describes	how	fear	is	used	as	one	such	method	of	control—for	instance,	in	
states	of	war	in	order	to	elicit	certain	behaviours	from	the	populace.	But	fear	and	
helplessness	are	used	by	many	ins_tu_ons	as	a	means	to	an	end	(e.g.,	in	the	
workplace).	These	methods	of	social	control	are	commonly	condoned	by	socie_es	
and	on	the	surface	appear	to	be	a	“normal”	part	of	a	given	culture.		
He	states	that	“in	this	state	of	compromised	control	and	rela_ve	helplessness,	the	
seeds	are	sown	for	trauma_sa_on	by	lijle	experiences	that	might	appear	to	be	
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trivial	but	for	their	unique	meaning	to	the	well-being	of	the	individual	-	a	meaning	
that	is	based	on	the	person’s	cumula_ve	life	experience.”	(Scaer,	2005	p.127).		
Likewise,	I	argue	that	it	is	exactly	this	culturally-condoned	trauma_sa_on,	which	
took	place	on	a	large	scale	in	the	GDR,	leading	to	a	wide	spectrum	individual	and	
societal	trauma.	In	the	regime,	the	majority	of	the	popula_on	was	exposed	to	the	
normalisa_on	of	a	culture	of	control,	in	the	form	of	mass-surveillance	and	
repression.	As	Scaer	writes:	
“A	spectrum	of	societal	trauma	exists,	but	it	is	invisible	to	the	eye	of	the	ci_zen	
because	the	sources	of	that	trauma	are	accepted	as	“normal”	and	endorsed	by	their	
parent	ins_tu_on”	(2005	p.127).	Even	in	the	a`ermath	of	socialism’s	collapse,	
condi_ons	were	fer_le	ground	for	further	trauma_c	experiences	(unemployment,	
new	poli_cal	and	social	order,	revela_on	of	Stasi	ﬁles	etc.).	In	other	words,	the	social	
contexts	which	were	common	in	the	GDR	made	people	much	more	vulnerable	to	
responding	poorly	to	unexpected	psychological	challenges,	even	under	improved	
circumstances.		
Scaer	argues	that	some	form	of	societal	trauma	exists	in	most	socie_es,	where	
through	an	evolu_on	of	cultural	norms	certain	extreme	behaviours	become	
normalised	and	over	_me	are	regarded	as	harmless	and	benign-	at	least	on	the	
surface.	One	example	of	society	condoned	trauma_sa_on	that	comes	to	my	mind	is	
the	early	sending	away	of	children	to	boarding	schools	in	Britain.	Similarly,	in	the	
GDR,	babies	were	separated	from	their	mothers	only	a	few	weeks	a`er	birth	and	
sent	to	cribs/nurseries	(Krippe),	while	their	parents	had	to	return	to	the	workplace	
	 241	
as	fast	as	possible.	Plänkers	et	al.	(2005)	call	this	accepted	child-rearing	prac_ce	in	
the	GDR,	“society-organised	trauma_sa_on”	(2005	p.55-70).		
"The	acceptance	of	these	societal	traumas	occurs	through	a	process	of	numbing	on	
the	part	of	the	populace	and	a	collec_ve	dissocia_on	driven	by	the	cumula_ve	
eﬀects	of	lijle	traumas."	(Scaer	2005	p.127)	My	informants'	cases	exemplify	such	an	
accumula_on	of	lijle	and	great	traumas.	Some	interviewees	displayed	these	
tendencies	of	numbing	and	denial,	especially	those	who	were	openly	in	support	of	
the	repressive	system.	One	example	of	this	behaviour	was	the	account	of	Frau	F.,	
whose	husband	had	been	imprisoned	in	younger	years	(for	an	ajempted	escape)	
and	was	periodically	commijed	to	mental	health	facili_es	to	treat	his	manic	
depression.	Frau	F.	was	aware	that	her	husband's	imprisonment	had	been	an	
extremely	frightening	experience.	Yet,	he	never	spoke	about	it	in	great	detail	
because	upon	his	release	the	Stasi	had	forced	him	to	sign	a	non-disclosure	
agreement.	She	knew	he	was	very	fearful.	At	one	point	the	couple	became	involved	
in	a	murder	inves_ga_on	that	was	conducted	in	their	local	neighbourhood.	The	
police	would	perform	in-depth	ques_oning	of	the	immediate	neighbours.	For	Frau	
F.'s	husband,	this	inves_ga_on	became	a	living	hell.	He	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	
murder	that	was	being	inves_gated,	yet	the	interroga_ons	forced	him	to	relive	past	
traumas	causing	severe	distress.	The	inves_ga_ons	went	on	for	some	_me	and	his	
mental	health	deteriorated,	leading	him	to	be	readmijed	to	the	mental	health	
ins_tu_on.	A	few	months	later,	a`er	he	had	returned	home,	another	police	
ques_oning	was	announced.	The	an_cipa_on	of	the	police	visit	made	him	so	fearful	
that	he	had	a	heart	ajack	and	consequently	died.	
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In	our	interview,	Frau	F.	spent	much	_me	describing	the	police	inves_ga_on	and	
men_oned	that	during	that	same	_me	period	the	Stasi	had	approached	her	to	work	
as	an	informant.	She	denied	accep_ng	the	oﬀer.	Yet	to	me	she	seemed	somewhat	
morally	ambiguous.	Not	only	was	she	very	knowledgable	about	the	rewards	that	the	
Stasi	gave	to	those	who	reported	unoﬃcially,	but	seemed	almost	unemo_onal	when	
she	recounted	her	husband's	death.	It	was	as	if	she	men_oned	it	in	passing.	She	
very	majer	of	factly	said	that	surely	her	husband	could	have	also	gojen	a	heart	
ajack	any	other	way.	When	I	heard	this,	I	was	shocked,	as	her	story	made	me	feel	
uneasy	and	slightly	puzzled.	Her	behaviour	seemed	strange	since	she	clearly	knew	
how	frightened	he	had	been	and	was	aware	of	the	anxiety	that	the	police	
ques_oning	evoked.	
Upon	further	thought,	however,	her	way	of	coping	with	the	situa_on	made	more	
sense.	Perhaps	she	was	in	denial	about	the	situa_on	and	numbing	her	emo_onal	
response	was	her	way	of	accep_ng	the	"normality"	of	severe	state	control	and	the	
Stasi's	inves_ga_ve	methods.	A`er	all,	she	had	previously	told	me	of	her	own	fears	
of	state	oﬃcials	and	government	buildings	as	a	lijle	girl.	Her	own	grandmother	had	
been	imprisoned	when	she	was	very	young,	and	she	had	witnessed	her	return	from	
prison	as	a	broken	woman.	She	was	deeply	trauma_sed	and	never	recovered	from	
the	experience.	Frau	F.	was	quite	open	about	her	fears	as	a	child,	but	it	appeared	
that	gradually	as	an	adult	she	suppressed	those	fears.	Indeed,	she	was	even	inclined	
to	become	involved	in	the	system	herself,	when	she	contemplated	joining	the	Stasi	
as	an	informant.	Perhaps	it	was	a	way	of	repea_ng	her	childhood	trauma?	Or	did	
this	direct	involvement	with	the	feared	state	oﬃcials	have	a	cathar_c	eﬀect	on	her?	
These	ques_ons	remain	unanswered,	yet	Frau	F.'s	ambiguous	story	illustrates	the	
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extent	to	which	people	numbed	their	emo_ons	in	order	to	func_on	in	a	culture	of	
control.	Fear	forced	ci_zens	to	comply	with	the	system	even	to	the	point	of	death.	
Her	husband	had	already	been	trauma_sed	by	his	previous	experiences	of	
imprisonment	and	his	experiences	in	mental	ins_tu_ons—both	of	which	placed	him	
in	an	extremely	precarious	and	vulnerable	posi_on.	There	was	no	way	to	escape;	
and	his	confronta_on	with	severe	helplessness	lead	not	only	to	to	mul_ple	trauma,	
but	eventually	to	his	un_mely	death.		
The	GDR	as	a	physical	and	cultural	cage	
Scaer	writes	that	"almost	any	social	seang	where	control	is	lost,	and	rela_ve	
helplessness	is	part	of	the	environment,	can	easily	progress	to	a	trauma_c	
experience"(Scaer	2005,	p.132).	In	the	GDR	this	was	true	on	a	large	scale	because	
the	popula_on's	loss	of	control	made	them	par_cularly	vulnerable	to	trauma.	
Ci_zens	were	trapped	in	their	own	country;	their	mobility	was	limited.	Playing	on	
the	fears	of	the	popula_on,	the	Wall	was	proclaimed	to	provide	security,	a	
protec_on	against	the	fascist	enemy.	The	state	intruded	and	controlled	ci_zens'	
lives,	limi_ng	personal	autonomy.	Deviant	behaviour	was	punished	and	the	state	
o`en	acted	arbitrarily,	causing	fear	and	ul_mately	leaving	the	popula_on	in	a	
helpless	posi_on.	As	Scaer	describes,	people	are	not	always	aware	of	their	trauma	
(as	it	is	o`en	seen	in	cases	of	childhood	abuse	and	trauma),	especially	when	they	do	
not	know	life	any	other	way.	Under	such	condi_ons	complicity	appears	to	be	the	
most	logical	modus	operandi.	Indeed,	he	says	that	“societal	rituals	that	are	
intrinsically	trauma_sing	eventually	tend	to	be	accepted	as	the	lesser	of	a	variety	of	
evils”	(2005,	p.132,	133).	Hence,	individuals	are	rarely	conscious	of	how	their	past	
trauma	shapes	their	physiology,	personality,	and	ongoing	life	choices.		
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Even	though	many	of	Scaer’s	examples	and	claims	are	certainly	arguable	and	
provoca_ve,	I	believe	he	makes	a	valid	point	in	his	asser_on	of	what	he	calls	a	
“cultural	cage".	While	social	control	(to	a	certain	extent)	is	a	necessity	to	prevent	
chaos	and	ensure	wellbeing,	this	control	can	easily	be	corrupted	and	altered	to	
achieve	"societal	norms	that	create	helplessness	in	the	face	of	everyday	conﬂicts"	
(p.149).	Ul_mately	these	condi_ons	lead	to	trauma_sa_on	in	a	process	of	an	
accumula_on	of	"lijle	traumas".	I	argue	that	in	the	GDR,	essen_ally	a	police	state,	
this	social	control	was	exacerbated,	causing	mul_ple	traumas	large	and	small.	Even	
as	the	regime	crumbled	and	the	Wall	eventually	fell,	new	trauma_c	situa_ons	(social	
and	ﬁnancial	insecurity,	revela_on	of	Stasi	ﬁles,	etc.)	emerged.	This	le`	East	
Germans	ever-more	vulnerable	to	further	set-backs.	
Furthermore,	Scaer	explains	that	from	a	biological	point	of	view	a	so-called	
“freeze/dissocia_on”17	Response	and	its	discharge	are	the	core	prerequisite	for	an	
experience	to	be	trauma_sing."	(2005,	p.149)	He	describes	how	"animals	in	cap_vity	
are	generally	unable	to	ini_ate	the	freeze	discharge,	a	trait	shared	by	humans".	
Therefore,	cemen_ng	his	asser_on	that	"entrapment	and	helplessness"	are	the	
main	cons_tuents	in	large-scale	societally	condoned	trauma,	just	as	like	the	metal	
cage	in	animals,	it	is	the	"cultural	cage"	in	humans	(2005,	p.149).			
As	previously	men_oned,	in	the	GDR	this	entrapment	was	literal	(conﬁned	by	
borders),	psychological	and	social.	The	Stasi's	system	of	control	evoked	the	feeling	
that	they	were	almighty	and	that	nowhere	was	safe.	I	agree	with	Scaer's	argument	
																																								 																				
17	 The	 reaction	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 fight-flight	 response	 in	 extremely	 frightening	
events.	In	this	case,	self-paralysis	sets	in	during	situations	where	one	concludes	that	
defeating	or	escaping	the	dangerous	opponent	is	impossible.	
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that	trauma	is	a	common	occurrence	in	"organised	socie_es",	yet	in	the	case	of	the	
socialist	dictatorship	in	East	Germany	I	would	argue	that	condi_ons	were	created	
where	propor_onately	higher	levels	of	trauma_sa_on	occurred,	simply	based	on	the	
nature	of	the	social	order	(repressive	dictatorship/police	state).	I	also	argue	that	
trauma	was	mul_faceted,	not	only	caused	directly	by	state	but	also	by	the	unique	
social	dynamics	that	the	system	of	control	generated	(e.g.	betrayal	and	denuncia_on	
by	close	rela_ves	and	friends,	social	pressure).	Such	large-scale	trauma_sa_on	can	
cause	a	mul_tude	of	societal	problems	(e.g.	collec_ve	anxie_es	and	social	distrust).	
In	some	socie_es,	this	can	lead	to,	or	at	least	contribute	to,	the	collapse	of	the	
system.	In	the	GDR	the	system	deteriorated	and	was	ended	by	the	"peaceful	
revolu_on"	in	1989.	Yet,	the	trauma_c	experiences	did	not	stop	there,	and	the	
repercussions	of	social	suﬀering	are	no_ceable	to	this	day.	
Rela_ng	this	to	the	theore_cal	asser_ons	made	in	chapter	2,	I	conclude	that	the	
governance	through	terror	led	to	a	wide	spectrum	of	individual,	collec_ve	and	
cultural	trauma	(Neal	1998;	Smelser	2004;	Alexander	2012).	In	the	following	sec_on,	
I	explore	the	way	in	which	my	informants	coped	with	their	trauma_c	experiences	
during	GDR-_mes	and	since	the	Wende.	Here,	I	demonstrate	that	the	healing	
process	of	my	informants	is	not	yet	completed.	Not	enough	_me	has	passed	yet	to	
heal	all	wounds.	This	ethnographic	study	illustrates	the	way	trauma	is	understood	
and	coped	with	by	individuals.		
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Summary:	State	control,	trauma	and	wellbeing	
	
Among	the	witnesses	of	the	dictatorship	interviewed,	the	individuals	who	explicitly	
regarded	the	Stasi	as	a	nega_ve	aspect	of	the	GDR	and	were	severely	aﬀected	by	its	
repression	(in	its	various	forms),	I	found	two	main	trends:		
1)	NegaLve	impacts	on	wellbeing	
All	interlocutors	con_nue	to	have	nega_ve	feelings	about	the	regime	of	the	German	
Democra_c	Republic,	their	personal	history	or	the	people	who	were	involved,	
especially	those	who	spied	on	them	or	pressured	them	to	abide	by	the	state	
doctrine.	They	s_ll	get	emo_onal	when	discussing	topics	surrounding	the	Stasi.	They	
also	reported	that	they	are	easily	angered	or	frustrated	when	people	defend	or	
jus_fy	the	GDR	regime	or	other	dictatorships.	In	some,	the	memory	of	
powerlessness	against	the	arbitrariness	of	the	state	is	displayed	as	cynicism,		
e.g.,	"Surveillance,	was	like	bad	weather,	it	was	there,	people	knew	it	existed,	but	
there	was	nothing	they	could	do	about	it"	(Herr	Z.).	
The	severity	of	ongoing	suﬀering	varies.	However,	all	informants	stated	that	their	
East	German	past	con_nues	to	impact	their	life,	even	today.	It	shapes	their	iden_ty.	
As	one	informant	said:	“It	is	an	important	part	of	life	experience	and	worldview”	-	
“Das	ist	ein	wichSger	Teil	der	Lebenserfahrung	und	für	die	Weltsicht”	(Herr	Z.).		
Another	interlocutor	commented	that	her	trauma_c	childhood	experience	in	the	
GDR	certainly	impacts	her	long-term	wellbeing.	She	feels	that	the	past	experience	
con_nues	to	inﬂuence	her	life,	it	is	part	of	who	she	is.	For	many	years	she	
suppressed	the	past,	but	nowadays	she	no	longer	has	to.		
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“Yes,	extremely,	well	maybe	not	very	extreme	...	but	in	any	case	it	sSll	deﬁnes	
my	life.	Since	it	is	a	piece	of	oneself.	And	someSmes	you	can	suppress	it	quite	
well,	but	you	do	not	really	need	to	suppress	it	anymore	nowadays	...	One	
gets	over	a	lot	of	things.”	
“Ja	ganz	extrem,	na	ja	vielleicht	ganz	extrem	auch	nicht…	aber	es	besSmmt	
das	Leben	auf	jeden	Fall	weiter.	Da	es	ja	ein	Stück	von	einem	selber	ist.	Und	
man	kann	es	manchmal	ganz	gut	verdrängen,	aber	man	braucht	es	heute	
eigentlich	nicht	mehr	zu	verdrängen…	man	steckt	einiges	so	weg.”	(Frau	L.)	
As	I	explained	in	previous	chapters,	suppression	of	fears	and	memories	was	
men_oned	repeatedly	by	my	informants.	And	as	I	have	men_oned	with	regards	to	
conformity,	I	was	told	that	people	had	to	blank	out	and	ignore	certain	reali_es	of	
the	regime.	For	some,	this	suppression	con_nued	for	many	years	a`er	the	collapse	
of	the	state.	Only	as	people	get	older	and	enter	re_rement	age,	does	an	ac_ve	
engagement	begin	to	take	place.	
Here,	an	informant	recalls	an	anecdote	of	a	workshop	she	ajended	several	years	
ago.		
"People	when	they	are	really	frightened…	They	tend	to	repress	their	
fears…this	became	very	clear	to	me	during	a	workshop	that	I	adended	with	
Susanne	S.	The	subject	was	"Stasi	in	GDR	everyday	life".	There	was	a	woman	
there…	And	Susanne	was	saying	that	people	were	scared	of	the	Stasi.	And	
the	woman	said,	"I	was	never	scared	of	the	Stasi"…	I	was	thinking	Ah	…ok…	
But	then	she	gave	an	example:	she	worked	in	a	factory	and	one	of	her	
colleagues	had	ﬂed	to	the	West.	One	of	the	most	important	things	to	the	
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GDR	state	was	not	to	ﬂee	to	the	West.	They	were	concerned	with	das	Loch	zu	
stopfen	so	that	nobody	could	follow	them	in	the	same	way.	So	what	they	do	
is,	they	interrogate	everybody	around	them.	To	ﬁnd	out	exactly	how	they	had	
gone…what	had	it	involved.	And	she,	was	one	of	the	people	they	
interrogated	for	15	hours	and	then	as	she	added	that	by	the	way	she	was	
eight	months	pregnant…	-	Being	interrogated	for	15	hours	when	you	are	
eight	months	pregnant!?...	And	interrogaSon	is	not	necessarily	pleasant…	
And	it	was	very	obvious…	She'd	been	frightened.	But	she	had	been	so	
frightened	that	she	repressed	her	fears.	I	repressed	them	since	I	was	a	child.	
It	took	me	50	years	and	psychotherapy	to	understand	and	to	feel	again….	
Understand	how	frightened	I	had	been.	And	I	think	this	is	what	happened	to	
a	lot	of	GDR	people	that	they	didn't	even	realise	how	frightened	they	were	
and	democracy	means	nothing	to	them.	It's	just	a	lot	of	babble,	talk…"	(Frau	
M.)	
She	deduced	from	her	personal	history	that	this	woman	had	also	suppressed	her	
fears.	Indeed,	those	who	had	the	most	trauma_sing	and	upseang	stories	revealed	
that	“they	buried	their	feelings	deep	inside”.		
Some	s_ll	experience	a	tremendous	amount	of	suﬀering.	Only	very	few	of	my	
informants	men_oned	that	they	had	received	psychotherapeu_c	help.	In	some	
cases,	individuals	struggle	with	persistent	memories	(and	dreams)	as	well	as	
anxie_es	and	embijerment	about	the	injus_ce	they	endured.	This	is	also	
experienced	psychosoma_cally	(e.g.,	via	insomnia	and	gastro-intes_nal	condi_ons;	
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a`er-eﬀects	of	imprisonment	such	a	dermatological	issues).	So,	even	physical	
manifesta_ons	of	their	suﬀering	stay	with	them	as	a	constant	reminder	of	the	past.	
The	memory	of	powerlessness,	both	regarding	being	en_rely	at	the	mercy	of	the	
state	and	also	their	own	fear	of	resistance,	con_nue	to	rest	heavily	on	their	minds.	
Interpersonal	rela_onships	are	entered	cau_ously.	Trust	con_nues	to	be	an	
ambivalent	feeling	in	East	Germany.	While	trust	on	a	personal	level	may	be	slowly	
improving	(and	is	also	highly	dependent	on	individual	experiences),	on	a	societal	
level	distrust	of	"otherness"	or	"outsiders"	con_nues	to	be	more	prevalent.	This	
could	be	seen	quite	recently	with	the	open	cri_que	in	the	East	of	the	inﬂux	of	
refugees,	the	rise	of	neo-nazism,	and	the	growing	fears	of	Islamiza_on	(e.g.	PEGIDA	
movement	in	Dresden	and	its	oﬀshoots).	Indeed,	he	number	of	right-wing	(Neo-
Nazi)	ideologically	mo_vated	crimes	(counted	number	as	per	ci_zen)	is	the	highest	
in	Eastern	Germany	with	the	regions	of	Sachsen-Anhalt,	Brandenburg	and	Sachsen	
leading	the	ranking	(Berth	et	al.	2014,	p.199).	One	must	diﬀeren_ate	between	
numbers	of	actual	crimes	commijed	and	na_onalis_c	opinions.	Berth	et	al.'s	(2014)	
comprehensive	long-term	study	of	East	Germany	oﬀers	a	detailed	review	of	the	
topic.	What	we	can	gather	from	such	impressions	though	is	that	East	Germans	who	
already	feel	disenfranchised	and	vulnerable	are	frightened	and	overwhelmed,	as	
they	fear	that	they	will	have	to	make	further	sacriﬁces	for	the	state.	
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Along	with	this,	a	widespread	scep_cism	and	distrust	of	the	government,	the	press	
and	other	ins_tu_ons	is	clearly	no_ceable.	Most	recently	reports	of	the	growing	
number	of	a	niche	group	of	"Imperial	ci_zens"	have	emerged.	Part	of	the	extreme	
right,	members	of	the	so-called	"Reichsbürger"	movement	do	not	accept	the	
existence	of	the	Federal	Republic	Germany.	They	claim	that	the	German	Reich	
con_nues	to	exist	to	this	day	and	believe	that	the	state	borders	of	1937	are	s_ll	
legi_mate	today.	
They	follow	some	
diﬀuse	ideologies	
and	are	not	
conﬁned	to	East	
Germany,	but	more	
prevalent	there.	
The	group	
embodies	distrust	
in	the	na_on-state	
and	ins_tu_onal	power	structures.	This	photo	was	taken	in	Berlin	and	shows	a	van	
parked	in	a	side	street,	displaying	various	ﬂags	in	its	windows,	including	that	of	the	
GDR	and	the	German	Reich.	The	symbolism	of	a	diﬀuse	aatude	towards	poli_cal	
ideology	and	state	power	is	evident	(see	Paper	issued	by	Federal	Oﬃce	for	the	
Protec_on	of	the	Cons_tu_on	Brandenburg	2016,	the	Economist	2016).		
2)	‘Focussing	on	the	PosiLves’:	Resilience	and	Overcoming	suﬀering		
	
	 251	
Of	the	above-men_oned	group,	several	people	stood	out	to	me	in	par_cular	due	to	
the	way	they	approached	and	reﬂected	on	their	own	personal	stories.	Although	they	
had	gone	through	some	challenging	experiences,	they	made	a	point	to	emphasise	
their	posi_ve	personality	traits.		
This	group	of	people	shared	a	common	factor:	they	all	either	emigrated	(or	ﬂed)	to	
the	West	before	the	borders	opened	or	moved	to	the	West	immediately	a`erwards.	
Indeed,	one	could	say	that	they	are	by	nature	proac_ve	individuals,	who	pursued	
their	goal	to	leave	the	East	behind.	Although	they	openly	voiced	their	dismay	over	
the	GDR	regime,	they	tended	to	focus	on	the	posi_ve	gains	that	emerged	from	their	
experiences.			
A	woman	who	was	granted	emigra_on	in	1981	says	she	feels	well	and	happy	now.	
Many	of	her	friends	who	also	emigrated	did	so	in	the	early	1980’s	before	the	big	
wave	of	migra_on	to	the	West.	She	says	that	in	those	days	they	had	to	be	
par_cularly	courageous.	All	of	them	did	well	for	themselves	in	the	West,	but	they	
live	very	consciously	and	con_nue	to	appreciate	their	freedom.	In	her	circle	of	
friends,	all	adjusted	well	to	their	life	in	the	West	and	none	of	them	wished	to	go	
back.		
"All	those	who	ler	(the	East)	have	had	an	incredibly	good	development	here	
in	the	West,	and	they	are	all	very	grateful	and	posiSve,	and	when	we	meet,	
we	oren	say	'We	are	doing	well!'.	I	think	in	our	circle	of	friends,	it's	all	very	
much	appreciate	and	we	live	very	consciously.	And	we	all	get	on	very	well	in	
life.	I	do	not	know	someone	did	not	like	it	or	wanted	to	go	back.	And	at	the	
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Sme	when	we	made	the	emigraSon	request,	in	the	early	1980s,	these	were	
people	who	really	needed	some	courage."	(Frau	T.)	
“Alle	die	weg	sind	haben	eine	unglaublich	gute	Entwicklung	hier	im	Westen	
gemacht	und	die	sind	Alle	sehr	dankbar	und	posiSv	und	wenn	man	sich	tri,	
wird	gesagt	‘Mensch	geht’s	uns	gut’.	Ich	denke	in	unserem	Freundeskreis	
wissen	es	Alle	sehr	zu	schätzen	und	leben	sehr	bewusst.	Und	kommen	sehr	
gut	zurecht	im	Leben.	Ich	kenne	nicht	Einen	dem’s	nicht	so	ging	oder	der	
zurück	wollte.	Und	in	der	Zeit	wo	wir	den	Antrag	stellten,	Anfang	der	
achtziger	Jahre,	das	waren	Menschen	die	wirklich	etwas	Mut	brauchten.”	
(Frau	T.)		
Herr	A.,	who	ﬂed	to	the	West	thinks	the	GDR	shaped	his	life	in	many	ways	but	he	
chooses	to	embrace	the	posi_ve	aspects.	He	likes	to	hire	people	from	the	East	
because	he	thinks	both	East	and	West	Germans	can	learn	a	lot	from	one	another.	He	
also	sends	employees	there	for	conferences	and	has	gojen	many	posi_ve	
responses.	He	thinks	that	there	are	a	number	of	posi_ve	aspects	of	the	East	German	
work	mentality,	and	he	feels	that	people	should	learn	from	one	another.		
	
Frau	T.	told	me	that	she’s	culturally	diﬀerent	from	her	West	German	friends—both	
in	her	upbringing	and	approach	to	society.	With	her	experience	she	feels	especially	
adept	at	cri_cally	assessing	and	recognising	trends	in	society	and	its	problems	and	
even	nowadays	in	regard	to	media	and	how	this	is	used	as	a	tool	to	achieve	certain	
means.	She	o`en	thinks	about	how	this	experience	impacted	and	shaped	her	life.	
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(Frau	T.)	Yet,		at	the	same	_me,	she	is	not	sad	about	having	lived	through	her	_me	in	
the	GDR	because	she	gained	inner	strength	from	the	experience:	
"I	am	not	sad	about	this	Sme,	it	has	given	me	strength.	Either	I	change	my	
life	and	do	not	just	accept	everything.	The	surveillance	...	If	I	had	been	here18	
I	could	never	have	made	the	experience.”	(Frau	T.)	
“Ich	bin	nicht	traurig	über	diese	Zeit,	sie	hat	mir	Krar	gegeben.	Entweder	ich	
ändere	mein	Leben	und	nehme	nicht	alles	hin.	Durch	die	Überwachung.	
…Wäre	ich	hier	gewesen	häde	ich	die	Erfahrung	nie	machen	können”(Frau	
T.).	
Bauchgefühl	und	Menschenkenntnis	-	what	people	have	gained	from	Stasi	
surveillance	
Aside	from	a	more	cri_cal	approach,	a	further	skill	gained	from	the	experience	of	
state	surveillance	is	“Menschenkenntnis”:	The	special	ability	to	read	people.	One	
informant	said	that	she	feels	like	her	experience	in	the	GDR	has	given	her	a	special	
sense	for	understanding	people’s	inten_ons	and	mo_va_ons	-	a	type	of	gut	feeling,	
which	she	s_ll	retains	to	this	very	day.	During	GDR	_mes	she	was	always	careful	
about	who	she	spoke	to.	She	said	that	this	care	was	mostly	led	by	her	intui_on	-	
“Bauchgefühl”.	She	can	s_ll	feel	it	today	and	relies	on	this	special	sense	in	many	
situa_ons.	It	is	something	that	she	has	relied	on	since	childhood.		
"This	feeling,	...	the	ability	to	assess	people.	This	is	the	posiSve	for	me	
because	I	learned	this	in	the	GDR."	(Frau	T.)		
“Dieses	Gespür,	…Menschen	einschätzen	zu	können.	Das	ist	das	posiSve	für		
																																								 																				
18	In	the	West	
	 254	
mich,	weil	ich	das	in	der	DDR	gelernt	habe.”	(Frau	T.)		
Another	informant	said	he	believes	that	he	could	always	trust	his	ins_ncts	when	
choosing	those	he	would	trust,	and	that	he	was	never	really	disappointed.	
"You	choose	your	friends.	With	my	circle	of	friends	I	was	never	really	
disappointed.	Perhaps	I	had	a	beder	knowledge	of	people.”	
“Man	sucht	sich	ja	seine	Freunde	aus,	mit	meinem	Freundeskreis	bin	ich	
eigentlich	nie	auf	die	Schnauze	gefallen.	Vielleicht	hade	ich	eine	bessere	
Menschenkenntnis.”	(Herr	A.)	
The	concept	of	Menschenkenntnis	is	extremely	interes_ng	and	should	be	unpacked	
further	in	future	inves_ga_ons.	
Collective	social	distrust?		
I	have	brieﬂy	outlined	some	of	the	diﬃcul_es	East	Germans	faced	living	in	the	GDR	
and	then	later	in	the	reunited	Germany.	East	Germany's	transi_on	from	the	GDR	to	
the	reunited	FRG	caused	great	upheaval	both	in	peoples'	private	and	professional	
lives.	Obviously,	the	extent	to	which	people	suﬀered	or	proﬁted	from	reuniﬁca_on	
varies	considerably	from	one	individual	to	another.	It	depends	on	their	age,	their	
gender,	their	profession,	posi_on	in	GDR	society	and	also	their	loca_on.	For	
example,	there	would	have	been	signiﬁcant	diﬀerences	between	someone	who	
rented	a	small	ﬂat	in	East	Berlin	and	lived	quite	independently	from	rela_ves	
compared	to	someone	who	owned	a	house	in	a	small	town	in	Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern	(North-East	Germany)	and	had	close	rela_ons	with	their	family.	Not	
everyone	was	able	readily	to	leave	behind	their	past	and	begin	a	new	life	in	1990.	
The	eﬀects	of	this	fragmenta_on	of	society	are	no_ceable	to	this	day.	Some	people	
	 255	
managed	to	build	a	comfortable	life	for	themselves,	while	others	con_nue	to	
struggle	to	adapt	or	have	simply	given	up.	Even	a	quarter	century	a`er	the	
reuniﬁca_on	social	diﬀerences	between	West	Germans	and	former	GDR	ci_zens	are	
s_ll	no_ceable,	as	well	as	amongst	East	Germans	themselves.	
The	many	forms	of	distrust	apparent	amongst	East	Germans	have	created	a	number	
of	social	problems,	which	ul_mately	impact	a	person's	sense	of	wellbeing	
signiﬁcantly.	These	issues	include	suspicion,	paranoia,	inability	to	form	normal	
rela_onships	with	others,	depression	and	other	psychological	and	physical	
disorders.	Alcohol	and	substance	abuse	(as	a	coping	mechanism)	is	a	par_cularly	
widespread	problem	in	East	Germany,	especially	in	rela_on	to	the	no_on	of	the	two-
fold	disillusionment	discussed	earlier.	During	GDR	_mes	and	then	in	the	reunited	
Germany,	alcoholism	plays	a	signiﬁcant	role.	
In	a	situa_on	of	hopelessness	and	disillusionment	people	seek	ways	to	escape	their	
problems,	and	numbing	their	feelings	with	alcohol	is	one	key	coping	strategy.	This	
strategy	has	had	destruc_ve	eﬀects	in	East	Germany	and	con_nues	to	do	so.	Kochan	
(2011)	in	his	ethnographic	study	of	GDR	drinking	culture	writes	that	the	state	had	an	
alcohol-centred	society,	where	alcohol	consump_on	was	seen	as	a	fun,	sociable	
past-_me	in	the	rela_vely	monotonous	everyday	life	of	the	GDR.	Alcohol	was	an	
invigora_ng	substance	that	could	be	used	as	an	exchange	product	or	as	a	welcome	
present	for	any	occasion.	His	argument	that	drinking	was	simply	an	expression	of	
East	Germans’	worry-free,	non-compe__ve	approach	to	life	in	a	collec_vist	society	
is	only	shedding	light	on	part	of	the	truth.	This	slightly	narrow	view	may	stem	from	
the	fact	that	Kochan	himself	opened	a	liquor	shop,	by	the	evoca_ve	name	
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Schnapskultur,	in	Berlin	Prenzlauer	Berg	only	shortly	a`er	publishing	his	doctoral	
thesis	(Spiegel	Online	4/2011).		
In	reality,	the	problem	of	alcoholism	in	the	GDR	and	now	East	Germany	can	hardly	
be	swept	under	the	carpet.	In	1988,	GDR	ci_zens	consumed	on	average	16.1	litres	of	
high	volume	spirits	a	year.	This	means	that	they	drank	on	average	23	bojles	of	hard	
liquor	per	person,	per	year!	Interna_onally,	the	former	GDR	ranked	as	one	of	the	
countries	with	the	highest	alcohol	consump_on	worldwide	(Spiegel	Online	4/2011).	
I	believe	that	alcohol	was	a	way	to	escape	the	reali_es	of	Socialism,	the	rigorous	
control	of	every	aspect	of	life,	and	social	pressure	to	conform.	
Even	today,	East	German	states	(Bundesländer)	register	signiﬁcantly	more	deaths	
related	to	alcoholism	than	West	Germany.	This	alcohol-related	mortality	is	thought	
to	be	linked	to	socio-economic	factors	aﬀec_ng	the	region,	as	well	as	the	a`ermath	
of	GDR	drinking	culture.	The	state	of	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,	for	instance,	
counts	an	average	of	37	alcohol-related	deaths	per	100	000	people.	In	comparison,	
the	West	German	state	of	Baden-Würjemberg	registers	13	per	100	000	(Spiegel	
Online	12/2012).	
	Just	as	the	issue	of	distrust	has	transformed	in	East	Germany	over	the	years,	so	
have	the	reasons	for	drinking.	While	previously	the	oppression	of	the	popula_on	
may	have	played	a	signiﬁcant	role	in	alcohol	consump_on,	nowadays	East	Germany	
is	s_ll	dealing	with	an	economic	decline,	unemployment,	and	extreme	feelings	of	
hopelessness,	which	lead	people	to	alcohol	abuse	as	a	coping	mechanism.	Trobisch-
Lütge	(2010)	moreover	describes	the	way	in	which	many	of	his	poli_cally	
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trauma_sed	pa_ents	turn	to	dissocia_ve	behaviour	in	order	escape	their	trauma	
leading	to	alcohol	and	substance	abuse.	
In	conclusion,	the	destruc_ve	force	of	distrust	can	be	seen	in	the	examples	outlined	
above.	We	learn	that	extreme	control	and	surveillance	by	a	state,	even	if	it	is	
promoted	to	the	popula_on	as	a	measure	to	ensure	security	(just	as	the	Wall	once	
was),	will	eventually	have	a	detrimental	eﬀect	on	human	rela_onships	and	
ul_mately	challenge	their	happiness	and	wellbeing.	Having	given	a	basic	outline	of	
four	types	of	distrust	in	East	Germany,	it	can	be	concluded	that,	indeed,	life	in	a	
dictatorship	poses	a	threat	to	social	trust,	as	well	as	trust	in	the	state.	Even	a`er	
Germany’s	reuniﬁca_on,	with	its	transi_on	to	a	democra_c	state,	the	lines	of	the	
past	are	not	easily	erased.	As	men_oned	above,	once	trust	is	broken,	it	is	almost	
impossible	for	that	rela_onship	to	recover.	The	same	underlying	suspicion	con_nues	
to	be	a	factor	in	many	East	Germans’	lives	today,	shaping	their	daily	interac_ons,	
their	closest	personal	rela_onships,	and	ul_mately	their	wellbeing.	
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Chapter	Eight:	Long-term	consequences	of	Mass-surveillance	and	
Repression		
	
In	this	chapter,	I	brieﬂy	examine	what	mass	surveillance	and	repression	do	in	the	
long	term	to	a	group	or	society	as	a	whole.	While	there	is	no	single,	clear-cut	
answer,	I	have	made	it	my	objec_ve	to	examine	my	interviewees'	accounts	and	my	
other	ﬁndings	from	observa_ons	in	the	ﬁeld.	My	informant's	responses	speak	for	
themselves	in	illustra_ng	the	broad	range	of	answers	to	this	ques_on.	
Several	themes	have	emerged.	First,	the	widespread	normalisa_on	of	a	culture	of	
control	amongst	the	GDR	popula_on,	along	with	the	ac_ve	repression,	surveillance	
and	abuse	commijed	by	the	SED	regime	(speciﬁcally	the	Ministry	for	State	Security)	
led	to	a	variety	of	trauma_c	experiences	(Plänkers	et	al.2005)	Second,	these	
mul_ple	trauma_c	instances	con_nue	to	impact	East	Germans’	lives	on	an	
individual,	and,	as	I	will	show,	a	collec_ve	level.	I	will	shed	light	on	one	theme	that	
stood	out	to	me	in	par_cular:	social	distrust.		
Surveillance	cannot	be	singled	out	as	a	factor	determining	the	behaviour	of	all	East	
Germans,	as	they	all	experienced	it	diﬀerently.	We	must,	therefore,	diﬀeren_ate	
between	those	who	were	scep_cal	of	the	regime,	those	who	openly	ques_oned	it,	
those	who	favoured	it,	and	those	who	were	rela_vely	indiﬀerent	towards	it.	For	
across	these	groups	of	people,	there	are	stark	diﬀerences	regarding	the	extent	to	
which	they	came	into	contact	with	the	Stasi.	The	scale	varies	from	“they	didn’t	really	
bother	me	much”	to	“they	destroyed	my	life”.	Although	these	are	two	extremes,	it	
can	be	said	that	the	majority	of	people	have	very	nega_ve	associa_ons	with	the	
Stasi.	
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To	summarise	the	ﬁndings	of	my	ethnographic	interviews,	below	is	a	list	indica_ng	
some	of	the	repercussions	of	mass	surveillance	for	East	Germans.	The	list	shows	
how	they	reported	they	felt	about	surveillance	in	the	GDR	(retrospec_vely)	and	also	
the	emo_ons	they	experienced	in	the	a`ermath	of	Germany's	reuniﬁca_on.	The	list	
demonstrates	the	complexity	of	the	situa_on	then	and	now.	
During	GDR-Smes:	
-Paralysis	
-Guarded	towards	others	
-Security		
-Order	
-Reliance	on	the	system	to	work/	comfort		
-Shame	
-Distrust	/	Trust	was	even	more	meaningful,	as	more	was	at	stake	
-Anger	
-Disappointment	
-Betrayal		
-	Fear	
-Uncertainty	
-Dissocia_ve	behaviour/	escape	through	alcohol	abuse	
	
Contemporary	Germany:	
-Scep_cism	
-Paranoia	
-Cynicism	
-Nostalgia	(related	to	order	and	security)	
-Events	of	the	past	overshadowing	present	life	
-Shame	
-Distrust	/	Trust		
-Anger	
	 260	
-Disappointment	
-Disillusionment		
-Betrayal		
-	Fear		
-Uncertainty	
-Dissocia_ve	behaviour/	escape	through	alcohol	or	drug	abuse	
Especially	in	compensa_on	disputes,	it	becomes	clear	how	distrusul	the	aﬀected	
East	Germans	s_ll	feel.	They	are	o`en	under	the	impression	that	they	are	being	
treated	unfairly	and	end	up	embijered	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.77)	
Those	who	were	poli_cally	trauma_sed	feel	alienated	and	high	levels	of	distrust,	
especially	towards	psychologists,	psychotherapists	and	medical	professionals	are	
very	common	(Bomberg	&	Trobisch	Lütge	2009,	p.	55).	Trauma	suﬀerers	believe	that	
they	are	not	recognised	as	the	vic_ms	of	an	unjust	regime,	but	that	their	suﬀering	is	
instead,	pathologized	subsequently	(Trobisch-Lütge	2010).		
Coming	to	terms	with	the	past	and	Continued	Suffering	
As	I	have	shown,	suﬀering	from	the	former	socialist	dictatorship	is	a	mul_faceted	
aﬀair.	People	can	poten_ally	have	had	polar	opposite	experiences	of	the	GDR	
regime,	and	yet	they	could	suﬀer	equally	in	the	a`ermath	or	vice	versa.	A	process	of	
Vergangenheits	Aufarbeitung	(coming	to	terms	with	the	past)	is	only	beginning	now.	
The	topic	is	s_ll	a	sensi_ve	one	and,	although	the	availability	of	Stasi	ﬁles	moved	the	
process	forward,	many	ques_ons	remain	unanswered.	As	interviews	revealed,	all	my	
informants	felt	that	a	public	discourse	about	the	dictatorship	is	s_ll	missing.	Old	
wounds	do	not	heal,	as	those	who	became	vic_ms	to	the	Stasi's	repressive	
techniques	feel	that	their	suﬀering	is	not	recognised	and	that	their	perpetrators	
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were	not	made	accountable	for	their	ac_ons.	Worse	s_ll,	some	fear	that	their	
tormentors	managed	to	get	a	foot	in	the	door	a`er	the	Wende,	con_nuing	to	work	
in	inﬂuen_al	posi_ons.	As	my	ethnographic	examples	illustrated,	this	con_nues	to	
be	a	source	of	distress.		
Social	Suﬀering	and	its	consequences		
The	broad	spectrum	of	individual	and	collec_ve	trauma	experienced	in	the	former	
GDR	has	had	far-reaching	consequences.	Social	suﬀering	is	an	explanatory	model	for	
the	“immediate	personal	experience	of	broad	human	problems	caused	by	the	cruel	
exercise	of	poli_cal	and	economic	power”	(Singer	&	Baer	2012:	90),	I	argue	that	East	
Germans	who	were	aﬀected	by	state	violence	and	repression	are	dealing	with	the	
long-term	eﬀects	of	social	suﬀering	(Kleinman	et	al,	1997,	ix).	Previously,	I	have	
shown	the	eﬀect	that	surveillance	and	repression	had	on	the	lives	of	individuals.	In	
par_cular,	I	have	explored	how	the	emo_onal	scars	of	the	experienced	trauma	have	
become	a	signiﬁcant	cons_tuent	in	the	construc_on	of	the	suﬀerer’s	iden_ty.	In	the	
past,	numerous	scholars	have	explored	cultural	trauma	and	its	consequences	
(Alexander	et	al.	2001,	Eyerman	2001,	Langer	1997,	Bombay,	Matheson	&	Anison	
2014,	Kirmayer,	Gone	&	Moses	2014).	For	instance,	Eyerman	(2001)	explores	in-
depth	the	cultural	trauma	that	arose	out	of	the	atroci_es	of	African-American	
slavery	and	its	impact	on	the	forma_on	of	iden_ty.		
Langer's	(1997)	analysis	of	the	narra_ves	of	Holocaust	survivors,	for	instance,	sheds	
light	on	the	concept	of	a	dura_onal	present,	where	survivors	do	not	heal	from	their	
trauma	but	experience	it	rather	as	"an	event	to	be	endured".	The	trauma_c	
memories	become	part	of	the	iden_ty	of	the	suﬀerer.	As	Langer	(1997)	writes,	“she	
is	deﬁned,	not	disabled	by,	her	memory”.		
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As	outlined	above,	my	informants	also	con_nue	to	experience	their	suﬀering	in	a	
number	of	ways,	although	in	varying	degrees	of	intensity.	For	East	Germans,	just	as	
Langer	and	other	colleagues	have	outlined	in	various	contexts,	lived	trauma	is	very	
much	ingrained	in	individual's	iden__es.	This	is	not	necessarily	interpreted	
nega_vely.	As	men_oned	above,	several	of	my	informants	have	told	me	they	gained	
strength	from	experience.	Some	interpret	their	lived	suﬀering	as	an	asset.	They	
men_oned	a	certain	set	of	skills	they	have	acquired	due	to	their	experience,	ﬁrst	
and	foremost	“Menschenkenntnis”-	a	par_cular	ability	to	read	and	understand	
people.	They	are	ﬁne-tuned	to	understand	people	and	can	“read	between	the	lines”.	
They	have	put	great	emphasis	on	their	ability	to	know	whom	they	can	trust.	
But	related	to	this	posi_ve	interpreta_on	of	suﬀering,	is	its	nega_ve	counterpart:	
distrust.	A	recent	study	by	Lichter	and	colleagues	has,	for	example,	provided	
sta_s_cal	evidence	for	the	las_ng	eﬀect	the	Stasi	spying	(in	par_cular	that	of	
unoﬃcial	informants	–	IM)	con_nues	to	have	in	Germany	(Lichter,	Löﬄer	&	Siegloch	
2015).	They	found	that	in	regions	that	originally	had	high	numbers	of	Stasi	spies,	
high	levels	of	social	distrust	were	found.	They	also	recorded	sta_s_cally	lower	
economical	power,	higher	distrust	in	the	state	and	its	ins_tu_ons,	lower	percentage	
of	voters	in	elec_ons	as	well	as	low	birth	rates.	This	data	could	indicate	
consequences	of	surveillance,	but	this	should	be	interpreted	with	care.	The	
inﬂuence	of	the	Stasi	past	can	also	be	seen	in	personal	interac_ons	as	has	been	
illustrated	in	my	ethnographic	examples.	
Suspicion	and	wariness		
In	East	Germany,	high	levels	of	social	distrust	were	created	among	the	popula_on	
during	the	_me	of	socialism.	This	distrust	emerged	primarily	through	the	extensive	
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use	of	mass	surveillance	by	the	socialist	state.	Living	under	condi_ons	of	suspicion,	
distrust	and	fear	have	shaped	East	German	percep_ons	of	the	self	(and	others);	and	
ul_mately	resulted	in	a	challenge	to	their	wellbeing,	in	the	long-term.		
Trust:	A	brief	overview	
The	topics	of	trust	and	distrust	have	been	of	interest	to	scholars	in	many	disciplines.	
Most	recently	the	topic	has	had	a	big	resurgence	(see	for	example	Hardin	2006;	
Fukuyama	1995;	Putnam	2000).	In	the	light	of	events	involving	large-scale	electronic	
surveillance	and	spying,	ques_ons	of	trust	in	the	state,	as	well	as	trust	amongst	
states,	have	resurfaced.	At	the	same	_me,	such	ques_ons	have	also	brought	the	
value	of	interpersonal	trust	back	into	the	picture.	But	what	is	this	enigma_c	concept	
of	trust	and	why	is	it	seemingly	so	important?	
Trust	shapes	all	aspects	of	human	life	and	pervades	all	socie_es	(Hardin	2002;	
Misztal	1996;	Luhmann	1979).	It	is	an	important	component	of	personal	and	
economic	exchanges;	moreover,	it	is	essen_al	in	any	interpersonal	rela_onship	from	
friends	and	family	to	business	partners	(Arrow	1972;	Mauss	2000;	Misztal	1996).	
Trust	contributes	to	economic	success,	and	to	social	stability	and	cohesion	(Knack	&	
Keefer	1997;	Hardin	2000;	2002;	Putnam	2000).	It	is	a	fundamental	principle	of	
social	order	and,	according	to	Locke,	stems	from	the	natural	sociability	of	humans	
(Misztal	1996).	
Trust	can	be	deﬁned	as	the	belief	in	the	truthful	and	good-natured	intenSons	of	
others.	There	are	many	diﬀerent	approaches	to	deﬁning	this	concept.	Poli_cal,	
economic,	psychological,	biological,	and	anthropological	theories	have	been	
developed	to	make	sense	of	this.		Each	discipline	explores	varying	aspects	of	what	
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trust	means	in	par_cular	contexts	(see	Luhmann	2000;	Gambeja	2000;	Misztal	
1996;	Hardin	2002;	2004;	2006	for	overviews).	Upon	closer	inspec_on,	all	these	
diﬀerent	approaches	are	intertwined	in	some	way.	
Lewis	and	Weigert	(1985)	provide	a	sociological	approach	to	trust	and	argue,	"an	
adequate	conceptual	analysis	of	trust	begins	by	recognising	its	mulS-faceted	
character.	It	has	disSnct	cogniSve,	emoSonal,	and	behavioural	dimensions	which	are	
merged	into	a	unitary	social	experience"	(Lewis	&	Weigert	1985:969).	They	
emphasise	that	the	study	of	trust	is	also	a	study	of	risk	and	doubt.			
Elster	(1993),	also	sees	trust	as	a	social	mechanism,	driven	by	peoples’	mo_va_ons	
and	beliefs.	Related	to	this	social	mechanism	is	the	idea	that	trust	is	the	main	
ingredient	in	human	coopera_on	(Misztal	1996).	It	is	the	basic	building	block	in	
human	rela_onships.	Sahlins	(1972)	and	Mauss	(2000)	look	at	trust	as	a	signiﬁcant	
factor	in	exchange	rela_onships,	par_cularly	with	respect	to	reciprocity	and	
according	obliga_ons.		
In	The	Gir,	Mauss	explores	the	non-immediate	reciprocity	in	gi`-giving,		
“where	reward	is	neither	discussed	nor	consciously	calculated	at	the	moment	
the	oﬀering	is	made.	In	the	long	run,	however,	one	expects	girs	to	be	
reciprocated.	Thus,	in	primiSve	and	archaic	socieSes,	those	socieSes	based	
on	gir-relaSonships,	there	is	no	middle	path;	there	is	either	trust	or	mistrust“	
(Mauss	2000).		
An	increasing	percep_on	of	societal	distrust	and	the	value	of	trust	as	social	capital	
has	been	a	par_cularly	popular	topic	of	inves_ga_on.	Robert	Putnam’s	bestselling	
book	Bowling	Alone	(2000),	about	rising	distrust	and	declining	social	par_cipa_on	in	
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the	United	States,	really	hit	a	nerve	for	many	Americans.	The	great	success	of	this	
book	can	be	traced	back	to	the	fact	that	it	deals	with	an	issue	concerning	many	
modern	socie_es	today.		
Notably,	Russell	Hardin	has	made	trust	and	distrust	his	main	areas	of	enquiry	(see	
2002;	2004;	2006;	2009)	looking	at	trust	as	encapsulated	interest,	placing	high	value	
on	a	person’s	desire	to	con_nue	a	par_cular	rela_onship	and	therefore	ac_ng	in	the	
other’s	interest:	“You	encapsulate	my	interests	in	your	own	interests”		(Hardin	
2004:6).	He	also	explores	trust	as	a	social	capital,	inves_ga_ng	why	it	is	such	an	
interes_ng	topic	to	so	many	scholars.	He	refers	to	poli_cal	scien_sts	such	as	Brehm,	
Fukuyma,	Rahn	and	others,	and	claims	that	the	study	of	social	capital	is	“moSvated	
primarily	by	the	linkage	between	levels	of	social	capital	and	collecSve	outcomes;	
high	levels	of	social	capital	appear	to	be	crucial	for	such	measures	of	collecSve	well-
being	as	economic	development,	eﬀecSve	poliScal	insStuSons,	low	crime	rates,	and	
lower	incidences	of	other	social	problems,	such	as	teen	pregnancy	and	delinquency”	
(Brehm	and	Rahn	1997:	1000;	cited	in	Hardin	2006).		
Diego	Gambeja	has	conducted	extensive	ethnographic	research	on	the	topics	of	
trust	and	distrust	(See	Gambeja	2000;	2005;	2009)	and	has	been	par_cularly	
interested	in	how	criminals	and	the	Maﬁa	ﬁnd	ways	to	trust	one	another,	examining	
the	methods	by	which	they	communicate	under	condi_ons	of	extreme	suspicion	
and	uncertainty.	He	explains	that	criminals	create	condi_ons	that	enforce	one	
anothers'	honesty	by	engaging	in	situa_ons	where	honesty	is	the	best	op_on	for	all	
par_es	involved	(Gambeja	2009,	p.	37).	His	study	highlights	that	once	individuals	
share	informa_on,	especially	if	it	is	of	a	sensi_ve	nature	(secrets),	trust	rela_onships	
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are	built	(2009.	P.66).	He,	furthermore,	highlights	how	powerful	informa_on	can	be	
regarding	issues	of	privacy	and	surveillance.	
Further	anthropological	studies	have	inves_gated	trust	cross-culturally	and,	
surprisingly,	even	ecologically.	One	compara_ve	study	has	shown	that	trust	is	an	
important	aspect	of	a	forager’s	internal	working	models.	Hewlej	et	al.	(2000)	
inves_gated	foragers'	rela_onships	with	the	environments	they	lived	in	and	
discovered	some	culture-speciﬁc	metaphors	which	were	o`en	based	on	trusul,	
nurturing	kinship	rela_ons.	These	metaphors	were	also	directly	linked	with	forager	
economic	behaviours,	such	as	no	food	storage	and	lijle	subsistence	ac_vity.			
“Among	some	forager	groups	(Nayaka,	MbuS,	and	BaSk	in	her	study)	the	parent-
child	relaSonship	is	the	primary	metaphor	(‘forest	as	parent’)	–	people	view	the	
environment	as	an	ever-providing,	loving,	and	uncondiSonally	supporSve	parent	–	
whereas	in	other	forager	groups	the	metaphors	are	linked	to	sexual	relatedness	
(Canadian	Cree)	or	procreaSonal	relatedness	(Australian	Aborigines)”	(Hewled	et	al.	
2000:	287;	see	also	Bird-David	1993).	
The	so-called	“meta-metaphors”	shared	by	all	foragers,	were	those	of	a	“giving”	and	
“trus_ng”	environment.	This	internal	working	model	gives	an	indica_on	as	to	how	
and	why	foragers	build	trust-rela_onships	with	their	environment	and	others.	The	
social	scien_ﬁc	work	produced	on	the	meaning	and	value	of	trust	indicates	its	
importance	in	human	life,	cross-culturally.	But	what	happens	when	bonds	of	trust	
get	damaged,	and	trust	turns	into	distrust?	How	do	people	manage	distrust	and	
uncertainty?	
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The	flip-side	of	the	coin:	Distrust		
All	of	us	have	found	ourselves	in	situa_ons	where	our	trust	of	another	has	been	
broken.	A	seemingly	strong,	trus_ng	rela_onship,	which	possibly	took	years	to	build,	
can	be	tainted	within	seconds.	What	may	begin	as	slight	doubt,	given	just	enough	
evidence	to	support	the	suspicion,	can	quickly	lead	to	distrust.	Emo_ons	invoked	by	
this	shi`	range	from	shock,	anger,	and	fear	to	melancholy	about	what	has	been	lost.	
Since	trust	is	such	a	substan_al	ingredient	in	our	personal	rela_onships,	as	soon	as	
distrust	creeps	in,	the	rela_onship	is	o`en	damaged	beyond	repair.		
Severe	breaches	of	trust	can	also	bring	about	loneliness	and	isola_on	when	a	
person’s	beliefs	are	challenged	in	such	a	devasta_ng	manner	that	they	feel	they	can	
no	longer	rely	on	anything.	Their	basic	beliefs	are	challenged	to	the	point	where	
they	do	not	know	who	or	what	can	be	trusted.		
In	the	German	language,	there	is	a	phrase	describing	this	feeling	of	helplessness	and	
uncertainty,	the	inability	to	carry	on	because	the	founda_ons	of	a	person's	
conﬁdence	in	the	world	are	crumbling:	“Den	Boden	unter	den	Füßen	verlieren.”	This	
literally	means	“losing	the	ground	underneath	your	feet.”	The	phrase	is	apt.	Indeed,	
I	would	argue	that	this	powerful	feeling,	stemming	from	betrayal	and	distrust,	has	
been	a	part	of	many	East	Germans’	lives.	As	Ullmann-Margalit	(2004)	claims;	trust	
and	distrust	are	complex	and	mul_dimensional.	In	the	former	GDR	and	now	East	
Germany,	many	types	of	distrust	have	been	apparent.	This	diversity	can	be	traced	
back	to	Germany’s	unique	history	of	division	and	reuniﬁcan_on	and,	signiﬁcantly	
the	close	succession	of	two	dictatorships.			
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What	is	distrust	and	what	does	it	do?	
Many	deﬁni_ons	of	distrust	have	been	discussed	in	anthropological	and	other	social	
scien_ﬁc	literature	(see	Hardin	et	al.	2004;	Gambeja	2000,	2005,	2009).	For	the	
purpose	of	this	chapter	I	believe	Edna	Ullmann-Margalit’s	mul_-dimensional	
perspec_ve	on	distrust	applies	to	East	Germany	especially	well.	She	thinks	trust	and	
distrust	exist	on	mul_ple	levels	and	explains	“full	trust”	in	the	following	way:	
“When	I	lack	the	belief	that	you	intend	to	act	in	my	best	interest	with	respect	to	a	
given	mader,	I	do	not	trust	you.	I	begin	to	distrust	you	when	I	am	in	a	posiSon	to	
form	the	actual	belief	that	you	do	not	intend	to	act	in	my	best	interests	in	that	
mader.	My	distrust	in	you	increases	when	I	become	suspicious	of	your	intenSons,	
and	it	increases	sSll	further	when	I	come	to	form	the	belief	that	you	actually	intend	
to	act	against	my	interests	in	the	mader	at	hand”.	(Ullmann-Margalit	2004,	p.67)	
A	more	extreme	level	of	distrust	is	achieved	when	someone	knows	your	interests,	
yet	s_ll	ac_vely	goes	against	them.	Ullmann-Margalit	(2004)	considers	the	most	
severe	form	of	distrust	to	arise	from	someone	ac_ng	against	your	interests	because	
they	are	your	interests	(2004,	p.67).	Therefore,	distrust	involves	“an	inten_on	
component,	a	right-reason	component,	and	a	competence	component”	(2004,	
p.67).		
In	addi_on	to	examining	the	severity	of	distrust,	its	origin	and	to	whom	or	what	it	is	
directed,	hold	signiﬁcance.	Interpersonal	distrust	can	take	diﬀerent	shapes	and	
forms	other	than	intergroup	distrust,	ins_tu_onal	distrust,	or	distrust	in	a	
government	(see	Kramer	1998;	2004,	Hardin	2004).	These	diﬀering	areas	can	once	
again	overlap	or	infect	one	another.	Hardin	asserts	that	the	level	of	trust	that	people	
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have	in	government,	for	example,	has	a	direct	impact	on	the	way	people	trust	in	
other	areas	of	life	(Hardin	2004:23).	Therefore,	it	can	be	said	that	the	more	
trustworthy	a	government	is,	the	more	trus_ng	are	its	people	to	one	another.	But,	
what	happens	when	distrust	becomes	the	prevalent	feeling	in	a	group	or	an	en_re	
country,	as	in	the	GDR?		
Kramer	(1998;	2004)	writes	about	the	way	in	which	distrust	can	lead	to	collec_ve	
paranoia.	Social	environments,	which	are	highly	hierarchical,	are	likely	to	foster	
distrust	and	suspicion.	Interes_ngly,	social	distrust	is	excep_onally	pronounced	
when	individuals	“feel	a	heightened	sense	of	self-consciousness,	perceive	
themselves	to	be	under	intense	evalua_ve	scru_ny,	or	are	uncertain	of	their	status	
or	standing	within	a	social	rela_on“(Kramer	2004,	p.	142,143).	Research	has	
indicated	that	when	self-consciousness	is	heightened,	people	are	more	likely	to	
make	“overly	personalis_c	ajribu_ons	about	others’	inten_ons	and	mo_ves”	(2004,	
p.143).	The	awareness	of	social	categories	within	a	par_cular	social	group	
emphasises	this	trend,	as	it	signiﬁcantly	impacts	how	people	deﬁne	themselves	
within	the	broader	social	context	(2004,	p.	143).	People's	understanding	of	their	
own	social	standing	in	a	social	system	is	extremely	important,	as	it	is	highly	valued	
by	them	and	shapes	their	iden_ty	(Burke	&	Stets	1999).	It	can	also	be	assumed	that	
lower	status	groups,	within	a	hierarchy,	are	more	aware	of	trust	rela_onships	than	
those	‘above'	them	in	the	social	hierarchy.	
Kramer	(2004)	suggests	that	large-scale	distrust	amongst	a	social	group	leads	to	a	
form	of	"collec_ve	paranoia".	The	consequences	of	this	broad-scale	distrust	are	
dangerous	and	far-reaching.	They	can,	for	example,	produce	high	levels	of	moral	
aggression,	an	intensely	nega_ve	reac_on	that	reﬂects	how	people	feel	when	they	
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have	been	treated	in	an	“unfair,	unjust,	or,	untrustworthy	fashion".	Moreover,	
defensive	non-coopera_on	becomes	apparent	when	moral	aggression	is	a	
mechanism	that	compromises	collec_ve	welfare	to	minimise	the	risks	of	
exploita_on	(Kramer	2004).	
Nugent	(2015)	has	studied	state	paranoia	in	great	detail.	He	has	undertaken	
research	on	the	APRA	in	Peru.	A	group	whom	the	Odria	regime	regarded	as	a	threat	
because,	amongst	other	things,	they	were	thought	to	undermine	the	government's	
endeavour	of	moderniza_on.	The	government	grew	increasingly	paranoid	about	the	
group's	power	and	inﬂuence.	As	a	way	of	ensuring	the	con_nua_on	of	state	power,	
he	explains	how	the	Peruvian	government	made	a	conscious	eﬀort	to	maintain	a	
strict	boundary	between	state	and	non-state.	This	idea	was	proclaimed	as	an	
improvement	of	general	wellbeing	or	"the	common	good".	In	the	SED-regime,	the	
ideology	presumed	that	the	ul_mate	source	of	wellbeing	was	the	"collec_ve",	which	
was	inherently	intertwined	with	the	state.	Indeed,	as	we	have	seen	the	state	was	
present	in	all	areas	of	life	and	the	Stasi's	work	constantly	blurred	the	lines,	between	
the	public	and	private.	Yet,	we	can	also	recognise	similari_es	with	Nugent's	example	
of	Peruvian	state	paranoia.	Just	as	it	was	the	case	in	the	GDR,	there	was	an	inherent	
distrust	towards	its	ci_zens	and	even	their	police	force.	
The	origins	of	social	distrust	
In	the	following	sec_on,	I	will	examine	how	East	Germany's	socio-historical	
condi_ons	brought	about	severe	social	distrust	among	the	popula_on.	
Knowing	the	poten_al	consequences	of	their	ac_ons	heightened	all	East	Germans'	
awareness	of	trust	or	distrust	in	social	interac_ons.	Trustworthiness	was	constantly	
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evaluated,	and	the	social	environment	was	monitored	at	all	_mes.	Being	"on	guard"	
was	much	more	prevalent	in	East	German's	everyday	life,	than	what	most	of	us	
experience	in	modern	democra_c	socie_es	today.	Indeed,	most	people	would	
describe	this	behaviour	as	a	normal	part	of	life.	Par_cularly	looking	back	at	it	years	
later,	East	Germans	o`en	speak	about	it	in	a	casual	manner	and	as	one	of	my	
informants	said	“...It’s	true,	when	I	look	at	it	today,	we	constantly	had	to	watch	
out...but	then	it	was	normal.	We	didn’t	know	it	any	other	way”,	again,	
demonstra_ng	the	normalisa_on	of	control.	
It	is	es_mated	that	up	to	one	in	six	people	reported	for	the	Stasi	unoﬃcially	(Funder	
2003).	As	I	have	shown	it	was	therefore	not	uncommon	to	work	among	Stasi	
informants	and	have	friends	and	family	who	secretly	(but	not	always	willingly)	
collaborated	with	the	secret	police.	As	men_oned	previously,	people	were	known	to	
have	“two	opinions”,	one	that	could	be	voiced	in	public	among	those	who	were	less	
trustworthy	and	another	in	private	only	among	those	closest	to	one	another.	I	
would	argue	that	this	created	a	condi_on	of	cogni_ve	dissonance	to	many	(Fes_nger	
1957).	This	is	displayed	in	an	example	where	the	line	between	the	private	and	the	
public	was	par_cularly	thin:	the	home.	What	could	and	could	not	be	said	in	each	
family,	of	course,	varied	immensely,	but	it	can	be	assumed	that	even	those	loyal	to	
socialism	felt	quite	protec_ve	of	their	home	and	family	life	(see	Hoﬀmann	2012).	
Beate	Volker	and	Henk	Flap	(1997)	demonstrate	this	in	their	sociological	study	about	
neighbourhood	rela_ons	in	the	former	GDR.	Their	ﬁndings	suggest	that	socialism	
had	a	detrimental	eﬀect	on	neighbourhood	rela_ons.	They	inves_gated	blocks	of	
ﬂats	in	two	East	German	ci_es	-	Leipzig	and	Dresden.	During	socialism,	in	an	ajempt	
by	the	state	to	encourage	a	“mixing	of	the	classes”,	people	of	diﬀering	backgrounds	
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and	occupa_ons	were	moved	into	the	same	building.	Contrary	to	the	state’s	
expecta_ons,	this	did	not	encourage	trust	amongst	neighbours	at	all.		In	fact,	living	
in	close	physical	proximity	to	people	considered	untrustworthy	posed	a	threat	to	
one’s	private	life	and	hence	created	a	general	atmosphere	of	distrust.	People	were	
aware	of	the	possibility	of	living	amongst	Stasi	informants	and	were,	therefore,	
more	guarded	in	their	neighbourly	rela_ons.	Völker	and	Flap	conclude:“We	
understand	these	phenomena	as	the	unintended	consequences	of	the	Marxist	belief	
system,	the	Leninist	one-party	system,	and	the	ensuing	and	all-encompassing	
poliScal	control	(Reve	1969	cited	in	Völker	&	Flap	1997).	People	knew	about	this	
control.	Because	of	the	far-reaching	consequences	that	allegaSons	of	being	a	class-
enemy	or	of	being	merely	a	less-than-eager	comrade	would	cause,	because	it	was	
far	from	clear	who	were	the	unoﬃcial	informants	of	the	Stasi,	this	control	constantly	
forced	people	to	consider	whether	others	were	to	be	trusted.	The	risk	of	being	
denounced	was	greater	if	strangers	were	concerned,	especially	dissimilar	others	or	
people	forced	on	one	by	circumstances,	such	as	neighbours	and	workmates.	
Neighbours	are	a	special	case:	because	of	propinquity,	they	have	access	to	the	
private	sphere	of	those	who	live	next	door.	A	major	ﬁnding	of	our	study	corroborates	
this	argument:	Ses	with	neighbours	and	with	socially	dissimilar	others	had	a	greater	
chance	of	being	loaded	with	distrust."	(Völker	and	Flap	1997:259)	
Indeed,	the	constant	state	of	distrust	in	GDR	society	was	a	mental	weight	carried	by	
all;	yet	the	way	this	is	accepted	and	understood	s_ll	varies	widely	today.	The	
normalisa_on	of	control	also	meant	that	the	“side-eﬀects”	-	distrust	and	suspicion	-	
were	rarely	openly	addressed	or	even	admijed.	The	real	extent	of	distrust	was	truly	
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recognisable	to	people	as	the	regime	unravelled	or	as	they	had	the	opportunity	to	
move	away	from	the	GDR.		
As	one	informant	told	me,	the	distrust	that	was	rooted	in	surveillance	is	something	
that	no	one	misses.	Indeed,	she	feels	that	it	is	a	burden	she	has	ﬁnally	shed.	-	“Eine	
Last	die	von	einem	abfällt”	(Frau	D.).	
She	also	explained	that	when	her	emigra_on	(Ausreiseantrag)	was	ﬁnally	granted,	
and	she	got	to	the	West,	she	was	glad	that	all	the	restric_ons	of	everyday	life	were	
gone	-	“das	gedrängte	und	eingeengte”	-	all	the	pressure	and	constraint,	not	
knowing	who	you	could	trust.	In	her	mind,	all	those	things	were	done	deliberately	to	
control	people.	Beginning	her	new	life	far	away	from	this	deep	distrust,	emphasised	
this	realisa_on.	I	argue	that,	although	the	immediate	threat	of	denuncia_on	and	
Stasi	psychological	(and	physical)	abuse	are	gone	today,	the	legacy	of	a	culture	of	
control	con_nues	to	permeate	East	German	society,	primarily	with	the	older	
genera_on	who	experienced	the	regime.		
Süß	is	spot	on	in	his	asser_on	that	the	consequences	of	large-scale	denuncia_on	
(and	Zersetzung)	led	to	a	severe	destruc_on	of	trust,	conﬁdence	and	solidarity	in	
groups.	Possibili_es	for	career	and	social	development	were	at	_mes	catastrophic	
for	those	aﬀected,	precisely	because	of	the	Stasi's	extensive	secret	work	and	
coopera_on	with	collaborators	within	the	general	popula_on,	state	and	social	
ins_tu_ons.	The	ministry's	ingenious	psychological	methods	have	had	a	las_ng	
eﬀect	on	individual	and	collec_ve	wellbeing,	aﬀec_ng	it	nega_vely	(Süß	1999).		
A`er	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	in	1989,	Germany	was	reunited	in	the	following	year.	
East	Germany	had	to	undergo	major	economic	and	social	transforma_on.	To	this	day	
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there	is	a	so-called	"psychological	gap"	between	the	East	and	West.	Many	feel	that	
the	na_onal	iden__es	of	the	"two	Germanies"	diﬀer	fundamentally.	A	1993	poll	
revealed	that	only	22%	of	West	Germans	and	11%	of	East	Germans	believed	they	
shared	a	common	iden_ty.	Interes_ngly,	in	1990,	73%	of	Easterners	s_ll	believed	
that	there	was	only	one	single	German	iden_ty,	by	1991	this	number	fell	to	40%.	
Major	diﬀerences	are	perceived	in	East	and	West	Germans'	approaches	to	work	and	
family	life,	as	well	as	the	role	of	the	state	(Roller	1994	cited	in	Misztal	1996)	and,	as	I	
would	add,	social	communica_on	and	social	rela_onships.	Especially	in	
compensa_on	disputes,	it	becomes	clear	how	distrusul	the	aﬀected	East	Germans	
s_ll	feel.	They	are	o`en	under	the	impression	that	they	are	being	treated	unfairly	
and	end	up	embijered	(Linden	2007;	Bomberg	&	Trobisch-Lütge	2009,	p.77).	
In	this	ethnographic	ﬁeldwork,	I	have	discovered	that	those	East	Germans	who	are	
par_cularly	nostalgic	about	the	GDR	o`en	like	to	praise	the	friendly,	neighbourly	
rela_ons	and	the	social	cohesion	they	experienced.	I	argue	that	this	view	is	only	
admiang	part	of	the	truth.	Upon	closer	inspec_on	it	becomes	clear	that	indeed	
many	friendships	were	cul_vated	and	maintained	in	the	GDR,	but	it	was	primarily	
done	out	of	sheer	necessity,	as	the	right	rela_ons	(Beziehungen)	were	essen_al	to	
live	a	rela_vely	comfortable	life	in	a	society	characterised	by	chronic	shortages.	
No	doubt,	there	were	many	true	friendships	which	have	lasted	through	the	years	to	
this	day.	But,	Kollmorgen	(2014)	sees	a	par_cular	trend	also	found	in	many	other	
postsocialist	socie_es.	He	believes	that	the	state's	forced	solidarity	and	dictated	
group	cohesion	led	people	to	be	less	interested	in	social	cohesion	when	they	ﬁnally	
had	the	freedom	to	choose.	In	democra_c	socie_es,	people	develop	social	
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rela_onships	with	others	more	naturally	and	are	therefore	more	likely	to	internalise	
them.	
A	recently	published	study	by	the	Bertelsmann	founda_on	(2014)	conﬁrmed	these	
assump_ons	in	a	sta_s_cal	analysis.	A	long-term	study	of	social	cohesion	was	
conducted	in	the	16	German	states	(Bundesländer)	from	1990-2012.	The	study	
demonstrated	signiﬁcant	diﬀerences	between	East	and	West	German	states.	The	
authors	of	this	study	consider	social	cohesion	to	be	characterised	by	stable	social	
rela_onships,	a	posi_ve	connec_on	with	members	of	the	public	and	a	strong	sense	
of	community	welfare.	This	was	established	by	asking	a	number	of	ques_ons.	The	
aim	was	to	ﬁnd	out,	for	example,	to	what	extent	the	par_cipants	trusted	the	people	
around	them,	and/or	whether	they	felt	that	they	were	treated	fairly	by	the	public.	
The	collected	data	created	interes_ng	images	of	the	diﬀerent	regions	of	Germany,	
highligh_ng	signiﬁcant	regional	varia_on.	They	concluded:	“Social	cohesion	is	
stronger	in	all	of	Germany’s	11	western	states	than	in	the	5	eastern	ones.	In	our	ﬁve-	
level	grouping,	the	eastern	states	can	be	found	in	the	lower	mid-range	(Brandenburg	
and	Saxony)	and	at	the	bodom	(Thuringia,	Mecklenburg-	Western	Pomerania	and	
Saxony	-Anhalt)	of	the	ranking.	The	gap	between	west	and	east	is	currently	even	
larger	than	it	was	directly	arer	reuniﬁcaSon	(observaSon	period	1990	to	1995).	
Unlike	in	other	areas,	when	it	comes	to	social	cohesion	Germany’s	eastern	states	
have	–	in	relaSve	terms	–	not	caught	up	with	their	western	counterparts.	There	has,	
however,	been	an	increase	in	social	cohesion	within	the	country’s	eastern	states,	
despite	the	extenuaSng	factors	found	there:	a	weaker	economy,	lower	employment	
levels,	a	higher	risk	of	poverty,	a	populaSon	that	is,	on	average,	older	than	in	the	
west,	and	a	lower	degree	of	urbanizaSon.”	(Bertelsmann,	2014,	p.66)	
	 276	
Interes_ngly,	East	German	states	showed	lower	scores	in	all	the	ques_ons	asked	
besides	the	categories	of	‘abiding	by	social	norms'	and	‘iden_ﬁca_on	with	local	
community'.	The	authors	conclude	the	East	German	results	show	strong	
resemblances	with	post-socialist	states	such	as	the	Czech	Republic,	Lithuania,	Latvia,	
Romania	and	Slovakia	(compared	to	a	previous	Interna_onal	Bertelsmann	study,	
2013).	Here,	people	were	also	less	trus_ng.	The	authors	link	this	to	a	culture	of	
control	that	used	to	be	par_cularly	apparent	in	socialist	countries.	
The	study	furthermore	showed	that	the	trend	of	social	cohesion	in	East	Germany	
declined	in	recent	years.	Right	a`er	reuniﬁca_on	and	in	the	early	nine_es,	the	
scores	were	slightly	higher	than	they	are	now	(Bertelsmann	S_`ung	2014).	This	
decline	could	be	explained	by	an	ini_al	con_nua_on	of	exis_ng	social	structures	and	
GDR	ins_tu_ons,	which	fostered	community	cohesion	(e.g.	community	holiday	
homes	or	leisure	clubs).	
MulL-layered	dimensions	of	distrust	in	East	Germany	
In	this	sec_on	I	will	brieﬂy	shed	light	on	the	varying	types	of	distrust	I	have	
encountered	in	my	ethnographic	ﬁeldwork	in	East	Germany,	and	how	they	have	
challenged	personal	rela_onships	and	impacted	people’s	wellbeing.		
Interviews	with	informants	have	revealed	four	main	forms	of	distrust	many	East	
Germans	have	encountered	before	and	a`er	the	reuniﬁca_on.		
1)	A	predominant	area	of	distrust	is	characterised	by	the	socialist	state's	
extensive	system	of	control	over	the	popula_on	in	the	GDR,	in	par_cular,	
surveillance	conducted	by	the	Stasi,	using	unoﬃcial	spies	within	the	
popula_on.	As	men_oned	previously,	this	created	an	atmosphere	of	
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suspicion	and	uncertainty.	People	were	wary	of	expressing	their	true	opinion	
in	public	for	fear	of	denuncia_on.	Such	guardedness	had	a	signiﬁcant	impact	
on	their	social	communica_on	and	interpersonal	rela_onships	in	general.	
Although	everyone	in	the	GDR	was	aware	of	this	control,	it	must	be	stressed	
that	the	extent	to	which	people	were	directly	aﬀected	by	this	control	varied	
greatly	(Kowalczuk	2013).	
Although	everyday	interac_ons	with	those	outside	of	the	immediate	family	
or	friendship	group	were	conducted	in	an	approachable	and	friendly	
manner,	the	actual	nature	of	conversa_ons	tended	to	be	marked	by	quite	
superﬁcial,	pha_c	communica_on.	Trobisch-Lütge	(2010)	calls	this:	
Mauersprache	(“Wall	speech“),	a	par_cular	way	of	talking	in	public	spaces	
(e.g.	a	pub),	which	meant	speaking	a	lot,	but	not	really	saying	much	at	all.	
Even	now,	during	my	ﬁeldwork,	I	have	seen	this	behaviour	frequently.	In	
Berlin,	this	is	not	very	no_ceable,	yet	in	other	regions	of	the	East,	it	appears	
to	be	more	common.	This	par_cular	type	of	pha_c	communica_on	is	one	
manifesta_on	of	East	Germany's	culture	of	distrust.	
Overall,	I	would	argue	that	today's	social	interac_ons	con_nue	to	be	
inﬂuenced	by	East	Germans'	experiences	of	the	past,	regarding	the	way	
exis_ng	rela_onships	were	disturbed	by	betrayal	associated	with	spying,	
par_cularly	if	those	aﬀected	gained	evidence	of	their	suspicions	through	
viewing	their	Stasi	ﬁles	(Funder	2003).	Many	family	rela_onships	were	
corrupted	by	such	revela_ons.	Even	25	years	later,	for	those	aﬀected,	
encounters	with	family	members	are	dictated	by	feelings	of	denial,	tension	
and	many	taboo	conversa_on	topics.	I	would,	moreover,	speculate	that	East	
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Germans	who	were	socialised	in	the	GDR	(born	before	1970)	con_nue	to	
follow	certain	pajerns	of	social	interac_ons	they	grew	up	with,	leading	them	
to	enter	close	personal	rela_onships	more	cau_ously.		
2)	Second,	distrust	was	felt	towards	the	state	GDR.	This	prevalent	feeling	
among	the	popula_on	peaked	in	the	1980's	(Kowalczuk	2013;	Baer	1992).	
Even	many	of	the	most	convinced	socialists	and	party	members	recognised	
the	state's	deteriora_on	and	ﬁnancial	collapse.	Everyday	life	was	dictated	by	
shortages	and	social	pressure	as	well	as	increased	state	control.	The	
popula_on's	distrust	was	further	reinforced	by	the	Stasi's	all-encompassing	
power,	as	well	as	the	growing	contradic_ons	between	the	SED	party	
preachings,	GDR	media	reports,	and	the	actual	reality	of	life	in	the	state.	
Finally,	revela_ons	about	elec_on	fraud	led	more	and	more	ci_zen	groups	to	
form	and	rise	up	against	the	repression,	eventually	leading	to	a	peaceful	
revolu_on.	
It	must	be	noted	that	there	was	a	large	part	of	the	popula_on	that	wanted	to	
bring	about	a	change	in	the	country	by	solving	exis_ng	problems.	They	were	
convinced	by	the	poli_cal	model	of	socialism	and	did	not	necessarily	want	a	
reuniﬁca_on	with	the	West	and	an	adop_on	of	capitalism.	Yet,	the	aged	and	
crumbling	poli_cal	leadership	was	unable	to	adjust	suﬃciently	to	avoid	the	
crisis	(Kowalczuk	2013).		
3)	The	third	kind	of	distrust	occurred	a`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall	and	was	
directed	at	the	West	German	government,	now	responsible	for	the	united	
country.	Many	East	Germans	felt	disillusioned	a`er	the	ini_al	euphoria	and	
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thrill	of	the	Wende	_me.	For	many	the	reuniﬁca_on	caused	great	existen_al	
uncertainty.	State-owned	companies	were	either	closed	immediately	or	
bought	by	Western	investors,	who	closed	them	shortly	a`er.	This	caused	
mass	unemployment	(un_l	then	virtually	unknown	to	GDR	ci_zens)	and	
ﬁnancial	instability.	
The	unfamiliarity	with	the	new	poli_cal	system	and	the	state’s	expecta_ons	
towards	ci_zens	were	cause	for	insecurity	and	worry	to	many.	Living	in	a	
“compe__ve	society”	centred	around	“the	individual”	as	opposed	to	“the	
collec_ve”	made	them	feel	“foreign	in	their	country.”	Many	feared	being	
taken	advantage	of,	not	being	prepared	for	the	“cudhroat”	mentality	of	
capitalism,	and	struggling	with	career	and	status	rivalry.	These	developments	
gave	rise	to	new	social	problems,	predominantly	featuring	anxiety	and	
distrust.	West	Germans	were	frequently	seen	in	an	untrustworthy	light;	
prejudice	in	both	East	and	West	about	the	“other”	con_nues	to	divide	the	
country.	East	Germans	felt	as	though	they	were	regarded	as	“second	class	
ciSzens”	by	the	“arrogant	Wessis”.	Indeed,	even	today	unjust	treatment	of	
the	East	by	the	government	con_nues	to	exist,	par_cularly	when	it	comes	to	
equality	in	wages	and	pension.	
4)		 The	ﬁnal	and	most	severe	form	of	distrust	I	outline	stems	from	intense	
repression	and	persecu_on	of	individuals	by	the	Stasi,	employing	the	
Zersetzung	method	and	imprisonment.	Those	who	were	aﬀected	by	these	
methods	and	who	have	sought	out	psychiatric	help	in	recent	years	are	
primarily	diagnosed	as	“poliScally	traumaSsed.”	The	resul_ng	type	of	
distrust	is	by	far	the	most	damaging	to	a	people’s	wellbeing.	It	is	impossible	
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to	know	exactly	how	many	East	Germans	are	aﬀected	by	this	(Trobisch-Lütge	
2010).	
Control	techniques	consisted	of	an	extremely	sophis_cated	form	of	
psychological	torture	aimed	at	genera_ng	intense	feelings	of	powerlessness.	
Oﬃcial	and	unoﬃcial	employees	of	the	Stasi	inﬁltrated	their	vic_ms’	lives	
and	o`en	coercively	applied	techniques	to	disorient	them,	taking	away	their	
basic	trust	in	stable	norms	and	rules.	
This	method	was	used	on	people	the	poli_cal	leadership	considered	
dissidents.	In	reality,	not	every	one	of	them	was	even	poli_cally	ac_ve	or	
followed	some	poli_cal	mo_ve.	Some_mes	it	was	suﬃcient	reason	to	put	
someone	under	close	observa_on	if	they	had	close	contact	with	the	West,	
through	family	or	friends.	No	one	was	safe	from	persecu_on,	even	party	
members	and	commijed	socialists	could	easily	come	under	the	radar	of	the	
Stasi.	Indeed,	Ruth	Hoﬀmann’s	excellent	book	“Stasi-Kinder:	Aufwachsen	im	
Überwachungsstaat”(2012)	portrays	this	very	well.	Here,	numerous	children	
of	former	Stasi	oﬃcials	describe	their	childhood	growing	up	in	the	GDR	and	
recoun_ng	the	extreme	pressure	their	parents	were	under.	Many	of	them	
lived	in	buildings	primarily	occupied	by	employees	of	the	Ministerium	für	
Staatssicherheit	(MfS),	ensuring	that	they	would	all	keep	an	eye	on	one	
another.	They	had	no	privacy,	and	the	slightest	faux	pas	could	have	serious	
consequences.	The	perpetrators	could	turn	into	vic_ms	from	one	moment	to	
the	next	and	vice	versa	(see	also	Hoﬀmann	2012,	Kowalczuk	2013).	
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Chapter	Nine:	Discussion	and	Conclusion		
	
Discussion	
	
In	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 I	 have	 explored	 surveillance	 by	 the	 Ministerium	 für	
Staatssicherheit	 (Stasi)	 and	 its	 las_ng	 implica_ons	 for	 East	 Germans.	 My	
ethnographic	ﬁeldwork	has	 revealed	a	 two-fold	 argument,	 exploring	 the	 legacy	of	
the	Stasi	on	a	collec_ve	and	an	individual	scale.	
The	collecLve	impact	of	mass	spying	
	
A	study	of	social	life	under	state	control	in	the	GDR	is	also	inevitably	an	explora_on	
of	 the	 social	 nature	 of	 dictatorships.	 The	 German	 Democra_c	 Republic	 was	 a	
repressive	 regime	 in	 which	 the	 social	 interac_ons	 of	 its	 ci_zens	 mirror	 those	 of	
other	 (and	 previous)	 dictatorships,	 yet	 displaying	 certain	 unique	 characteris_cs	 of	
neo-totalitarianism.	 The	 GDR's	 system	 of	 social	 and	 poli_cal	 control	 was	 highly	
sophis_cated,	and	the	secret	police's	extensive	use	of	unoﬃcial	informants	amongst	
the	popula_on	created	extreme	condi_ons	of	social	pressure	and	distrust.	
Auto-governmentality	
This	system	of	control	was	perfected	in	such	a	way	that	the	principle	of	Foucault's	
Panop_con	was	 taken	 even	 further.	Not	 only	were	people	 self-policing	 for	 fear	 of	
being	 watched	 and	 suﬀering	 the	 consequences,	 but	 they	 were	 also	 constantly	
observing	others.	This	created	the	illusion	that	the	Stasi	really	was	all	around,	just	as	
they	 had	 intended.	 East	 Germans	 altered	 their	 behaviour,	 primarily	 in	 the	 public	
sphere	to	ﬁt	the	state-prescribed	image	of	the	model	socialist	ci_zen.	Thus,	anyone	
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who	was	 perceived	 as	 even	 slightly	 “diﬀerent”,	 could	 easily	 become	 the	 target	 of	
scapegoa_ng.	The	sense	of	all-encompassing	surveillance	signiﬁcantly	impacted	the	
way	 personal	 rela_onships	were	 conducted	 and	 social	 processes	 took	 place,	 thus	
sugges_ng	a	type	of	auto-governmentality	being	exercised.		
But,	 what	 was	 it	 that	 led	 people	 to	 conform	 and	 become	 deeply	 involved	 in	 the	
dictatorship,	even	if	they	were	not	necessarily	convinced	by	socialist	ideology?	The	
GDR	was,	what	Zimbardo	(2008)	calls	"a	system	that	creates	evil".	Of	course,	that	is	
not	to	say	that	all	GDR	ci_zens	were	evil,	but	instead	it	means	that	the	dictatorship	
created	 condi_ons	were	 the	 enforcement	 of	 control	 (with	 all	 its	 aspects)	 became	
normalized,	this	also	echoes	what	other	scholars	have	discussed	in	the	past	(see	for	
instance	Foucault’s	Discipline	and	Punish,	1977;	Dalibert	2013).	As	the	years	of	the	
regime	went	by,	social	control	became	more	and	more	incorporated	and	accepted	in	
everyday	 life.	 In	 the	 mean_me,	 the	 Stasi's	 methods	 of	 control	 had	 advanced	
signiﬁcantly	and	become	more	subtle.	They	were	less	openly	aggressive,	yet	making	
use	 of	 more	 sophis_cated	 psychological	 repressive	 techniques,	 causing	 harm	
primarily	to	East	Germans'	mental	wellbeing.	Especially	to	the	genera_on	who	were	
born	and	socialised	in	the	dictatorship,	surveillance	and	control	were	a	regular	part	
of	 their	 lives,	 as	 they	 had	 never	 experienced	 anything	 diﬀerent.	 It	 created	
detrimental	condi_ons	of	what	Hannah	Arendt	(1961)	called	"not	thinking".		
We	cannot	assume	that	Stasi	control	was	constantly	on	peoples'	minds;	 instead,	 it	
became	 normality.	 As	 described	 previously,	 the	 state's	 presence	 was	 o`en	
disguised,	becoming	an	inevitable	and	inescapable	part	of	people's	existence	within	
the	GDR.	Such	a	disguise	could,	for	instance,	be	fun—as	in	communal	ac_vi_es,	like	
work	 ou_ngs	 or	 holiday	 camps.	 These	 served	 the	 state	 in	 gaining	 a	maximum	 of	
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insight	 and	 inﬂuence	 into	 people	 lives,	 at	 the	 same	 _me	 it	 created	 a	 sense	 of	
solidarity	and	community	(Gemeinscharsgefühl),	which,	independent	of	the	state's	
original	 inten_ons,	 con_nued	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 hallmarks	 of	 self-described	 East	
German	 iden_ty	and	 the	predominant	 longing	 for	 those	who	are	nostalgic	 for	 the	
past	"GDR-_mes"(Ostalgie).		
But,	on	the	other	hand,	conformity	in	the	former	GDR	came	in	many	diﬀerent	and	
o`en	 poten_ally	 unhealthy	 shapes.	 These	 ranged,	 for	 instance,	 from	 being	 a	 SED	
party	member	or	working	 for	 the	Stasi,	 to	merely	 following	orders	 -	 ac_ng	as	 the	
model	 socialist	 ci_zen	 -	 or	 as	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 some	 of	my	 informant's	 examples,	
shunning	those	who	did	not	comply.	Such	social	dynamics	created	extreme	pressure	
-	 a	 burden	 few	 East	 Germans	 could	 shoulder.	 For	 some,	 this	was	 reﬂected	 in	 the	
sense	of	defeat	and	a	resul_ng	conformity	because	the	Stasi's	extensive	permea_on	
of	GDR	society	blurred	the	lines	between	ac_ve	par_cipant	and	follower.	It	is	these	
abstract	 social	 condi_ons	 which	 make	 the	 study	 of	 East	 Germany	 par_cularly	
intriguing	 and	 complex.	 Individuals'	 roles	within	 the	 system	were	 rarely	 clear-cut.	
Instead,	this	 inves_ga_on	has	shown	that	o`en,	"perpetrators"	and	"vic_ms"	were	
not	necessarily	separate	en__es	(e.g.	those	who	spied,	were	spied	on	themselves).			
Rela_onships,	in	the	end,	are	complex	and	interrelated.	This	also	became	evident	in	
the	a`ermath	of	 the	breakdown	of	socialism,	through	the	revela_ons	of	Stasi	ﬁles	
and	the	personal	consequences	that	followed.	In	some	cases,	revela_ons	impacted	
an	 individual's	 personal	 life	 and	 career	 substan_ally	 (e.g.,	 by	being	denied	 certain	
employment	 due	 to	 previous	 involvement	 with	 the	 Stasi).	 The	 way,	 then,	 that	
individuals	relate	to	the	former	GDR	today	are	certainly	shaped	by	their	own	path	
a`er	the	Wall	came	down.	Yet,	as	all	interviewees	agreed,	there	has	been	a	lack	of	
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public	discourse	accoun_ng	for	the	past.	My	hope	here	is	that	this	disserta_on	and	
those	who	assisted	me	will	one	day	contribute	to	just	such	a	public	discussion.	
The	dictatorship	in	many	ways	corresponds	with	Arendt's	(1961)	reﬂec_ons	on	the	
infamous	"Banality	of	evil",	where	all	ci_zens	play	a	part	in	the	regime,	yet	no	one	
feels	truly	responsible.	People	were	conforming	with	the	system,	not	only	 in	order	
to	avoid	punishment	but	out	of	comfort	or	even	to	gain	certain	personal	beneﬁts	or	
advantages.		
I	argue	that	it	is	the	normalisa_on	of	control	coupled	with	the	comforts	of	everyday	
life,	which	became	the	most	dangerous	social	dynamic	in	the	dictatorship.	As	I	have	
shown,	 those	who	made	certain	gains	 from	the	dictatorship	 (in	 line	with	Stefes	et	
al.’s	Three	pillars	theory),	were	more	likely	to	conform	and	ac_vely	par_cipate	in	the	
regime.	This	was	certainly	true	 in	the	GDR.	Those	who	lived	rela_vely	comfortable	
lives	 (beneﬁ_ng	from	the	occasional	privileges),	were	 less	 inclined	to	ques_on	the	
regime	 or	 the	 system	 of	 control	 they	 were	 living	 and	 perhaps	 even	 ac_vely	
par_cipa_ng	in.	Comfort	made	some	East	Germans	complacent;	it	prevented	them	
from	 looking	 beyond	 the	 mundani_es	 of	 everyday	 life.	 As	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 my	
explora_on	 of	 privacy,	 this	 complacency	 is	 undoubtedly	 translatable	 to	
contemporary	 life	 too.	 As	 Bauman	 argues,	 our	 desire	 for	 a	 sense	 of	 community	
(nowadays	 replicated	 through	 social	 media)	 and	 personal	 comforts	 and	
conveniences	 (Arendt)	 leads	 to	 our	 decreasing	 engagement	 with	 public	 poli_cal	
discourses	 and	 diminished	 valuing	 of	 democracy	 (see	 Foa	 and	 Monk	 2016).	 A	
warped	 concept	 of	 privacy	 only	 being	 one	 symptom	 of	 this	 trend	 (see	 also	 Bejs	
2010).	In	other	words,	if	basic	needs	are	met,	people	are	likely	to	accept	their	fate.		
Of	 course,	 in	 the	GDR	ci_zens	did	eventually	 rise	up	against	 the	 regime,	once	 the	
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discrepancies	between	state	ideology	and	reality	grew	to	an	extent	that	was	hard	to	
ignore.	 	Yet,	even	under	these	circumstances,	a	 large	propor_on	of	the	popula_on	
was	in	favour	of	state	reforms,	but	not	necessarily	an	incorpora_on	to	the	FRG.		
There	were	state-prescribed	rules	and	people	 followed	them	for	 the	most	part,	at	
least	outwardly.	My	interviewees’	accounts	revealed	that	people	lived	their	lives	in	
two	 diﬀerent	 spaces,	 that	 of	 the	 public	 (work,	 school,	 some	 friendships,	 holiday	
ou_ngs)	and	that	of	the	home	or	whichever	private	niche	they	could	ﬁnd.	For	many	
their	family	represented	this	space	and	privacy	was	valued	highly.	The	family	indeed	
became	 a	 “protec_ve	 refuge	 for	 most	 people”	 (Bejs	 201,	 p.49),	 where	 a	 strong	
sense	of	cohension	and	an	emphasis	placed	on	trust	were	paramount.	These	strong	
rela_onships	 are	 certainly	 remembered	 dearly	 and	 nostalgically	 by	 many	 East	
Germans	today.	
While	 there	 was	 certainly	 a	 deep,	 widespread	 fear	 of	 the	 possible	 nega_ve	
repercussions	 of	 resistance,	 conformity	 with	 the	 dictatorship	 and	 the	 blind	
obedience	displayed	by	many	stemmed	from	simply	blanking	out	certain	reali_es	to	
come	 to	 terms	 with	 their	 situa_on.	 Survival	 was	 the	 main	 objec_ve,	 especially	
where	ques_ons	of	morality	 remained	ambiguous.	Certainly,	 some	 recognised	 the	
dangerous	 tendencies	of	 the	dictatorship	 and	were	 cri_cal	 of	 it.	As	 I	 have	 shown,	
these	 people	 suﬀered	 incredibly,	 both	 by	 Stasi	 repression	 as	 well	 as	 the	 social	
pressure	exerted	by	fellow	GDR	ci_zens.	
The	 results	 are	 trauma	and	a	 vast	destruc_on	of	 social	 trust,	 leaving	a	burden	on	
interpersonal	rela_onships	and	general	wellbeing	of	the	popula_on.	Collec_vely	this	
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causes	 ongoing	 social	 suﬀering.	 This	 is	 displayed	 in	 examples	 of	 collec_ve	 anxiety	
and	distrust.		
In	this	thesis,	I	have	shown	how	individuals	describe	and	deal	with	their	trauma.	In	
various	examples,	 I	have	outlined	how	anxiety	and	distrust	 con_nue	 to	determine	
lives,	as	seen	even	in	small	examples	such	as	s_ll	avoiding	travel	through	the	East,	or	
simply	being	reminded	of	something	related	to	the	GDR	 in	a	movie	or	 tv	program	
resul_ng	in	anger	and	frustra_on.	I	was	o`en	told	of	"sore	spots"	-	"wunde	Punkte",	
certain	 topics	 or	 memories	 which	 triggered	 pain.	 For	 some	 of	 my	 informants	
suﬀering	 is	 s_ll	 very	 much	 in	 the	 forefront	 of	 their	 lives.	 Some	 reported	 having	
psychosoma_c	disorders,	sleeplessness	or	nightmares,	anxiety,	paranoia	and	deep-
seated	distrust.	In	these	individuals'	narra_ves,	their	personal	suﬀering	is	repeatedly	
men_oned.	They	emphasised	their	discomfort	and	at	_mes	sense	of	deep	isola_on.	
In	 the	 least,	 there	 was	 certainly	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 felt	 they	 were	 repeatedly	
confronted	with	injus_ce.	
A	further	dimension	was	added	when	age	was	considered.	Not	only	were	my	older	
interviewees	(70+	years)	poten_ally	trauma_sed	by	WWII	as	well	as	by	the	socialist	
regime;	 they	 have	 also	 reached	 an	 age	 where,	 especially	 a`er	 re_rement,	 they	
tended	to	spend	a	signiﬁcant	amount	of	_me	reﬂec_ng	on	their	 lives.	The	trauma	
they	had	 lived	 through	many	years	previously	only	 really	 came	 to	 the	 forefront	at	
re_rement	age	when	they	began	to	ac_vely	engage	with	the	past.		
What	struck	me	most	amongst	 individuals	who	reported	having	experienced	some	
form	of	trauma	caused	by	the	wider	consequences	of	state	control,	was	a	narra_ve	
of	 resilience	 and	 hope.	 Here,	 trust	 was	 emphasised	 over	 distrust.	 Several	 people	
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who	I	interviewed	who	had	experienced	betrayal	and	rejec_on,	in	the	end	focused	
on	those	who	had	proven	trustworthy	and	reliable	even	under	adverse	condi_ons.	
This	 group	 of	 interviewees,	 despite	 their	 undoubtedly	 painful	 experiences,	 had	
posi_ve	 interpreta_ons	of	the	eﬀects	of	their	suﬀering.	They	stressed	the	strength	
that	 they	gained	 from	the	experience,	 interpre_ng	 their	East	German	 iden_ty	and	
past	as	an	asset.	They	o`en	men_oned	special	skills	that	they	gained,	especially	in	
terms	 of	 interpersonal	 rela_onships	 and	 the	 cri_cal	 assessment	 of	 other	 people's	
inten_ons:	a	bejer	"Menschenkenntnis"	-	a	knowledge	of	people,	as	it	were.		
That	is	not	to	say	that	their	trauma	has	completely	healed;	but,	rather,	it	sheds	light	
on	the	way	they	deal	with	it	in	an	everyday	context.	I	argue	that	the	emo_onal	scars	
of	 their	 past	 experiences	 are	 undoubtedly	 s_ll	 present.	 Yet,	 in	 the	 group	 of	 East	
Germans	 I	 have	 interviewed	 in-depth,	 these	 two	 diﬀering	 types	 of	 coping	
mechanisms	have	emerged.		
As	men_oned	above,	while	I	would	be	reluctant	in	determining	a	single	East	German	
condi_on	or	 illness,	 I	agree	with	Scaer's	argument	 that	 trauma	 is	a	 "con_nuum	of	
variably	nega_ve	 life	events	occurring	over	the	 lifespan,	 including	events	 that	may	
be	 accepted	 as	 "normal"	 in	 the	 context	 of	 our	 daily	 experience	 because	 they	 are	
endorsed	and	perpetuated	by	our	own	cultural	ins_tu_ons."	(2005,	p.	2).	In	my	East	
German	 case	 study	 of	 Stasi	 surveillance	 and	 violence,	 the	 normalisa_on	 of	 state-
control	 provided	 the	backdrop	 for	many	 such	 trauma_c	 instances.	 Further	 painful	
experiences	stemmed	from	Germany's	reuniﬁca_on	and	its	a`ermath,	including	the	
availability	 of	 Stasi	 records.	 This	 ethnographic	 explora_on	has	 provided	 an	 insight	
into	the	mul_faceted	nature	of	trauma	caused	by	state	control	and	the	way	in	which	
this	 can	 lead	 to	 "societal	damage".	As	Scaer	 (2005)	outlines,	 this	 is	 "based	on	 the	
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eﬀects	that	insidious	and	recurrent	trauma	may	have	on	the	structure	and	func_on	
of	 the	 brain,	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 mind,	 and	 the	 health	 of	 the	 body.	 Trauma	 as	 a	
ubiquitous	societal	experience	therefore	 far	exceeds	 the	deﬁni_on	of	a	psychiatric	
disease."	 Thus,	 the	 ﬁndings	 of	 this	 ethnographic	 ﬁeldwork	 show	 that	 mass	
surveillance	and	a	culture	 that	condones	extreme	state	control	nega_vely	 impacts	
individual	and	societal	wellbeing.	
Legacy	of	the	Stasi	in	people's	minds:	Individual	consequences		
Having	 conducted	 ethnographic	 ﬁeldwork	 and	 collected	 numerous	 life	 histories,	 I	
have	seen	a	vast	 range	of	personal	 reac_ons	 to	 the	mass	surveillance	prac_sed	 in	
East	Germany.	I	follow	other	authors	(Plänkers	T.,	Bahrke	U.,	Waltzer	M.	Et	al.	2005)	
in	their	reluctance	to	summarise	East	German's	experience	of	suﬀering	into	a	single	
condi_on.	It	would	be	problema_c	to	label	everyone	with	having	some	kind	of	"East	
German	Angst",	since,	as	I	have	shown,	individual	experiences	of	the	regime	varied	
greatly.	It	can	indeed	be	said	that	the	experience	of	mass	surveillance	did	elicit	high	
levels	 of	 distrust	 and	 trauma.	 Indeed,	 Linden's	 concept	 of	 Post	 Trauma_c	
Embijerment	 Disorder	 (PTED)	 is	 extremely	 useful	 in	 dis_nguishing	 the	 types	 of	
trauma	 experienced	 by	 individuals;	 yet	 it	 cannot	 necessarily	 be	 applied	 to	 the	
popula_on	as	a	whole.	Therefore,	 I	made	 it	my	objec_ve	 to	be	ﬁrst	and	 foremost	
descrip_ve	 in	my	approach.	 Like	Plänkers	T.,	Bahrke	U.,	Waltzer	M.	et	al.	 (2005),	 I	
have	chosen	to	present	how	my	 informants,	all	of	whom	came	 into	direct	contact	
with	 the	 Stasi	 and	 were	 spied	 upon	 (and/or	 spied	 themselves),	 experienced	 life	
under	 these	 diﬃcult	 condi_ons	 and	 how	 this	 experience	 of	 surveillance	 has	
con_nued	to	shape	their	paths	un_l	today.	I	have	deliberately	taken	an	ethnographic	
approach	to	illustrate	and	make	sense	of	these	East	Germans'	unique	experiences.	
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In	Chapter	Three	 (Ethnographic	Vignejes),	 I	 presented	 three	 life	histories	 that	 for	
me	 exemplify	 several	 themes	 that	 repeatedly	 emerged	 in	 my	 conversa_ons	 with	
informants.	 First,	 I	 examine	 individual	 approaches	 to	 state	 doctrine	 and	 the	
enforcement	of	control.	I	have	explored	how	some	people	saw	socialism	as	a	source	
of	 hope	 for	 a	 bejer	 future	 a`er	 the	 war,	 while	 others	 perceived	 it	 as	 a	 further	
threatening,	 restric_ve	regime.	This	outlook	also	shaped	the	way	 they	understood	
state	control	and	along	with	that,	conformity.	
Here,	moreover,	I	also	outlined	some	of	the	meanings	of	Conformity	in	the	GDR	and	
how	 this	 conformity	both	 impacted	 individuals'	 everyday	 lives	 and	has	 lived	on	 in	
many	East	Germans'	minds.	What	did	privacy	mean	 then,	 and	what	does	 it	mean	
now?	 I	 have	 examined	 how	 this	 concept	 has	 shi`ed	 signiﬁcantly,	 especially	when	
viewed	cross-genera_onally.	I	argue	that	small	spaces	of	privacy	were	valued	highly	
in	 the	mass-surveillance	society	 ("having	 two	opinions"	 -	one	 in	public	and	one	at	
home),	 while	 today	 privacy	 is	 no	 longer	 protected	 so	 vigorously	 because	 t	 is	
perceived	to	be	less	threatened,	or	at	least	otherwise	threatened.	
Comforts	 and	 the	 conveniences	 of	 everyday	 life	 eliminate	 the	 urgency	 for	 cri_cal	
discourse.	 	 Because	 of	 this	 truism,	 I	 argue	 that,	 in	 the	 same	way,	 that	 some	 East	
Germans	became	apathe_c	in	the	face	of	state	control	(originally	stemming	from	a	
deep-seated	fear	of	the	consequences	of	resistance),	nowadays	an	open	cri_que	of	
the	 freedom	 inhibi_ng	 and	 poten_ally	 controlling	 forces	 "online"	 is	 rare	 because	
convenience	 is	 favoured.	Albeit	 these	social	dynamics	 took	place	on	very	diﬀerent	
scales,	there	is	a	similar	process	at	play.	
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Hannah	 Arendt's	 provoca_ve	 account	 of	 Eichmann	 in	 Jerusalem	 (1961)	 in	 part	
examines	this	process.	She	wrote	how	Eichmann,	the	man	who	was	charged	guilty	
for	his	 responsibility	 in	 the	 large-scale	homicide	 in	 the	Third	Reich,	was	actually	a	
rather	dull	and	ordinary	character.	Contrary	to	what	could	be	expected,	he	was	no	
grand	mastermind,	but	instead	a	colourless	bureaucrat.	In	his	narra_ves,	she	found	
that	he	did	not	reﬂect	much	on	the	wider	consequences	of	his	ac_ons.	Instead,	he	
was	 enveloped	 in	 a	 system	 where	 evil	 deeds	 were	 normalised,	 where	 he	 was	
"merely	doing	his	 job".	 	 In	her	claims	regarding	the	"banality	of	evil",	she	outlined	
the	dangers	of	convenience	 in	a	physical,	emo_onal,	and	 intellectual	 sense.	 In	her	
opinion,	a	convenient	life	fosters	the	broad	acceptance	of	clichés	and	ideologies.	As	
exempliﬁed	by	Eichmann,	convenience	leads	to	a	culture	of	"not	thinking".			
Arendt	 examined	 his	 accounts	 and	 found	 that	 in	 his	 personal	 narra_ve	 he	 was	
en_rely	 pre-occupied	 with	 own	 life	 and	 career.	 She	 described	 how	 he	 did	 not	
ques_on	 the	wider	 consequences	 of	 his	 deeds,	 and	when	 pressed	 further	 by	 the	
court,	he	o`en	responded	in	clichés.	Therefore,	when	Arendt	spoke	of	banality,	she	
meant	 the	 unreﬂected	 acceptance,	 even	 normalisa_on,	 of	 evil	 acts.	 Arendt	
concludes	that	Eichmann's	inten_ons	were	insigniﬁcant,	in	the	sense	that	he	had	no	
real	inten_ons	as	he	did	not	think	or	reﬂect	cri_cally	about	his	ac_ons.	Albeit	this	is	
a	 drama_c	 example,	 it	 matches	 my	 argument	 of	 how	 convenience	 can	 lead	 to	
apathy.	
Nonetheless,	one	must	not	lose	sight	of	the	other	contribu_ng	factors	that	elicited	
apathy.	 I	 have	 shown,	 for	 example,	 that	 some	 GDR	 ci_zens	 were	 undoubtedly	
convinced	 by	 the	 socialist	 cause	 and	 acted	 in	 line	 with	 their	 convic_ons;	 they	
believed	that	state	control	was	necessary.	Yet	others	were	driven	by	fear	more	than	
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anything	else.	As	I	have	shown	in	detail,	conformity	was	(unlike	today)	for	the	most	
part,	forced.	Those	who	were	frightened	of	the	nega_ve	repercussions	of	resistance	
certainly	had	valid	reasons	for	conforming.	Accounts	of	Stasi	ac_ve	surveillance	and	
violence,	house	searches,	 interroga_ons	and	 imprisonment	provide	only	a	glimpse	
into	the	frightening	reality	that	many	GDR	ci_zens	experienced.	
Through	various	accounts,	 I	 have	demonstrated	how	 those	who	 suﬀered	 severely,	
even	today	feel	that	"not	much	has	changed".	In	their	opinion,	a	“coming	to	terms	
with	the	past”	has	only	taken	place	superﬁcially.	East	Germans	who	were	exposed	
to	extreme	state	violence	and	repression	today	fear	the	survival	of	"old	structures",	
meaning	that	former	Stasi	employees	s_ll	possess	inﬂuen_al	powers	in	society.		
Furthermore,	I	have	shown	how	the	availability	of	Stasi	records	is	received	by	those	
who	were	 surveilled.	 In	my	conversa_ons,	 I	 found	 that	 some	ac_vely	engage	with	
their	personal	history,	while	others	placed	greater	emphasis	on	moving	forward	and	
leaving	behind	the	past,	or	simply	on	avoiding	viewing	their	ﬁles	altogether	for	fear	
of	 what	 could	 be	 revealed.	 As	 demonstrated	 in	 numerous	 narra_ves,	 painful	
betrayal	 became	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 many	 peoples'	 lives,	 further,	 intensifying	
condi_ons	of	distrust.	As	I	learnt	from	one	informant	(see	Frau	L.),	the	capacity	for	
forgiveness	 in	 the	 face	 of	 betrayal	 is	 also	 impacted	 by	 age.	 She	 found	 that	 her	
parents,	 who	 had	 spent	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 their	 lives	 in	 the	 dictatorship,	 had	
greater	 capacity	 for	 forgiveness.	 They	 understood	 the	 condi_ons	 of	 living	 in	 the	
regime	 bejer	 than	 her,	 who	 had	 only	 experienced	 childhood	 there.	 She	 felt	
betrayed	and	hurt	by	the	people	who	should	have	been	there	to	support	her	in	the	
diﬃcult	situa_on	she	was	exposed	to	as	a	child.	For	her,	it	has	been	harder	to	come	
to	 terms	with	 the	 past.	 Her	 parents	 on	 the	 other	 take	 a	more	 nuanced	 view	 and	
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understand	the	moral	ambiguity	of	 the	situa_on	 in	 the	GDR.	Nevertheless,	Frau	L.	
found	her	own	way	of	coping	with	the	trauma_c	past.	
Now,	 I	 will	 move	 onto	 the	 ﬁnal	 (and	 perhaps	 from	 a	 Medical	 Anthropology	
perspec_ve)	 most	 signiﬁcant	 ques_on:	 the	 possibility	 of	 healing	 trauma.	 I	 have	
presented	the	complexity	of	East	Germans'	percep_ons	of	Stasi	surveillance.	It	has	
come	 to	 the	 forefront	 that	 a	 repressive	 regime	 like	 the	 GDR,	 which	 violates	
individuals'	 basic	 freedoms,	 inevitably	 aﬀects	 wellbeing	 nega_vely.	 While	 some	
people	 openly	 voice	 their	 discomfort	 and	 have	 reﬂected	 on	 their	 suﬀering	
extensively,	 others	 suppress	 it	 and	 only	 through	 in-depth	 discussions	 allow	
themselves	 to	 reveal	 their	emo_onal	world.	Perhaps	 future	 research	could	 reveal,	
whether	East	Germans	are	 in	fact	stuck	within	a	situa_on	of	permanent	 liminality,	
while	 the	 trauma	 process	 s_ll	 con_nues	 to	 unravel.	 Perhaps	more	 _me	 needs	 to	
pass	before	a	socio-politcal	transi_on	is	underway,	a	genera_onal	turnover	can	take	
place	and	a	healing	process	can	occur	(Sztompka	2004).	The	former	GDR	serves	as	a	
case	 study	 of	 how	 mass	 surveillance	 causes	 long-term	 suﬀering.	 Coupled	 with	 a	
breadth	of	diﬀering	experiences	before	and	a`er	the	fall	of	the	Wall,	it	has	created	a	
complex	landscape	of	trauma	and	anxiety.		
Conclusion	
	
As	 I	have	demonstrated,	a	number	of	key	 themes	emerged	 from	my	ethnographic	
ﬁeldwork	 amongst	 former	 East	 Germans.	 Formal	 interviews	 and	 recording	 of	 life	
histories	 "Zeitzeugengespräche",	have	 revealed	 that	 the	 legacy	of	 the	Stasi	 in	East	
Germany	is	two-fold,	there	is	the	collec_ve	level	and	the	individual	 level,	and	they	
diverge	considerably.		
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On	 a	 collec_ve	 level,	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 socialist	 doctrine	 was	 ins_lled	 in	 the	
popula_on,	 star_ng	with	 children	 from	very	 young	age.	 There	was	a	 complex	and	
far-reaching	propaganda	machinery	 in	place	and	state	eﬀorts	to	create	the	perfect	
new	socialist	human	being.	It	was	the	secret	police's	main	aim	to	enforce	this.	I	have	
demonstrated	how	the	dictatorship	pressured	everyone	to	be	produc_ve	and	ac_ve	
members	of	society	and	thereby	ensuring	that	they	were	unwillingly	and	some_mes	
unknowingly	deeply	ingrained	in	a	system	of	social	control.	The	system	undoubtedly	
had	some	posi_ve	sides	which	upheld	the	regime	for	a	 long	_me.	Especially	when	
people	had	rela_vely	comfortable	 lives	and	beneﬁjed	personally	from	the	regime,	
they	 felt	 less	 inclined	 to	 ques_on	 it.	 These	 are	 the	 aspects	 that	 people	 remain	
nostalgic	about	 (e.g.,	 social	cohesion	or	Zusammenhalt).	But	as	we	have	seen,	 the	
regime’s	dark	sides	con_nue	to	haunt	some	East	Germans	to	this	day.	 I	argue	that	
on	 a	 collec_ve	 level,	 condi_ons	 of	 state	 control	 and	 repression	 have	 caused	 high	
levels	 of	 social	 suﬀering	 that	 are	 displayed	 in	 examples	 of	 collec_ve	 anxiety	 and	
distrust.		
On	 an	 individual	 level,	 I	 have	 shown	 examples	 of	 the	 way	 state	 control	 and	
repression	impact	personal	wellbeing	adversely.	My	informants'	accounts	reﬂect	the	
way	 in	 which	 the	 Stasi's	 surveillance	 and	 control	 became	 (seemingly)	 all-
encompassing.	In	line	with	Foucault's	idea	of	the	panop_con,	it	led	East	Germans	to	
self-police	 and,	 signiﬁcantly,	 it	 led	 them	 to	 constantly	 monitor	 one	 another,	
fundamentally	impac_ng	interpersonal	rela_onships.	State	violence	and	repression,	
coupled	with	social	pressure	to	conform,	caused	a	great	deal	of	anxiety	and	trauma.	
For	some	this	means	ongoing	suﬀering	and	dealing	with	distrust.	
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Yet,	 as	 I	 have	 found,	 a	 small	 group	 of	 people	 have	 transformed	 these	 nega_ve	
experiences	 into	 posi_ve	 ones,	 becoming	 'resilient'.	 Despite	 their	 narra_ves	 of	
trauma_c	past	experiences	and	the	recurrent	men_oning	of	"sore	spots"	(related	to	
feelings	 of	 betrayal	 and	 injus_ce),	 the	 overall	 interpreta_on	 of	 their	 current	
wellbeing	 ("Wohlbeﬁnden")	 is	 mostly	 posi_ve.	 They	 judge	 their	 quality	 of	 life	 as	
bejer	 and	 con_nue	 to	 recognise	 the	 posi_ve	 aspects	 they	 gained	 living	 in	 a	
democracy.	 They	 are	 hopeful	 and	 aware	 that	 one	 can	 bejer	 one’s	 own	 situa_on.	
They	 feel	 that	 that	 they	 have	 gained	 strength	 from	 their	 trauma_c	 experience,	
allowing	 them	 to	 be	 a	 'bejer	 self'.	 This	was	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 having	 gained	
special	 skills,	 especially	 related	 to	 their	 ability	 to	 read	 and	 understand	 people	
(Menschenkenntnis)	and	societal	and	poli_cal	trends.		
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Personal	ReﬂecLons			
During	my	ﬁeldwork	I	o`en	encountered	silence.	When	people	for	example	asked	
me	what	my	PhD	research	was	about	and	I	men_oned	the	word	“surveillance”,	they	
were	generally	rather	quick	to	change	the	topic	of	conversa_on,	or	they	would	
simply	say	“Ah	well,	that	was	such	a	long	Sme	ago…”,	indica_ng	that	they	had	no	
interest	in	discussing	the	issue	any	further.	I	wondered	why	they	were	so	reluctant	
to	speak	to	me.		Yet,	examining	ethnographic	studies	in	other	contexts	of	state-
control,	persecu_on	and	repression,	it	has	been	shown	that	silence	is	a	common	
response.	Das	has	wrijen	extensively	the	way	in	which	violence	evokes	silence	(see	
for	example	Das	2000;	2007).	In	a	recent	ar_cle	Pillen	(2016)	also	shed	light	on	how	
trauma	leads	to	speechlessness	and	even	to	the	loss	of	language.	She	writes,	“A	
momentary	descent	into	inhumanity—where	pain	destroys	language	and	carnage	
leads	to	an	inar_culate	state	of	cries—is	mirrored	by	the	sounds	of	bajle,	
onslaught,	or	strike	ac_on.	In	its	a`ermath,	as	linguis_c	expression	con_nues	to	fail,	
such	dehumaniza_on	appears	as	an	injury	to	mankind’s	linguis_c	accomplishments”	
(Pillen	2016,	p.	96).	
Indeed,	for	some	of	my	informants	their	memories	were	so	painful	that	they	were	
unable	 to	 put	 their	 distress	 into	 words.	 But,	 viewing	 their	 stories	 before	 the	
backdrop	of	decades	of	state-imposed	silencing	and	self-policing,	their	reluctance	to	
speak	makes	sense.	At	the	same	_me,	I	also	found	myself	stalling	in	conversa_ons,	
holding	back	ques_ons	I	wanted	to	ask	but	was	too	afraid	to	address.		
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Many	a	_me,	 I	 feared	I	was	making	a	person	uncomfortable	or	reminding	them	of	
painful	experiences.	On	other	occasions,	when	 I	 interviewed	people	whom	I	knew	
well,	 something	 else	 was	 holding	 me	 back.	 Perhaps	 the	 fear	 of	 discovering	
something	unexpected	 that	would	put	 the	person	 in	 front	 of	me,	 into	 an	 en_rely	
new	 light.	 In	many	ways	 I	 could	understand	my	 informants’s	 choice	of	 leaving	 the	
past	behind	and	preferring	not	to	read	their	ﬁles,	in	order	to	avoid	disappointment.			
With	 some	 distance	 to	 my	 ﬁeldwork,	 I	 realise	 that	 my	 personal	 role	 in	 the	
inves_ga_on	is	more	impacul	than	I	an_cipated.	It	seems	that	I	am,	myself,	part	of	
this	 intergenera_onal	 struggle	 of	 coming	 to	 terms	 with	 the	 past.	 Perhaps	 the	
suﬀering	by	those	around	me	-	friends	and	family	-	have	shaped	also	me	as	person	
and	 eventually	 led	me	on	 this	 journey	 in	 the	ﬁrst	 place.	 Conduc_ng	 this	 research	
certainly	 confronted	me	 with	 my	 own	 East	 German	 iden_ty	 and	 o`en	made	me	
wonder	what	I	would	have	done	in	a	par_cular	situa_on.	What	would	my	life	have	
been	like	if	the	wall	had	con_nued	to	exist?	What	would	have	been	my	role	in	that	
system	of	ongoing	surveillance?		
It	 can	 be	 said	 that	 my	 ﬁeldwork	 deﬁnitely	 changed	 the	 way	 I	 iden_fy	 as	 East	
German,	 as	 it	 has	 forced	 me	 to	 overcome	 my	 irra_onal	 fear	 of	 admiang	 my	
background.	I	was	able	to	shed	my	anxiety	partly	because	my	informants	indirectly	
forced	 me	 to	 admit	 where	 I	 am	 from.	 Though,	 more	 importantly	 my	 broadened	
understanding	 of	 the	 experiences	 that	 the	 people	 around	me	had	 lived	 through	 -	
the	 trauma	 and	 suﬀering	 they	 endured-	 has	 led	 me	 to	 see	 my	 own	 fears	 in	
perspec_ve.	 All	 of	 a	 sudden,	 they	 seemed	 childish	 and	 pointless.	 Hearing	 the	
incredible	stories	of	East	Germans	and	how	they	mastered	life	under	such	adverse	
condi_ons,	 also	 erased	 some	 of	my	 own	 preconcep_ons	 and	 clichés	 I	 held	 about	
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"Ossis".	 It	 showed	 me	 that	 social	 rela_onships	 were	
(and	 remain)	 very	 complex	 in	 East	 Germany.	
Perpetrators	could	turn	into	vic_ms	within	a	moment's	
no_ce	 and	 vice	 versa.	 There	 are	 no	 simple	 truths.	
Similarly,	 exploring	 the	 mo_va_ons	 of	 certain	
behaviours	 led	 me	 to	 understand	 that	 seemingly	
irra_onal	 agendas	 made	 a	 lot	 more	 sense	 once	 one	
knew	 what	 a	 person	 had	 lived	 through	 in	 the	 Nazi	
regime	and	Second	World	War.		
Addi_onally,	 becoming	 aware	 of	 the	 necessity	 of	 this	 research—that	 is,	 knowing	
that	 there	 are	 s_ll	 so	 many	 unanswered	 ques_ons—gave	 me	 conﬁdence	 in	 the	
necessity	 of	 my	 own	 work,	 but	 also	 in	 my	 role	 as	 a	 "parSal	 insider"	 and	
anthropologist.	Without	 a	 doubt,	 it	 is	 my	 wish	 to	 con_nue	my	 engagement	 with	
researching	 East	 Germany	 in	 the	 future,	 as	 I	 feel	 that	 this	 study	 has	 merely	
scratched	 the	 surface	 of	 the	 many	 themes	 and	 issues,	 which	 may	 help	 us	
understand	surveillance,	state-control	and	its	impact	on	wellbeing.	
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Appendix:	
Photos	in	order	of	appearance:	
	
1) View	from	my	home	in	East	Berlin	(1989)	
2) Bautzen	Prison	Memorial	(2016)	
3) Shelves	of	Records	at	the	Stasi	File	Archive	in	Berlin	(2014)		
4) Stasi	File	Archive	–	Department	for	searching	for	records,	for	example	via	
addresses	or	names	(2016)	
5) Sample	Agreement	to	provide	services	for	the	MfS	(2016)	
6) Sample	Stasi	Report	(BStU)	(2016)	
7) Bal_c	Seaside	Town	Bansin	(2015)		
8) Van	parked	in	Berlin	displaying	various	ﬂags	in	the	windows	(including	GDR	
and	the	German	Reich)		
9) 	Polaroid	photo	taken	of	my	family	and	I	on	our	ﬁrst	visit	to	West	Berlin	
(1989)	(with	permission).	
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